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The member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely; the Kingdom of 
Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been moving towards more 
economic integration while taking practical steps in the direction of market opening and 
liberalisation. Over the past ten years, the GCC has evolved into a more integrated economic 
zone with agreed common policies that are coordinated through its Secretariat. With respect 
to service utilities, the GCC Interconnection Grid – nearing completion in 2011 – is 
considered a milestone in the direction of integrating GCC electricity markets. 
 
The objective of this research is to suggest a GCC-wide policy to support reform of GCC 
electricity markets. The suggested policy would include new market structure(s) as well as 
institutional changes supported - when required - by sector specific laws and regulations. 
Further to the study’s academic contributions, the research is primarily intended to advance 
the further development of the economies of GCC member states. The study presents a model 
that we believe could contribute to expediting the process of developing the GCC zone as a 
common market by advising policy makers on the applicable elements of GCC electricity 
market structure, governance and performance.  
 
This study provides a comprehensive review of the theoretical aspects of electricity sector 
restructuring and examines different options for reform and restructuring based on worldwide 
experiences. The study adopts a case study research method to analyse the GCC situation in 
order to arrive at the recommended policy or ‘model’. The research specifically emphasises 
reforms that have already taken place in the Sultanate of Oman – for which an empirical 
social cost benefit analysis is carried out - and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (UAE). Oman and 
Abu Dhabi are believed to be at more advanced stages of electricity market reform compared 
to other countries within the region.  
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The study concludes that while some GCC member states have already taken the initial steps 
to restructure their respective electricity markets, other members are expected to follow. The 
study recommends a set of common steps or ‘rules’ that are presented in the form of a 
‘model’ for restructuring GCC electricity markets. The proposed model for reform takes into 
consideration the nature of member states’ economies as well as the restrictions imposed by 
market size limitations and some other considerations that are a feature of prevailing policies 
in the region - such as commitments to subsidise consumer electricity tariffs.  Since not all 
GCC member states are on an equal footing in terms of economy-size and preparation for 
structural reform, the suggested model allows for a transition mechanism. The study 
recommends that the electricity markets are unbundled before embarking on any further 
privatisation programmes. Further measures of wholesale competition may be then 
introduced allowing for a mix of both private and state-ownership through the use of a single-
buyer model. Subsequently, activities that have natural monopoly characteristics such as 
transmission and distribution are to be separated and subject to incentive based regulation. 
 
The study recommends that the role of the GCC Interconnection Authority be restricted to 
transmission and system operations only and that each member state should have its own 
independent regulator. The study suggests that the GCC Secretariat play a co-ordination role 
between the different regulators while a separate power-exchange instrument be introduced to 
facilitate cross-border electricity trading between GCC member states. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an economic zone made up of six sovereign states. 
Over the last two decades, GCC member states have witnessed strong economic growth 
capitalising on the revenues from oil and natural gas exports. Moreover, the member states of 
the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been moving towards 
more economic integration while diversifying their hydrocarbon-dependant economies.  
 
According to Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
‘Significant progress toward regional integration in the GCC has already been achieved 
through the elimination of barriers to free movement of goods, services, capital and national 
labour, and a common external tariff. Although some important differences have emerged in 
members' positions on the progress toward the monetary union, there is considerable 
momentum among the members to form the union. Deep political commitments provide the 
necessary environment to pursue an accelerated implementation of the remaining steps, 
including a formal agreement on the convergence criteria, establishment of a common market 
and customs union by 2008, and putting in place the necessary institutional framework and 
infrastructure’ (IMF Press Release No. 07/243, 2007).  
 
The GCC has progressed into a Custom Union, however; even with such optimistic views 
from the IMF, later parts of this research reveal that not all member countries are in favour of 
a Monetary Union. Further, it is less likely that the GCC economic zone will develop into a 
fully integrated single market like the Euro zone or a developed common market without the 
monetary commitments like the European Union. Nevertheless, it is now evident that GCC 
member states – with some moving faster than others - are choosing to diversify their 
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economies and move towards market liberalisation and service sector reform. Moreover, the 
current state of economic integration suggests that the GCC is moving towards a more 
advanced stage of integration than that of the less-binding form of regional integration 
achieved by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
 
Greater GCC regional integration among the six member states is also being pursued in the 
context of their membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). With Saudi Arabia 
being the last to join the WTO, members of the GCC are now expected to move faster 
towards decentralization and privatisation through the adaptation of economic reforms that 
are usually associated with market opening. Being full members of the WTO, the GCC - as a 
region - is also expected to undergo a new round of WTO negotiations which is a process that 
entails more group commitments towards further market opening including increased levels 
of transparency and economic reforms. Hence, this process should result in more regional 
market-harmonisation vis-à-vis a unified trading approach with the outside world. Moreover, 
based on the experience of the EU alone we must realize that the issue of increasing 
economic integration within a free trade-zone typically leads to more stringent discussions of 
‘macro-economic’ issues. The harmonization of competition policy, environmental law and 
electricity market rules are good examples of this.  
 
Needless-to-say, greater economic integration has significant microeconomic implications 
that may include, but are not limited to, structural adjustments required within participating 
economies to accommodate and respond to greater integration, changes in the level and 
distribution of welfare and the important question of whether resource allocation can be 
improved as a result of the policy. In short, the process of economic integration for a given 
free trade-zone requires an array of macro as well as micro-economic reforms within the 
participating member states.   
 
A GCC-wide economic reform policy raises important economic issues that can be evaluated 
at the micro level. The political conditions are necessary (but not sufficient) to allow for the 
successful implementation of a GCC-wide policy. The economic rationale, particularly for 
market reforms including privatisation, requires the genuine transfer of certain risks from the 
public to the private sector.  If there is no genuine risk transfer, the allocation of resources 
may be distorted and the cost of a privatisation policy may outweigh the expected benefits. 
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 3 
This is of course true at the national level as well as for integrated markets such as the GCC. 
But it is the complexity of such factors in the context of a union such as the GCC that makes 
the issue so meaningful and interesting from a research point of view. A poorly implemented 
regulatory infrastructure can damage welfare and leave those participating worse off. For 
example, deregulation can only work if the conditions or ‘rules of the game’ are understood 
and properly implemented, particularly by the participating governments.  Wamukonya 
(2003, p.7) believes that ‘reform has been designed to mainly address economic and, in 
particular, financial concerns, with insufficient consideration for social and environmental 
issues’. The issue to be discussed is not whether deregulation as a policy works; this has been 
amply demonstrated elsewhere, but how could the GCC accommodate the economic, social 
and political constraints within a given reform policy? 
 
GCC electricity markets are suitable candidate for reform. Over the past two decades, many 
countries have already chosen to liberalise their electricity markets by unbundling the 
previously viewed vertically integrated natural monopoly. Others that have shown interest in 
following such reform are driven by expectations that market opening would increase 
efficiency, promote more competitive use of capital - usually driven by private investments - 
and may lead to technological advances.  Similarly, in the GCC region, some governments 
have taken practical steps towards liberalising their respective electricity markets. The 
Sultanate of Oman and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi of the UAE are two good examples of such 
progressive change. The GCC Interconnection Grid may also be considered as a milestone in 
bringing closer the integration of GCC electricity markets.  
 
However, in order to establish the basis for genuine GCC-wide economic reforms - including 
the electricity sector reform - we must first discus a number of political and institutional 
considerations. Hence, taking into consideration that ‘electricity’ is vital for driving forward 
development and economic diversification, this research will propose a reform ‘package’ 
only once the applicability of such change is properly questioned.  The research, therefore, 
needs to answer a set of questions. Could a region-wide electricity-market-policy be 
implemented under the present GCC mandate?  Or, would some degree of institutional 
change, new protocols or amendments be required? Even in the absence of such mandates, 
could we introduce the basis for a common GCC utility regulatory framework? More 
specifically, are the GCC member states in a position to establish a GCC reform-policy 
including the legislation and institutions required to restructure electricity markets?  On the 
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other hand, could sector-specific legislation - already introduced by members like Oman, the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi and in part by Saudi Arabia - pave the way for wider GCC-wide 
electricity reform?    
 
One of the main objectives of this research is to propose a GCC-wide policy in the form of a 
set of guidelines for reform and restructuring of GCC member state electricity markets. 
  
1.2 Research Problem 
 
The idea of privatisation has been around for many years. In recent years, governments 
around the world rallied for the transfer of the state-owned assets to the hands of the private 
sector. Ownership transfer should be accompanied by genuine risk transfer in order for the 
policy to yield more economic benefits. Most particular to service utilities like electricity, the 
seemingly straightforward choice to privatise is made more complex by the monopolistic 
nature of the utility networks (transmission, distribution). Here, the scope for competition and 
the choices to privatise, regulate or deregulate the different segments of vertically integrated 
utilities need to be subjected to more scrutiny based on some economic criteria. 
 
This research investigates the possibility of advising a GCC-wide reform policy for member 
state electricity markets. Here, the key aspect would be the transfer of risk from the public to 
the private sector in a manner that protects consumer interests, allows for market competition 
withstanding market power
1
, promotes efficiency and attracts investor interest.  
 
Ideally, the intended GCC-wide policy and market structure might be based on – whenever 
possible - ‘limited-interference’ by government(s) in the affairs of the reformed service 
utility.  Once an entity is privatised, it must take ownership and control of a previously 
                                                 
1
 Based on Oxford Dictionary of Economics (Black, 2002, p.292), Market Power is defined as ‘An 
indefinite concept concerned with the strength of the position of the dominant firm in a market. 
Market power can be regarded as high if the dominant firm has the ability to act as a price leader, if it 
can dictate the conditions of sale for its products, if it is able to deter entry, or if it can make 
persistently super-normal profits’.  
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public-sector entity and accept all the associated risks (and rewards). Subject to the private 
entity delivering the services to the required standards and quality, the government would be 
advised not to appropriate profits when the private entity is successful as this would dissuade 
further private sector participation. On the other hand, the government is not required to 
provide financial support when profitability (for whatever reason) is poor.  The private entity 
is therefore subject to the disciplines of the market, supported by effective regulation 
whenever applicable, and it is these disciplines that drive incentives for and expectations of 
improved efficiency from which many of the benefits of market reforms and privatisation 
derive. Similarly, government (or governments) must refrain from interfering with activities 
and functions of the service regulatory authority (or authorities).  
 
This researcher is of the opinion that any study in the field of service-utility reforms should 
adopt a holistic view, taking into consideration the complexities induced by not only the 
economic implications of change required but also the expected social welfare change and 
political environment in which reform is to take place. Later parts of this study (primarily 
Section  3.5 and Section  3.6) will illustrate that not all ex ante measures were implemented 
(even with relatively good market-design) as politicians and state-representatives intervened 
with markets in response to political pressures due to non-favourable situations including 
economic underperformance and natural causes. The key point is that market-design must 
take into account all possible factors and find the appropriate ex post and ex ante remedies 
because once reform is implemented any further state-level intervention may lead to 
‘disastrous’ consequences involving high consumer price-spikes like in the case of California 
and lost investor interest like in the case of Argentina (to be discussed in detail in  Chapter 3). 
This research needs to take extra care when recommending a model for a GCC-wide market 
structure. Decision makers would need to understand before embarking on such reforms that 
reform is a process of change. While decision makers might understand the necessities for 
change, they must also be prepared to accept that such reforms may require the transfer of 
their ‘powers’ to new regulatory authorities with administrative and financial independence. 
It is only prior to the adaptation of such reforms that policy makers may choose over 
privatisation, regulation or deregulation. Once those decisions are negotiated, evaluated and 
finally agreed upon at the national or regional level, going back is like the act of having to 
demolish a newly constructed multi-storey building. This basic argument with regards to the 
complexities associated with the undoing of announced reforms should lead us directly to the 
significance of this chosen research.  




1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
By now, we should have established a feel for the complexity of electricity market reform. 
With respect to the focus of this particular research, there are three areas in which the 
researcher hopes the present study will make useful contributions. 
 
Firstly, the study is expected to make some contribution to academic study by evaluating the 
possibilities of establishing common rules for electricity sector reform for the developing 
economies of the GCC. In the academic arena, there is a variety of meaningful research in 
relation to the very developed utility markets within advanced economies as well as some 
good references to the experiences of the developing world. However, it is not yet clear that 
academic interest has focused on the GCC region. This study should contribute, in academic 
terms, to the rather limited electricity service utility research in the GCC and may prompt 
further research for other service utilities within the region and other regions in the 
developing world. 
 
Secondly, the study may make meaningful contributions to the economic development of the 
GCC at large. Later parts of the study illustrate that GCC member states have similar 
economic structures with varying levels of wealth, almost identical weather conditions, are at 
varying stages of development and face relatively similar economic and social challenges. 
This research may aid decision makers and the general public alike in realizing the choices 
available for electricity reforms and market opening, hence, allowing individual states to 
adopt appropriate measures in this regard. 
 
Thirdly, this research may contribute to the further development of the proposed Common 
Market of the GCC. While carefully investigating electricity market situations in each 
member state, the study puts to the test – as case studies – the electricity sector laws in Oman 
and Abu Dhabi, in order to arrive at a common set of ‘rules’ for reform. By proposing a 
GCC-wide electricity legislative and adequate market structure, the study is intended to set 
the rules for enhancing the regional-integration possibilities, and hence, deepening the 
coherence of the GCC economic zone. Such proposed GCC-wide electricity rules may be 
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further utilized for reforming other network utilities like gas, water, sewage and 
communications. 
 
1.4 Research Objective 
 
The economies of the GCC are growing at a very rapid rate, fuelled by increased oil and gas 
revenues. Over the years, each member state was able to plan its economic expansion by 
means of state funded infrastructure and encouraged private participation through monetary 
incentives. Member states have learned the importance of reducing their dependence on oil 
and gas by introducing new long-term plans for diversification and enhanced private sector 
involvement through market opening and reform. Electricity markets and services are at the 
heart of economic activity in the Gulf and elsewhere and how they are structured and 
regulated will influence future economic activity.  
     
As already mentioned, the primary objective for this research is to propose a GCC-wide 
policy for electricity market reform. In doing so, the study aims for a policy that would be 
easy to adopt by most of the member states and relevant to the GCC’s current and future 
situation. An advisable GCC-policy would need to be capable of protecting consumer 
interests, allowing for market competition, promoting efficiency, facilitating cross-border 
trade among member states while attracting investor interest to this service utility sector. 
Moreover, the research aims at proposing a market structure that would facilitate a GCC 
cross-border trading of electricity.  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
In order to arrive at a proposed reform model suitable for GCC member states, the study 
investigates different options for reform including those already implemented by other 
countries and economic zones. We acknowledge it will be important to ensure some 
consistency in the information collection, analysis and composition throughout the research 
process. Since the choices are various due to the diversity of international experiences 
including those of the GCC, a case study approach was considered appropriate for our 
research analysis as discussed next.   




The study thus investigates the prospect for a GCC-wide regulatory and institutional 
framework for electricity market reform based on sound economic principles. Based on 
Oman and Abu Dhabi case studies, the research proposes a model policy for electricity sector 
reform in the GCC. More precisely, the study investigates possible market liberalisation 
options available for the GCC member states and whether the electric wholesale segment 
may be subjected to market competition. While keeping in mind the market size limitations in 
each member state, this research is also intended to review experiences from around the 
world with respect to power sector trading arrangements from the ‘single-buyer’ model to the 
more advanced wholesale and retail forms.  Market size limitations as well as other economic 
considerations may favour the use of one model over the other. However, it is the 
researcher’s view that all options need to be investigated in order to uphold the consistency of 
this research.  Also, drawing from the work of Jones et al. (1990), Galal et al. (1994), 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997), Damsgaard and Green (2005) and others, we subject the new 
market structure in Oman to a detailed social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA). Subsequently, at 
more advanced stages of electricity market reforms, the GCC member states may consider a 
more market-based or ‘less regulated’ trading arrangement like the establishment of a GCC 
power-exchange or a pool. 
 
1.5.1 Research Approach: Using the Case Study Research Method 
 
Although it is not very common to use case studies for economic research, there are situations 
where such a method has been used. Alston (2008, p. 103) is among the advocates for the use 
of case studies in new institutional economics (NIE) as ‘they enable us to analyse both the 
determinants and consequences of institutions and institutional change’.  
 
There are several methods used for social science research including surveys, experiments 
and histories besides the use of case studies. According to Yin (2003a) there are three 
conditions for choosing a research method or strategy; (1) the kind of question asked, (2) the 
degree of focus on contemporary rather than historical events and (3) the required control 
over behavioural events. While, experiments, history and case studies answer the questions of 
how and why, only experiments and case studies focus on current events. However, 
experiments require control over behavioural events where case studies do not. Yin (2003a) 
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cites the topic of ‘decisions’ as the main focus of case studies drawn from the definition of 
Schramm (1971)  that a case study tries to clarify why a  decision or a number of decisions 
were taken and how they were implemented leading to a particular outcome. Based on Yin 
(2003a), other topics include organisations, processes, programmes, institutions and events. 
Yin (2003a, p. xiv) describes a case study of any topic to involve ‘problem definition, design, 
data collection, data analysis, and composition and reporting’.  
 
For the purpose of evaluating electricity reform and identifying a suitable policy for the GCC, 
a study must be undertaken to understand the current situation including some in-depth 
analysis of already existing reform experiences (decisions) of member states. For the purpose 
of this study, the case study research method is believed to be the most suitable approach to 
study electricity market reform in the GCC; first, the explanatory nature of this research 
requires us to address the (how) and (why) questions, second, this research focuses on 
contemporary (not historical) events which should enable the researcher to carry out some 
observatory activities including interviews with the persons involved in such cases and third, 
during the course of the study the researcher has no control over the events under study. 
  
One of the complexities of qualitative case study research is associated with the setting of the 
boundaries of the study. According to Stake (1995) social science researchers need to view 
the case as an object (a system with boundaries and working parts) rather than a process. He 
suggests that such a definition is more suitable for people and programmes rather than for 
events and processes. Furthermore, according to Yin (2003, p.23) a descriptive case study - 
answering the (how) and (why) questions - relies on a descriptive theory that ‘covers the 
scope and depth of the subject (case) being described. If you were to describe an individual, 
an organisation, or some other possible subject of a case study, where should your description 
start, and where should it end? What should your description include, and what might it 
exclude?’  
 
Having already chosen the case study research method for analysing electricity sector reform 
in the GCC, it is now essential to determine the means for setting the boundaries for this 
‘case’. Here, a ‘market-place functions’ related theory may be established to guide the 
research in its phases of defining the research problem, case study design, data collection, 
data analysis and then leading to the composition and reporting stages of the research. For 
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such purposes, our study would apply a Textbook Model developed by Professor Stephen 
Littlechild
2
 for electricity market structure and reform. The ‘Textbook Model’ used will be 
discussed in detail in  Chapter 2. The application of this model should help establish the 
‘boundaries’ of the research as well as produce a more uniform set of questions for each case 
(market) under study, and hence, produce comparable sets of findings (reports).  Figure 1 
illustrates how a case study research approach is integrated with the Textbook Model for the 
purpose of this research.  
 
Figure 1 Case Study Approach (Using the Textbook Model) 
 























1.5.2 Research Questions 
 
The major research questions in this research are: 
 
1. Is it possible to subject electricity to pure market mechanisms?  In answering this 
question the study reviews electricity markets and the applicable economic theories 
while exploring the relationship between the state (assuming responsibility for service 
availability) and the utility (as a service provider) including reform options available 
and the relevant regulation where market mechanisms do not apply; 
2. Do existing GCC legislations support a common electricity regulatory and 
institutional framework? Here, we view GCC Directives as well as the differences 
among member states that may affect the common-electricity-policy under 
investigation; 
                                                 
2
 Professor Stephen Littlechild was the first UK director general of electricity supply and head of the 
Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) from 1989-1998. 
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3. What is the current status and structure of electricity markets in the GCC member 
states? The answer to this question deals with the status of electricity market 
developments in each member state giving some emphasis to member states that are 
already reforming their electricity markets;  
4. How do the Oman and Abu Dhabi electricity reforms laws and market design 
measure up internationally? Answering this question will help establish whether such 
laws may be the basis for a common GCC policy – ultimately - as a GCC Directive; 
and  
5. Why some features of GCC electricity markets should remain unreformed? In 
answering such question by studying the cases of Oman and Abu Dhabi we are able to 
advise on the most suitable reform policies for member states - including the required 
regulation and organisational change – in order to sustain common GCC policy. 
 
1.5.3 Research Instrument 
 
The study uses a mix of secondary and primary data. The research is strengthened by 
valuable meetings and one-on-one interviews with experts and related business executives, 
and special studies. 
 
Using Secondary Data  
There is a considerable amount of theory and experience of electricity market regulatory 
reforms. Since 1978, the US Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) established the 
basics for power sector regulatory reforms. The published work on the England and Wales 
electricity pool, supplemented by the much freer arrangements of the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA) which was introduced in 2001 provide for a practical experience - 
backed by considerable amount of field research - on how market liberalisation needs to be 
complemented by appropriate legislations. Moreover, in the context of a GCC like situation, 
the researcher closely studied the information made available with respect to the electricity 
markets of the European Union (EU) and the wholesale market of the Nordic countries (Nord 
Pool) operational since 1996.  
 
The World Bank and the IMF provide information relevant to the economies of the GCC 
member states. Other information and statistics was obtained from the GCC Secretariat, the 
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Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consultancy (GOIC) and the GCC Interconnection Authority 
(GCCIA).  
 
Using Primary Data  
Due to the nature of this reforming sector, some information could not be obtained from the 
above-mentioned resources. It was necessary for the completion of this research to obtain 
some primary data from various firms and institutions like electricity transmission 
companies, regulators and responsible authorities. For the purpose of the study, the researcher 
was able to have meetings with experts, government officials, policy makers, regulatory 
authorities, and company executives.  
 
According to Zikmund (2003), a well designed questionnaire must be both relevant and 
accurate. From the start of this research, a fact finding questionnaire was specially devised 
and carefully distributed to key persons in the GCC region (Appendix 5). Although limited 
responses were received, the purpose was served as the questionnaire was designed to obtain 
primary factual information on country specific electricity laws, market structures and 
regulations. Completed questionnaires as well as related inquires and follow up were very 
useful in designing more relevant and accurate sets of questions for the interviews and group 
meetings carried out at the later stages of the research.  
 
Data Compilation and Reporting 
A number of tables were devised to incorporate information that was gathered by through the 
questionnaire and meetings and verified using annual reports and other published materials. 
The specially devised tables (illustrated in  Chapter 8) are intended to formulate a better 
understanding of electricity market and legislative environments in each member state while 




The complexity and challenges associated with utility service reforms make the subject of 
this research a difficult one. While trying to focus on the main issues, the researcher has 
encountered a number of limitations: 




- There is limited academic research for the GCC region in the area of service utility 
regulation – in general - and for the electricity sector - in particular;  
 
- Most governments in the region are currently studying the prospects of liberalising network 
utilities. Countries that have already started the reform process have little experience to share, 
while others who have commissioned market reform related studies tend to prefer not to part 
with their plans for the time being. Understanding the economic and political dimensions for 
such structural reforms, one would only be expected to demonstrate a sympathetic 
understanding to such secrecy; 
 
- Public domain information is also limited in this area of research. While some of the newly 
established service utilities continue to be state-owned and are not subjected to detailed 
public reviews, other newly privatised (mostly public listed companies) while required to 
publish some information (such as audited financial statements) others prefer to shield certain 
information (especially that relevant to costs of production, delivery, profit breakdown, 
technical operation and expansion strategies) on grounds of commercial sensitivity.  While 
we note that the Oman regulator publishes comprehensive annual reports, the two other 
regulators publish reasonably informative annual reports; 
 
- The researcher is currently a senior public servant in the Omani government with previous 
and current duties including the planning and implementation of government policy. It is 
sometimes challenging for others to understand that information gathered by interviews and 
questionnaires is strictly intended for the purpose of this academic work. Moreover, the 
researcher needed to take extra care that feedback and findings are not to be influenced or 
‘biased’ by the researcher’s own experience;  
 
- While this research is focused on electricity, it is importance to take into account that most 
GCC regulations tend to combine electricity with water due to the fact that water is 
simultaneously produced with electricity (through combined cycle electricity generation and 
water desalinisation plants). This research acknowledges a close relationship between water 
and electricity regulation in the GCC situation, however; this study is restricted to electricity 
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markets. For a variety of considerations identified in this research, associated water 
production should have very minimum consequences – if any – on the subject of this 
research;   
 
- In order to keep this research more focussed to market related reforms, the research does not 
cover regulations for renewable energy or the environmental aspects of regulatory reform. 
This must not underestimate the relevance and importance of such issues at both regional and 
international levels.   Accordingly, the research does not cover the aspects and implications of 
the future of nuclear, although discussions have already started and there may be potential for 
GCC member states to utilise nuclear energy ((Doukas et al, 2006 and Patlitzianas et al, 
2006); and  
 
- Similarly, while the research touches on some existing and future GCC electricity grid-
interconnections, the research does not cover the technicalities of interconnections nor does 
the research investigate any cross-border trades and/or limitations of GCC interconnections. 
 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
 
 Chapter 1 mainly gives an overall background of the study, introduces related concepts and 
states the research problem. 
 
 Chapter 2 examines the relevant literature and economic theory and discusses the relationship 
between privatisation and reform, and explores the notion of regulatory reform while 
providing a comparison between the concepts of regulation versus deregulation.  The chapter 
also discusses electricity markets and underlines the options for power sector reforms 
emphasising a specific ‘Textbook Model’ for restructuring and competition.  
 
 Chapter 3 represents a ‘gathering’ of worldwide relevant experiences in power sector 
reforms. The chapter provides an insight into the experiences of England and Wales, the 
Nordic Market, the European Union (EU), the US market and some relevant experiences 
from developing countries such as: Thailand, Pakistan, Chile, Argentina and Brazil. 




 Chapter 4 introduces the GCC by examining the region’s overall economic integration legal 
and institutional framework. This chapter also provides an overview of the respective 
economies of each member state as well as some indicators and cross-country comparisons. 
The chapter also looks at the electricity sector situation in the GCC as well as the prospects 
for the partially completed GCC Interconnection Grid. The chapter also studies the need for 
GCC power sector reforms and the possibilities of establishing a GCC-wide regulatory 
framework. More specifically, the chapter examines the necessity for an enlarged market for 
electricity and the state of readiness for market liberalisation in each member state.  
 
 Chapter 5 studies electricity sector reform in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (of the UAE). Here, 
the research presents background information on Abu Dhabi’s electricity sector, the laws 
applied and relevant market structure after unbundling. 
 
 Chapter 6 is a case study of the Omani electricity sector reforms. The chapter discusses the 
Omani law, how restructuring was initiated and the limited role of privatisation in the reform 
process. 
  
 Chapter 7 presents a social cost benefit analysis (SCBA) of electricity market reform in 
Oman.  Our SCBA tests whether Oman has benefited from its reforms compared to 
continuation of the previously government owned, vertically integrated market structure.  
 
 Chapter 8 presents the findings and implications of our research. The chapter presents an 
assessment of the current status of GCC electricity markets, applies the results of the review 
to a Textbook Model, and undertakes Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) to check if 
four electricity market models are compatible with certain GCC policy consideration.   
 
 Chapter 9 concludes the research by presenting the main recommendations. In this chapter, 
the research proposes the required degree of legislation and institutional changes in the form 
of a ‘model’ for reform.  
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Chapter 2 A Review of Conceptual Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews economic theory and related concepts to establish a basis for 
recommendations for electricity market reform.  We start by identifying the properties and 
assumptions of the ideal market paradigm of perfect competition and investigate the 
relationship between perfect competition and our preferred standard of social welfare.  More 
specific to electricity market reforms, we compare four possible market structures and subject 
them to critical scrutiny against the proposed welfare standard. Using the principles of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE), we consider each of the market structures in terms of their 
economic properties and the potential behaviour of market players within each market 
structure. We then present details of a ‘textbook model’ for restructuring electricity markets 
and combine its practical guidelines with economic theory to establish a rigorous basis for 
our recommendations to GCC governments on electricity market reform.  The need for on-
going regulation of transmission and distribution functions leads on to a discussion of 
regulation and the required scope of functions and status of regulatory authorities. We also 
discuss how private ownership raises issues for market design and regulation.  
 
2.2 Economic Considerations 
 
Economic theory identifies a particular market paradigm that can, subject to certain 
underlying assumptions, maximise total social welfare. Listing the assumptions on which the 
competitive market paradigm is based will allow us to investigate whether these assumptions 
would apply in all market structures, and thereby, assess the welfare properties of different 
market structures.  
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2.2.1 Perfect Competition and Social Welfare  
 
According to Bailey (1995, p. 18), ‘in perfectly competitive market conditions, firms have to 
be as competitive as possible, buying all their inputs at lowest possible cost (economy), using 
them to maximise output (productive efficiency), and selling them for a price that only just 
allows the firm to remain in business (i.e. ‘normal profits’)’. Moreover, ‘since all consumers 
purchase those outputs in accordance with their personal preferences and finances, then 
output is automatically allocated so as to maximise utility. No rearrangement of production or 
consumption is possible that will increase economic welfare for given sets of production 
conditions and personal preferences’ (ibid).   This is an important point as it highlights the 
fact that the possibility of Pareto optimum requires markets to be perfectly competitive.  
 
However, having suggested that perfectly competitive markets can maximise welfare (the 
sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus), we acknowledge that under certain 
conditions markets may fail. Examples of market failures as identified by Stiglitz (2000) 
include: (i) failures of competition due to market concentration where some firms can 
influence price such that prices do not reflect marginal costs or the occurrence of natural 
monopoly – a situation where a single firm can supply a market at a lower cost than several 
firms; (ii) externalities (positive or negative), situations where the full costs and benefits of 
consumption of a good is not reflected in its price; (iii) where the market is incomplete (for 
example when a market fails to provide a good or service even though the cost of provision is 
less than what consumers are willing to pay); (iv) imperfect information; (v) pure public 
goods, these are goods that have a zero marginal cost and where it is impossible to exclude 
individual consumers from its consumption. Understanding why markets sometimes fail is 
important as market failures can provide justification for government intervention, something 
that is particularly important for this research when developing policy recommendations for 
restructuring GCC electricity markets.  
 
From micro economic theory, we note that there are two elements to an assessment of total 
welfare: consumer welfare and producer welfare (surplus). In a perfectly competitive market, 
where price equals marginal cost, total welfare is maximised (as the sum of producer and 
consumer surplus is maximised). When price does not equal marginal cost (in situations of 
market failure), however, focussing on consumer surplus alone would overlook the change in 
producer surplus following a change in price and therefore provide an incomplete assessment 
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of the change in total welfare. There might be pressure to set prices at too low level. Hence, 
‘it follows that other things being equal, an increase of the price at which goods are sold 
reduces consumer surplus and increases producer surplus. It turns out, however, that in 
general as the price increases, the increase in profits made by the firms does not compensate 
for the reduction in the consumer surplus. Hence, welfare is lowest when the market price 
equals the monopoly price (the highest price firms might want to charge), and highest when it 
equals marginal costs of production’ (Motta, 2009, p.18).  
 
As one aim of this thesis is to develop recommendations for GCC governments to restructure 
their electricity markets, it is necessary to establish a clear rationale for our policy proposals. 
In the context of GCC electricity market restructuring, our recommendation will be to adopt a 
welfare standard defined as the maximisation of consumer and producer surplus. 
 
2.2.2 The Use of Marginal Cost Pricing 
 
Thus far we have noted the importance of marginal cost pricing.  William Vickery explained 
that ‘We can speak of a “rule” that, to produce an optimum allocation of resources, the prices 
of all goods and services actually being produced must be set uniformly equal to their 
respective marginal costs’3 (Arnott et al, 1994, p. 216).  
 
The application of marginal-cost pricing can sometimes be difficult to implement. First, if 
there are decreasing-costs of scale, a choice has to be made whether to operate at high levels 
of output (which does not mean the lowest marginal costs) or at a subsidised best-level of 
operations (Arnott et al, 1994). Second, demand fluctuations affect marginal costs. Vickery 
(Arnott et al, 1994) argued that fluctuations in marginal costs over time may result from 
demand fluctuations for a non-storable service such as electricity.  Demand-side fluctuations 
may arise in three cases: (1) periodical or repetitive fluctuations that may be dealt with by a 
time-varying tariff called “peak-load pricing”; (2) irregular or not predictable fluctuations 
which could be dealt with using ex post measures; (3) fluctuations predictable by some 
buyers but not the sellers, at such case could be handled through “speculators’ markets”. The 
                                                 
3
 Marginal cost (MC) in power-market analysis is defined as the cost of producing the last unit (Stoft, 
2002, pp.61&448). Technically MC is the rate at which cost changes with output at a given output 
level (MC = dVC/dQ).   
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third issue relates to difficulties in estimating marginal costs for new entrants (or contracts). 
Estimating future marginal costs is complex and highly uncertain and historical costs may not 
be an appropriate basis for future prices. 
 
Marginal cost calculations are of great importance in the case of a single-buyer model (to be 
discussed later for possible GCC application), as bids are based on load charges (the cost of 
making power available) and energy charges (the cost of actual power produced). Marginal 
cost calculations are the basis for energy charges (Hunt and Shuttleworth, 1996). 
2.2.3 Analysing Market Behaviour 
 
In his book the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith uses a definite and sometimes an indefinite 
article attached to it when referring to competition. Blaug (1997) suggested that to Adam 
Smith ‘the competition with private traders’ or ‘a competition between capitals’ was a 
behavioural activity rather than a state or a situation. It is therefore; a race between two or 
more individuals to dispose surplus supplies or to acquire limited-quantity goods or services. 
This implied that ‘to compete’ would be an exercise of one’s ‘act of natural liberty’ in the 
absence of restraints or impediments. Blaug (1997, p.42) also argued that ‘monopoly did not 
imply a single seller but a situation of less than perfect factor mobility and hence inelastic 
supply; and the opposite of competition was not monopoly but cooperation’.  In other words, 
any environment that allows for a collective or ‘coordinated’ situation by market players – 
although more than one - should question the reliability of a pure market place mechanism.  
 
It was Coase (1937) who added new dimensions to the understanding of firms in his article 
the ‘Nature of the Firm’ that paved the way for further contributions to NIE by other scholars 
like Williamson (2000) who presented a framework for social or institutional analysis listing 
four levels. Level 1 is social embeddedness (including informal institutions, norms, traditions 
and customs); Level 2 is the Institutional Environment, which Williamson (2000, p. 597) also 
refers to it as ‘the formal rules of the game’ including political systems, property rights and 
related legislative, judiciary, and bureaucratic functions of the government; Level 3 is 
Governance also referred to as the ‘play of the game’ relating to institutional arrangements 
governing a given economic environment, also referred to as transaction cost economics; and 
Level 4 Resource Allocation and Employment (neoclassical economics/ principal-agent 
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theory) which relates to how economies operate and the consequences of market failures like 
monopoly. 
 
After Coase (1937), many NIE scholars analysed the firm in terms of relevant contractual 
and institutional arrangements. Garrouste and Saussier (2008) view the firm as a collection 
of assets and internal incentive mechanisms, where knowledge is built internally or bought on 
the market (through an exchange of property rights). Understanding the firm is important to 
this research as it helps highlight the implications of unbundling in terms of transactions costs 
and the cost implications of introducing new structures and institution and the relationships 
between market participants (principal-agent relationships).  A firm can be assessed in terms 
of a decision to ‘make’ or ‘buy’ goods and services.  A firm that chooses to produce its goods 
and services is described as vertically integrated (González-Díaz and Vázquez 2008).  
However, a firm would be expected to outsource the required goods and services if the cost 
of procurement is less than the cost of production.  From transaction cost economics we note, 
however, that outsourcing (or subcontracting) can be costly, for example the costs associated 
with acquiring information, negotiating terms and enforcing agreements. The magnitude of 
such costs will depend on the nature of transactions and the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms.    
 
Brousseau (2008) defines contracts as coordination tools which allow agents to allocate and 
transfer rights between one another noting that contracts do not solve all ex ante coordination 
and organisation issues, and may require ex post adjustments.  This is relevant to our research 
as we will be considering the allocation of risk and property rights and differences in 
institutional arrangements in different electricity market structures and the need for effective 
regulation.    
 
Nye (2008) stressed the complexity of institutions and implementing institutional reform, 
considering the administrative burdens and the ability to agree a common reform as well as a 
method of transition from one business environment to another. He also stated the role of the 
government in NIE is to understand the institutions and institutional change.  
 
In a market situation or ‘business environment’, competitive or ‘good’ market behaviour 
ensures that goods or services are exchanged at the lowest possible price – thereby increasing 
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consumer welfare - while manufactures or service providers maximise their profits through 
improved efficiency – by means of better employment of factors of production. However, in 
concentrated markets such as monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly and monopsony participants may 




 and Oskar Morgenstern (1974, p.13) stated that ‘When the number of 
participants becomes really great, some hope emerges that the influence of every particular 
participant will become negligible’; this is the classical condition of ‘free competition’. 
However, ‘When the number of participants –while greater than 1- is of moderate size … 
every participant is influenced by the anticipated reactions of the others to his own measures’, 
clearly a typical case of non-favourable market conditions.  
 
By means of game theory applications, economists are able to construct models that 
rationalise the behavioural aspects of a limited number of market players with conflicting 
interests (Rubinstein, 1990). Fudenberg and Tirole (1992) illustrated that both cooperative 
and non-cooperative behaviours in game theory may yield a ‘Nash equilibrium’5 outcome. In 
a game of two parties (hunters for a stag worth 4 points or 2 hares worth 1 point each) a 
cooperative behaviour yielded a Nash equilibrium outcome (one half of a stag each) without 
any of the two having an incentive to unilaterally change his strategy. Similarly, as the two 
parties suspected the other to act differently, a non-cooperative approach could also result in 
a Nash equilibrium outcome as both decided to opt for a choice of a strategy that resulted a 
gain without depriving the other party his share of the gain (a hare each). In the case of 
limited information on the game played and the expectations of each party, it is difficult to 
predict the outcome. In game theory, ‘Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that 
each player’s strategy is an optimal response to the other players’ strategies’ (Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1992). 
 
                                                 
4
 Born in 1903 (in Budapast, Hungary) John Von Neuman is considered as the most important figure 
in the early development of game theory (Osborne, 2004). 
5
 Nash equilibrium is ‘a situation in which two or more agents are taking decisions on their strategies, 
where no agent can gain by any change in their strategy given the strategies currently being pursued 
by the others. Such a non-cooperative equilibrium is usually not Pareto-optimal, and could be 
improved on by some form of co-operation’ (Black, 2002, p. 313). 
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Monopsony is also a non-favourable market condition as it concentrates buying power in a 
single entity.  Although it can be avoided, poor market design as well as special limitations of 
market size may result in situations where a single buyer operates. This is a problem more 
commonly faced by service providers rather than manufacturers. Based on John F. Nash, Jr. 
(1996), the economic situations of monopoly versus monopsony may be considered as a 
bargaining problem and therefore; be dealt with in accordingly. However – in predicting the 
outcome – Nash assumes an ideal situation where the two parties are highly rational, so that 
each can compare its respective desires precisely, that both have equal bargaining skills and 
that each has complete knowledge of the preferences of the other party. Martin J. Osborne 
(2004) explains that Nash equilibrium theory has two components; (1) the players acting 
according to the theory of rational choice, given their beliefs about the actions of other 
players, and (2) that such beliefs are correct (Osborne, 2004). However, even if accurate 
predictions may be made on the above mentioned assumptions, such assumptions are not 
easily justifiable in the case of service market design.  
 
Relevant to this research, we note that different electricity market structures involving 
different degrees of horizontal and vertical separation will have different numbers of market 
participants.  The economic benefits (welfare) derived from each market structure will be 
influenced by the behaviour and performance of market participants.  Relationships between 
market players (firms) and institutions (regulator) are typically governed by contracts that 
stipulate the obligations of each partly and the degree and nature of coordination between 
them.  Contracts may take the form of regulatory contracts such as licences or commercial 
contracts such as connection agreements and power purchase agreements.     
 
The way a market is designed and the nature of the contractual relationships assigned to 
market participants present important challenges to policy makers seeking to ensure a market 
will operate so as to maximise welfare.  NIE provides helpful insights into the ‘market 
design’ problem, contracting and the need to articulate and specify incentives that will 
motivate contract counterparties to act in ways consistent with competitive behaviour and 
thereby maximise welfare. According to Brousseau (2008, pg 39), ‘contracts are embedded 
because the institutional framework set the endowment of agents in terms of rights of 
decisions.  Not only does it fix the set of assets, of which use may be decided by agents, but it 
also delimitates these rights of decision (and therefore of contracting)’.   
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Principal-agent relationships are of particular relevance to market design. In this case, the 
relationship between the government (principal) and the management of the regulated firm 
(agent) must be governed by a set of rules. Based on Kay and Vickers (1990), the problem 
can be better viewed as that of the principal which has a set of objectives that could only be 
achieved by the agent. If the firm (the agent) has superior knowledge and different sets of 
incentives, then how could the regulator (the principal) better accomplish its objectives?  The 
set of solutions to the problem vary; for example, nationalisation - a rather severe solution – 
would be one choice to eliminate the need for regulation in anticipation that the agent ‘a state 
owned firm’ may adopt the objectives of the principal ‘the regulator’. This is not a 
‘fashionable’ choice in the economies of today and there is still no guarantee that the agent 
would adhere to the objectives of the regulator. Further, it is still questionable whether 
nationalised boards are able to determine the public interest. On the other hand, regulators 
may not necessarily follow the public interest. Another way to deal with the problem would 
be the setting up of an independent public agency or an independent regulator that is 
governed by a set of rules of conduct and with specific powers and functions (Kay and 
Vickers, 1990). Here, the regulator must still be governed by some set of rules or ‘safeguards’ 
as will be illustrated in later parts of this research in order to assure that its actions are 
primarily targeted towards the public interest.  
 
This principal-agent relationship is optimally administered when the principal (a service 
utility regulator for example) is assumed to have full information about the agent (regulated 
firm), which is not usually the case. The optimal ‘prescribed’ ex ante policy, therefore, 
requires that firms have an incentive not to deviate from the policy. Here, more precisely in a 
case of price-regulation, the relationship needs to be guided by some ex post observation of 
the previously agreed sets of prices, and ‘if the regulator “finds” that the firm had 
misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set, he can order a refund to 
consumers’ (Baron and Besanko, 1984, p. 447). More practices would usually be introduced 
to deal with the case of asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated firms.     
 
Self-regulation is also a form of dealing with principal-agent relationships, however, the 
effectiveness of self-regulation would depend on the authority and accountability (given and 
imposed) by the interested parties.  Indeed, the nature of the principal-agent relationship may 
be challenged by the possible collusion between the regulator and the firm (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988). Assumptions based on public interest theories may be altered due to such 
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collusion. Interest group pressures like shareholders and unions (on the one side) and voters 
and government demands (on the other side) may produce a multi-layered hierarchy which 
may distort the principal-agent relationship(s). Based on the UK experience - discussed in 
Section  3.2 of this research – although the RPI-X method of regulation gives considerable 
powers to the regulator, however; such power is limited by the possibility of appealing to a 
well established competition authority.     
 
There may be several principal-agent relationships within a given market situation. In well 
established democracies, a worthwhile relationship would be where people ‘the general 
public’ act as the principal while the elected government becomes the agent. Here, the policy 
measures of the government ‘the agent’ aim to please a great portion of the voters ‘the 
principal’ – especially in the short term.  Regulation, being a form of government policy, may 
therefore be greatly influenced by such relationship. 
 
2.3 Electricity Markets: Options for Power Sector Reforms6 
 
Many options exist for power sector reforms depending on each country’s economic, political 
and technical constraints.  In recent years, many ambitious electricity market reforms have 
been successfully implemented, yet some hard lessons have been learned meanwhile. 
California’s electricity restructuring programme is one of particular interest. Market 
liberalisation was also accompanied by more, not less, government intervention. Some may 
argue that these repeated interventions take a good share of the blame for what happened in 
California as analysed in detail in Section  3.5. Prices in the wholesale electricity market 
increased by 500% between 1999 and 2000 (Joskow, 2001). First, prices increased to 
$300/MWh in the first four months of 2001, about 10 times those of 1998. Then, unregulated 
wholesale suppliers stopped selling power to retailers due to credit problems which required 
federal court orders and $8 billion of tax payers’ money to avoid blackouts. A mix of 
political, regulatory and economic factors may have led to the California situation. Lessons 
learned from this experience bear witness to the fact that market liberalisation does not 
guarantee lower prices and security of supply.  Technical constraints could also hinder the 
                                                 
6
 Much of the literature in this section is drawn from the paper of ‘Electricity Deregulation in the 
OECD Countries’ by Al-Sunaidy and Green (2006).  
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progress of electricity market reforms. Although this may not have been applicable to the 
California crisis, network limitations may be exploited to gain market power (Bunn, 2003).  
 
A market needs to be defined before it is studied. For the electricity market, it is important to 
decide whether it is local, regional or national (Glynn, 1997). The market may also be 
characterised in terms of load, highest demand or consumers and their ability to pay for the 
electricity service. Moreover, a market needs to be questioned in terms of coverage. Does the 
electricity market cover gas or it is a separate ‘distinct’ one? Glynn (1997) broadly recites a 
definition – also used by the US anti-trust authorities - that if a hypothetical monopoly 
supplier of a product could find it profitable to increase the price, then such product or 
service constitutes a distinct market.  
  
However, market structure must be carefully studied when planning for new power 
legislation. A worthwhile study was the work of Andersson and Bergman (1995) in their 
investigation of the electricity market in Sweden. A model was developed for exploring the 
relationship of the number and size of firms on the supply side to the prices in the electricity 
market. The study concluded that on the basis of Swedish electricity market firm structure 
and high degree of supply side concentration, deregulation was not sufficient to ensure lower 
equilibrium prices. In fact, due to such concentration on the supply side, deregulation may 
produce higher prices. Therefore, legislation (most ideally general antimonopoly laws), must 
make it illegal for a firm with large market share to take advantage of the situation. 
Furthermore, deregulation with a split of a large company might yield a reduced market price. 
Andersson and Bergman (1995) found that it was desirable to have at least five similar-size-
firms competing in the Swedish market as their possibility to influence prices is greatly 
reduced. An increase in concentration on demand side of Swedish electricity market may be 
one method to counterweight the high degree of concentration on the supply side, for 
example, organized cooperation among consumers or the development of large wholesale 
firms. They also concluded that the integrating of Sweden and Norway may yield more 
favourable market conditions. 
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Based on the analysis of Brunekreeft (2002) of the German experience, market liberalisation 
has three aspects;  
1. Deregulation: is the removal of legal entry barriers 
2. Restructuring: is the designing of the industry so that competition may be developed in a 
sustainable way.  
3. Privatisation: is the reduction of government control on the daily operation of the firm or 
sector. 
 
On the other hand, Paul L. Joskow (2005) specified seven components as the fundamental 
steps to be taken for electricity market reforms; 
1. The vertical separation of competitive elements like generation and retail from the 
regulated elements of distribution, transmission, and system operations.  
2. The horizontal integration of transmission and network operations in order to ensure that 
wholesale market dealings are performed under the 'governance' of a single and 
independent system operator (SO), hence ensuring that supply meets demand while 
frequency, voltage and overall  system stability are maintained at all times. 
3. Establishing the required institutions for the wholesale market and the operating reserve 
market for electricity in order to allow for economic trading of electricity (dealings 
among suppliers, sellers and buyers) while maintaining the requirements of real-time 
balancing (allowing for a fast and effective reaction to any unexpected shortfalls of the 
electricity system in place). 
4. Establishing the needed institutions for facilitating access to transmission networks 
supplemented by adequate mechanisms for the efficient allocation of the limited 
transmission line capacities. 
5. The horizontal restructuring of generation, with forward contracts and rules limiting 
exposure to market power with the wholesale market.  
6. Retail tariff separation so that the prices for distribution and transmission (usually 
regulated monopolies) are distinct from prices of power suppliers and their supporting 
services.  
7.  Allowing consumers to get their power requirements directly from competing retail 
suppliers which are, on the other hand, allowed to procure their requirements from 
wholesale markets.           




In his later work, Paul L. Joskow (2006) introduced a ten-component ‘Textbook Architecture’ 
for restructuring and competition. More explicit than his previous work, this Textbook 
Architecture included the sale of state owned utilities and the introduction of adequate 
regulation if policy makers decide that market cannot be subjected to a pure competition 
mechanism. Moreover, the amendments clearly state the need for independent regulatory 
agencies. Joskow’s later additions illustrate that electricity reforms are evolving and that a 
variety of combinations may exist depending on the market structure (and its anticipated 
behaviour) for which these reform components are to be applied.        
 
From earlier parts of the research we recall, however, that in order for privatisation to yield 
meaningful economic gains, such reduction of control by the state must be complemented by 
a genuine transfer of associated risks. 
 
2.3.1 Electricity Supply Chain Functions 
 
In order to understand the suitability of different electricity market structures to country 
specific conditions it is important to understand the physical characteristics of each 
component of the electricity supply chain, including generation, system operations, 
transmission, distribution and supply.  
 
Wholesaling and retailing are trading functions, while the transmission and distribution 
functions are transport related (Hunt, 2002a). According to Hunt (2002) generation and 
distribution are the largest contributors to the final cost of the electricity supply chain. 
Generation usually accounts between 35-50% of the cost while transmission accounts for 5-
15% and distribution for 30-50%.  
 
As explained by Xu Yi-chong (2004); 1) generation is the process by which coal, nuclear 
power, gas, oil, wind, and other forms of energy is converted into electricity, 2) transmission 
consists of two functions; i. transporting electricity from a large number of generators via 
high-voltage lines (voltage is stepped-up to reduce loss over the wires), and ii. the balancing 
of  production and consumption simultaneously (which is the responsibility of the System 
Operator), 3) distribution is the transporting of electricity via low-voltage lines (after voltage 
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is stepped-down) to individual end-use consumers, and 4) the retailing functions may include 
making individual connections, meter reading and billing etc. 
 
It is also usual that competition is first introduced in the generation segment filtering through 
to the wholesaling and retailing segments of the market. However, the functions of 
transmission and distribution (primarily in small markets) are potentially natural monopolies 
and most policy makers tend to keep them regulated. The retailing elements of distribution 
(individual end-use customer connections, metering, billing etc.) are usually competitive and 
may be easily contracted out even in markets where the electricity service is a state-owned 
public utility. 
 
Transmission is a special element of the power system. In order to understand the complexity 
of market design for transmission, we need to understand some technical details about the 
way electricity ‘travels in the wires’ (Bautista et al, 2007). Transmission lines carry electric 
power between two long distance points (at high voltage to reduce power loss over the wires). 
This operation involves, never-the-less, some power losses (that requires proper 
compensations and accounting implications), as well as transmission line and voltage 
limitations (causing congestion and possibly limiting the entry to some local or regional 
generators). Such physical constraints entail congestion charge to be passed on to sellers or 
buyers and may sometimes deprive some local or regional generators from entry. The 
transmission system also requires a balancing mechanism where reserve power is purchased 
by the System Operator at varying costs to ‘top-up’ the system as voltage must be kept 
between operation maximum and minimum limits at all time. If not properly administered, 
the system may experience a partial or total black-out causing great financial and other 
undesirable losses. Consequently, transmission remains a concern for market power 
exploitation and security of supply. It is often observed that transmission remains state-
owned – but does not necessarily need to be – or somewhat state-controlled to stop 
undesirable takeovers – as justified by the government’s ‘golden shares’ of the British 
National Grid Company – at the early stages of power sector reforms (Robinson, 1996). 
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2.3.2 Electricity Market Structure Options  
 
Joskow (2005, p. 34) stated that ‘Electricity sectors almost everywhere on earth evolved with 
(primarily) vertically integrated geographic monopolies that were either publicly owned or 
subject to public regulation of prices, service obligations, major investments, financing, and 
expansion into unregulated lines of business’.  
 
Following Hunt (2002) we discuss four distinct models of electricity market structure that 
allow for varying degrees of competition.  
 
1. Vertically integrated monopoly: in this case there is no generation competition while the 
system is bundled as a state-owned industry or regulated monopoly. 
 
Figure 2 Vertically Integrated Monopoly  
 
Source: Hunt (2002, p 42) 
 
In this model (as shown in ‎Figure 2), all trading and transport related functions are carried out 
by a state-owned service utility.   Here the entity acts – in a self-regulating capacity under 
government ownership - as the ‘guardian’ of customer interests.   The market involves a very 
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limited number of institutions and participants and few if any contractual arrangements due to 
the vertically integrated nature of the electricity functions.  
 
2.  Single-buyer model: where a single-entity acts both as a monopsonist and monopolist and 
is at the centre of this market structure.  In many cases, this has been the first step of market 
liberalisation involving long-term contractual arrangements between the single-buyer and the 
various IPPs.   
 
Figure 3 Single-buyer Model    
 
Source: Hunt (2002, p 43) 
 
As shown in  Figure 3, this model allows for generator competition ‘to enter the market’, with 
generation separated from transmission and distribution.  This model requires new 
arrangements to govern the newly introduced institutional and contractual relationships as the 
market comprises many private and public sector entities.  Furthermore, the participation of 
private sector entities raises a question about the appropriate form of regulation and its 
independence. 
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3. Wholesale Competition: allows for full competition in generation and allows a limited 
number of large customers to choose to be supplied by a generator.  
 
Figure 4 Wholesale Competition  
 
Source: Hunt (2002, p 45) 
 
 Figure 4 shows that in this model there is full competition in generation requiring full details 
of the market rules and regulations to be specified ex-ante.  The generation market is subject 
to higher transaction costs as - unlike the single-buyer model - before making market entry 
investments IPPs have to search for and contract with a sufficient number of distributors 
and/or customers to ensure cost recovery.  There is also a requirement with this market 
structure for more extensive regulation to safeguard the interests of customers who can 
transact with privately owned generators.  Moreover, it would be important to ensure that a 
market subject to wholesale competition was large enough to sustain enough participants to 
guard against concentration and collusion. 
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4. Retail Competition: according to Bacon and Besant-Jones (2002) – and as discussed above 
– while the previous three market structures can be categorised in accordance with increasing 
degrees of competition, it is only through retail competition that customers are optimally able 
to choose freely their suppliers. 
 
Figure 5 Retail Competition  
 
Source: Hunt (2002, p 54) 
 
According to  Figure 5, there is full competition in the generation and retail activities, and so 
provided the market is large enough to prevent concentration and collusion, we would expect 
this model to offer higher economic welfare than the previous three market models.  
 
In principle and following on from the above analysis, generation and supply are two 
elements of the electricity supply chain that could be subjected to full competition.  However, 
subjecting generation and supply to competition may be constrained by possible market 
failures, due to market size limitations and concentration. Transmission is a natural monopoly 
and distribution is widely regarded as having natural monopoly characterises (Hunt, 2002).   
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Thus far we reviewed a number of possible electricity market structures and noted differences 
in the scope for competition that will influence each markets potential to improve social 
welfare.  For the purpose of this research we use Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis 
(MCDA) to select the model most suitable for GCC electricity market reform. This method of 
analysis – drawn from the basis of Value Tree Analysis – can be put to practical use for 
public policy problems. Through the use of MCDA, policy makers may be informed on 
adequate decisions after comparing a set of alternative choices (HUT Systems Analysis 
Laboratory, 2009). More specific to this study, this method of analysis tests each of four 
models of electricity reform on the basis of a number of criteria set by this researcher. 
Furthermore, in order for us to better understand the practical applications of each model, 
 Chapter 3 reviews worldwide experience of implementing IPP, wholesale and retail 
competition based reforms.   
 
To further support model selection, the research applies social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) 
to the Omani case study.   According to Brent (2006), SCBA widens the scope of analysis to 
include other effects of the project on all individuals in the society. More relevant to our 
research, cost-benefit analysis has been used to evaluate public divestiture policy by 
evaluating the net gains (loses) as a result of privatisation (or reform) for all parties involved. 
Our use of SCBA in  Chapter 7 draws on work already carried out by Jones et al. (1990), 
Galal et al. (1994), Newbery and Pollitt (1997), Damsgaard and Green (2005) and Green and 
McDaniel (1998). 
 
2.3.3 A “Textbook Model” for Restructuring and Competition 
 
Professor Stephen Littlechild, the first UK electricity regulator, has summarised reform in a 
‘Textbook Model’ for Restructuring and Competition which he also referred to as the 
‘standard model’ (Littlechild, 2006). This Textbook Model is made of 10 components for 
reforming the electricity service utility: 
 Privatisation in order to increase performance levels and reduce state intervention, 
 Vertical separation to separate the competitive segments of the market (like 
generation) from the regulated activities (like transmission and distribution),  
 Horizontal restructuring so that there are adequate numbers of competing suppliers 
service providers,  
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 Designation of an independent system operator (ISO) in order to guarantee network 
stability and encourage competition,  
 Creation of markets and trading arrangements in order to facilitate trade transactions 
and to provide for system real-time balancing arrangements, 
 Application of regulatory rules for transmission network access on a non-
discriminatory basis so that all generators are allowed to compete on equal grounds,  
 Unbundling of retail tariffs to promote competition at retail level by enabling access 
to distribution networks,   
 Specification of customer supply arrangements in the absence of retail competition,   
 Creation of an independent regulatory authority, with enabling powers and adequate 
human and financial resources in order to be able to administer its primary roles of 
incentive regulation and the promotion of competition, and, 
 Provision of transition mechanisms that facilitate a smooth reform process while 
responding to any obstructions that might be encountered (after Littlechild, 2006, p. 
xvii). 
 
Littlechild argues that the Textbook Model must be complemented by a ‘do nothing more’ 
component as government agencies seem to be tempted to over-regulate service utilities.  
 
In comparison to that of Joskow (2005) and Brunekreeft (2002), Littlechild’s presentation of 
the Textbook Model proves to be more elaborate with less overlap between the different 
components for reform. Therefore, for the purpose of this research, we have used Littlechild’s 
Textbook Model to cross-check the reforms undertaken internationally and to examine the 
scope for reforming GCC electricity markets, and specifically to inform the case studies of 
electricity reform and market restructuring in Oman and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. By 
applying this model, the researcher aims to obtain higher consistency in this investigation and 
optimally arrive at a set of applicable regulatory and market reform recommendations for the 
GCC member states.   
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2.4 Regulating  Electricity Functions 
 
 
In its simplest forms, to regulate – which is a government function – would be to impose 
some elements of control over the activities and of a given private or public enterprise. 
Regulation is, therefore, an act of some interference by the state and need not be imposed if it 
can be replaced effectively by other means of market mechanism. Based on Reiche et al, 
(2006), there are four basic principles to be followed in order for regulation to be effective. 
First, is to adopt simple regulations that minimise costs on both regulator and the regulated 
enterprise. Information requirements should be kept to a minimum while regulatory reviews 
should be as infrequent as possible; second, regulators should be encouraged to delegate their 
tasks to other relevant government or non-government organisation whenever possible, for 
example by subcontracting its original tasks to local regulators if no conflict of interest is 
envisaged; third, the regulator should be flexible. Legislation should allow regulators to 
respond as they believe appropriate to situations as they arise; and fourth, regulation must 
ensure that standards are realistic and affordable and can easily be monitored and enforced. 
Box 1 lists four important questions relevant to regulatory design. 
 
Box 1 Basic design questions for regulation 
1. Jurisdiction: What entities should be regulated? 
2. Coverage: What activities or parameters should be regulated? 
3. Method: How regulation is implemented? 
4. Responsibility: Who should perform regulation? 
 
Source: Reiche et al (2006, p.13) 
 
While too little flexibility may hinder the functionality of a regulator, too much flexibility is 
not to be given without caution. Depending on the organisational structure of the regulatory 
authority, too much flexibility may result in excessive use of regulatory power especially if 
decisions are dominated by an individual rather that a board of directors. Furthermore, some 
regulators - although established as independent bodies – are not entirely free from political 
and commercial pressures.  
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2.4.1 Regulation, Deregulation and Liberalisation 
 
Stoft (2002, pp8-9) argues that ‘Deregulation requires the market not be a strong natural 
monopoly. If a monopolist can produce power at significantly lower cost than the best 
competitive market, then deregulation makes little sense. ‘Deregulation means ceasing to 
regulate’ (Hunt, 2002a, p.15).  In the absence of economic justification for reforms, keeping 
the status quo becomes the inevitable choice for policy makers. In other words, regulated 
activities continue to be regulated. On the other hand, a prerequisite for choosing 
deregulation would be the prior examination of the prevailing and expected market 
mechanisms. Policy makers need to be convinced that the proposed system would have 
enough elements of competition and transparency so that it is guarded from the possible use 
of excessive market power. With this regard, we need to investigate two distinct arguments 
adding to the complexity of making a choice to deregulate. First, due to economies of scale, 
natural monopolies should be capable of delivering services at the lowest possible cost. Other 
things being equal, a sensible regulation may in turn yield the best possible value for money. 
An attempt to deregulate the service utility may produce fierce competition at the start, but 
soon, much of the awaited benefits of open market reforms may vanish as larger utility 
service providers may drive the smaller competitors out of business. This may not only result 
in higher consumer prices, but also act as a natural barrier to entry causing deregulation to 
loose much of its relevancy and credibility.  
 
Based on Damsgaard and Green (2005), deregulation may be better described as re-regulation 
or liberalisation. In a more simplistic way of describing the process, it is the increase of 
market mechanism (competition) in the deregulated sector. It is assumed that within a 
deregulated market, competing firms will keep costs down as they are not guaranteed a full 
recovery of their investment, thus yielding lower prices to end-users. Another added feature 
of liberalisation is the unrestricted new entry to the sector. In order for new market players to 
survive competition, they must introduce new management styles along with new 
technologies and hopefully lower market prices.       
 
Cecilia Ugaz (2003, p.83) presented a general, yet a multidimensional view to why regulate? 
‘Utility regulation has three main objectives: to protect consumers from monopoly power 
resulting from lack of competition in the utility markets; to support investment by protecting 
investors from arbitrary action by government; and to promote economic efficiency’.   




Another argument relates to the unnecessarily frequent government interventions or use of 
regulatory authority. We may probably arrive at a conclusion at a later stage that there is no 
agreed definition for ‘free service utility market or free electricity utility market’.  It will 
become more evident in the later parts of this research that most market opening reforms 
ended up with one form of regulation or another. The argument at this point is that once 
deregulation is chosen over regulation, due to political pressures, governments would find 
themselves in a difficult position not to interfere with market mechanisms. This would again 
not only distort the market but also send the wrong long term signals about investment 
appraisal associated financial risks. In such case, the market may be better off with regulation 
than having to live with many uncertainties.  
 
Klodt (1997) provides two policy lessons with respect to the choice of regulation over 
deregulation. In the first, private monopolies require no supervision if the respective markets 
are ‘contestable’ while in the second; regulation needs to concentrate on ‘monopolistic 
bottlenecks’ without any interference with non-monopolistic parts of the market. On the basis 
of such policy, market reforms may separate the different segments of the market; while 
market design may account for regulation in areas of ‘concern’, it must be left to pure-
competition mechanisms to deal with the ‘contestable’ segments of the market. Drawing from 
the American experience of the breaking up of AT&T (a case of communication network 
natural-monopoly), Henning Klodt (1997) assumed that ‘markets may be competitive even in 
the presence of high fixed costs’. Incumbents may be ‘attacked’ by the hit-and-run 
‘contestability’ of new entrants. However, Littlechild (1997) suggested that in order to draw 
such policy from the theory of contestable markets - with the assumption of zero sunk costs - 
uncertainty arises in identifying such markets, and hence, that very few markets met the 
assumption of zero sunk costs and would be suitable for this policy to be applied.  
 
Based on the work of Kay and Vickers (1990), market power is a reason for regulation. Even 
if competition is desirable, the threat of potential market power makes it not feasible to 
deregulate the market. Illustrated in  Figure 6, while the typical case for competition is both 
feasible and desirable, the three cases of market failure are where competition is:  
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1. Feasible but not desirable: this is a case where the benefits of economies of scale of 
limited market player(s) overweigh the choice of induced market competition. A good 
example would be in the case of a contestable market where sustainability
7
 is 
questionable (Littlechild, 1997). If, in a contestable market, the incumbent’s fear of new 
entrants’ competition keeps prices at levels near to costs, then such theory of contestable 
markets shows how potential entry would discipline the market. However, ‘cream-
skimming’ is a cause of concern that makes deregulation undesirable. In the absence of 
entry regulation, new entrants may seize certain opportunities to only compete with the 
incumbent in profitable segments of the market, and hence, regulation may include 
market entry restrictions; 
2. Desirable but not feasible: in which case regulation is necessary to offset market 
misbehaviours like in the cases of monopoly, monopsony, etc.  
3. Not-desirable and not feasible: this is the case of natural monopolies where market power 
exploitation is very likely and market conditions do not support competitive behaviour. 
 
Figure 6 Desirable and Feasible Competition 




















Typical case  Cream skimming 
N
o
 Dominant incumbent(s) prevents 
entry 
Severe natural monopoly 
Source: Kay and Vickers (1990, p. 227) 
 
 
Natural Monopolies is a case where competition is not feasible and regulation is required.  Xu 
Yi-chong (2004, p.14) assumes at least five products of natural monopoly trends. First, the 
industry or service is capital intensive, and therefore, imposing financial difficulties for new 
entrants. Second, the product or service is recognized as a necessity, and in such a case, any 
failure may cause a wide spread and non- tolerable impact to the general public. We may 
assume here that, more than economists, politicians are expected to rally for regulation. 
                                                 
7
 A sustainable natural monopoly is one where there is a set of prices at which the incumbent can meet 
market demand while covering its costs, and no entrant can cover the cost of meeting part of such 
demand. An unsustainable natural monopoly is one where no such set of prices exist. 
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Third, the commodity is non-storable. It is to be noted that this is a common feature among 
the different service utilities like electricity
8
, telephony and railway. However, some elements 
of such non-storable service industry may be separated and, therefore, be subjected to 
competition. The later stages of this research show that by vertical disintegration some parts 
of the electricity service utility can be 'unbundled' and may be subjected to market 
competition mechanisms. Fourth, the service can only be produced in favourable locations. 
We must add that some situations challenged by environment and geological and 
geographical constraints. More than any other service, this is very noticeable in the case of 
electricity transmission. Fifth, the service involves direct connections to customers. Many 
legal and administrative complexities are associated with this attribute of monopoly trends. 
 
However, deregulation just like regulation has its own cost implications. Some hidden costs 
of deregulation that are sometimes overlooked by policy makers come from the fact that 
‘deregulation’ comes with a new set of bureaucracies. For example, within few years after 
opening the power utility market in California, rules and rule-makers expanded hugely. The 
single responsibility of regulation of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) was shared, after 
market deregulation, between the PUC, the Independent System Operator (ISO), the 
California Power Exchange (PX) and a Market Surveillance Committee alongside with other 
new agencies (Palast et al, 2003). The same scenario was also seen in the United Kingdom 
(through the England and Wales electricity reforms illustrated in Section  3.2) and may be 
repeated elsewhere as part of the ‘deregulation evolution’. 
 
Moreover, the existing rules of a particular market are decisive in the level of deregulatory 
reform. Newbery argued that, most importantly, the ‘rules for market behaviour' should be set 
out before embarking regulatory reform
9
. Good market design yields less regulation and 
intervention, if any. It is almost a prerequisite to establish the right market rules and 
conditions before rushing into the phase of economic reforms. Even so, worldwide 
experience would bear witness that even with well-debated precautions taken at the stage of 
market design - usually a feature of the democracies of Europe and America – there would 
always be teething problems to deal with at the early stages of reform implementation. Russia 
                                                 
8
 Technology to store energy from electricity exists, however it is rather limited in scale while costs 
are relatively much higher than production costs.   
9
 Based on a meeting with Prof. David Newbery, Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of 
Cambridge on 28 June 2006, Cambridge, UK. 
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is probably a good example of the possible adverse effects of ‘hurrying’ in the absence of 
structural and regulatory reform. While some argue that tariffs in Russia were very low – not 
allowing to even cover the costs – others may argue that tariff increases were too sharp that 
they imposed constraints on the living standards of people and the economic development in 
general (Yi-chong, 2004). In any case, regulation must take in account two relevant elements; 
investment and pricing. Knowing that both elements are the usual responsibilities of a 
regulator, it is most unadvisable to follow the temptation of expanding on privation before 
setting the proper relevant market design – an argument well presented by Newbery above. In 
the case of Russian electricity reform, one hurdle was the non-payment problem. Cash 
collected over total amount billed was just 80%. The problem was even made worse by ‘non-
billed consumption’ (Kennedy, 2003, p. 751). Furthermore, the shock also may come years 
after the reforms are introduced, as will be observed later, in the case of the Californian 
power sector reforms. The research suggests, at a later stage, that poor market design as well 
as frequent government interventions were among the main contributors to market failure in 
California. 
 
Based on Rothwell and Gómez (2003, p. 78), ‘The economic theory of regulation maintains 
that the institutional arrangement that eventually is preferable in a regulated industry is the 
one that maximizes social welfare through minimizing social costs and maximizing social 
benefits. In some countries, it is possible that government ownership with government 
oversight maximizes welfare. However, in many countries, private ownership with 
independent regulation is better able to minimize social costs of providing electricity’.  
Among other measures, independent regulation must relate to minimising potential exposure 
to market ‘misbehaviours’ by limiting market concentration.  
 
In order for privatisation to work, the conditions need to be set in advance including post-
privatisation regulatory reforms and in order to understand the relationship between 
privatisation and the subsequent possible regulatory reforms associated with it, we need to 
establish the ownership characteristics of a private entity. The foremost feature is that shares 
are exchangeable. Although control in the private entity is a collective act, the rights to trade 
or 'exchange ownership' may be exercised individually (Ricketts, 2004). This very character 
of the private entity, if not regulated, allows for the transfer of assets from the diversified 
hands of the many to the concentrated hands of the few, a case in which there are few firms 
owning assets or a few controlling shareholders (even if the assets are divided among many 
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firms with common shareholders). If this leads to market concentration, market outcomes 
may then be influenced by the few, therefore, establishing ground for regulation as part of the 
reform process in order to minimise possibilities of collective firm actions or measures that 
may – consequently - lead to market power exploitation. On the other hand, regulation needs 
to take into consideration certain rules allowing for mergers of assets – which do not 
necessarily entail added ownership concentration – and are often associated with increasing 
efficiency or raising productivity levels and other financial and economic gains.    
 
It is then likely to expect post-privatisation regulatory reforms to be concerned with the 
possibilities of market concentration. In such case, one or a very limited number of firms take 
possession of the market. Market reforms, therefore, need to be designed in such a way that 
the incumbent - usually state-owned - is broken up into smaller entities, or separated 
(unbundled)
10
 before ownership is transferred from to privately-owned firms or individuals. 
Regulatory reforms must also be concerned here with the potentiality of future mergers and 
acquisitions.
11
 Gilardi et al (2006) argued that the time of reform is also a time of regulation. 
It should, therefore, be reasonable to assume that freer markets imply more rules and 
regulating agencies. Moreover, a link can also be established between regulation and regional 
integration. The EU is considered as a good example where an economic zone can rely on the 
use of common regulation in order to overcome its insufficient human and financial resources 
that may limit the process of integration and harmonization.   
 
It is vitally important to recognise that privatisation may be carried out successfully only if 
market conditions are correct and vice-versa an adequate market design would be required in 
order to embark on a thriving privatisation programme. Proper market design includes proper 
regulatory reforms. In this section, the research covers a range of terminologies that are most 
relevant to the market reform in general and regulatory reforms in particular. Regulatory 
reforms also involve the establishment of independent regulatory authorities. Some argue that 
such authorities give a good signal to investors. Gilardi et al (2006) explain that ‘this signal 
conveys the following message: we are serious about private investment and we assure you 
that we are committed to stable decision making’. Any reversal policies become difficult 
once such autonomous regulatory authorities are established.   
                                                 
10
 The research covers at a later stage the different forms of unbundling. 
11
 The later sections of this research cover ex post and ex ante forms of electricity regulation.  




Based on Yi-chong, (2004), market reforms are usually concerned with three categories, 
namely; ownership, the structure of the industry and the regulatory framework under which 
the new market operates. Regulatory reforms are part of a progressive process that aims at 
promoting competition thorough market mechanisms – whenever possible - along with the 
adequate regulatory mechanisms. Here, we must find a proper ‘recipe’ that allows for a 
market driven mechanism with minimal requirement for regulatory mechanisms.  
 
In the case of deregulated segments of the market, for the service utility business 
environment to work mainly on the basis of market mechanisms it would require a good 
amount of reliable and published information, a manageable market concentration, and 
minimal, if any, politically influenced decisions. (i) Information is the basic ingredient for 
market efficiency. Consumers and governments alike need to make sure that they are not 
imperfectly informed. In the case of regulated markets, government intervention is sometimes 
vital to guarantee the flow of information. State information policies must ensure that market 
is ‘moving towards the full-information equilibrium’ (Katz and Rosen, 1998, p.575). Markets 
are bound to lack efficiency in the case of asymmetric information. To deal with such a 
deficiency, governments often intervene – on behalf of consumers – by setting up consumer 
protection commissions (Breyer, 1990) or competition authorities. (ii) The degree of market 
concentration is an important factor in determining the possibilities for market efficiency. In 
the case of a market that is made up of one or few firms, such oligopolies would always be 
tempted to exploit market power. (iii) Reforms are often distorted by excessive government 
interventions. This is clearly illustrated by the consequences of state interferences in the 
reforms of California and Argentina reforms to be presented in  Chapter 3.    
 
On the other hand, when designing for regulatory mechanisms, they need to aim at increased 
efficiency while keeping the administrative cost down (Gönenç et al, 2001). One problem 
that can be envisaged is that of the principal-agent relationship. As information is not readily 
available to the principal, the contract has to include some incentives to the ‘agent’ in reward 
for its increased performance or decreased wastage of resources etc. It is then the 
responsibility of the regulatory body or ‘principal’ to include such performance-related 
incentive schemes for the ‘agent’ so that the agent will ‘behave as the principal wishes’ 
(Begg et al, 1997, p. 52).   




Over the years, economists were able to test a number of regulation mechanisms on the 
reforms of various service utilities. For network utilities like power, gas, water and telephony, 
reforms included the use of three methods: (a) the yardstick method was used at a point in 
time by regulators in Britain for the electricity and water supply industries. Here, the 
performance of other firms - for example capital requirement, profitability, costs of 
technology and other inputs - is used as a benchmark to compare that of the regulated firm 
(Gönenç et al, 2001). The firm’s regulated price is not based on that firm’s performance, but 
the industry’s average cost as a whole. While this method was seldom used in a pure form, 
cost comparisons are frequently made in method (b) incentive regulation as will be see in the 
following Chapter. Some jurisdictions still use method (c) – the rate of return method.  
 
While prices are the residual in the case of rate of return methods, profits are the residual in 
the case of incentive regulation. A comparison of these two methods can be found in later 
parts of this research on the subject of transmission regulation. 
   
Regulation must also take account of externalities both positive and negative. Once again, 
proper regulation must be designed to deal with such irregularities in the absence of free 
market mechanisms. Based on Kay and Vickers (1990, p. 226), ‘externalities arise when the 
well-being of one economic agent (consumer or firm) is directly affected by the actions of 
another’. In the case of a utility-network in rural areas, externalities may arise since high 
electricity charges might add to pressures to leave the area and move to towns, worsening 
(undesirable) rural depopulation. Here, some regulation – in the form of subsidies – may be 
desirable.  
 
One aspect of utility-regulatory reform concerns the relationship between regulation and 
competition authorities. In the case of developed economies like the UK, the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC) was established in 1948 - long before any steps were taken 
towards service-utility regulatory reforms. Before the MMC was established, it was the duty 
of common law to safeguard against any anti-competitive, market exploitation or other 
abnormal market behaviours. It was sometimes argued that regulation must not be – in the 
long-term – a replacement for competitive markets. Instead, regulatory bodies should aim at 
inducing enough competition to a sufficient extent that further involvement would not be 





, 1993). However, later parts of this research illustrate that natural 
monopolies like transmission and distribution networks require continuous attention in terms 
of regulation. Furthermore, ‘Careful consideration should be given to the initial restructuring 
of the sector, as any new structure will tend to create vested interests that may resist or 
complicate subsequent adjustments to the structure of the sector (Jamasb, 2006). 
 
2.4.2 Regulating the Wires   
 
According to Günter Knieps as cited by Debreu et al (2001, p.275), ‘As it turns out, 
government regulation of interconnection/access conditions (tariffs, quality of access, etc.) is 
only justified in those parts of networks where market power can be identified ex ante’.  
Knieps argued that characteristics of network structures are not enough to guarantee market 
power. Competition can be introduced if all existing and potential suppliers are ensured equal 
access to the network. However, a market power situation is expected to arise in the case of 
economies of scale as the relatively huge sunk costs may deter market entry and in such 
cases, the incumbent may enjoy a comparative advantage over potential entrants.  
 
From previous sections we understand that electricity transmission and distribution are 
usually considered natural monopolies. While they need not be state owned, as in the case of 
many OECD countries, they are required to be regulated. In the case of network industries, 
competition may not safeguard the market from any excessive price increases to consumers. 
The natural monopoly of electricity networks may also limit entry for small generators.  
 
Governments could choose to privatise the wires; however, regulation would still have to deal 
with the problems arising from this principal-agent relationship. ‘Here the agent, the 
regulated firm, [is] better informed than the regulatory authority about that firm’s costs of 
production, effects of certain regulatory measures on profitability and, in most cases, future 
demand forecasts’ (Gönenç et al, 2001, p. 30). In dealing with the problem, regulation must 
provide incentives that would encourage the transmission and distribution regulated-firms to 
better fulfil their part of the contract or ‘relationship’.   
                                                 
12
 Sir Sydney Lipworth was the Chairman of the UK’s Monopolies and Mergers Commission when 
the paper was presented in 1993. 




In deregulated markets transmission requires a system operator (SO) and a mechanism of 
settling differences between contractual and actual power flows. Hogan (1998) suggested that 
a bid-based spot market is required in order to ensure an open access system. While a system 
operator is essential to insure uninterrupted supply, other mechanisms may be established to 
allow for open access and a minimal level of fair competition.  
 
The System Operator (SO) 
The management of electricity systems requires generation to closely and continuously match 
demand. This is due to the fact that electricity can not easily be stored and needs to be 
consumed at the rate of which it is produced. The System Operator (SO) or Transmission 
System Operator (TSO) is therefore responsible for an integral part of the market 
infrastructure that is inherently a natural monopoly. Due to the special nature of electricity, 
one single system operator is needed to control the physical operations in each area, balance 
hourly demand and supply and coordinate with nearby areas. The main role of the SO, 
therefore, is to predict power demand for a given hour then match such demand with the bids 
received. While power is wasted by excessive supply, either too much or too little supply 
could result in a total blackout. Since this particular property of electricity requires that 
demand has to match supply at all times for the system not to be interrupted, output (both 
planned and actual) has to match loads. This is called real-time balancing which is the 
responsibility of the SO.  
 
Based on European Union Legislation (EU Directive 2003/54/EC, 2003), the Transmission 
System Operations need to be separated with the main tasks including: 
(a) ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the 
transmission of electricity; (b) contributing to security of supply: (c) managing the energy 
flows on the system including considerations for exchanges with other interconnected 
systems; (d) providing sufficient information to other operators – for the purpose of ensuring 
secure and efficient operation to other systems with which its system is interconnected; (e) 
ensuring non-discrimination as between system users; and (f) providing system users with the 
information they need for efficient access to the system. 
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Article 10 of the Directive also states that the TSO shall be independent from any activities 
not relating to transmission - at least in terms of its legal form, organisation and decision 
making.  
 
Methods of Price Regulation 
Two methods of price regulation are used to regulate different parts of the industry especially 
the wires: a price cap and a cost-based or rate-of-return regulation. Different from the cost-
based regulation, a price-cap gives an incentive for the transmission network utility to cut 
cost (Newbery, 1999). In terms of time frame, a price-cap is announced for a specified period 
of time, allowing firms to benefit from any cost cuttings, whereas rate-of-return regulation is 
designed to allow for a presumed fair return on investment, raising the price when the returns 
do not justify the investment (Green, 1997).   
 
Generally speaking, electricity transmission in the OECD is governed by a cost-based 
regulation. In this case, regulated firms can earn revenues equal to their historical costs 
including a return on investment corresponding to the cost of capital. Exceptionally, Italy, 
Norway and the United Kingdom use a price-cap regulation for electricity transmission. The 
regulator here sets a cap with an incentive factor X, to induce lower costs, for a specified 
period of time. The complexity of such regulation lies in determining the value of X over 
each period of time. As the time period between reviews becomes shorter, the ‘RPI-X’ or 
Price-cap regulation becomes closer to rate-of-return regulation (Gönenç et al, 2001).  
 
‘One the major defects of conventional rate-of-return regulation is that it makes no provision 
for distinguishing between the different sources of profit: superior performance, monopoly 
and luck’ and therefore, ‘superior performance is discouraged, and monopoly power is 
marked by inefficiency and high costs’ (Littlechild, 1983, p. 32). In search of a profit ceiling 
scheme, Littlechild argued that calculations of an RPI-X price cap regulation are simpler than 
those associated with rate-of-return calculations while they yield increased efficiency. Here, 
the cap is set using the simpler price indexes rather than calculating rates of return and 
undergoing departmental cost separation. Also cited by Armstrong et al (1994), the RPI-X 
method, according to Littlechild’s findings, yields better results in terms of: minimizing 
monopoly, increasing efficiency and innovation, lowering the load on regulators, encouraging 
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competition while it allowed the firm potential future profits and hence the sales revenue to 
the treasury.  
 
Price regulation is based on a process that is aimed at delivering the service at an appropriate 
price – neither too high or too low - so it ensures that customers’ interests are protected while 
allowing privatised entities to cover their costs including a minimum margin for profit.  Figure 
7 illustrates how prices are arrived at in a regulated service industry. Once standards are set, 
the price setting exercise then involves the evaluation of capital expenditure required, 
deciding the rate of return, while studying the financial conditions of the sector and 
examining the efficient levels of operating expenditure (Mayer, 1994). To add to the 
complexity of the exercise, cost of capital may not be determined only for the time at which 
major expenditure was incurred (both for newly installed or privatised assets). Adjustments 
should be made as cost of investment calculations may be as volatile as interest rates.  
 




Source: Mayer (1994, p. 25) 





Efficient operating costs 
Required revenues 
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A price cap is concerned with the price level but not the price structure (Bruneekreeft, 2003). 
It is therefore – in many jurisdictions - left to the regulated firm to decide such price 
structure, where the ex-ante commitment of a price level is set based on some assumptions 
until the next review is carried out. As will be seen later, some GCC electricity reforming 
markets have already chosen to apply an RPI-X price cap regulation for the regulated 
segments of the electricity service utilities.  
 
In reality, price caps are a product of forecasted costs with an adjustment for efficiency (Kay, 
1996). However, regulators would find it difficult – at a later stage – to distinguish whether 
any savings or ‘higher profits’ were due to increased efficiency or rising costs. Firms tend to 
over-estimate their cost projections while regulators may arbitrarily reduce such estimates. In 
large markets with many players, a yardstick method may be used. When asked to give his 
views on water-company regulations, Professor Littlechild found the RPI-X method would 
soon yield an outcome much nearer to that of a rate of return regulation –different from the 
case of the ever changing sector of communications. Littlechild’s recommendation was to use 
a ‘yardstick’ regulation, where X would then be based on comparative efficiency standards in 
the industry (Littlechild, 1986). Clearly, this is not an effective tool where markets are small 
and players are limited.  
 
For developing counties, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2006) argue that a rate of return regulation 
policy may be advantageous when compared to a price cap method as the adaptation of rate 
of return controls offers many advantages to developing countries: 
1. Ex-government regulatory staff (assuming it is the case for many developing 
countries) may be tempted to keep their ‘old habits’ of setting prices for state-owned 
entities equal to ‘costs’ whereas a rate of return policy should economise the industry. 
2. Investors may also be more assured since profit margins are expected to be more 
stable when a rate of return regulation is adopted.  
3. A rate of return policy should attract much of the needed international investment 
since it minimises the risks of regulatory-related uncertainties 
4. Clear policy based on actual financial-information as in the case of rate-of-return 
calculations should be more advantageous to the using price-cap benchmarks or 
‘yard-sticks’. Forecasts and benchmarks are expected to be more controversial than a 
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more ‘rigged’ cost related regulations of a rate of return method (after Parker and 
Kirkpatrick, 2006, p.201).  
 
2.4.3 Unbundling the Vertically Integrated Utility 
 
As discussed earlier, transmission wires are usually a natural monopoly. Transmission is the 
technical process of carrying electricity from one side where it is generated to the side where 
it is consumed, however, limitation of the wires constrain the movement of power and, 
therefore, could produce different prices at each location in the grid network. Such 
‘Congestion pricing’ would highly influence the overall price within a country and any cross-
border dealings. It is therefore a common practice in most OECD
13
 countries and elsewhere 
that early stage reforms start with the separation of the vertically integrated activities of 
generation and transmission.  
 
Ocaña (2001) presented four approaches to separating transmission and SO activities from 
generation namely; ‘behavioural measures’, for the first two approaches, and ‘structural 
measures’ for the second two. First, accounting separation, by which the service utility is 
charged the same cost as those connected to the grid while maintaining separate transmission 
accounts. Second, functional separation, keeping transmission related information and staff 
apart from generation and other activities of the organization. Third, operational separation, 
in which case transmission functions and related activities are totally separated from those of 
generation, yet the service utility continues to own the two parts of the business. Fourth, 
divestiture or ownership separation (as different legal entities are formed without common 
owners of major shareholdings).  
 
In the case of the OECD, different countries choose different forms of separation. For 
example, Denmark requires ‘corporate unbundling’, in practice similar to accounting 
separation, by creating separate legal entities for generation and transmission while keeping 
common ownership (Ocaña, 2001). In Sweden, it is a legal requirement to separate generation 
                                                 
13
 The Member countries of the OECD are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, Japan, Finland, Australia, 
New Zealand, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Korea, and the Slovak Republic. 
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from transmission, while in Norway and Finland, accounting and management must be 
separated (Amundsen and Bergman, 2002).  
 
Until 1991, the electricity sector in Italy was a public legal monopoly. Partly privatized in 
1999 (35%), ENEL Spa still dominates the electricity sector. Transmission is now in the 
hands of an independent system operator with both transmission and distribution regulated by 
price caps. However, ownership of transmission assets and the bulk of generations were not 
totally separated. While the SO operates and maintains the national grid, ENEL owned 93% 
of the low-voltage distribution grid (OECD Report, 2000). 
 
A point of precaution when choosing over the different unbundling scenarios would be to 
check for any lost economies of scale especially in the case of relatively smaller markets. 
 
The ‘Single Buyer’ Model as a Trading Arrangement 
‘The collective term trading arrangements denotes legal agreements between traders and the 
system operator and/or the transmission owners’ (Hunt, 2002, p.121). Further, such 
arrangements may be in the form of voluntary ‘pool based’ and/or compulsory ‘regulated’ 
trading. The Brazilian pool model (presented in Section  3.6) features a combination of both 
trading arrangements that include ‘free pool’ and ‘regulated’ purchases of power. According 
to Hunt (2002), there are short term and long-term trading arrangements:    
1. Short-term trading include (i) operational or operation codes arrangements 
which facilitate for access and short-term operation, (ii) commercial or power 
exchange codes arrangements that administrate the buying and selling of 
electricity within a particular area and (iii) interconnection arrangements that 
deal with both operational and commercial arrangements between the 
different areas. 
2. Long-term arrangements including (i) connection agreements which establish 
the relationship between operators or transmission owners and the other 
market participants on the basis of fair grounds and optimal levels of 
efficiency, (ii) transmission control agreements in the case of independent 
system operators – ISO – (separate from transmission), (iii) and the use-of-the 
systems agreements specifying the terms and charges. Hunt (2002) also states 
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that long-term arrangements must also specify the conditions of other 
ancillary service purchases
14
 between market participants as well as any 
approvals or licences that may be required.   
 
The single buyer model was first introduced in the United States by the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) with the aim of exerting competitive pressure on integrated 
utilities. Later, the model was adopted by developing countries with the aim to attract private 
sector investment into electricity generation especially in cases of expected shortages (Arizu 
et al, 2006).  Similar to many trading arrangements, this method of centralised purchasing has 
it own potential problems including the lack of transparency and accountability, high tariffs, 
excess capacity as well as possible misconducts including corruption. Although such 
problems may have been experienced in the past, the findings of Arizu et al’s (2006) study 
for the World Bank concluded that this model remains a valid option for many countries in 
the developing world. While single buyer arrangements were chosen by developing countries 
with financial constraints, other richer countries found the single buyer model more suitable 
than other wholesale competition arrangements due to market size limitations.  
 
According to Arizu et al (2006), the term of ‘single buyer’ was misinterpreted in the case of 
the developing countries and usually refers to ‘centralised purchasing arrangements’. 
According to their study many arrangements existed including the arrangement of a ‘pure’ 
single buyer where an independent single entity, generally a state-owned agency or firm, is 
responsible for the total electricity procurement and then resell to distributors and other 
retailers.  
 
A case of a vertically integrated single buyer is where a vertically integrated utility is 
responsible for all electricity purchases while still being responsible for other functions 
including generation (like in the case of Saudi Arabia to be presented in  Chapter 4). Using 
this model, competition is expected at the stage of building. Bidders have to offer most 
competitive prices at the stage of tendering or deal negotiation. Here, the buying 
arrangements are based on long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) for 15-year terms or 
more.  For countries that fall short of funding while facing increasing demands, such model 
                                                 
14
 Due to the specific nature of electricity, there are certain ancillary services purchases that are 
required for operating reserves and reactive power etc. (Hunt, 2002). 
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allows for an alternative source of capital in the form of independent power producers (IPPs). 
This option was chosen by many countries with unbundled electricity service utilities also in 
charge of procurement like Pakistan and Thailand (to be presented in Section  3.6).  
 
It is worth mentioning that most IPPs were possible only due to the credibility of a state-
owned buying utility. A private wholesale buyer may still not be creditworthy and an IPP 
would only be possible with some government sovereign guaranties. In effect, while the 
integrated single buyer option provides for the needed private investment - including some 
expected efficiency gains by the private generating plants - it does not truly shift the 
investment risk to the side of the private sector. 
 
Another method is the functional separation of the unbundled single-buyer where generation 
is separated from the other utility functions including procurement. As illustrated by Arizu et 
al (2006), unbundling took place by either by means of functional and accounts separation 
(ring fencing) or by means of corporatisation (establishing separate entities). In such cases, it 
was more likely that transmission networks would be made available to all generators on a 
non-discriminatory basis, hence resulting in an increased investor confidence. Moreover, 
such an unbundled single buyer method should have allowed for smoother transition into 
further market opening and overall sector reforms.  Case studies of Oman and Abu Dhabi 
presented at later parts of this research also show that the GCC seems to be heading for a 
similar choice.     
 
Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996) stated that such arrangements of a single-purchasing agency 
require that it must be credit-worthy since it is required to sign long term contracts with the 
various generators. On the subject of ownership separation, they think that the single-buyer 
model ‘makes no substantive difference whether there is a separate transmission company or 
whether the purchasing agency and the wires are in common ownership’ (Hunt and 
Shuttleworth, 1996, pp. 47&48). Further, an added feature of this model is its ability to 
incorporate ‘social policy objectives’ in the generation bids. For example, the buying agency 
can set certain rules for the bid including the type fuel used (ibid).  
 
Drawing from worldwide experience, to be presented in detail in later parts of this research, 
we can assume that speedy market opening could result in unbearable consequences. 
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Politicians and economists alike would have to safeguard their decisions from any potential 
market failures – like the case of Brazil where insufficient investments caused power 
shortage crises, Chile where droughts, lack of coordination among generators and other 
factors attributed to blackouts and the overwhelming price-spike of California due to market 
failures. 
 
Having established that it would be necessary to regulate the network functions after 
unbundling we now turn to discuss the required scope of regulation and principles to guide 
the establishment of effective regulatory authorities.   
 
2.4.4 Regulatory Authorities 
 
The main role of the service utility regulator is to protect consumers against any service 
monopoly charging unjustifiably high prices. The regulator sets prices at levels that allow 
investors just enough or ‘fair’ returns for their investments. This is a power, Green (1999) 
argues, that needs not be given to one individual or a small regulatory authority without the 
appropriate checks and balances. ‘Effectively, the regulator has the power to confiscate assets 
belonging to the company’s shareholders by setting prices insufficient to cover the supplier’s 
costs and allow a reasonable return on the capital invested’ Green (1999, p. 1). It is therefore 
of great importance that reform legislations include provisions for appealing regulator 
decisions. Very practically, such appeals could be directed to commercial, administrative, 
supreme courts or any similar legal institutions. Needless to say, ‘a tradition of judicial 
independence and efficiency opens the governance option of using administrative tribunals to 
resolve conflicts between the government and the utility within the confines of the existing 
regulatory system’ (Levy and Spiller, 1996). 
 
As outlined by Swift
15
 (1995), the missions and objectives of the regulator’s office must be: 
independence, accountability, facilitating reconstruction, control of monopoly abuse, 
consumer protection and acting fairly. More specifically, the regulator must be judged on the 
basis of: making the right decisions, through a fair process and connected to each other by 
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 John Swift QC was appointed as the Rail Regulator in 1 December 1993 after almost a year as 
advisor to the Secretary of Sate for Transport, UK.  
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means of promoting public interest within a given timetable. Based on Swift’s own 
experience, the regulator had the following principles: a) to secure good incentives so that 
competitors may plan for better systems, b) to promote competitive structures and practices, 
c) to aid the restructuring process aiming at privatising the sector and d) to ensure the 
consumers are protected from market exploitation or market failure. 
 
In a regulated environment, a major role for the regulator is to set tariffs. This is a very 
important task, as tariffs must be set to reflect cost. In this “game of balance”, if tariffs are set 
too high then consumers are deprived from the awaited benefits of regulatory reforms. On the 
other hand, if tariffs are set too low then companies are driven out of business which may 
escalate to a market failure yielding in bankruptcies, limiting market entrants and perhaps 
resulting in even larger monopolies pressurizing the regulator to set much higher tariffs.  
 
In order for regulators to be effective, they must be independent, transparent, accountable, 
and credible as well as being equipped with the required expertise (Yi-chong, 2004). First and 
most important, independence is a key element - especially from direct state influence or 
industry lobbying. It is therefore preferable that regulators are appointed by other than the 
government department concerned. Second, transparency is required so that quality of 
business conduct and efficiency are assured. Third, accountability is equally important so 
procedures are fair, decisions and arbitrations are in accordance with laws and so that over all 
decisions are based on economic calculations. Finally, the regulatory body must have capable 
staff and expertise in order for its decisions to be credible and respected by the industry.     
 
Many developed utility markets have already established independent regulators with 
autonomous financial and administrative structures. However, most newly established 
regulatory infrastructures still use the regulatory powers of related government organizations 
and anti-monopoly commissions. In the case of the developed market of the OECD, most 
countries like Italy, Australia, Finland, the UK and the USA, the electricity transmission 
utility regulator is an independent regulatory agency. For Germany, The Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunication, Post and Railway – responsible for many 
service utilities as the name suggests - operates separately under the scope of the German 
Ministry of Economics and Technology (Federal Network Agency, 2007). For New Zealand, 
the competition authority acts as the regulator (OECD, 2001).  




In the developing world, regulator independence is not enough. According to Bakovic et al 
(2003), independent regulators fall short in making balanced decisions due to bad starting 
conditions, longer than expected transition periods, unwelcome foreign ownership and less 
firm enforcement of the law. Bakovic et al (2003) recommended that independence should be 
complemented by regulatory contracts agreed between the government and the private 
operators. Such contracts need not pre-specify prices but must cover the regulatory treatment 
in a very transparent mater. Later parts of this research review the experience of regulator 
independence in the developing countries.      
 
Parker and Kirkpatrick (2006) stated that regulators in the developing countries face 
challenges of their own. Among other issues, regulators in developing countries are often not 
able to fulfil their duties due to missing legal codes for appeal, underdeveloped competition 
policy to protect consumers, weak macroeconomic environments - with high rates of inflation 
and volatile exchanges rates - and limited regulator independence.  
   
In the absence of competition authorities, regulators are sometimes expected to act as 
competition ‘watch-dogs’. Ideally, competition authorities would be an integral part of any 
reform process. In a merchant environment, market behaviour is typically overseen by 
competition authorities to safeguard consumers from any market-power exploitation or any 
other market-inferiorities. A good example is the UK’s Competition Commission, previously 
known as the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC).  However, regulated 
environments also involve competition authorities to - rightly - play the significant role of 
appeal bodies - undermining the otherwise unlimited ‘powers’ of independent regulators.  In 
the absence of a reputable competition authority, proper market designs must offer alternative 
mechanisms like court referrals and international arbitration to work in congestion with the 
regulatory authorities. The Omani case study to be presented in  Chapter 6 should investigate 
how the law provides for such measures in the absence of a competition authority. 
 
2.5 Private Ownership and Reform 
 
S. K. Nath as cited by Ng (1983, p. 31) argued that ‘If we adopt a series of economic policies 
which make the richer group richer but have the poorer group at the same absolute level, then 
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according to a Pareto-type social welfare function … we would be necessarily raising the 
level of social welfare’.  However, could we agree that Pareto-type changes yield a positive 
net effect to the welfare of the society? In which case, economists and politicians alike could 
use such ‘off-the-shelf' arguments to defend privatisation as an 'acceptable' ingredient for 
market reform. After all, shouldn’t the society accept such a change if it makes a few 
members of the society better off while no single member of the society loses?  
 
We must not be tempted, yet, to answer with a ‘yes’. It is not the Pareto-superior principle of 
allocation (having at least one market player better off without any other player losing) we 
need to question, but its implications for social welfare and the political burden of dealing 
with such a proposition. Ng (1983, pp.31-32) argued that such positive change can only be 
assumed if ‘there is no externality in consumption…if there are external effects in 
consumption, an individual may be made worse off even if his own income stays unchanged, 
as he may have envy for the increased consumption of others, or find it difficult to keep up 
with the consumption standard of his neighbours’. 
  
From the above, it may be concluded that change should be acceptable – and may be socially 
justifiable - if it was a case of a Pareto-superior ‘reform’. However, in the case of electricity, 
a Pareto-superior outcome may only be sustained with proper compensation, which is almost 
impossible. Therefore, for the applications of developing economies, the compensation 
principle is expected to be a more relevant ‘choice’ to take. Accordingly, ‘gainers’ should be 
in a position to compensate ‘losers’ as the advantages or ‘expected gains’ from reform must 
be established so that they outweigh the disadvantages and consequently, only in cases of 
market failure should regulatory interventions be continued (or introduced) to protect the 
public interest from any potential abuse of market power. 
 
Secondly, we need to deal with the issue of reform from a political dimension. One can argue 
that politics and economics are two distinct disciplines, but they are not totally separable. 
Market reform options will involve making choices for the economy of a particular state or 
nation. However, such choices must not be made in the absence of the political will and 
consent of that particular state or nation. The later parts of this research will clearly illustrate 
– from worldwide experiences – that it is almost impossible to reverse reform once it is 
adopted as a policy without incurring significant costs. Government interventions due to 
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political pressures have often led to unfavourable market reactions and more distortions and 
price hikes.  
 
Furthermore, in order to increase efficiency and reduce costs, 'restructuring' is often a choice 
for the stage that leads the way to 'privatisation' but only with a lesser demand for political 
authority. In the case of electricity, restructuring is related to the commercial activities of 
trading energy by means of separating integrated structures of the industry while introducing 
some elements of competition. On the other hand, privatisation requires a genuine change of 
ownership and management from the state to the private sector. In some cases, as in the 
experience of the UK, electricity was privatised and restructured at the same time (Hunt and 
Shuttleworth, 1996)   
 
It is rather simplistic to assume that private ownership will be the answer to problems of 
economic efficiency and government financial short-fallings. The process is more complex 
and ‘the effects of privatisation in any particular context will be, therefore, highly dependent 
upon the wider market, regulatory and institutional environments in which it is implemented' 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1991, p.130). Privatisation or ownership reform, in a more generalized 
form, aims at increasing efficiency and financing government debts. It is however, important 
to note that while privatisation worked for the very developed market-based economies of the 
west, developing economies need to carefully study the behaviour of their respective markets 
as well as the capabilities of their capital markets before embarking on privatisation. Due to 
political implications of the ownership transfer process, governments often find themselves 
faced with the need to subsidize prices - at least at the early stages of reform - to end-use 
customers of the privatized services or entities. While referring here to privatisation
16
 as an 
activity of ownership transfer (from the hands of the state to the hands of private firms and 
individuals) we need to carefully acknowledge the risk-transfer involved in order for 
privatisation to be complete. The complexities of such risk-transfers usually make a case for 
government intervention to continue even after the service sector in question is fully 
privatized. Furthermore, we need to highlight that as it is not possible to stop monitoring and 
                                                 
16
 Privatisation can be characterized as 1) privatisation of competitive firms: by the transfer of state-
owned enterprise operating in competitive markets - with no market failures - to the private sector; 2) 
privatisation of monopolies: by transferring state-owned enterprise to the private sector where market 
power existed; and 3) contracting out to the private sector services that were usually performed by 
public sector entities (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). 
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questioning the behaviour of a privatized market, consumers need to be protected from 
possible market failures. On the other hand, continuous state intervention may distort 
markets, and hence, may result in some damage that is difficult to repair. In later parts of this 
research lessons will be drawn in this regard from the California power market crisis of 2000-
1 where wholesale prices reached ‘unimaginable’ levels. 
 
Generally speaking, economic reforms start with a restructuring process that leads to 
privatisation initiatives, such as Independent Power Projects (IPP) in the case of electricity 
market reform, with regulation of some market segments. Restructuring - by means of 
separation or 'unbundling' - is less demanding in terms of politics and regulation alike and is 
usually a first step towards improved management performance and increased efficiency. 
According to Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996), the process of restructuring may be split into 
commercialisation and corporatisation. By commercialisation, the state passes the control to 
an autonomous profit making enterprise. This step usually includes the separation of the 
different segments of the business from the core business of the commercialised entity.  Next, 
corporatisation is the legal separation of ownership and management. Even though the state 
remains the owner of such legally separated entities, the state does not interfere with the day 
to day operations of the corporatised entity.  Privatisation takes place only when ownership 
changes - totally or partially - from the hands of the state to the hands of the private sector. 
 
In the UK, privatisation of service utilities has yielded significant improvements in 
efficiency. Almost all utilities have become customer oriented while utilities were given more 
freedom to invest both within and outside their core business (Kay, 1996). Moreover, many 
economists believe that privatisation yields grater benefits if firms are sold into competitive 
markets. For the UK, much of the productivity gains of privatising British Telecom and 
British Gas were realised – at a later stage - only after competition was introduced (Parker, 
2006).   
 
One of the fallacies of private sector participation relates to a government’s ability to 
influence the market post reform. It is often assumed that privatisation necessitates the 
transfer of all decision-making power from government to private sector (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1991). On the contrary, firms often want government intervention if it was for the 
cause, for example, of subsidising losses and providing for tax exemptions.  




Nevertheless, government intervention must be kept to minimum once a firm (or sector) is 
subject to private sector participation. In order for private sector participation to yield positive 
economic gains, the process must lead to a genuine transfer of risk. Private sector entities 
should be rewarded for their risk taking initiatives (with some element of efficiency 
requirements). The RPI-X price control of England and Wales illustrated in Section  2.3 of 
this research provides for just that when regulating privatised entities. On the other hand, 
privatised entities should not expect (under normal circumstances) to be compensated for 
their ‘short fallings’.  
 
Due to political pressures and/or other reasons including lack of confidence in the regulatory 
environment, countries may choose not to privatise certain segments of the market. However, 
Irwin and Yamamoto (2004) cite at least two fundamental problems with such a decision: (1) 
that there are other factors – not the firm’s profitability – that drive the actions of politicians 
and government officials. Such actions (resulting from social commitments and political 
pressures) are usually not directed to increasing the overall performance of the firm and may 
cause distortion to the market in which the firm operates. (2) a state-owned firm already 
poses a conflict-of-interest concern. State officials may be inclined to opt for certain policy 
measures that favour state-owned entities. Although privatisation remains the main solution 
for such concerns, there are measures to improve the corporate governance of state-owned 
enterprises. Irwin and Yamamoto (2004) listed measures including the application of private-
sector company laws to such entities. 
 





Our review of economic theory identified a strong positive relationship between competitive 
markets and social welfare (the sum of consumer and producer surplus) and highlighted 
circumstances in which markets fail.  We adopted total social welfare as the preferred welfare 
standard due to concerns that focusing on consumer welfare only would overlook situations 
where following a reduction in price, resulting increases in consumer welfare would not fully 
compensate for the reduction in profits.  
 
We consider how market behaviour might vary with market structure and where the number 
of market participants is low and noted using principal-agent theory that institutional 
arrangements and contract specification would be required to promote welfare enhancing 
behaviour.  
 
We then considered four options for electricity market reform noting the different scope for 
competition in each and that the highest level of social welfare was offered by the market 
structure with wholesale and retail competition.   As the network functions of transmission 
and distribution have natural monopoly characteristics they would need to be subject to 
regulation.   
 
The Textbook Model proposed by Littlechild (2006) provided criteria for our analysis of 
possible market options for the GCC.  A review of relevant literature raised points for 
consideration on the scope of regulation, possible approaches to regulation and the 
importance of transparency, consistency and independence when implementing regulatory 





Chapter 3 A Review of Worldwide Experiences 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The process of transforming electricity markets from regulated monopolies into competitive 
markets differs from one place to another. This chapter closely looks at the experience of 
England and Wales which has certainly been among the best living examples of good market 
design and a leader of power sector reform within the EU.  Outside the EU, Norway may be 
considered as the leader of electricity market reforms. This chapter covers the Nordic market 
(Nord-Pool) which may represent an excellent opportunity to examine evolving market 
designs based on pre-set minimal requirements for entry. The EU case is also presented to 
illustrate how electricity common rules – once adopted on voluntary basis - may pave the 
way for more binding reform arrangements and market opening on the regional level. 
 
Furthermore, the diversity of the United States electricity market should provides an insight 
into how the federal law allows individual states to regulate their individual markets. In the 
case of the US power market, the chapter illustrates the relationship between federal and 
state-level regulations while highlighting the California crisis of 2000 and its implications.  
 
This chapter also presents examples of a number of developing countries that have embarked 
on some forms of electricity sector restructuring like in the case of Thailand using the a single 
buyer model and Pakistan which choose to hurry privatisation through IPPs. The chapter also 
presents the experiences of early market designs in Argentina, Chile and Brazil; however, 
even for such early starters, this research will illustrate how such reforms are far from 
complete. 
 
Before advancing further, it is important to highlight some milestones in the history of 
electricity reforms. In the United States, the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland 
Interconnection (PJM) dates back to 1927 as a power pool but filed with Federal Energy 
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Regulatory Commission to be an Independent System Operator in 1997 and evolved as a 
market for electricity since then (Bowring, 2006).  The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURPA) of 1978 required all utility firms to buy electricity from ‘qualifying facilities’ of co-
generators and small power plants. Chile introduced a law in 1982 allowing large end users to 
choose their supplier and negotiate their prices freely. In 1990, the England and Wales 
Electricity Pool was established allowing competition between generators as a major step in 
defining the first rules for market mechanisms of electricity trading. In 1991, Norway 
established its electricity pool which was extended in 1996 to incorporate Sweden in what 
was thereafter called the Nord Pool. The Wholesale Electricity Market of New Zealand was 
established in 1996.  In 1998, the National Electricity Market of Australia was established. 
This was a result of a merger between the Victoria Pool (since 1994) and the New South 
Wales Pool (in operation since 1996).  The Amsterdam Power Exchange of the Netherlands 
was setup in 1999 followed by the other pools in Germany and France (Ocaña, 2001).     
   
3.2 Reforms of England and Wales 
 
Up to date, the England and Wales electricity reforms remain – perhaps unchallenged – the 
most comprehensive model of power sector reform in the world. It is most essential for this 
research to understand such a model and how it evolved over the years. Although this 
particular experience has certainly undergone a series of reviews and alternations, the most 
significant phases of reform are the Pool (1990-2001), NETA (2001-2005) and BETTA (post 
2005). 
 
Prior to 1990, the Central Electricity General Board (CEGB) continued to be a public-owned 
monopoly that provided electricity for England and Wales. CEGB and 12 Area Boards 
serving a population of 50 million and having nearly 50 GW peak demand was the UK's main 
power system in 1991. Scotland had a peak demand of 5.6 GW including export while 
Northern Ireland had a peak demand of 1.5 GW. The Electricity Act 1989 divided the CEGB 
into three generation companies; National Power owning 40 of the 74 conventional power 
stations with a total capacity of 30 GW, PowerGen owning 23 plants with a capacity of 20 
GW, while 12 nuclear stations of an 8 GW capacity went to Nuclear Electric. This structural 
reform included that transmission (alongside with 2GW of pumped storage generation) was 
carried out by National Grid Company, a regulated monopoly, where distribution and supply 
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was carried out by 12 Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) (Bergman et al, 1999). By the 
end of 1990, the RECs were sold to the public. The share of the state in the generators was 
PowerGen and National Power was then partially offered to the public - in 1991 - and 
subsequently disposed of in 1995. By mid 1996, the more modern (high performance) nuclear 
power generators, then owned by British Energy, were sold to the public (Green, 2005).   
 
Different from Nord Pool reforms (focused primary on efficiency considerations), the Pool of 
England and Wales (a whole restructuring) was "driven by the aim to privatize the electricity 
supply industry" (Amundsen and Bergman, 2003). In effect, 1990 was the starting year for 
reforming the England and Wales electricity service utility. Firstly, a vertical separation of 
generation from transmission as transmission was privatized through the National Grid 
Company. Secondly, a horizontal separation as generation went to National Power, 
PowerGen and Nuclear Electric (privatised later). Finally, vertical and horizontal separations 
as twelve Regional Electricity Companies were privatized with supply and distribution assets 
(Yi-chong, 2004). In essence, the vertically integrated electricity utility of England and Wales 
was almost totally separated 'unbundled' and restructured before it was privatized (Bergman 
et al, 1999). 
 
The Pool of England and Wales 
The main feature of the Pool was that all electricity must be traded at the Pool. Different from 
the Nord Pool, to be discussed in the next section, the Pool of England and Wales controlled 
all short-term electricity dealings. Another feature was that supply to the Pool was restricted 
to the electricity generators only (Amundsen and Bergman, 2003). The spot market, or 'Pool' 
is aimed at operating as a competitive market of last-price auction, and hence, creating a 
marketplace for the sale of publicly supplied electricity (Newbery, 1995). Each morning, 
generators submit next-day's schedules of available sets of supply and the corresponding 
prices for each set. Based on the received bids, the grid operator determines the lowest cost 
for meeting the expected demand (ranking the financial offers in ascending order). All 
generators in each set are then paid the same price - a system marginal price (SMP) – which 
is the price of the most expensive bid or 'last unit' to make the set run. Here, the Pool acts as a 
middle-person as it buys from generators and sells to retailers.  
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Reset by Professor Stephen Littlechild who was the UK’s Electricity Regulator at the time, 
the RPI-X price-cap regulation - a modified rate-of-return – was an important feature of the 
service utility reforms of England and Wales. While this method for setting transmission 
charges acted as a price-cap, it also allowed for X as an efficiency incentive. A comparison of 
price caps versus cost-based regulation was already presented in a Section  2.3. 
 
Contract for differences (CfDs) were an added feature to the Pool market place. Green (2005) 
reported that 80 to 90% of the spot market dealings were hedged by CfDs. Using the CfDs' 
mechanism, a price was agreed between sellers and buyers for certain quantities in the Pool. 
If the Pool clears at a price higher than the agreed price using CfDs, then sellers compensated 
the buyers with the difference, and vice-versa, if Pool prices fell below the CfDs agreed price, 
then sellers had to be paid the difference by the buyers.   
 
Thus, with high concentration, mainly two large producers (National Power and PowerGen) 
as a result of the horizontal separation, there was the risk of influencing the price of the 
wholesale electricity market by manipulating the pool system operations (OECD, 2002). The 
larger generators could in effect increase their profits. In 1993, the regulator thought that 
there was not enough competition in the wholesale market (with pool prise above avoidable 
costs). The regulator was to commission a study into the two main companies in order to 
decide if they should be referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). Early 
in 1994, National Power and PowerGen agreed to hold prices for two years below prevailing 
levels and to dispose of 6GW within two years, and accordingly, the regulator decided not to 
refer the case to the MMC (Green, 2005). 
 
Lessons can be drawn from the reforms of England and Wales for those that worry about the 
undesirable implications of privatising transmission. As underlined by Professor Littechild 
long before the floatation of the National Grid Company (NGC) that there were no reasons to 
question the continuity or security of supply if the RECs were no longer owners of NGC. He 
argued that transmission and distribution may easily be owned by different entities and that 
ownership of the NGC by the RECs was just a transitional measure in order to facilitate 
privatisation (Littlechild, 1995). 
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Generally, generators had to bid a price-quantity into the Pool the day ahead. The Pool selling 
prices were then calculated every half-an-hour (48 spot) on the bases shown in  Table 1 
below.    
 
Table 1 Pool Spot-price Calculations 
Variables   Method of calculation 
Output for each production Unit Based on scheduled capacity; reflecting short-run 
production costs (especially fuel) 
System Marginal Price (SMP) Last unit to be scheduled (marginal unit) 
Capacity Payment (CP) An element reflecting fixed costs of generation 
CP  = loss of load probability (LOLP) x (value of lost 
load [VOLL]* – SMP) 
Pool Purchase Price (PPP) PPP = SMP+CP 
Pool Selling price (PSP) PSP = PPP + Uplift 
Source: Bruneekreeft (2003)     *VOLL was set at £ 2 per kWh in 1990 
 
Based on the 1990 reforms, retail was subjected to market competition. At the start, 
customers with a maximum demand of more than 1 MW (nearly 5000 customers representing 
30% of demand) were allowed to switch between retailers for a small charge (corresponding 
to metering costs). In 1994 further market opening measures were introduced allowing 
customers of 100 kW (45000 customers representing an extra 20% of demand) to choose 
their suppliers. By May 1999, all customers were permitted to switch retailers. While large 
customers switched suppliers to get better prices, only two-fifth of small customers shopped 
around for a saving of about 10% (Green, 2005). In order to correlate consumers’ 
consumption to the relevant retailers, half-hourly metering was required. Such metering 
technicalities could have contributed to the 'no-change' attitude of the majority of these 
customers. It was simply very expensive for each small (domestic) consumer to install a half-
hourly meter. Therefore, a system of profiling was introduced to do away with the need for 
the half-hourly meters. 
 
The Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer), was primarily managed by one single person; 
the Director General of Electricity Supply (DGES). Offer, being set up as an independent 
body under the Electricity Act, allowed for criticisms that the job of the DGES may be 
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dominated or heavily influenced by one person (Green et al, 2006). On the other hand, one of 
the drawbacks the Regulator (DGES) often complained about that the Pool Rules were very 
rigid and change (to the best interest of the Pool's customers) was a rather lengthy procedure 
(Green, 2005). 
 
Like in the case of other markets, the Pool had its own economical and political pressures. 
Due to such pressures, mainly employment-related, regulation was allowed to interfere with – 
otherwise ordinary market competition – as generators were asked to enter into 3 to 5 year 
coal purchase agreements in order to safeguard the jobs of mine-workers.   
 
However, the setting up of the Pool for electricity was not sufficient to guarantee free trade of 
electricity. Although customers taking more than 1 MW of power had a choice over the 
different suppliers, the regulatory environment had to constantly review the published tariffs 
of the National Grid Company and those of the Regional Electricity Companies in order to 
allow for access on a non-discriminatory basis (Yi-chong, 2004).  
 
Some also argued that even after introducing such competitive electricity market mechanisms 
that price controls were still necessary to protect small consumers (Glynn, 1997). Much of 
such debate is expected elsewhere to justify regulation in a competitive market.  For example, 
in the California reforms wholesale trading was subjected to pure-market competition while 
end-user retail offerings were regulated using a cap-control. Such ‘imbalanced’ market 
environment – among other factors – had lead to catastrophic consequences.  
 
The New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA and BETTA) 
The New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) introduced in March 2001 abolished the 
pool and replaced it by a new forwards-market and a short-term transmission system 
balancing and settlement process.   These were extended to Scotland in April 2005 via the 
British Electricity Trading & Transmission Arrangements (BETTA). The main development 
here was that Britain under BETTA became one integrated market with NGC assuming the 
responsibility of Britain’s entire TSO. 
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One of the main features of the law enabling NETA was that Ofgem was set up to replace 
Offer. The regulator is now replaced by five executive and six non-executive members 
chaired by an independent individual for a set period of time (Green et al, 2006). The 
authority is, therefore, split where alterations or amendments to the regulation are viewed by 
the members and then referred to the Competition Commission, previously known as the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC).  
 
The transmission system is owned and operated by the National Grid Company (NGC) which 
is a publicly traded company which also acts as the TSO.  The company, however, is not 
allowed to perform down or upstream activities. The Electricity Act obliged the NGC to 
develop, maintain and operate the transmission system in an economic, coordinated and 
efficient way. Under NETA, generation is no longer centrally dispatched as each plant is self-
dispatched and responsible of balancing output with demand where the job of the TSO is only 
to ensure system stability (OECD, 2002 and Newbery, 2006).  
 
Although NETA comes with substantially higher costs
17
, the National Audit Office (NAO) 
argued that the overall reforms are thought to have proven to be rewarding. According to 
NAO, NETA has helped lower wholesale prices by over 20% between March 2001 and 
October 2002 and by 40 per cent since NETA was proposed in the year 1998 (NAO, 2003). 
Industrial and commercial customers have also benefited from NETA. The NAO report also 
stated that prices paid by such non-domestic customers have also fallen by 18 per cent since 
the start of NETA and by 30% since April 1998. Meanwhile prices paid by domestic 
customers have fallen only by 8 to 17% since April 1998. While customers who stayed with 
the same supplier obtain a saving of only 8 per cent (about 62% remained with the same 
suppliers since 1999), consumers who switched suppliers may obtain savings of up to 22%. 
More specifically, according to the Ofgem Market Review (2004), 51% of domestic 
customers (in almost all regions of Great Britain, in various social groups, across all incomes 
and of all age groups) switched supplier while in the north of Scotland, however, only 36% of 
customers choose to switch suppliers. However, many including Newbery and McDaniel 
(2003) argue that prices fell primarily due to competition even before introducing NETA. 
Further, according to energy price analysis between April 1997 and March 2005 by Evans 
                                                 
17
 Ofgem estimated that market participants will spend up to £580 million in order to implement the 
NETA over the first 5 years of its introduction and £30 million annually thereafter (NAO, 2003). 
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and Green (2005, p.19), it was concluded that ‘NETA did not have a direct impact upon 
market prices for electrical energy’.  
 
NETA seems to have introduced a more competitive marketplace which – like in any other 
‘commodity’ competitive marketplace – is very responsive to the rules of supply and demand. 
According to the Ofgem Corporate Strategy (2008), domestic-user electricity tariffs were 
greatly influenced by the rising gas prices since one third of electricity in Britain is produced 
from gas-fired power stations. During the second half of 2007, the near doubling of oil prices 
had a great impact on gas prices which resulted in increase of almost 15 per cent in electricity 
retail prices by end 2007 and early 2008. With such volatility - and although Ofgem had no 
strong evidence of market failure - Ofgem still decided to carry out an investigation of gas 
and electricity supply markets. On 6 October 2008, Ofgem published the Energy Supply 
Probe – Initial Report summarizing the study findings (Ofgem Supply Probe Report, 2008, 
p.5). The study found that both domestic gas and electricity sectors have moved – since 
markets were opened for competition - ‘from pure monopolies to markets where there are 
now greater levels of competitive activity and consumer switching than almost every other 
energy market in the world and most other UK consumer services markets’ and that the 
‘annual switching rate of 18 per cent also compares well with other retail services in the UK’. 
However, the study found that ‘Until very recently, the five former incumbent electricity 
suppliers charged electricity customers in their former monopoly areas an average of over 10 
per cent higher prices than comparable “out-of-area” customers’ meanwhile the ‘most recent 
price changes (which occurred during the Probe) narrowed this differential to around 6 per 
cent on average’ (Ofgem Supply Probe Report, 2008, p.9). 
 
NETA, different from its predecessor the Pool, is a more demand-responsive mechanism. The 
Pool's demand-side bidding scheme is no longer a feature of the new arrangements and, 
therefore, allowing the prices to be more reflective of the actual market and, hence, 
minimizing exposure to supply-side market power (Green, 2005). Moreover, supply 
competition increased over the years after NETA was introduced. On the other hand, falling 
wholesale prices resulted in financial difficulties for some generators (especially for those 
with uneconomic long term contracts (NAO, 2003)). The government had to intervene by 
providing a credit facility of £650 million to British Energy (with a 20% market share) in 
September 2002 due to strategic reasons related to a nuclear-safety international treaty.  
 
 Chapter 3 A Review of Worldwide Experiences 
 
 69 
One important feature of the NETA market-design is its confidence in ordinary market-
mechanism to secure security of supply (the availability of capacity to meet demand). While 
NETA still kept an annual margin (a gap) of 20 per cent extra capacity over expected 
demand, a situation of a reduced gap may still occur in the case of a generator’s withdrawal 
before it is replaced in the market. Here, NETA relies on market good ‘behaviour’ so that 
generators will enter the market in order to seize the opportunity of rising prices (NAO, 
2003).  However, such purely market-based measure may be undermined by wholesale prices 
rising and remaining high for long enough periods that could lead to passing them to 
household customers (who may then expect government intervention). Meanwhile, the 
government future energy policy (spelled out in a White Paper) declared that it is not to 
intervene ‘except in extreme circumstances’ (NAO, 2003, p. 4). On the other hand a capital-
intensive industry is a subjected to a cyclic behaviour which may cause a short to medium 
term shortage of supply if it was all left for pure market behaviour and that the ‘security of 
supply’ gap was not strictly administered.   
 
In summary, there are lessons to be learned from the experience of England and Wales as 
such market remains the leader in market-based electricity reforms. Green (2005) addressed 
many of the lessons to be draw from England and Wales, some of which are listed below: 
 
1. The electricity utility better be 'unbundled' and restructured before privatisation. 
2. The RPI-X, first introduced in the England and Wales market, is a tested incentive 
regulation system that allows for an acceptable rate-of-return mechanism while promoting 
efficiency. 
3. To maximize the benefits of reform, the regulator needs to be an independent body with 
specific terms for the director general (or chairman), a clear mandate and with adequate 
accountability measures. Here, governance is a key contributor to the success or failure of 
the undertaken reform. While adequate regulation must be introduced, as part of the 
reform process, to guard from market 'lobbying' and 'abuse' of regulatory power, it is vital 
to allow for elements of 'measurable' flexibility that allows for change to take place in a 
speedy and efficient way.   
4. The industry does not necessarily have to sacrifice profits, while consumers reap the 
benefits of restructuring.   
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5. The opening of retail to competition does not automatically guarantee that all domestic 
end-use customers will maximise their benefits from reform by exercising their 'right to 
choose'.   
6. Market power is most likely when the market is concentrated. It is, therefore, important to 
manage concentration at the very start of market design.  
7. Contracts could bring stability for the reformed electricity-market and should be allowed 
alongside retail competition. While contracts allow for long generator-retailer 
relationships (and hence reduce the likelihood of market power exploitation), retail 
competition ensures that large consumers would continuously have a choice over a 
number of suppliers within the market place. 
 
It is of this researcher’s opinion, however, that only at very advanced stages of reform that 
the NETA (or BETTA) model may be introduced for establishing a typical commodity 
market for electricity where power 'electricity' be traded as a commodity based on pure 
market mechanism. While such ‘responsive’ marketplace promises customers - both domestic 
and commercial - the benefits of a competitive environment, customers ‘especially domestic 
ones’ must be prepared to accept sudden price increases when direct cost increases are passed 
to them by wholesalers.  
 
3.3 Reforms of the Nordic Market (Nord Pool) 
 
The Nordic market or Nord Pool is made up of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
Norway was the first to opt for electricity deregulatory reforms by issuing the Energy Act 
effective on 1 January 1991. On 1 June 1995, Finland took similar step then was followed by 
Sweden on 1 January 1996 forming the Norwegian-Swedish pool (Nord-Pool, ASA) which 
signalled the start of the unification of the two wholesale markets. Denmark was the last to be 
included in such an evolving electricity market. The integrated electricity market of the Nord 
Pool model was built assuming a perfect market competition situation (Amundsen et al, 
1999). An important feature of this electricity market is that it is an international one. Nordic 
economic conditions are not comparable to those of the GCC, however; this research should 
benefit from studying the Nordic electricity market mechanism from its international 
perspective.  
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The Nord Pool is a non-mandatory electricity market – based on voluntary participation – 
allowing bilateral trade (directly between players) and trading via the Nord Pool Spot AS 
physical market (Nord-pool-spot, 2007). The Pool also provides a good reference for power 
derivatives traded in the Nordic Power exchange for financial contracts. The financial market 
acts as a commercial centre where securities (price securing contracts) are traded. Since this 
is not a physical market, the financial contracts are settled only after electricity is physically 
traded. According to Boisseleau and Jansen (2005) we may visualise the Nord Pool operating 
as a combination of four markets (two for physical delivery and two for the related financial 
tools); 
(i) The Elspot, which is a day-ahead spot market with prices determined in a supply and 
demand double auctioning for each hour of the day. The price used is a reference for 
settling financial power contracts as well as a benchmark for bilateral transactions. 
The Elspot price represents a bid to buy or sell an hourly load of one MWh 
(NOK/MWh) to be physically delivered the following day. Buyers are obligated to 
pay the price of firm contracts of load hours purchased. A System Price is the balance 
price of system aggregated demand and supply. 
(ii) The Elbas, which is a short-term market for delivery allowing market players to adjust 
their positions – previously taken on the Elspot – up to two hours before actual 
delivery takes place. 
(iii) The Eltermin, which is the financial part of the market place intended for risk 
management through trading futures and forward contracts. As mentioned earlier, this 
market is purely financial and does not involve actual physical delivery of electricity. 
(iv) The Eloption, which complements the above mentioned financial tools by providing a 
market for options. 
 
Norway and Sweden have higher electricity demand per-capita than most EU and OECD 
countries. In 1998; Norway had an electricity per-capita of 27,285 kWh, Sweden had 16,678 
kWh per capita while the figures for the EU and OECD were 6,686 kWh and 8,300 kWh 
respectively.  Both Norwegian and Swedish markets have their own national grid companies, 
namely Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät (Amundsen and Bergman, 2003). In each country, the 
two companies are responsible for real-time dispatch and balancing. The two companies are 
therefore responsible to keep the system operational including voltage and frequency 
stability. The two companies are entrusted with the transmission capacity allocation and 
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pricing, hence, Statnett uses a Nord Pool mechanism called regulation market, while Svenska 
Kraftnät used a Swedish market tool called the balance service. In both cases, individual 
generators make their bids and the main operator (either company) calls each bidding unit 
into production on the basis of its rank. The trade on the regulation (Norwegian) or balancing 
(Swedish) mechanism is prompted (from the normal day-ahead wholesale market) only by 
the uncertainties between actual and expected demand and supply situations.    
 
The two grid companies had no direct influence over the dispatches of electricity into the 
market. The plans for hourly production were determined on the basis of a day-ahead spot 
market. The Nord Pool, which is an independent company owned by the two grid companies, 
operated the wholesale (day-ahead) spot market, where sellers and buyers trade electricity 
based on hourly prices and scheduled deliveries. This is another evolution of the Nord Pool. 
At its starting stage, buyers and sellers traded only with the Nord Pool (with virtually no 
payment risks). Now, buyers place their bids by 12 pm the day before the actual dispatch of 
electricity takes place. It is then the job of Nord Pool to schedule next day's power supplies 
based on total demand (determined the day ahead). Outside dealings are allowed by the Nord 
Pool. In reality, only 25% of the traded electricity is done within the trading environment of 
the Nord Pool wholesale spot market (Amundsen and Bergman, 2003).         
 
For transmission pricing, the Nordic market uses point-of-connection tariffs
18
. By such 
mechanism, there is one unique price to each unit extracted from (or fed into) the system 
irrelevant to the location of the generator supplying (or end-use customer buying) such unit of 
power.   
 
Transmission-tariffs differ between Norway and Sweden as well as between the different 
regions in Norway and are known as area-prices, where Nord Pool prices are called system-
prices (explained above). In the case of Sweden, different from Norway, locational 
congestion differences were not reflected in transmission costs. Here, any resulting excess in 
demand a particular region was handled using the 'counter-purchases' by the grid company 
Svenska Kraftnät. As maybe expected, such 'counter-purchases' are usually carried out at 
higher costs (from the reserve capacities in these regions) and are passed on (as fixed 
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 Point-of-connection tariffs reflect two elements of cost: 1. marginal cost of losses, and 2. marginal 
cost of congestion. In term of nodal pricing, both cost elements are reflected at each node.  
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charges) to the transmission system users. Nevertheless, based on the study of Damsgaard 
and Green (2005), there are at least three reasons why Sweden should consider the option of 
regional or 'area' wholesale prices; 1). Consumers can then be charged the actual cost of their 
electricity purchases. In the absence of such regional or 'area' prices, some consumers are 
practically subsidizing cost for others. 2). The use of regional prices allows for a more 
receptive electricity market. Once a particular region has higher area-prices, it is then 
expected - due to ordinary market mechanism – that new generation capacities would be 
added to that region. Similarly, no new generation capacity would be added to the regions 
that are benefiting from the counter-purchases of the grid company. Clearly, these counter-
purchases are only distorting the market. 3). This absence of regional pricing causes market 
fragmentation; Swedish internal market on one side is governed by a single area-price while 
the Nord-pool on the other uses a system-price mechanism that will split the price into two in 
the case of cross-border congestion. A grid company like, Svenska Kraftnät – a state-owned 
public company (Svenska Kraftnät, 2007), may have some incentives to exploit using some 
counter-trading arrangements. Since those purchases, as seen earlier, would be obtained at 
higher rates, the grid company has an incentive to obtain its purchases through Nord Pool. By 
simply telling the Nord pool that it had a constraint at its border, the company qualifies for 
congestion fees for any MWh imported into the country. In a well designed market, this is 
non-allowable. 
 
Although the Nord Pool membership is based on a set of minimal rules, it allows a good 
degree of differentiation among the member countries. Ownership is a good example of these 
important differences. As highlighted by Midttun et al (2003) 'While all four Nordic countries 
have dominant public ownership in the electricity industry, there is still considerable 
variation. The Norwegian electricity industry represents the most 'pure' application of the 
public sector model, while Sweden and Finland, with a larger share of private ownership 
come closer to a mixed economy model. With is large share of direct consumer ownership, 
Danish electricity industry represents a special variant of the Nordic model". In 1999, over 
50% of the Swedish generation capacity was owned by the state as well as over 30% of the 
country’s supply. Municipal ownership accounted for nearly 15% and 40% of production and 
supply accordingly. Industry, institutional and foreign investments were left with nearly 40% 
and 30% of the country's generation and supply. During the same year a little over 20% of the 
electricity in Finland was generated by state owned enterprises while the state owned less 
than 20% of the country’s supply system. Here, municipal ownership amounted to over 10% 
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and 60% of production and supply accordingly. The industry, institutional and foreign 
investments were allowed to own a good sum of nearly 70% of the country’s total generation 
capacity and controlled almost 30% of the country's supply ownership. In Norway, the state 
controlled 40% of the country’s total power generation and a very limited stake of the 
country’s supply system, where the municipal ownership exceeded 50% of the country’s 
generation and over 80% of the supply. The industry, institutions and foreign investments 
were left with negligible stakes in the country's power sector. The Danish generation and 
supply is almost split 50-50 between municipal and customer ownership. As a result, we can 
assume a well functioning Nordic market with a diversity of ownership structures.     
  
Another aspect of the Nord Pool is the increased intra-trading between member countries. 
Based on the calculations of Damsgaard and Green (2005), electricity trade among member 
countries was clearly rising between 1978 and 2002. It is worth noting that highest trade 
levels were reached between 1989 and 1990 - as Norway and Sweden had surplus hydro 
power to export - even before member countries had liberalised their power markets. The 
experience of the Nordic market reveals that cross-border trading is possible even in the 
absence of fully liberalised markets.   
 
Effectively, retail competition in the Nordic market was opened during 1998 and 1999 
(Littlechild, 2007)
19
. After about 3 years, 18% of residential customers did switch suppliers in 
Sweden, compared to 15% in Norway and only 5% in Finland. Although these levels are 
much lower than the 34% in the case of UK, Littlechild (2007) underlined the new form of 
competition provided the variety of contract types offered to customers in the Nordic market. 
Accordingly, tariffs may not remain the only means of competition in retail. Suppliers may 
agree fixed prices with their customers while others offer favourable ‘contractual’ conditions 
to stay ahead of competition.   
 
In summary, the Nordic electricity market experience offers some valuable lessons: 
 
                                                 
19
 According to (Littlechild, 2007) this is when load profiling was allowed instead of having to install 
hourly meters.  
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1. Based on the Nordic Pool market design, the geographical distance between buyers and 
sellers has no impact on prices. It is then possible to allow for a 'common market' where 
generators compete on equal terms. 
2. On the one hand, the counter-purchase used in the Swedish transmission system allows 
for a single price for all users across all regions. It is possible for individual customers 
and regions to, therefore, be able to compete more 'equally'. On the other hand, however, 
such market design would also imply that electricity in some regions would be 
sometimes sold at prices below their respective marginal costs. Some valid debate could 
be expected as customers in other regions would implicitly be deprived from enjoying 
actual lower prices (costs) for their power purchases. Also, under such market design, 
extra transmission capacity would be required in order for the counter-purchase system to 
be efficient. 
3. The Nord Pool features a good level of flexibility in market design. First, the wholesale 
market can sustain more that one set of prices (Nord Pool system prices may differ from 
area prices in Norway and Sweden, while Sweden opted for a single price for the 
country). Second, ownership structure may be allowed to differ between member 
countries. Finally and most importantly, electricity may be freely traded outside the Pool 
by means of bilateral contracts. 
4. Individual markets need not be equally liberalised in order to allow cross-border trading. 
The different regulatory environments of the Nord Pool member countries, although 
converging over the years, could still allow considerable amount of electricity trade 
between the members. 
5. In retail, contractual arrangements may induce competition if there was ‘no room’ for 
price competition.  
 
With respect to cross-border trading, the free access bid-based market has proven to be 
competitive. However, few issues need to be carefully examined when it comes to dealing 
with congestion. It is the main responsibility of the system operator (SO) to regulate the 
transmission limits so that there is no congestion allowing for a much freer cross-border trade 
of electricity. However, the SO of this integrated market needs to be evaluated in terms of its 
handling of the financial implications of congestions. The argument here is that the TSO may 
have an incentive to distort congestion information (Glachant and Pignon, 2004). The 
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potential for distortion, if any, may be due to the System Operator’s share of the revenue 
produced by the congestion pricing mechanism.  
 
Noting that this research does not cover such issues, one important feature of the Nordic 
Market is that member countries maintain rather a uniform policy towards environmental 
issues. The member countries are all party to the various protocols and agreements that limit 
the CO2 and other non-environmentally friendly emissions into the air. Those include; the 
Geneva Convention and the Geneva protocol of 1991, the Sofia Protocol of 1988, and the 
Helsinki Protocol of 1995. The member countries confirm to the Toronto Conference of 1988 
of a 20% CO2 reduction by 2005 (from the base year of 1989).  Moreover, and on voluntarily 
bases, the members of the Nordic market have set up higher limits for themselves (Amundsen 
et al, 1999). 
 
3.4 The Experience of the European Union (EU) 
 
The European Union (EU) is made up of twenty-seven countries
20
. Since 1990, members of 
the EU were required to facilitate the cross border trading or ‘transit’ of electricity by means 
of a European directive. Starting from 1992, the Council of Ministers was discussing 
common rules for electricity markets. The European Commission (EC) issued Directive No. 
96/92/EC (EU Directive 96/92EC, 1996) for the creation of internal markets in electricity and 
gas. All countries were to implement the directive within two years with the exception of 
Belgium and Ireland (who received a transitional period of an extra year) and Greece (who 
was given two more years). The primary objective for the directive was the setting up of ‘a 
level playing field’ in terms of the three segments of electricity, generation, transmission and 
distribution, a pre-request for a single European electricity market while the main feature of 
the directive was to ensure network accessibility (Shuttleworth, 2000). It is to be noted that 
only 8-10% of the European national consumption originates from cross-border trading as 
networks are still limited since they were originally built to serve national markets 
(Boisseleau and Jansen, 2005). The inter-connections between the European countries were 
made to facilitate cross-border trading for the purpose of system stability. Among other 
factors, such limitations of the wires still prevail, hence, resulting in individual electricity 
                                                 
20
 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.  
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markets rather than a common European Electricity market (Haas et al, 2006).  For the 
purpose of this research – and regardless of its status so far - it would be most relevant to 
explore a regional electricity reform process such as that of the EU. 
 
In the EU, ‘privatisation was a decision of individual member states – nothing in EU law 
obligates member states to privatise any type of undertaking’ (Vasconcelos, 2007, p. 65). 
However, liberalisation was viewed as a necessity for integration at the EU-level. In 1996, a 
Common rule was adopted for electricity, and like other similar rules, the purpose was to 
facilitate a single European market. Vasconcelos (2007) reiterated that the European model 
allows for the coexistence of many types of electricity structures. The main features of the 
model are (1) open markets for investment and trading among member states, (2) freedom to 
choose for consumers and (3) the legal unbundling of transmission and distribution from 
other activities of generation and supply.      
 
Subsequently, in 26 June 2003, a new directive was issued replacing the previous directive of 
1996 (EU Directive 2003/54/EC, 2003). The main characteristics of both EU directives are:  
1. Network accessibility: Articles 17 and 18 of the earlier Directive stated that member 
states could choose between (a) allowing third party access (TPA) to national 
distribution and transmission electricity networks (regulated or negotiated TPA), or 
alternatively (b) making arrangements for a single buyer model by which the single 
buyer acquires electricity contracted by eligible customers at the published retail tariff 
for the customer - minus the published tariff rate for using the network which made both 
methods very similar. The Directive of 2003 no longer allowed such single-buyer 
arrangements. 
2. Market opening: Article 19 puts a time-table for a three-stage market liberalisation that 
by the year 2003 allowed consumers with annual consumption over 9GWh to choose 
between different suppliers while it required member states to open 33% of their 
national markets for competition. Later, Article 20 of the 2003 Directive stipulated that 
by 1 July 2007 the EU moved to full retail competition as all customers were allowed to 
choose between suppliers. 
3. Tendering and plant authorisation: In the case of a single buyer model, the 1996 
Directive expects member states to use competitive tendering procedures or use a non-
discriminatory method licensing power plants when a tendering system is used. Article 
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7 of the 2003 Directive demands that details of the tendering procedures are published 
at least six months prior to tendering in the Official Journal.   
4. Unbundling: While the directive required separate accounts to be kept for generation, 
transmission, distribution and other non-related activities, there were no specific 
requirements for structural unbundling. This was then extended to legal unbundling by 
Article 10 of the 2003 Directive).  
5. Security of Supply:  Article 4 of the 2003 Directive clearly makes each member country 
(through its respective regulators) responsible for assuring the security of supply in its 
national market.  
 
From July 2004, the EU’s Community Law included the electricity and gas Directives and a 
regulation on cross-border electricity exchanges.
21
 Such regulations are part of EU reforms 
intended for increasing efficiency in the energy sector, lifting up standards for public sector, 
raising competition levels and boosting cross border trade (EC, 2004). Very importantly, the 
directives specify that the Commission must report on a regular basis how the market is 
functioning and more specifically the status of issues like legal unbundling.  
 
In order for EU Directives to be applicable, member states would have to issue their 
individual 'national' legislations respectively. The EU secretariat issues, on annual basis, 
benchmarking reports to see who scores 'good' or 'bad'. Based on Green et al (2006), the 
usual practice is that underperformers are flagged 'red' in these reports' while 'green' is given 
for best performers. The EU benchmarking reports investigate member-country progress 
levels in areas like market design (including market opening and type of separation or 
'unbundling'), market power (including market share or 'concentration' and possible barriers 
to entry ) and the kind of regulation used (including the power of the regulator and the use of 
'ex ante' or 'post ante' regulation).  
 
The Third Benchmarking Report on the Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas 
Market issued in Brussels on 1 March 2004 shows that member states have taken good steps 
towards the implementation of the regulation. However, there is little progress in power 
cross-trading between the members (EC, 2004). It is evident that by just implementing 
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 This is in reference to Directives 2003/54 and no. 2003/55 & Regulation 1228/2003. 
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directives, member states can not ensure an increased inter-regional utility trade especially – 
and as discussed earlier - if transmission networks are limited.  
 
Continuous follow up is required for a regionally integrated market like the EU. The Council 
of European Energy Regulators (CEER) was established to discuss maters of this sort. The 
CEER Florence Forum held on 9-10 November 2000 identified, among others, the following 
important issues that may have hindered cross-border trade of electricity (Shuttleworth, 
2000):  
 
1. ‘Pancaking’22: CEER was led to believe that by the time electricity was crossing 
borders, the long distance transmission charges were piled so the costs outweighed the 
competitive generators’ marginal costs. The debate now goes on between CEER and 
the European associates of transmission system operators (ETSOs). 
2. Non-uniformity of transmission charges: CEER was of the opinion that some 
distortion is created by the non-uniformity of transmission charges levied on 
generators. For example, the portion is 0 in France and Spain while it is 30% in 
England and was suggested to reach 50% in the case of Greece. While CEER felt such 
charges must be born by the buyer side of the market, some member states like the 
UK argues that such charges should be used as an incentive for increased efficiency in 
plant locations.     
3. Congestion23 costing: High levels of congestion (limitation of the wires) are another 
factor that hinders cross-border or ‘trans-EU’ trading. In dealing with the issue, the 
ETSOs suggested a proposal at the Florence forum to levy a charge ‘across the board’ 
on all members of the integrated continental European system. However, not all 
members were in agreement with the proposed scheme.  
 
In November 2003, the EU set up the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(ERGEG). The primary reason for setting up ERGEG is to facilitate the completion of the 
energy market through the co-operation and co-ordination among its members. It is objective 
is to assist the Commission in consolidating the energy market of the EU (ERGEG, 2007).  
                                                 
22
 Piling up charges is known in the US as ‘pancaking’ (Shuttleworth, 2000). 
23
 ‘If a line would be overused if its limit were not enforced, it is congested’ (Stoft, 2002, p.392).  




Historically, EU individual member states like other countries had their share of cross-
subsidies. The electricity industry often was lending a hand to other industries. In the case of 
France, only locally made equipment was to be used for the construction of power plants. In 
the UK and Germany, state-owned power generators entered into long term agreements with 
state-owned coal mining firms (Yi-chong, 2004). However, cross-subsidies do not continue 
unnoticed and cause continuous political debate. If discovered, the public would reject them 
as they may contribute to an increase in costs while other market players and competitors 
would certainly question them as they represent an unfair trading environment. In short, 
subsidy issues usually cause continuous political debate and may limit free utility cross-
border trading. 
 
Nevertheless, EU regional electricity reforms are far from complete as structural market 
differences still remain within the member countries. Haas et al (2006, p.274) argue that ‘In 
practice, the major area of action within the European liberalisation project was “providing 
access to the market”. Far less attention was paid to the issues of restructuring generation & 
supply and designing market places as well as ensuring adequate generation and transmission 
capacity’. With respect to vertical integration, for example, state-owned vertically integrated 
monopolies have dominated the industry in France, Italy, Poland and Hungary. Meanwhile, 
Germany had few generators integrated with transmission but partially integrated with supply 
while the distribution companies in the Netherlands – through upward integration – 
controlled transmission and generation.  
 
The EU reforms are flexible – when need be – allowing for some compromise for the benefit 
of members. A good example was the case of the so called ‘Gazprom clause’. On October 
2008, the EU energy ministers agreed to ease a ban on outside energy providers – allowing 
mainly Germany to continue importing about 40% of its gas requirements from Russia’s 
Gazprom. The relaxed clause which was – then - agreed stipulated that outside suppliers must 
open their markets for EU investors and they must meet the ‘security of supply’ test of the 
European Commission (International Herald Tribune, 2008).   
     
The EU reforms illustrate that even with such high-level commitments (spelled out in the 
agreed EU directives) and years of progressive change, a common market (with high levels of 
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trading) and/or common regulatory infrastructure may not be an assured outcome of regional 
reform. However, most relevantly to this research, the EU example provides the GCC with a 
good experience for regional cooperation:  
1. Regional policies can be spelled out in the form of directives, while individual-states 
should issue national regulations that are binding and are administrated by local 
regulators. Although directives must be well negotiated and agreed among member 
states, they remain non-binding. The success in implementation is totally based on the 
commitment of individual states by means of individual local regulations.  
2. It is most essential - at the early stages of service utility reforms - to establish 
mechanisms for coordination among regulating bodies. 
3. The implementation of regional directives may facilitate - but not automatically 
guarantee – an increase in intra-regional electricity trade.  
 
From NIE we understand that interest group participation in policy making is unavoidable. 
Spiller and Liao (2008, p 307) state that ‘No society can be so repressed – nor individual’s 
power so extreme – that decisions are undertaken by a narrow clique of individuals, without 
consideration of others’.  European Union negotiations provide good case study material on 
how multi-country agreements are facilitated. Eising (2002, p. 85) states that elites in 
member-states ‘form their preferences on the basis of domestic economic situations or in 
response to pressure from domestic interest groups. Agreements are then reached on the basis 
of bargaining power and mutual concessions in a given bargaining space’. Further, in their 
analysis of environment policymaking, Héritier et al. (1994, p. 181) as quoted by Eising 
(2002) states that many member states may try to transfer their respective regulations and 
practices to the EU level so that their adaptation costs are limited, and hence, ‘allowing for 
solutions based on least common denominators, on mutual exchanges, and on comprehensive 
package deals’. 
 
After eight years of negotiations, in 1996 minimum requirements for a Directive were agreed 





electricity Directives in 1996 and 2003 first introduced gradual electricity market integration 
by opening markets to cross-border exchange and tightening the rules for such exchange. 
According to Jamasb and Pollitt (2005), the creating of a wider EU electricity market was 
undertaken by two parallel processes: the Directives required members to liberalise their 
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home markets and abide by certain minimum requirements. Meanwhile the European 
Commission was effectively driving the advancement of interfaces between markets by 
improving the rules for cross-border trading.  Further, the 2
nd
 Directive set out some specific 
and more stringent rules - including transition periods - with regards to network access, the 
requirement for independent regulators, the unbundling of System Operators and the 
prohibition of a single-buyer-based market structure (that was at the time in place in Italy, 
Portugal and Northern Ireland). However, this process of regional electricity market 
integration allowed for a certain levels of flexibility as required by political considerations. 
State-ownership was allowed to continue unchallenged in certain markets (such as in France), 
and countries could adopt different approaches to separating the different electricity market 
segments while the Directives did not require market opening for household consumers until 
2007 (ibid).  Eising (2002) stated that one of the core elements of negotiating agreements for 
liberalising EU electricity markets was to prevent cross-subsidies between various activities, 
which might undermine competition, an issue that will need to be addressed in the GCC. 
 
The EU Commission had to undergo a series of negotiations in order to achieve consensus for 
agreeing the Directives, negotiations in which positions were influenced by the economic 
conditions prevailing in each member state and the demands of various interest groups. More 
broadly, Eising (2002, p. 87) stated that ‘four distinct institutional mechanisms structure EU 
decision-making processes’, among which ‘decision routines provide standardised 
mechanisms for resolving conflicts and facilitate policy learning by increasing the amount of 
information available about policy consequences’. Our review of GCC institutional and legal 
arrangements presented in Chapter 4 suggests that equivalent mechanisms are not as clearly 
defined or developed as in the EU.  Further, according to Keohane, (1989, p. 163) as quoted 
by Eising (2002, p. 89) ‘The EU institutions consist of a set of EU organisations and a set of 
norms, rules and routines that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations’.   
  
3.5 The Experience of the United States 
 
The power sector in the US may be divided into five groups; (1) the privately owned 
vertically integrated utilities or ‘investor owned utilities’ (IOUs); (2) the federally owned 
utility service providers which generate and transmit electricity but usually do not sell 
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directly to end user customers
24
; (3) the state municipal, public, district and rural co-operative 
utilities. Most of those entities in this group are small which mainly buy electricity in small 
quantities and re-sell it to their communities beside the few state or municipal vertically 
integrated utilities; (4) the privately owned independent power producers otherwise referred 
to as ‘non-utility generators’ (NUGs); and finally (5) is the group of marketing entities like 
brokerage firms (OECD, 1999b).  
   
Rural areas were expected to face difficulty in supply by privately-owned service providers. 
Among other state-driven initiatives, The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was 
specifically established in 1933 to provide farmers, which may have been ignored otherwise 
by private suppliers, with low cost electricity. In 1935, the congress put in place what was 
called the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) which main duty was to provide the 
farmers in the remote areas low interest loans and technical support for forming cooperative 
distribution companies for their areas (Yi-chong, 2004). 
 
Independent federal and state regulators carry out power sector regulation in the US. 
Alongside, there is a cluster of public and private voluntary organizations that act as 
coordinators. While the regulators execute and monitor the implementation of the policy 
objectives, coordinating organizations strive for overall increased efficiency of the system.  In 
1978, the US introduced a single-buyer method by means of the national regulatory 
framework, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act. However, it did not work in all states 
because some utilities, regulators and other interests may have worked in favour of some 
inefficient form of production like supporting the local sources of coal (Shuttleworth, 2000). 
Such ‘favouritism’ needs not to be restricted to the market of the US; nevertheless, it is worth 
investigating once we look closely into the share of some federal corporations in the US 
hydropower sector. Based on the OECD report on Regulatory Reform in the United States 
(OECD, 1999a) it was noticed that among other federal market players; the US Army Corps 
of Engineers owned and operated some power projects with an estimated share of nearly 25% 
of the total country’s hydropower; the Bureau of Reclamation of the US Department of 
Interior owned and operated almost 60 similar projects (a share of 17% of the US 
hydropower); while the Tennessee Valley Authority owned over 70% of coal-fired and a 
substantial share of the transmission system in the south-eastern part of the country. 
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 For example: the US Army Corps of Engineers owns and operates 75 hydro-power and irrigation 
plants (24% of the US hydropower – a total capacity of 20 720 MW (OECD, 1999b).  




Electricity sector reforms in the United States are different from all others. While federal 
regulations provide for the minimum requirement for nationwide reforms, each state enjoys a 
considerable level of flexibility within the boundaries of federal regulations. Accordingly, 
some states were relatively slower in market opening reforms, while others surpassed the 
much broader federal laws. Hunt (2002a) argues that the institutional issues are a major 
concern in the US in that regulation is split between the federal government and the 
individual states and that no one single entity has the overall authority to decide on what 
needs to be done. For that reason, each state becomes a learning experience of its own, 
however; lessons to draw from the California experience should clearly illustrate how split-
power alongside with improper-regulation may result in major market failures.  
 
An important lesson to learn, apart from the already established problems with too much state 
ownership, would be the downsides of excessive state interference within deregulated 
markets. Economists might have the tendency to deal with it as an isolated situation of market 
failure; yet, the California price spike situation – briefly introduced in the previous chapter - 
is probably the most costly lesson to be learned here. In year 2000 California witnessed 
shortages due to increased demand coupled with an increase of gas prices through out the 
country (Blumstein and Green, 2002).  Many believe - including Littlechild (2006) - that the 
California power shortage was not mainly due to an inferior wholesale-market but due to the 
fact that capacity increases were delayed by the necessary approvals. The regulatory 
framework also contributed as retail suppliers (the incumbent utilities) were not allowed to 
enter into long-term contract arrangements with generators. As will be seen in the case of 
Brazil - presented in Section  3.6 below - long-term bilateral contracts may also be intended to 
act as a hedge against potential volatilities.    
 
Another problem which led to the situation was a mismatch between a wholesale and a retail 
regulation. While wholesale prices were subjected to ‘free’ market-mechanism, retail prices 
were capped and when wholesale prices rose, the remaining ‘regulated’ low retail prices 
caused the near bankruptcy of two utilities. The investor-owned utilities (IOUs) – which we 
know from above are a major player in the United States market – were locked into long-term 
contacts with fixed (capped) retail prices and short-term wholesale prices. Meanwhile, 
regulators were not willing to negotiate the raising of such cap levels (Littlechild, 2006).  On 
the other hand, according to Wolak (2005), the regulatory oversight of the Federal Energy 
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Regulatory Commission (FERC) over the wholesale market also fell short as it did not 
intervene to curb price increases. Then the situation was in the hand of the multi-layer 
regulatory infrastructure to add to the crisis.  
 
FERC allowed for a mixed price mechanism in the market. Power could be purchased by a 
participant at a market price if such participant could demonstrate that it does not have 
market power (by submitting a sworn testimony). Those market participants failing to do so 
would only be allowed to obtain power through the cost-based regulated price (Wolak, 2005). 
In California or elsewhere, the time lag needed to set up a new electric generation capacity 
may result in a price hike for a considerable period of time. In this particular case, according 
to (Wolak, 2005) at least eighteen to twenty-four months were required in order to establish a 
new capacity of 50 MW or more. This period may also be extended due to permit delays. As 
will be discussed later in the study, in developing economies like the GCC, such periods may 
be extended to almost four years. Market power exploitation is very possible if demand is 
incorrectly estimated or the economy witnesses rather unexpected levels of growth. 
Littlechild (2007) reiterated that economists are still debating whether there was concrete 
evidence of market power exploitation. Others are of the view that in California, market 
power was exploited as supply was affected by hydro conditions in the Pacific Northwest 
while demand had risen in the Southwest leaving California with limited import opportunities 
from these regions. Meanwhile, FERC was not prepared to take action even when prices 
reached $300/MWh. During the summer and autumn of 2000, the state of California argued 
that wholesale prices were unjust and unreasonable but FERC disputed it and only arrived to 
this conclusion four months later (Wolak, 2005).  
 
In August 2000, FERC ruled out the use of price caps and later on it removed the utility trade 
from the Power Exchange (PX). Utilities were only allowed to sell in the wholesale market 
by permission of FERC. Moreover, FERC introduced a soft cap on sales - where those 
charging above the cap would have to justify their costs – while issuing a notice to generators 
that any successive overcharging would be subject to refund evaluation. Such a measure, 
needless to say, would be a good opportunity for factoring in some inflated costs. FERC no 
longer entrusted the ISO Board with the market and decided to have its own monitoring 
measures. By December 2000, FERC had a new set of problems to deal with particularly 
those concerned with the real-time market. In such case, FERC turned to the ISO to establish 
some outage coordination programmes while establishing a single price-auction in the real-
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time market and an emergency real-time price mitigation that indeed was fully put to use by 
June 2001 (Moore, 2002).  
 
The California situation, in effect, produced a temporary return to applying the single-buyer 
model. In 2001, the Governor of California issued an order to the Department of Water 
Resources (DWR), a state owned utility, to purchase electricity for California’s largest three 
investor-owned utilities in attempt to helping them meet their demands as they were close to 
their bankruptcy. DWR had to commit to many medium and long-term contracts amounting 
to US$18 Billion leaving the California taxpayers to pay off such decisions since it was not 
practical to charge individual customers for the recovery of such extraordinary costs (Arizu et 
al, 2006).    
 
According to Vries, (2005) other outcomes of a market-design fault in California were the 
fact that consumers did not react to high electricity prices since tariffs were fixed for the 
majority of them while not having enough incentives in order to attract the required long term 
investment levels (a reality only emphasised by the crisis).  
 
Outside the California situation, FERC plays a better role of a coordinator. In 22 December 
1999, FERC set up a framework for regional transmission organizations (RTOs) by Order 
2000. It was aiming to promote ‘interstate’ electricity trade through (i) facilitating access over 
the various networks and; (ii) increasing overall operational efficiency (Shuttleworth, 2000). 
The Order combined state grid companies to provide integrated operations which gave birth 
to many transmission companies (TRANSCOs).  
 
While deregulation initiatives in the US started in the mid-1990s, it must be noted, however, 
that wholesale power markets for the vertically integrated electric utilities were in existence 
many years before that allowing for daily and hourly trading. The Public Utility Regulatory 
Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978 allowed for such trading. In 1992, the Energy Policy Act 
expanded the authority of FERC in order to facilitate wholesale power dealings (Joskow, 
2005). By the time transmission and wholesale market rules and FERC regulatory orders 
were issued in the mid-90s, power sector policies were already debated within the state of 
California and some states of the northeast of the United States; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Mane, and New Jersey.  By the year 2001, the states in the west 
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and southwest had more reasons to reject the regulatory and competition policies of FERC.  
Factors adding to the California crisis included the Enron bankruptcy, the financial 
difficulties faced by generators and trading companies, unstable wholesale prices, accounting 
abuses and allegations of market power exploitation. As a result, FERC announced on April 
28, 2003 that ‘it would provide states and regions with more time and flexibility to implement 
the wholesale market reform’ (Joskow, 2005, p.32). Since then, the pace of wholesale and 
retail competition, restructuring and regulatory reforms has slowed down in the United States 
as policy makers failed to prove how such power sector reforms could benefit the voting end-
use customers.   
 
There is a new set of lessons to learn from the vast experience of US electricity market: 
1. Regulatory reforms, although intended for such purposes, may not always succeed in 
guaranteeing benefits to consumers.  
2. While minimum regulations can be set-up at a federal-level (and perhaps applying to 
regional confederations), individual participating-states must be given good levels of 
regulatory flexibility without the fear of limited cross-border trading. 
3. Inferior market design or speedy implementation could lead to many post-
deregulations state interventions yielding further market distortions and failures. A 
case of market failure or speedy reforms may also cause tremendous delays to market 
opening in general due to political pressures. 
4. Market design must put a priority on adequate incentives for investment in order to 
guarantee security of supply. 
 
3.6 Experiences from Developing Countries 
 
Many countries in the developing world have already initiated electricity sector reforms. In 
recent years - and for obvious reasons - developing countries have investigated other than a 
status quo option. Their growing populations accompanied by relatively fast market 
expansions have put governments under increased financial pressures. Also, governments 
sought to generate immediate revenues by disposing of some assets. Even for oil producing 
countries – with adequate financial resources to fund expansion projects - reform and market 
opening were essential in order to diversify their economies and increase overall efficiency 
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and competitiveness. Moreover, the level of market opening and economic reform are often 
the main criteria for attracting foreign investments.  
 
The World Bank carried out a study in the year 2000 analysing the electricity sector and any 
reforms in 116 developing countries (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2002). The study concluded 
that in 17 countries industrial customers had a choice of their electricity supplier, 37 countries 
had independent regulators and that in 27 countries private finance and ownership was a key 
player in the electricity service utility. Although some progress has been made with respect to 
private sector involvement, the study confirms earlier arguments that much of the needed 
reform the developing world was far from complete.   
 
With respect to overall electricity market restructuring, we have already established that 
electricity reform ‘packages’ vary depending on the market situation in which they are 
applied. Furthermore, developing economies are more likely to have market distortions 
(including monopolies) making market power an obvious cause for concern leading to more 
caution with regards to reform and market opening. Accordingly, each participant 
government viewed the components of restructuring and competition differently. Such 
‘cautious’ transitions have resulted in a variety of experiences to investigate.   
 
As the World Bank continued its efforts to encourage privatisation, ‘there was a consensus 
that private investors would not show up unless the system for settling tariffs – the core 
regulatory task – was “de-politicized” and “made independent” (Bakovic et al, 2003, p. 13). 
The World Bank encouraged the establishment of regulatory authorities that could balance 
consumer and investor interests while setting up tariffs. According to Bakovic et al (2003), 
however, a 10-year experience shows that many regulators in developing countries never 
became independent while some were granted limited legal independence. Moreover, tariffs 
in many cases fell short of covering cost which called for political intervention to recover 
costs. Among other things, the gaps between actual and expected returns were due to 
insufficient information at early stages of tariff setting and exaggerated efficiency 
requirements. In the cases of Georgia and India, the problem was worsened due to lack of 
support by local authorities to enforce law on the non-paying illegally connected customers. 
Although this is merely an enforcement issue and should not be viewed as a regulatory 
concern, it distorts performance of participating firms and challenges the tariff-setting 
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functions of the regulator. Once laws fail to enforce collection of the tariffs already set ‘ex 
ante’ by regulators then returns would fall short of fulfilling investments and operational cost 
requirements leading to further ‘ex post’ corrective measures. Not only such corrective 
measures would be unfair to paying consumers but may also send a wrong signal about an 
inefficient regulator and, hence, weaken the overall regulatory environment. Bakovic et al 
(2003) recommended an alternative regulation by contract - already in place in some Latin 
American countries – as an alternate to regulatory independence. By means of such contracts 
a formal agreement is signed with distribution companies underlining the formulas by which 
prices for distribution are set (including regulatory treatment with respect to cost pass-
through). The argument here is that regulation by contract could protect consumers from 
market exploitation (high prices or inferior service quality) and – at the same time - maintain 
an attractive environment for investment. In accordance to the terms of the contract, risk can 
be allocated, and accordingly, distribution companies can manage risks associated with prices 
to reflect charges, costs envisaged and quantities to be sold. It is worth noting that this 
approach was not so successful in Brazil due to many factors including uncertainty about 
pass-through for power-purchase costs, foreign exchange risks, uncertainty in legal 
framework and lack of respect for contracts.       
 
Thailand: The Choice of a ‘Single Buyer Model’  
Although the single buyer model purchasing arrangements may result in higher costs and 
reduced transparency compared to full liberalisation, it was chosen by many developing 
countries due to shortages in available state funding, market size limitation or worries over 
consequences of speedy market opening and reform. According to Arizu et al (2006), the 
experience of Thailand is a typical case of integrated single buyer based reforms.  Electricity 
generation in Thailand was opened for competition in 1992 while keeping the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and the two distribution firms in the hands of the 
state. Since 1992, EGAT, a vertically integrated generation and transmission utility also in 
charge of procurement, invited small power producers to bid for electricity supply. In 1994, 
EGAT requested proposals for large capacity IPPs for the period from 1996 to 2002. The 
bidding resulted in EGAT signing 7 IPP deals with a total capacity of 5,950 MW. The last of 
these was concluded by 2003 without government guarantees under a 25-year Power 
Purchase agreement. For the government of Thailand, a single buyer model was the only 
option to take as utilities and unions opposed a pool system while some uncertainties rose in 
relation to expected operational complexities. The government has then announced an 
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enhanced single buyer model allowing EGAT to continue being the procurer while requiring 
accounts separation for EGAT activities and those of the state-owned distribution companies 
with a view to corporatise and list all entities in the stock exchange. By the early 1990s, just 
like Thailand, many developing countries including Mexico, Honduras, Nigeria, Jordan, 
Tanzania and Cambodia introduced the single buyer model as part of their market reform 
‘packages’. Meanwhile, Brazil - as will be explained later - had developed its own electricity 
procurement system.   
 
It is worth noting that after the California Crisis, reforms in some countries like Thailand and 
Mexico seem to have slowed down. Although their regulatory bodies are already in place, 
‘they do not yet have much of a private or competitive market to regulate’ (Littlechild, 2007, 
p. 8). 
 
Pakistan: Privatisation through IPPs  
In 1994, Pakistan adopted a Private Power Policy, with the help of the World Bank, which 
enabled the country to secure financial close of about 3400 MW through 19 IPPs (4 of which 
amounting to 435 MW were terminated) in what was then referred to as the Private Power 
Policy (Fraser, 2005). Pakistan’s first private IPP, the US$1.6 billion (1292 MW) Hub Power 
Project, was so successful in its fundraising that Euromoney Institutional Investor announced 
it, then, the ‘Deal of the year’. The Independent Power Producer (IPP) programme was 
launched two years after Pakistan started unbundling its electricity service utility through the 
splitting of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) into generation, 
transmission, dispatch and distribution.  
 
However, the Hub Power Project did not truly materialise and the speedy reform programme 
was not so successful after all. In 1998, the government announced a plan to terminate 11 
IPPs (about 66% of the privately contracted power) on the basis of technical and corruption 
related allegations which resulted in a rally of tariff renegotiations and contract cancellations. 
The view of international investors changed dramatically. Once again, the World Bank was 
called to the rescue where the primary advice was to separate criminal accusations from 
commercial disputes. Criminal charges were handled through the courts while commercial 
disputes were negotiated. Pakistan was able to contract out most of its needed extra capacity 
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through the setting up of a bulk tariff ceiling (rather than open bidding)
25
. Noted by Fraser 
(2005), one important lesson to learn from Pakistan’s experience is that expansion in private 
sector generation needs to be aligned with the country’s state of sector reforms as well as 
other economic and political considerations including institutional governance. In line with 
similar mechanisms elsewhere, tariff payments comprised of a capacity price (fixed 
regardless if plants were not actually called to operate) and a variable energy price (based on 
actual power purchased). However, critiques of Pakistan’s 1994 Private Power Policy 
included over-estimated demand leading to unnecessary capacity charges.  
 
A World Bank survey showed that foreign investment in developing country power sectors 
was growing in the first part of the 1990s - driven by IPPs in East Asia and privatisation in 
Latin America - until reaching a peak of more than $50 billion in 1997 (Lamech and Saeed, 
2003). However, this trend sharply declined once these projects were completed while such 
projects were becoming less attractive to investors. The survey concluded that the financial 
crisis like the ones in Argentina and East Asia have contributed to the declining levels of 
foreign investor interest as they resulted in devaluations of local currencies which led to 
questioning the sustainability of investments. Other factors may have included specific 
conditions in these countries and the experiences of investors in them.  
 
Argentina: Early Market Designs and Excessive Interference  
Argentina is thought to be a good example of electricity reform in the developing world with 
utility sector privatisation dating back to 1989 (Chisari et al, 1999). It was in 1992 when the 
country underwent a complete restructuring programme for its electricity service utilities. 
Immediately, Argentina’s electricity utility reforms resulted in considerable economic gains 
by lowering both government debt and public spending as well as expanding the size of the 
stock market. Generation capacity was also expanded while transmission lines were extended 
(Haselip, 2005). Further, according to a study by Chisari et al (1999), between 1992 and 
1995, efficiency gains (reduction in intermediate inputs as a share of sales) were 19.5% and 
6.3% in generation and distribution respectively while labour productivity gains in the two 
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 The price was set to US cents 6.1 per kWh as an average for the first ten years then US cents 5.5 per 
kWh for the life the project. Although, at the time, the price was competitive to those prevailing in 
Indonesia, Philippines and India, Bangladesh was able to obtain a price of US cents 3 per kWh 
through an open tender (Fraser, 2005).  
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segments (increase in as Gigawatt-hours per employee for electricity) were 23.1% and 17.6% 
accordingly.  However, in 2002, the government declared a public emergency when it was 
forced to abandon the currency fix resulting in the country’s currency (the Peso) losing 70% 
of its value.  Until the tariff freeze brought in by the crises, many agree that reforms in 
Argentina were a success (Haselip, 2005). After this macroeconomic crisis, excessive 
interferences in Argentina may provide ‘lessons in how not to manage energy policy’ (Pollitt, 
2008, p. 1537).  
 
Like many other reforms, the Argentinean reform ‘package’ was also based on gradual 
change. At the start, the restructuring programme involved the break up of the three state-
owned vertically integrated companies into 27 generators, 7 transmission companies and few 
distributors. Transition was guided by legislation. In November 1989, the Pacto Federal 
Electrico (Federal Electricity Pact) was adopted. The Pact did not have a noticeable impact 
calling for another attempt of restructuring of the electricity sector with the assistance of the 
World Bank leading to the issue of Decree 634 in 1991 and, subsequently, the introduction of 
a new Electricity Law (24065) enforced in April 1992. The Law together with the Decree 
formed the basis for disintegrating or ‘unbundling’ the vertically integrated utility and, hence, 
the privatisation of almost all generators (60-80%), all transmission companies and most 
distribution (60-70%). Meanwhile, the state continued to own the nuclear plants and two 
hydro-electric plants. Among other things, the Law also facilitated for the creation of a 
wholesale electricity market and a separate regulator as well as defining the role of the 
Secretary of Energy.  The main features of the Law included regulatory safeguards for the 
transmission and distribution monopolies and required third party open-access to 
transmission and distribution networks on non-discriminatory basis. While generation was 
open for competition, all generators received the same rate which was determined by the 
National Load Dispatch mainly on the basis of marginal cost and non-supplied energy. The 
Law provided for a separate SO in charge of dispatch and an independent regulator - the 
National Regulator of Electricity (ENRE) - while the wholesale market had a cost based 
bidding system for scheduling generation plants. The law also allowed for seasonal average 
prices to be passed through to customers. Meanwhile, the Law established an advisory 
Federal Energy Council which was also entrusted with administering the National Fund of 
Electricity for regional subsidies. The main Wholesale Electricity Market (MEM) supplied 
93% of the country’s requirement while the 6% requirements of the southern - non-
interconnected – system was catered for by the (MEMSP) Market with only 1% of 
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Argentina’s electricity requirements met by small isolated systems. Generators placed their 
hourly bids every six months with prices not exceeding 115% of actual fuel cost with some 
adjustment mechanism for fuel price fluctuations.  The Argentinean wholesale market was 
based on two parts; a spot market which are determined hourly on the basis of short-term 
marginal costs and bilateral contracts that are negotiated and freely agreed between the 
different market agents (Dyner et al, 2006 and Pollitt, 2008).   
 
Spot prices fell considerably between 1992 and 2004 (from an average of little over 75 
Argentinean Peso/MWh to around 30 Peso/MWh) partly due to increased competition and an 
addition of low-cost natural gas (Dyner et al, 2006). Between the years 1998 and 2005 the 
electricity distribution business environment in Argentina remained non-attractive. According 
to the return on capital analysis carried out by Rocha et al (2006) for the period, Argentinean 
distribution firms were not able to provide their shareholders with a return that is consistent 
with the estimated cost of equity. Many other market participants in Argentina would also 
await someone to pay for ‘the cost of “re-balancing” electricity prices in the wake of the 
currency collapse’ (Haselip, 2005).   
 
Argentinean reforms may have been considered - when introduced – the most elaborate 
among the developing countries. Pollitt (2008) leads us to some specific lessons from the 
Argentina case and the subsequent interferences to the energy crisis in 2002: 
1. All beneficiaries must pay for their use of electricity. Between 1992 and 2001 they were 
able to move to a situation where all domestic users were billed. The government assisted 
(in a form of subsidy) those who could not afford such bills. This is a good lesson for 
developing countries which still allow non-paying as a way of ‘redistributing wealth’. 
While cross-subsidies distort the market, a proper tax and subsidy scheme may result in 
higher overall system efficiency. 
2. Excessive regulatory interventions due to political pressures may only distort the market 
leading to even more unjustified interventions. In the case of Argentina, such 
interferences included keeping distribution access charge low (which lead to payment 
issues in generation).  
3. No other authority should be allowed to play the role of the designated regulator. Since 
the Argentinean crisis, electricity market issues are in the hands of the Federal 
Government’s Commission for the Renegotiation of Public Contracts (Haselip, 2005). 
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Moreover, the Secretary of Energy was involved in the setting up of seasonal prices, 
dispute arbitration and approving regulated tariffs (Pollitt, 2008).  
 
Brazil: Extending the ‘Contract-based’ Model into a Pool  
Even with market orientated reforms, supported by an independent Brazilian Electricity 
Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) founded in 1996, generation did not match demand as 
‘capacity’  rose by only 28% while demand increased at 45% between 1990 and 1999 
(OECD, 2005). Under the reforms, the government initiated a programme in the year 2000 
which was only able to deliver 15 plants (amounting to 4 GW) out of the planned 49 gas- 
fired projects. The programme was intended to lessen the country’s heavy reliance on 
hydropower generation which amounted to 68.2 GW representing 80% of the country’s total 
generation capacity.
26
 The insufficient investment may have been attributed to some 
uncertainties caused by the risk that existing hydropower plants could undercut the gas-fired 
generators, except in a dry year. This weakness in Brazil’s market design meant that these 
reforms were not able to safeguard the country from an energy shortage crisis between July 
and December 2001 due to a dry summer as water levels plunged into seriously law levels. 
Subsequently, the government established an ‘emergency’ company in order to purchase 
electricity (financed by newly introduced taxes on electricity consumption) and pass it on 
directly to distribution companies through a rationalising scheme.  The rationing scheme was 
then lifted by February 2002 thanks to a rainy season and reduced consumption.  
 
Law 8631 marked the start of electricity reform in Brazil in 1993 and even with non-
complete rules, privatisation started. While most distribution companies and a few generators 
were privatised from the start, transmission companies (TRANSCOs) remained state-owned. 
According to (Araújo, 2006, p. 579) ‘the misalignment between reform and divestment 
processes generated a heavy backlog of ad hoc contracts and measures, and some unpleasant 
surprises’ including the modifications of quality of supply contract clauses after the blackouts 
of 1997/1998.   
 
Prior to 2004, Brazilian distribution and supply companies (DISCOs) were allowed to 
negotiate their own purchases directly with suppliers (at least 85% of their requirements 
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 Brazil has the largest water storage capacity in the world (OECD, 2005). 
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secured by forward contracts of a two-year period or more while the remaining 15% must be 
purchased through short-term contracts or in the spot-market - calculated on weekly basis)
27
.  
The 85% bilateral contract requirement (then became 95%) was to hedge against potential 
volatilities (Araújo, 2006). In 2004, Brazil introduced a pool model (Ambiente de 
Contratação Regulado, ACR) to replace the procurement system of ‘initial contracts’ that 
were also a replacement of the original long-term power supply contracts (OECD, 2005).  In 
the original Brazilian electricity supply industry (ESI), these long-term contracts were 
initially signed between generators and distributors following the privatisation of generation 
and distribution by end 1990s and by which generators continued to supply electricity to 
distributors according to cost-of-service basis.  
 
The new auctioning scheme the ‘pool’ did not upset the previously signed PPAs. The 
different DISCOs could only sign new bilateral agreements only on the basis of the new 
purchasing arrangements.  In the new environment, the Chamber of Electric Energy 
Commercialization (CCEE) - the market administrator – acted as the ‘auctioneer’ while the 
role of the government was restricted to being the ‘broker’. The new method was considered 
to be a success although some state-owned generators were criticised for quoting very low 
prices resulting in below cost contracted deals for some private generators. Another drawback 
is the lack of international interest in the Brazilian market (Arizu et al, 2006, p. 28). 
 
Therefore, the contract-based Brazilian pool, although not fully subjected to market 
mechanism, allowed for risk to be shared among market participants (as apposed to being 
born by a single state-owned agency like in the case of a single-buyer model). The new 
model aimed at encouraging investment by reducing market risks. This also meant that the 
government would ultimately remain responsible for capacity planning; and hence lessening 
ordinary market demand forces to drive supply. In practice - different from the other models 
of the Nord Pool and England and Wales - the Brazilian pool had two basic features (OECD, 
2006): 
1. This ‘regulated’ pool is based on long-term contracts and acted, merely, as a 
coordinator (not a real-time marketplace). Demand is estimated by 
distribution companies which are then mandated to contact out their projected 
demand over a period of 3 to 5 years. 
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 Between September 2000 to June 2001, prices were set on a monthly basis (Araújo, 2006). 
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2. Parallel to the above pool ran a ‘free’ market pool (Ambiente de Contratação 
Livre, ACL). This market-based pool allowed distribution companies to 
purchase their extra requirements (if projected quantities were less than actual 
demand) or sell off any access capacities (if demand falls short of 
expectations). However, distribution companies are only allowed to pass 
through - to their customers - any extra costs incurred up to 5% of the newly 
contracted (non-projected) requirements.  
 
Through this model, the sixty-four electricity distributors are regulated by a price-cap with a 
tariff revision every 4 to 5 years.  In 2003 and 2004, forty-four of Brazil’s distributors 
underwent periodic revisions (Rocha et al, 2006).  The revisions are aimed at re-establishing 
two factors; (i) a tariff reporting (TR) corresponding to a fair return on investment and a tariff 
index factor (X) allowing for some productivity and efficiency gains to be passed to 
consumers. Based on the analysis of Rocha et al (2006), 2005 was the first year when 
profitability levels of the distribution segment were shown to be consistent with the cost of 
equity. The Brazilian model also allowed for an annual tariff adjustment process in order to 
adjust for the rate of inflation.    
 
Chile: A Cost-based Pool  
Chilean electricity reforms dated back to the 1980s before England and Norway. However, 
with almost three decades of evolving legislation, significant parts of the industry in this 
reform-leader of the developing world are still regulated. Generation in Chile is subjected to 
competition, the transmission system is run on non-discriminatory basis with an independent 
system operator (SO) while distribution monopolies are regulated (Raineri, 2006). According 
to the law, there are three markets for electricity; (1) generators can sell to distributors who 
then sell electricity to small consumers at regulated prices, (2) generators and distributors 
may sell directly to large consumers (with loads above 0.5 MW) at freely negotiated 
electricity supply contracts and (3) generators can sell energy at prices decided by the 
Economic Load Dispatch Center (Centro Despacho Económico de Carga, CDEC) on the 
basis of marginal costs (declared by generators) while power transfers are charged to small 
consumers at a ‘capacity charge’ regulated by the National Energy Commission (Comsión 
Nacional de Energía, CNE).  There are four isolated ‘non-connected’ power systems in Chile. 
The largest are Sistema Interconectado Central, SIC (in the center) and Sistema 
Interconectado del Norte, SING (in the north). According to the analysis of Rocha et al 
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(2006) on the Chilean industry between 1998 and 2005, it was observed that - with the 
exception of 1999 - Chilean distribution companies were able to obtain adequate returns on 
their investments (since profit levels remained above the envisaged cost of equity).  
 
In the last fifteen years, the Chilean model was challenged at least three times. First, during 
1998 and 1999, the hydro-dominated power sector was adversely affected by a serious 
drought situation (Raineri, 2006). The diminishing generating reserves called for government 
intervention by introducing three Electricity Rationalising Decrees in order to facilitate the 
work of the DISCOs until the drought crisis was over by mid-year 1999. During this time, 
technical failures also delayed the introduction of newly installed gas-fired stations. The 
crisis also caused concerns over the sustainability of the regulatory framework as well as 
disagreements between generators and distribution companies over energy prices to be paid 
under such ‘failures’. The second challenge was faced in 1999 in the form of blackouts 
attributed primarily to lack of coordination between the different generators; hence, the 
regulatory environment was not able to cope with the expansions in gas-fired power 
generators. Thirdly, in 2004 the interruption of gas supply - due to political and economic 
situations in neighbouring countries – posed a new challenge for the model of Chile.  Chile 
has increasingly depended on the importation of natural gas from Argentina since 1997 and 
by 2004 the Chilean main systems, SIC and SING, respectively produced 28% and 61% of 
their electricity from natural gas-fired turbines.  The Argentinean natural gas deficit in that 
year was passed to its importing neighbour Chile forcing the government to once again 
intervene by instructing market participants so that available gas-fired plants (yielding 
relatively lower prices than thermal plants) must first supply domestic users, hospitals and 
small firms before supplying their larger customers.    
 
According to Raineri (2006) there are some valuable lessons for market design drawing from 
the experience of Chile, among them introducing pricing flexibility that does not segregate 
end-users from short-term market conditions, avoiding regulatory uncertainties by 
introducing stable rules that responds to market changes and having adequate coordination 
among market participants.  
 
 





Alongside the other non favourable incidents, the California Crisis would continuously cast a 
‘shadow’ over the many – otherwise justifiable – market opening initiatives. After all, ‘How 
could such a high-tech state lose control over the electricity system to the extent that service 
could no longer be guaranteed?’ (Vries, 2005, p. 89). Ultimately, governments would have no 
other choices but to explore - each at its own pace – the possibilities for electricity reform 
while keeping in mind that there is no one specific practice to be followed. Nevertheless, 
there are a variety of ‘packages’ to choose from when planning for reform. Worldwide 
experiences clearly illustrate that electricity market reforms and market opening must be 
based on careful market designs to avoid future interventions.  Purchasing and/or wholesale 
trading arrangements are at the center of any power sector reform. While the single buyer 
arrangements through PPAs may deprive consumers from potential savings due to their long 
term commitments, such transitional arrangements may still yield comparative prices and 
pave the way for further reforms once are efficiently implemented. Although the single buyer 
model is not the only form of centralised purchasing, it is used within the Developing World 
and may be a ‘safer’ transitional arrangement especially in the case of market size limitations.
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Chapter 4 A Review of the GCC 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), outlines its organisational 
structure and aims and objectives, and describes the legal and institutional framework under 
which it operates. We identify important similarities and differences across member states 
that are relevant to our study and examine the GCC Interconnection Grid that could facilitate 
cross-border electricity trading. We review member state electricity markets and consider 
how the GCC Interconnection Grid may influence member-state electricity sector reform.  
4.2 An Overview of the GCC as a Region 
 
On 25th May 1981, the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait met in Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates and signed a cooperative framework to effect coordination, integration 
and inter-connection among the Member States in all fields in order to achieve unity.  The 
GCC meets annually and is chaired on a rotating basis by the heads of state.  
As shown in  Figure 8 the GCC covers an extensive and contiguous area.  
Figure 8  Map of the GCC 
 
Source: University of Texas Libraries (Map of the GCC, 2007) 
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4.2.1 Institutional Framework 
 
The main authorities of the GCC are the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council and the 
Commission for the Settlement of Disputes:  
 
A. The Supreme Council:  consisting of heads of member states, is the highest authority. 
The Supreme Council holds a regular session - usually at the end of each year – and 
may hold extraordinary sessions upon request. The draft agenda for the Supreme 
Council is prepared by the Ministerial Council; 
 
B. The Ministerial Council: acts as the filtering mechanism for the Supreme Council 
and consists of member state Foreign Minsters or other delegated ministers. The 
Council holds ordinary sessions once every three months and may hold extraordinary 
meetings at the request of a member state. Meetings are chaired by the member state 
that presided over the last ordinary session of the Supreme Council. Unanimous 
approval of member states present is required to pass a resolution while a majority 
vote is required for procedural matters; and   
 
C. The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes:  Article 3 of the Rules of 
Procedure Commission for Settlement of Disputes states that the commission once 
installed may only consider the following matters referred to it by the Supreme 
Council: (1) Disputes between member states, and (2) Differences of opinion with 
regards to interpretation or implementation of the Cooperation Council Charter (GCC 
Charter and Procedures, 1991).   The Commission selects its chairperson from among 
its members who are citizens of member states not involved in the dispute and 
submits its recommendations or opinion to the Supreme Council. 
The GCC Charter:  
One of the basic objectives of the Cooperation Council is to formulate similar regulations in 
the fields of (a) economic and financial affairs and (b) commerce, customs and 
communications (Article 4). The Charter allows for further market opening and economic 
integration. However, any new regulations must be unanimously approved by the members of 
the supreme council (heads of member states) as each member has one vote, while only 
resolutions on procedural issues are carried by majority vote (Article 9).  
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The Economic Agreement between GCC States: 
A further Economic Agreement was approved and signed by the Supreme Council at its 22
nd
 
Session during the Muscat Summit on 31 December 2001.  More detailed than its 1981 
predecessor (which aimed at establishing the GCC as a free trading zone), the new agreement 
aims - in its preamble - to ‘achieve advanced stages of economic integration that would lead 
to a common market and an Economic and Monetary Union’ (GCC Economic Agreement, 
2004). The intended level of economic integration between the GCC member countries was 
reflected in a number of articles in the Agreement: 
 
(i) Establishing a Custom Union through a common external customs tariff of 5%, an 
agreed set of regulations and procedures, a single entry point, the elimination of 
trade barriers and the same national treatment of goods produced in the GCC 
(Article 1);  
(ii) Proposing collective international negotiations and economic relations (Article 2);  
(iii) Requiring the removal of any differentiation or discrimination among member 
states in terms of: job opportunities among citizens, real estate ownership, capital 
movement, tax treatment, stock ownership, and other social services like health 
and education (Article 3);  
(iv) Paving the way for possible Monetary Union by 2010: by streamlining the 
investment climate so that all related laws and regulations are similar, providing 




(v) the GCC Agreement stipulates that ‘Member States shall adopt integrational 
policies for the establishment of the infrastructure projects such as seaports, 
airports, Desalination plants, electric power stations, and roads’ (Article 23); and    
(vi) Implementing a mechanism for the Settlement of Disputes among member states. 
When necessary, a specialized judicial commission may be formed to arbitrate 
disputes arising from the implementation of the agreement (Article 27).   
 
We shall consider below what progress has been made to achieve these objectives. 
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 Although some of these measures were implemented, monetary union has not yet been achieved  
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4.2.2 Economic Indicators and Comparisons 
 
There are important economic similarities and differences across GCC member states.  With 
the exception of Bahrain, GCC countries are reasonably well endowed with oil and gas 
reserves although only four countries (Kuwait, Qatar, KSA and the UAE) are members of the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  Oman has oil and gas resources 
but is not a member of OPEC.  Some comparative statistics are presented in  Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Comparison of Economic Indicators Across GCC Countries (2009) 
  
Bahrain  Oman  Qatar  Saudi Kuwait  UAE GCC 
GDP at Current 
Prices (Million US$) 
20,595 46,114 98,313 375,766 148,024 230,252 919,064 
% of GCC 2% 5% 11% 41% 16% 25% 100% 
Popultion (000’s) 792 2,845 1,409 25,391 2,795 4,599 37,831 
% of GCC 2% 8% 4% 67% 7% 12% 100% 
Per Capita Income 
GDP (000 US$) 
26 16 70 15 53 50 24 
Rank (largest = 1) 4 5 1 6 2 3   
Lank Area Sq km 707 309,500 4,200 2,200,000 24,282 83,600 2,622,289 
% of GCC 0.03% 12% 0.2% 84% 1% 3% 100% 
   Source: The World Bank Group (www.worldbank.org) 
 
 
In terms of economic activity and population, Saudi Arabia accounted for over 40% of total 
GCC GDP in 2009 and 65% of the GCC’s population, but has the lowest GDP per capita of 
$15,000.  The GDP per capita of Qatar ($70,000) Kuwait ($53,000) and the UAE ($50,000) 
are significantly higher than the GCC average of $24,000 per capita.  Bahrain’s GDP per 
capita of $26,000 is just above the GCC average whereas the GDP per capita of Oman and 
Saudi Arabia are below the average.  
 
The GCC region covers a total land mass of 2,662 thousand square kilometres. Saudi Arabia 
and Oman account for 96% of this area with other member states accounting for 3% or less.  
 
Most GCC countries are endowed with hydrocarbon resources and some of the world’s 
largest oil and gas reserves are located in the GCC.  In 2006, GCC countries produced 5,762 
million barrels of oil of which Saudi Arabia accounted for 56%, Kuwait and UAE each 
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accounted for 16% of production, and collectively Bahrain, Oman and Qatar accounted for 
11% of total GCC production.  
 
Proven GCC oil reserves in 2006 were an estimated 484,450 million barrels. Saudi Arabia 
accounts for 55% of these reserves, Kuwait 21% and UAE 20%.  Oman and Qatar 
collectively account for just 4% of total GCC proven reserves with Bahrain accounting for 
less than one tenth of one per cent. 
 
Table 3  GCC Crude Oil Production and Reserves (Million Barrels) 
  
Bahrain Oman Qatar Saudi Kuwait UAE GCC 
Production per year 
(2006) 
67 288 310 3,252 895 950 5,762 
% of GCC 1% 5% 5% 56% 16% 16% 100% 
Proven Reserves  120 5,510 15,207 264,310 101,500 97,800 484,447 
% of GCC 0.02% 1% 3% 55% 21% 20% 100% 
Expected years of 
Reserve 
2 19 49 81 113 103   
Source: GOIC (2007) 
 
Turning to GCC gas production, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE accounted for 33%, 22% 
and 22%, respectively, of GCC gas production in 2006.  Oman accounted for 11% with 
Bahrain and Kuwait each accounting for 6%.   Total GCC gas reserves were an estimated 
41,712 billion cubic meters in 2006 of which Qatar’s share is 62%.  In terms of 2006 
production, Qatar has over 500 years of gas reserves.   
 
 
Table 4 GCC Natural Gas Production and Reserves (Million Cubic Meters) 
  
Bahrain Oman Qatar Saudi Kuwait UAE GCC 
Production per 
year (2006) 
13,400 25,300 48,300 73,500 12,800 47,600 220,900 
% of GCC 6% 11% 22% 33% 6% 22% 100% 
Proven Reserve  92,000 900,000 25,783,000 7,037,000 1,600,000 6,300,000 41,712,000 
% of GCC 0.22% 2% 62% 17% 4% 15% 100% 
Expected years of 
Reserve 
7 36 534 96 125 132   
Source: GOIC (2007) 




GCC countries with minimal gas reserves benefit from their proximity to the abundant 
natural gas reserves of Qatar. The Dolphin pipeline project is a good example of this 
economic cooperation: the Dolphin project processes natural gas from the Qatari North Field 
of Ras Laffan (the largest non-associated gas field in the world with 24 wells) and transports 
it through a pipeline to the UAE and Oman in order to facilitate long term industrial growth 
(Shemaine, 2008).   The 364-kilometre 48-inch sub-sea pipeline was partially completed in 
August 2006 and serves customers in three UAE Emirates (Dubai, Abu Dhabi (Al Ain) and 
Fujairah).   The project is expected to supply gas to the Abu Dhabi Water & Electricity 
Authority (ADWEA), Dubai Supply Authority (Dusup), Union Water & Electricity Company 
(UWEC) and Oman Oil Company (OOC). In October 2008, the final link of the pipeline with 
Oman was completed and can deliver an average of 200 million standard cubic feet of gas per 
day for a period of 25 years (Al Dhuhli, 2008 and Observer, 2008).  
       
 Table 5  lists some specific characteristics of GCC member states.   
 
Table 5 Specific Characteristics Among GCC Countries  
Country Specific characteristics 
Bahrain 
* Limited oil and gas reserves could speed up diversification including privatisation of 
services. 
* Small size of land could adversely affect the ability for economic expansion especially in 
power generation. 
* A strong financial sector with reputable offshore financial institutions. 
Kuwait 
* Difficulties in reaching political consensus between government and the parliament had, 
in part, slowed down the implementation of the official strategy on development (IMF 
Country Report No. 04/186, 2004). 
* Over the years, surplus oil revenues were channelled through the General Reserve Fund 
(GRF).   
Oman 
* According to Vision 2020, crude oil is planned to constitute only 9 % of GDP in 2020 
from 40% in 2001.  
Qatar 
* Financially, Qatar has enjoyed a reasonable budget surplus at a time when other GCC 
members were running deficits (like for the 2002 due to a drastic drop in oil revenues). 
Saudi Arabia 
* The last GCC member to join the WTO (December 2005) after lengthy negotiations on 
market opening. 
UAE 
* In recent years, the UAE – especially the Emirate of Dubai- has expanded its real-estate 
sector by further extending foreign ownership rights and developing required financial tools 
and marketing. 
Source: The World Bank Group (www.worldbank.org) 




The economies of all six GCC member states are heavily dependent on hydrocarbons but as 
shown above there are significant differences in member state oil and gas reserves, GDP, 
populations and GDP per capita.  In order to diversify their economies away from 
hydrocarbons GCC member states have introduced policies focussed on increasing private 
sector participation and export oriented manufacturing, real estate development and tourism. 
 Table 6 identifies some of the sectors GCC member states are promoting to aid economic 
diversification.  
 
Table 6 Expected Future Contributors to the Economies of the GCC 
   Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  Saudi 
Arabia  
UAE 
Main Exports       
 





Agro-based   fish    
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based 
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of the economy 
financial 
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Source: Based on GCC Statistical Bulletin (2007), GOIC (2007) and researcher’s findings 
 
 
4.3 GCC Electricity Markets 
 
GCC member states are experiencing strong growth in electricity demand.  In his presentation 
to the 9
th
 Middle East Power Generation Conference
29
, Mohamed Ayesh Dishdash, Director 
of Electricity Department at ARAMCO-Saudi Arabia estimated that by 2015 about US$160 
billion would be required to meet the electricity demands in the area of the Middle East out of 
which US$85 billion would be needed for new generating capacity while US$75 billion 
would be needed to finance the transmission and distribution networks (Al-Shaik, 2004).   
 




 Middle East Power Generation Conference, Dubai, UAE, February 2003.   
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The structure of 2008 electricity demand in GCC member states is presented in  Figure 9:  
residential ‘domestic’ consumption accounts for around 50% of total GCC consumption.  
UAE residential consumers have the lowest share of total consumption at 35%, and Oman the 
highest at 55%.   In an empirical study on the demand for electricity within the GCC, Al-
Faris (2002, p.123) found limited scope for residential customers to switch to alternative 
energy sources (other than electricity) as the elasticity of price and income results for the 
member countries were ‘notoriously small’. The study concluded that ‘the majority of people 
in these countries consider electricity as a necessity’ (ibid). Other users (which available 
statistics fail to disaggregate) may also include government (mainly administration 
buildings). This is one possible explanation why demand is seasonable and falls sharply in 
cooler months as both households and government administrative buildings use less air-
conditioning in cooler months of the year.  
 


















Source: GCC Statistical Bulletin (2008) publication pending  
 
 Figure 10 presents a comparison of the fuel used to generate electricity in each member state 
in 2005. 
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Source: GCC-CIGRE Statistical Bulletin (2005) * The source does not provide details on the fuel used for 
steam generation. 
 
GCC member states are extensive users of fossil fuels for electricity generation.  Oman is the 
most heavily dependent on natural gas for electricity generation and with strong growth in the 
electricity demands of commercial and industrial customers may need to import gas from gas 
rich GCC countries (such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) in the longer term.  
 
All GCC electricity markets are subsidised with consumer tariffs set by the respective 
governments of each member state. The case studies of Oman and Abu Dhabi (to be 
presented in  Chapter 6 and  Chapter 5, respectively) will show that even in countries that have 
introduced electricity market reform, consumer prices are not cost reflective.  GCC experts 
and officials like Al-Asaad and Al Mahrouqi share the view that governments will continue 
subsidising consumer prices
30
.    
 
The Kingdom of Bahrain 
Electricity in Bahrain remains a vertically integrated utility the Authority of Electricity and 
Water (AEW). The Authority – Chaired by the Minister of Works - assumed the 
                                                 
30
 Based on personal communications from Hassan K. Al-Asaad, Corporate Services, GCC 
Interconnection Authority (Saudi Arabia) received on 21 April 2009 and Mohammed Al Mahrouqi, 
Chairman of Public Authority for Electricity and Water (Oman) received on 20 May 2009. 
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responsibilities of the Ministry of Electricity and Water according to a Royal Decree in 12 
December 2007 (Gulf daily News, 2007b).   
 
The BABCO refinery of Bahrain and the Aluminium Smelter, ALBA, are licensed for self 




 (Appendix 1) Bahrain was expected to announce reforms 
through a new regulation in 2007.   Hill and Raza (Appendix 1) also stated that Bahrain and 
Qatar have indicated in a ‘verbal and public context that they do not want to be locked into 
their existing electricity structures’ which gave a signal towards change. Bahrain has taken 
steps to privatise electricity generation. In May 2007, the Parliament voted to delay 
discussion of a new electricity law (Alwaqt, 2007).   
 
On 23 January 2006, three international firms agreed to acquire the assets of Al Hidd Power 
Company (producing little over 900 MW of and 30 million gallons of desalinated water) and 
expand the project on a Build-Own-Operate basis by International Power of the UK (40%), 
Suez Energy International of Belgium (30%) and Sumitomo Corporation of Japan (30%). The 
privatisation deal included the expansion of the plant capacity to produce 60 million gallons 
of desalinated water on the basis of a government 20-year Power and Water Purchase 
Agreement (PWPA) and a separate 20-year Natural Gas Supply Agreement (International 
Power, 2007).   
 
On 3 June 2007, Al Ezzel Power Company (AEPC) started commercial production of full 
capacity of 950 MW (Gulf Daily News, 2007).  Awarded in 2004 on the basis of a 20-year 
PPA signed with the Ministry of Electricity and Water (now the Electricity and Water 
Authority), Al Ezzel is Bahrain’s first independent power producer (IPP) with 45% owned by 
Suez Energy International (Suez Energy International, 2007), 45% owned by the Kuwaiti 
based Gulf Investment Company (GIC) and 10% of the shares held by Pension Fund 
Commission of Bahrain. Al Ezzel accounts for one third of Bahrain’s power generation, Al 
Hidd produces little over one third (962 MW) and the rest (855 MW) is produced by other 
facilities at Sitra, Riffa and Muharraq (Gulf Daily News, 2007).  
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 Adnan I. Al-Mohaisen was then the CEO of the GCC Interconnection Authority (Saudi Arabia). 




It is to be noted that with a 30% and 45% stake in Al Hidd and Al Ezzel - the largest 
electricity producers in Bahrain account for two thirds of the market - Suez Energy 
International is the largest owner of power generation in Bahrain. On the demand side, it is 
estimated that Bahrain needs an additional 300 MW every two years (Ali, 2006). According 
to Abdullah (Appendix 1), all new power generation in Bahrain will be contracted out 
through IPPs, however; no plans are finalised to separate the different segments of the 
industry.  
 
The State of Kuwait 
Kuwait has a state-owned vertically integrated power utility. The Kuwaiti Ministry of 
Electricity and Water manages the utility service as there is no independent regulator. Based 
on the GCCIA report, electricity tariffs in Kuwait are subsidised by the government and 
among the lowest in the GCC region. According to Al-Mohaisen (Appendix 1), Kuwait was 
not one of the early states in declaring specific plans for power sector reforms. In this 
researcher’s view, such delays may have been caused by the Parliament and the government 
not reaching agreements over some development plans.  
 
Kuwait faces electricity shortages in summer months. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Electricity 
and Water added an extra 240 MW capacity in during the summer of 2007 to the already 
existing capacity of 9,100 MW. During summer, the Ministry runs a ‘power rationing’ 
campaign which - according to its undersecretary Al-Hajiri – had a positive public response 
(Kuwait News Agency, 2007). 
 
A significant recent development was the passing of Law No 39/2010 Promulgating The 
Incorporation of Kuwaiti Joint Stock Companies to Undertake the Building and Execution of 
Electricity Power and Water Desalination Station in Kuwait. Article 1 of the law (i) restricts 
government and its affiliates shareholding to no more than 24%, (ii) not less than 26% of the 
shares shall be placed for sale through public auction, (iii) 50% of the shares shall be 
allocated to Kuwaiti nationals (Kuwait Electricity Law, 2010).   
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Law No. 7/2008 introduced a framework for public private partnerships (PPP) and Law No. 
39/2010 permits PPP for generation in the form of BOT projects but with no further 
separation of functions.  The Ministry of Electricity and Water remains a vertically integrated 
entity responsible for system operator and regulatory functions while tariffs are heavily 
subsidised.  When asked if these reforms would lead to the implementation of a cost-
reflective tariff, Al Jassar
32
 (Appendix 1) said this was unlikely.  
 
The Sultanate of Oman 
A full assessment of the Oman electricity market is presented in  Chapter 6 and a detailed 
social cost benefit analysis of the Omani reforms is presented in  Chapter 7. 
 
The State of Qatar 
Based on The Power of Watt (2006), Qatar maintains the highest per capita installed capacity 
among all Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and 
significant gas reserves – the largest in the GCC.    
 
Qatar has undertaken steps to privatise its electricity utility sector.  According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), “The privatisation of the power sector in Qatar has 
advanced rapidly, with most government power generation plants already sold to Qatar 
Electricity and Water Corporation - which is majority-owned by the local private sector. In 
addition, construction has already started on the first independent power and water plant in 
the country, which is majority-owned by a foreign developer” (IMF PIN No.02/99, 2002).  
  
Qatar General Electricity & Water Corporation (QGEWC or KAHRAMA) was established in 
1992 to replace the Ministry of Electricity & Water (Qatari Law No- 6/1992, 1992). The 
Corporation has exclusive rights over the transmission and distribution wires in Qatar but no 
generation activities. This was the first step of separating of the vertically integrated utility.    
 
Qatar Electricity and Water Company (QEWC) is the country’s main electricity producer. 
Established in 1990, the state-dominated (little over 57%) monopoly was set up to own and 
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manage power generation and water desalination. With a private Qatari ownership of about 
43% (Doha Stock Exchange, 2004), the publicly listed QEWC enjoys a renewable 50-year 
term licence.  Ras-Abu-Funtas B station, started operations in 1999 generating 609 
megawatts, Ras-Abu-Funtas A generates 260 megawatts, while Ras-Abu-Abbood and other 
substations generate 502 megawatts (Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).  
 
Separately, Ras Laffan Power Company Limited (RLPC) was established in 2001 by the 
Amiri Decree 44/2001 to operate the power generation facilities at Ras Laffan offshore oil 
field. 10% of RLPC is owned by Qatar Petroleum, 25% by Qatar General Electricity and 
Water Corporation, 10% by the Gulf Investment Corporation and the remaining 55% is 
owned by AES Ras Laffan Holdings. The targeted capacity of the plant is 750 megawatts of 
electricity and 40 million gallons of water.  
 
Apart from the steps taken to privatise generation, the electricity market remains a vertically 
integrated structure with no separate regulator. Licensing and many other regulatory 
functions still remain in the hands of the Ministry of Energy and Industry. Although not clear, 
there is a view to assign some regulatory authority to Kahrama. Being the country’s sole 
transmission and distribution system operator, this may not prove to be a reasonable choice to 
take due to possible conflict of interest.  
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi Arabian electricity restructuring programme is third in line, after earlier reforms in 
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi followed by the Sultanate of Oman. The following parts of this 
research review in detail, as mentioned earlier, the Saudi electricity sector reforms. 
 
Until 1981, four regional Saudi Consolidated Electricity Companies (SCECOs) operated to 
cater for consumer needs in different regions of the country. The electricity service utility in 
Saudi Arabia is mainly in the hands of the state-dominated Saudi Electricity Company (SEC).  
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Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) was established in 2000 by the Saudi government 
(74.15%), Saudi ARAMCO
33
 (6.89) with a private sector shareholding of 18.96% (Saudi 
Electricity Company, 2004).  The company was established by a Royal Decree as a joint 
stock company taking over the assets and responsibilities of the General Electricity 
Corporation (GEC) whose main task was to oversee the main electricity utility, provide 
electricity in rural areas that fell outside the supply chain of the consolidated companies and 
look after the government’s investment in the independent power producers.  
 
According to Abudullah Al Hussayen, the Saudi Water and Electricity Minister, Saudi Arabia 
would require an investment of SR340 billion (nearly US$91 billion) fulfilling its electricity 
requirements over the next 20 years with an annual growth rate of 7%. To meet such demand, 
the Saudi Water and Electricity Minister also noted that the Supreme Economic Council 
approved four IWPPs to be built on the basis of BOO, namely; Shuaiba phase-3, Shuqaiq 
phase-2, Ras AlZour & Jubail phase-3. Based on similar arrangements, Shuaiba phase-3 was 
the first to be contracted for with a capacity of 900MW and 194 million gallons of 
desalinated water per day. The project is funded by the Public Investment Fund (32%), the 
Saudi Electricity Company (8%) and the private sector (60%). The owner, Water and 
Electricity Company will sell all its produced electricity to the Saudi Electricity Company 
(Shaikh, 2007).  
 
The Saudi Electricity Law: 
On 22 November 2005 the Saudi Electricity Law was issue by Royal Decree No. M/56 
(Saudi Electricity Law, 2005). The main features of the Law are summarised as follows; 
1. The Law establishes the Electricity & Co-generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA) as 
a separate regulator for electricity; 
2. The Law requires the regulator (ECRA) to periodically review the tariff structure and 
submit its recommendations to the Council of Ministers (Article 9);  
3. The Law allows the Ministry of Electricity and Water to continue being in charge of 
electricity sector planning, network development and insuring availability of supply 
including that of non-serviced remote areas. The Ministry is also responsible for 
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representing the country in any cross-border trade negotiations and agreements 
(Article 3);     
4. The Law makes a reference to promoting competition in the electricity industry - as a 
joint responsibility of the Ministry and the Regulatory Authority - with a clause 
prohibiting a licensee with a dominant position to undertake any activity that could 
restrict competition (Article 10). Although there are no specific limitations on cross-
ownership specified by the Law, based on Article 10, licensees are to obtain a prior 
approval from the ECRA before undertaking any merger or acquisition, and; before 
purchasing 5% or more of the shares of another licensee.  
5. The Law makes it the responsibility of the regulator to guarantee transmission and 
distribution rights to all licensees on a non-discriminatory basis (Article 11).  
 
The Electricity Regulator:  
The Electricity & Co-generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA) is responsible for licensing 
and compliance, tariff assessments and reviews, developing technical and performance 
standards as well as other organizational and administrative dirties (ECRA, 2007). According 
to the Law, the Authority carries out periodical Tariff structure reviews and submits such 
reviews to the Council of Ministers (Article 9). Although not clear from Article 9, it may be 
assumed that any Tariff change must be taken at the level of the Council. The ECRA is 
managed by a board of directors and chaired by the Minister of Water & Electricity.  
 
The Board of ECRA constitutes of 13 members and a secretary including high officials from 
the Ministries of Finance, Electricity, Economy and Planning and the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources. 
 
The New Market Structure: 
The new electricity sector still remains vertically integrated to a great extent. The Saudi 
Electricity Company (SEC) – with majority state ownership - remains a vertically integrated 
system with a majority market share.  
 
Based on Al-Asaad (Appendix 1), a study was concluded on unbundling the other segments 
of the power sector (i.e. transmission and distribution) which are currently under the 
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jurisdiction of the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) but was not applied. According to Al-
Mohaisen (Appendix 1) a decision has already been taken in early years– at a management 
level - for the unbundling of the vertically integrated electricity company (SEC).   
 
While SEC remains the dominant producer (a traded company with a majority state-holding), 
Marafiq Water & Electricity Company remains the only sizable result of the first round of 
generation privatisation and separation within Saudi Arabia.     
 
For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, transmission, distribution and supply remain largely 
bundled. According to Moussa (2010), Saudi electricity is currently in a transitional stage that 
may take two years. This stage involves the finalisation of regulatory framework, setting 
service standards, identifying licensing methods and procedures, and studying the feasibility 
of separating generation from transmission. A further intermediate stage would then be 
required to separate transmission from generation, a stage which may require 3-5 more years 
(ibid). According to Khan (Appendix 1), some actions have already been taken with this 
regards as a separate transmission company was formed which will also be the system 
operator effective January 2012.  In addition, a principal buyer unit is to be established in the 
beginning of year 2012 and a separate distribution company will be formed in the year 2013. 
 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
The seven UAE Emirates are linked through the Emirates National Grid.  Despite this the 
electricity markets remain mostly vertically integrated systems in each Emirate with the 
exception of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi which has been involved in sector reforms since 1998 
that are discussed in detail in  Chapter 5. 
 
The UAE Ministry of Electricity and Water carried out a national plan that would, once fully 
completed, link the east coast area of Fujairah with the north and west coast Emirates of 
Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-Khaimah. New grid interconnections would also link the 
middle parts of the UAE with the Fujairah in the east. The optimum aim would be to link the 
UAE national grid to the GCC-Grid (UAE Ministry of Electricity and Water, 2004).  
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There are four electricity and water authorities in the UAE: Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity 
Authority (ADWEA), Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA), Sharjah Electricity 
and Water Authority (SEWA) and the Federal Electricity and Water Authority (FEWA).   By 
2007, the UAE had an installed capacity of 16,131 MW with Abu Dhabi (ADWEA), Dubai 
(DEWA), Sharjah (SEWA), Northern Emirates (FEWA) and Northern Emirates (ADWEA) 
accounting for 7,811 MW, 4,710 MW, 1,750 MW, 1,200 MW and 660 MW respectively (UK 
Trade and Investment, 2007).  
 
DEWA (part of the Government of Dubai), SEWA (Part of the Government of Sharjah) and 
(FEWA) are arms of the Federal Government and operate vertically integrated systems.  
 
The Emirates National Grid is a step forward in integrating the different electricity market 
segments of the UAE. The Emirates National Grid (ENG) is an arrangement rather than a 
regulated activity. The ENG Supervision Committee monitors the activities while each entity 
in the system is responsible for arranging flow between the different Emirates. The ENG 
made a significant impact as it already owns some assets. The high voltage substation at Al 
Dhaid is already owned by Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority (ADWEA), the Dubai 
Water and Electricity Authority (DEWA), the Sharjah Water and Electricity Authority 
(SEWA) and the Federal Water and Electricity Authority (FEWA).  
   
GCC Interconnection Authority 
On 16
 
June 1999, the GCC member states agreed to establish the GCC Interconnection 
Authority (GCCIA) as a joint stock company of a US$1.1 billion share capital (GCCIA 
Articles of Association, 1999). According to Janahi (Appendix 1), the SNC-Lavalin original 
study of the project had to be revised so that that the implementation would be carried out in 
two phases instead. It was agreed that the first phase of the interconnection would include 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar while the second phase would bring in Oman and 
the United Arab Emirates.  Based on Abdulrahman Al Atiya, Secretary General the GCC, the 
GCC-Grid would have to be owned and managed - on a purely commercial basis - by the 
independent GCC Interconnection Authority (GCC Ministers Meeting, 2004). 
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According to the GCCIA Articles of Association (1999), The GCCIA is set up as a joint 
stock company. Article 3 allocated the authorised shares capital of U$1.1 billion among the 
member states so that countries with larger connection capacities are allocated larger 
percentages of the share capital, (see  Table 7).  
 
Table 7 GCCIA Interconnection Criteria and Share-capital 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar KSA UAE Total 
Shareholding 
(Million US$) 
99 294 62 129 348 169 1,100 
Shareholding 
(%) 
9% 26.7% 5.6% 11.7% 31.6% 15.4% 100% 
Interconnection 
(MW) 
600 1,200 400 750 1,200 900* 5,050 
Source: GCCIA Annual Report (2006)  * the UAE has an added 400 MW interconnection line with Oman 
 
 
It was subsequently decided to implement the Interconnection Grid in three phases. Contracts 
for the construction of Phase I were awarded in November 2005 (Al-Mohaisen et al., 2007) 
and completed in early 2009 (GCCIA, 2009).  Since Saudi Arabia has a 60Hz voltage system, 
the project included an HVDC Back-to-Back frequency converter contracted at US$206 
million. But the GCCIA is only responsible for the implementation of Phase I - the North 
Grid which interconnects Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia - for which work has 
already started (please refer to  Figure 11). According to Al-Khusaibi, the development of 
Phase II - the South Grid – will be left for Oman and UAE and once completed; Phase III 
would interconnect the North Grid with the South Grid (Appendix 1). However, on 1 April 
2009, the general assembly of the GCCIA approved expediting the joining of UAE to the grid 
and raising the share capital to US$ 1,407 Million (GCCIA, 2009). 
 
Al-Mohaisen (Appendix 1) warned that the size of cross-border electricity flows will be small 
due to connection limitations. He noted that in order to engage in ‘meaningful’ power trade, 
capacity of the interconnection Grid would have to be extended. According to Al-Mohaisen, 
the Grid should further enhance GCC regional integration by removing the ‘mental barriers’ 
to cross-border power trading and hence leading to more cooperative projects between the 
members.  




Figure 11 GCC Interconnection Grid   
 
Source: GCC Interconnection Authority (www.gccia.com.sa) 
 
Stafford Reimers, the Chief Executive of the Bahraini Al Ezzel Power Company (AEPC) 
backed the GCC interconnection Project in anticipation that such grid would help member 
states to balance their peaks and accordingly save on generation related investments (Gulf 
Daily News, 2007). 
 
Al Jassar (Appendix 1) believes the interconnector will provide enhanced system security but 
only limited power exchanges and therefore have little impact on the domestic market 
structure, and since Kuwait’s is a heavily oil-based economy it is unlikely to be a net exporter 
of electricity.  
 
A study by Harara (2008) found that once Phase III of the GCC interconnection is completed, 
Saudi Arabia will be expected to gain the most (41.30%) followed by the UAE (21.68%) 
despite that fact that UAE has the highest peak load among the member states. Kuwait came 
third as it will be expected to take 13.90% of the total gains of the interconnection while the 
expected shares of Bahrain, Oman and Qatar will be 7.83%, 7.67% and 7.62% of the total 
gains, accordingly. 
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The Abu Dhabi and Oman interconnector was energised in 2011 and the procurement and 
transmission system operators licensed by their respective regulators. 
 
Al Hinai and Cleary observed that it is not clear how the GCC-Grid would be regulated 
(Appendix 1). When asked about the expected role of the GCCIA, Hill and Raza (Appendix 
1) expressed concern that it may see itself as a System Operator for all GCC electricity 
markets. Like in many worldwide experiences, electricity reforms are based on a process of 
evolution as one step leads to another. Very importantly, in order for the GCC-Grid to 
become the backbone for electricity trade in the GCC, some ‘new trading arrangements and 
regulatory framework will need to be designed to support the functioning of this new system’ 
(Boisseleau and Jansen, 2005, p. 2).  
 
According to Al-Shaikh (2007), the GCC Grid will be governed by three kinds of legal 
agreements: (i) the General Agreement (GA) between the members for setting the rules and 
defining regulatory committee and regulatory principles, (ii) the Interconnector Transmission 
Code (ITC) for setting out the technical provisions for the Authority, the TSOs and 
procurement agencies, and (iii) the Power Exchange and Trading Agreement (PETA) for 
setting out other capacity and reserve obligations as well as other trade related issues.  
 
While the GCCIA could promote regional reforms by means of the PETA obligations, Al-
Asaad (Appendix 1) argues that the Authority could eventually evolve as a regional regulator.  
Later parts of this research, however, recommend individual GCC regulators whose efforts 
may be coordinated through a regional forum, a view also shared by Al-Mohaisen (Appendix 
1). 
 
4.4 Framework for GCC Economic Integration 
 
 
If the GCC is to achieve greater integration of its electricity markets, this will be achieved 
under the present framework agreements that we turn now to consider. The existing legal 
framework of the GCC provides a framework for and can facilitate greater economic 
integration within the GCC zone.  The framework includes the GCC Charter, the Economic 
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Agreement between GCC States and the Common Customs Law.  The legal framework of 
these agreements may facilitate increases in trade and services between GCC member states.  
 
The Implementation Procedures for the Customs Union: 
The GCC Customs Union was approved by the supreme Council in its 23
rd
 Session held in 
Qatar from 21 to 22 December 2002. According to the GCC Customs Implementation 
Procedures (2003): 
 
(i) The  Customs Union  is based on a common external customs tariff, a common 
law, the unification of internal customs, administrative regulations and procedures 
for imports, exports and re-exports, the  free movement of goods among member 
countries, and the treatment produced in any GCC member as national products;  
(ii) The common customs tariff of the Union is 5%, 417 commodities are exempted 
from all duties in addition to the exemptions provided for the Customs Regulation 
Law while certain extra taxes are levied on special products like tobacco;  
(iii) Duties are collected at first point of entry of the GCC states where the shares of 
the member states shall be distributed according to the final destination of the 
goods for the first three years of establishing the Union; and  
(iv) Imports of manufacturing units (i.e. equipment, spare parts, raw materials and 
other inputs required for production) are exempt from customs duties according to 
the agreed controls and procedures. 
 
To better understand the significance of a GCC economic zone, it would be helpful to 
distinguish between market or economic integration and policy (Molle, 2001). Economic 
integration is, therefore, a two dimensional process. While the first is concerned with 
activating the free movement of goods and services between the member countries, the 
second deals with establishing common rules and regulations for the zone.  As the process of 
economic integration evolves, new legal and institutional arrangements are needed.  
 
In its current form the GCC is a “custom union”, at a stage somewhat between a “free-trade 
zone” and a “Common Market”, subject to the following:  
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(i) a 0% tariff on products of GCC origin cross-trading within member countries (GCC 
Economic Agreement, 2004);  
(ii) the GCC is already implementing a common import tax of 5% towards the outside 
world. Based on a revenue sharing system, the import tax- settlement mechanism 
allows for a free cross-border movement of such imported goods (GCC 
Accomplishments, 2006); 
(iii) the GCC Economic Agreement promotes the free movement of GCC nationals who 
may work in both private and government institutions without any visa requirements. 
Although each member state has its own social security system and pension funds, 
GCC nationals can now move from one country to another and retain the same 
benefits in their original country of residence (GCC Uniform Insurance Law, 2005). 
All member states issued legislation to implement the GCC Law in 2006 except Qatar 
who implemented the GCC uniform law in March 2007 (Qatari Insurance Law, 2007). 
(iv) GCC legislation provides for the free movement of capital and investment among the 
member states. With very limited exceptions
34
, the Agreement allows all GCC firms 
to establish economic and commercial activities within any member country. 
Moreover, GCC firms and nationals are treated as local investors in terms of 
shareholding and share purchases of joint stock companies
35
;  
(v) Finally, GCC member states have similar policy commitments to national health care, 
free education, taxes exemptions including income tax exemptions, and infrastructure 
development.  This is due in part to similarities in economic activity with most 
hydrocarbon-based and with development plans and fiscal policies that are based on 
and sensitive to oil and gas price fluctuations.  
 
Some GCC member states like Bahrain and Oman have entered into tax-free agreements with 
the USA.  If other GCC countries do not do likewise, these agreements may conflict with 
some obligations of the Custom Union.  
  
                                                 
34
 Exceptions are limited to few commercial and economic activities including farming, fishing, 
newspapers and advertising as well as limits on land size ownership.   
35
 Some GCC countries apply certain limitations (for locals only) when offering the shares of the 
newly privatized entities to the public.  
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GCC decision makers are discovering that the more economically integrated a region 
becomes the less control individual member states may have over their own economies.  With 
respect to ‘financial sovereignty’, Oman and the UAE have opted out of the proposed 
Monetary Union (originally scheduled for 2010) while Kuwait has followed its own interests 
and discontinued the Dinar - US Dollar peg.  
 
Pelkmans (2006) stated that ‘The higher or more ambitious the stages of economic 
integration, the closer is their resemblance to economic federalism’.  Moreover, whether 
sovereign states become more or less influential in collective decision making will depend on 
factors such as the size of their economy, their international relations, and the political 
influence they have over other member states.  The Maastricht Treaty negotiations of the 
early 1990s (Treaty of the European Union) are a good example of how some countries 
choose a follow a slower path to economic integration.   During treaty discussions about ‘how 
federal the community may be’ the UK took a clear stand against the federal community 
option and both Germany and France opposed granting authority to the European Parliament 
(McDonald and Dearden, 2005).   States can be reluctant to hand over ‘sovereign power’ to 
regional secretariats or parliaments.  According to Pelkmans (2006), the European 
Community has evolved by means of three processes; 
i) Deepening through economic liberalisation (which included expanding 
common policies and regulations as well as further developing the 
commitments and prohibition list of it members; 
ii) Widening the range of its economic and other powers; and 
iii) Enlargement (through increasing the membership).  
 
With respect to the GCC we can assume - based on the GCC Charter and the Economic 
Agreement to be covered in the next section of the research - that the GCC zone has already 
embarked on the deepening process and the GCC Custom Union has paved the way for a 
widening process. However, enlargement, such as allowing Yemen and Iraq to join the GCC, 
appears less likely due to political and economic considerations.  At present, Yemen’s 
relationship with the GCC is limited to coordinating matters with respect to health, education 
and youth while Iraq’s participation in GCC functions is restricted to sports activities. 
Without ruling out the future possibilities – as the GCC economies are expected to gain due 
to market expansion - any enlargement to the GCC remains most unlikely.  
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Table 8 Phases of Economic Integration and Conditions 
Type Main Criteria Conditions among members 
Free Trade Zone 
(FTZ) 
Consists of a number of 
countries that agree a set of 
policies allowing easy cross-
border exchange of goods.   
 Removal of barriers to trade (like tariffs and 
quotas)  
 Similar production cost structures  
 comparable work procedures and economic 
conditions 




FTZ with one external tariff  One agreed tariff on goods imported including 
no or same quotas to others 
 An agreed revenue sharing system 
 Compatibility in customs procedures used  
Common Market 
(CM) 
CU with free movement of 
labour and capital (no 
restrictions on goods and 
factors movement) 
 Comparable conditions for capital and labour 
availability and cost 
 Free movement of people and investment 
Economic Union 
(EU) 
CM with harmonised economic 
and social policies eliminating 
trade distortion and/or 
discrimination  
 Compatibility of institutions 
 Compatibly of policies 
 Compatibility of decision making forum 
Monetary Union 
(MU) 
Economic Union (EU) with 
common Currency  
 Irrevocable fixed exchange rates 
 Coordinated fiscal policies 
 One single central bank or a unified system of 
central banks 
 Identical inflation rates 
 Similar levels of economic development 
Total economic 
integration 
Unification of monetary, fiscal, 
and social policies 
 Creating a  supranational authority where all 
decisions are made 
 Decisions taken are binding to all member 
countries 
Source: McDonald and Dearden (2005), Molle (2001), Pelkmans (2006), and Jovanović (1997) 
 
The GCC may learn lessons from the EU experience of enlargement.   Based on a study for 
the Austrian Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and labour, transition countries
36
  seeking 
to join the EU faced two types of challenges (Buiter, 2003): i) the macroeconomic challenge 
of aligning fiscal and monetary policies, and ii) microeconomic challenges of implementing 
required structural reforms necessary to improve competitiveness such as institutional reform 
of private enterprises, banking and infrastructure management.  Table 8 reviews the different 
phases of regional integration primarily on the basis of economic integration. 
                                                 
36
 The three Baltic countries (Estonia Latvia, Lithuania), Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania 
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As it is now, the GCC would still require further steps in terms of deepening the convergence 
process (including the required reforms in incentives and subsidies) in order for it to move to 
a stage of an “economic union”. However, the GCC economic zone has its own ‘teething 
problems’. For example, although GCC member states had agreed to launch a Common GCC 
Currency by 2010, Oman has opted out of the “monetary union” option. Based on (Hamood 
Al-Zadjali
37
, 2007), the main arguments against Oman joining are: 
1. Monetary union could entail major costs as a result of ‘loss of sovereignty in the 
sphere of macroeconomic policy making (particularly in respect of fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policies) due to binding restrictions imposed by the convergence 
criteria’ (Hamood Al-Zidjali, 2007, p.1). While keeping in mind Oman’s limited 
hydrocarbon resources and its large young population, ‘Restrictions on “fiscal deficit” 
and “debt” can limit the scope for independent use of national budgets to promote 
growth and development objectives’. In the absence of a strong private sector, this 
may hinder diversification plans through public spending.  Loss of sovereignty in 
fiscal policy could be ‘detrimental to the employment and sustainable growth 
objectives of Oman’; 
2. Over time, the oil and gas dependence would vary from one GCC member to another 
resulting in shifts in macroeconomic requirements and policies among member states. 
Countries with low hydrocarbon reserves may be required to apply completely 
different fiscal, monetary and exchange rate polices, while members with higher oil 
and natural gas reserves may wish to keep their existing policies; and  
3. Based on EU experience, the larger Euro-zone economies may decide to impose 
benchmarks and conditions on smaller countries while larger economies may violate 
such criteria. Hence, the interests of Oman’s relatively smaller economy may be 
overlooked by group policies of the GCC.  
 
The Currency Union is also challenged by a set of managerial, psychological, and as a result, 
cultural and political implications. Due to a weakening US Dollar, Kuwait decided to move 
back to a basket of currencies Dinar-exchange system in the first half of 2007. In defending 
the timing of such decision, the Governor of Central Bank of Kuwait Sheik Salem Al-A-
Sabah said that it had its justification and it would bring down inflation rates (Kuna, 2007). 
This removal of Kuwaiti-Dinar’s peg to the US Dollar complicated matters even further and 
                                                 
37
 CEO of Oman Central Bank 
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could lead the way for other GCC members to follow (Kerr, 2007) like the UAE which has 
also been considering the ending its currency’s peg to the Dollar (Gulf Times, 2007). Just 
three years before the agreed date for establishing Union, the UAE Central Bank Governor 
Sultan Al Suweidi hinted that a single currency was not achievable by 2010 (John, 2007). By 
May 2009 (less than a year before the agreed date) the UAE officially declared that it will not 
participate in the GCC Monetary Union after expressing reservations over a decision to base 
the Monetary Council (the precursor to a GCC central bank) in Riyadh of Saudi Arabia 
(Subhani, 2009). Although other GCC countries continue to promote a common currency, 





The GCC region is now at a stage of a Custom Union, and although there are similarities 
between the member states, primarily due to their proximity and heavy dependence on 
income from oil and gas, their economies differ amply. The key conclusions of our review of 
the GCC are summarised below: 
1. The diversities between member states in terms of country area and population (with 
Saudi Arabia accounting for over 80% and 60% of the total share respectively) and in 
terms of gas and oil reserves (with Qatar having 62% and Saudi Arabia having 55% 
of the GCC total share respectively), could yield some imbalances that might 
influence regional negotiations and slow down more ambitious regional integration 
and market opening. Accordingly, we must account for possible implications when 
advising for a policy targeted at regional market reform including electricity sector 
restructuring; 
2. While the GCC Interconnector may play the intended role of providing electricity 
(cross-border) in cases of emergency, the Interconnector is still limited in size while 
member country electricity regulations vary and there are no specific trading 
arrangements to promote cross-border exchange. Unless such constraints are dealt 
with at the GCC level, we envisage very limited – if any - cross-border electricity 
exchange in the medium term; 
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3. The existing GCC institutional framework may promote multi-intergovernmental 
discussions but would need to be complemented by a sector-specific policy if regional 
electricity sector restructuring is to be implemented; 
4. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, the small size of GCC member state electricity 
markets will limit the scope of possible market reform.  Moreover, there seems to be a 
consensus within the GCC that a policy of tariff subsidisation will continue and that 
security of supply is an important policy priority.  We consider the constraints 
imposed by the policy considerations when developing policy recommendation advice 
for GCC electricity market reform; and 
5. On the issue of electricity market design, in the absence of GCC competition law – 












The Emirate of Abu Dhabi of the UAE initiated extensive electricity market reforms on 1 
March 1998 with the promulgation of Abu Dhabi law No 2 of 1998.  This chapter presents a 
case study of the Abu Dhabi reforms highlighting some provisions of the Law and its 
amendments, and describes the new market structure and key market participants.  When 
relevant, we refer to the Omani case study presented in  Chapter 6.    
 
5.2 Background and Electricity Market Characteristics 
 
Prior to the issue of the Law the Abu Dhabi electricity market was vertically integrated under 
the management of the Water and Electricity Department of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The 
reforms passed responsibility for the sector to the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority 
(ADWEA) which serves 1.7 million people and is responsible for meeting the electricity 
requirements of more than 39% of the UAE population covering 87% of the UAE land area 
(ADWEA Annual Report, 2006).   
 
Between 1998 and 2010, electricity generation in Abu Dhabi increased by 210%, from 16 
TWh to 50 TWh, representing annual average growth of 10%.   Over the same period 
installed generating capacity increased from 16.1 GW to 49.9 GW, a 266% increase.   Figure 
12 presents indices for electricity generation and capacity from 1998 to 2010 with 1998 = 
100.   
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Cummulative capacity 1998 = 100
Cummulative generation 1998 = 100
 
Source: ADWEC Statistical Reports (2008 to 2010)  
 
The characteristics of electricity and system operational requirements give rise to a need for 
capacity to always exceed demand.  It is clear, however, that between 2004 and 2006 growth 
in capacity significantly exceeded demand and again from 2008 to 2010.  Gaps between 
planned capacity and actual generation are to a degree unavoidable due to the lumpy nature 
of capacity additions, although excess capacity surpluses can reflect inefficient procurement 
and give rise to excessive costs.  When determining if a system has excess capacity it is 
important to consider other factors such as, in the case of Abu Dhabi, whether electricity 
capacity is required to produce desalinated water.  A further point is the rate of growth in 
electricity demand as strong demand growth can reduce the expected duration of surplus 
capacity.   
 
The post reform increase in capacity might also be explained by an increased focus on 
security of supply reflected in new statutory based planning obligations, including a 
generating capacity planning standard of 1 day in 10 years (ADWEC, 2009).    
 
Another feature of the Abu Dhabi electricity system is an established seasonal profile of 
generation,  Figure 13 presents monthly generation for 2006 to 2010.   
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Source: ADWEC Statistical Reports (2010)  
 
Generation is significantly higher in the months of May to October when ambient 
temperatures are high and declines in other months in line with temperature.  Based on 
CIGRE-GCC (2005), 52% of the electricity in the GCC, UAE included, is consumed by 
households whose air-conditioning requirements are positively correlated with temperature.  
 
During cooler months of the year, the power system in Abu Dhabi has nearly 50% 
unavoidable extra capacity. According to Miller et al. (2005), the Abu Dhabi load profile 
illustrated in  Figure 13 is broadly similar to other GCC electricity demand profiles as seen in 
the Omani case study presented in  Chapter 6.  Al-Khusaibi observed that cross-border trade 
may still be viable between Abu Dhabi and Oman even in the summer months and that there 
are some gains expected from differences between peak months and time zones. He noted 
that Oman’s usual summer peak months are May and June while for Abu Dhabi the peak is 
after the month of July, suggesting that reserves could be better utilized through trade 
(Appendix 1).  
 
 
                                                 
38
 Gross energy demand for Abu Dhabi is the sum of ADWEA system monthly generation plus net 
imports from Takreer (in the Emirate of Fujairah) 
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5.3 Abu Dhabi Electricity Sector Law (Law No (2) of 1998)  
 
The Abu Dhabi electricity sector legislation “Law No (2) of 1998 Concerning the Regulation 
of the Water & Electricity Sector in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi” was enforced by the State 
Decree No. 2 issued on 1 March 1998 in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi of the UAE.  Based on the 
Law, the previously vertically integrated electric and water service utilities were unbundled 
(Abu Dhabi Law No. 2, 1998 and its amendments Abu Dhabi Law No. 19, 2007). The 
following sections provide a listing of the purpose of the Law – and its amendments – as well 
as some of the main legislation policies relevant to this research.   
 
First, the purpose of the sector law may be summarised as follows:  
(i) To create an independent government agency for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (Abu 
Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority) responsible for managing the electricity 
and water sector in the Emirate (Article 3); and 
(ii) That the Authority shall have a separate legal personality (Article 4) and is 
entitled to retain ownership of all the shares of the Abu Dhabi Power Corporation 
(Article 7); and       
(iii) That all government ownership in area of electricity generation and water 
production, transmission, supply and other related services would be consolidated 
through the special investment vehicle (Abu Dhabi Power Corporation) under the 
full control of the above mentioned government Authority (Article 27); and to  
(iv) Establish  a sole regulator to the sector (the Regulation & Supervision Bureau (the 
Bureau)); and to  
(v) Set up a single-buyer model (through Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company).        
 
Second, the sector law includes a number of important policies: 
(i) The law states that government-owned firms in the sector (wholly or partially-
owned) be exempted from any taxes or fees including import duties on machines 
and spare parts (Article18);  
(ii) The law provides for a company for servicing remote areas (Article 41) if need be; 
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(iii) Based on the law (Article 44), the Bureau was established to act as the sole 
regulator of the water and electricity sector. Later, Water Sewerage was added to 
the responsibilities of the Bureau (Abu Dhabi Law No. 17, 2005). The law 
mandates that the RSB issues an annual report – to be made available for the 
public - on its activities including its investigations during the year (Article 58). 
The RSB is financed by licence fees while the budget is approved by its members 
(amended Article 52);  
(iv) Based on the law, the regulator (RSB) has a number of obligatory functions and 
duties (Articles 53 and 54): 
 To primarily ensure the continued availability of water for human 
consumption and electricity for hospitals and disabled, aged and sick.; and to 
 Ensure the security of supply of water and electricity in Abu Dhabi. In doing 
so, the Bureau would be required to oversee the  efforts of ADWEC which is 
entrusted by the law (Article 32) with the capacity planning duty; 
 Ensure the connection and supply of water and electricity to all consumers on 
reasonable demand; 
 To provide for health and safety standards; and 
 To promote competition and protect consumer interest in terms of conditions 
and price of supply.  
(v) The Board Members of the Bureau (RSB) are appointed by the Chairman of the 
Executive Council of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (previously by the Chairman of 
ADWEA) for a – renewable - term of five years (according to the amended Article 
45 of Law No. 19). Moreover, members of the subsidiaries of ADWEA may be 
appointed by ADWEA, however; based on Article 25 of the law, the management 
and board of the Authority shall not be involved in the board of the Abu Dhabi 
Corporation during their term of appointment in ADWEA;   
(vi) The Abu Dhabi sector law ensures that the Bureau regulates the prices to be 
charged to consumers and the methods in which they are to be charged (Article 
55); 
(vii) The law states that all new capacities are tendered. The tender procedure involves 
consultation with the Bureau and a requirement that allows only entities with prior 
 Chapter 5  Case Study I – Electricity Sector Reform in Abu Dhabi 
 131 
experience of developing IPP with appropriate financial and managerial 
competencies to participate in tender competitions (Article 35); and  
(viii) The law prohibits transmission companies – by licence conditions - from 
undertaking any other activities (Article 93). Further, distribution and supply 
licensees are not allowed to undertake any other activities while licensees are to 
refrain from any cross-subsidy between the activities of distribution and supply 
(Article 94). 
 
2007 Amendments  
On 1 July 2007 Abu Dhabi Law No. 19, 2007 made some important amendments to 
provisions of Law No 2 of 1998.  The amendments provided for greater independence for the 
regulator – especially from ADWEA - and strengthened powers for Bureau board members to 
reduce the likelihood of the Bureau being dominated or influenced by one person, following 
criticisms voiced over some decisions of the UK Director General of Electricity Supply as 
presented by Green et al (2006) in Section  3.2 of this research. Other amendment measures 
include: 
(i) The board members of the Bureau set out and decide its procedures, voting 
process, meetings as well as the management system which allows for more 
independency (new Paragraph 1 of Article 45);   
(ii) The board members of the Bureau shall be appointed by the Chairman of the 
Executive Council of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (amended Paragraph 2 of Article 
45); 
(iii) Resignation of any board member must be addressed to the Chairman of the 
Executive Council which allows for less dominance by the Chairman of the Board 
(amended Article 46). Moreover, the removal from office of any member is now 
in the hands of the Chairman of the Executive Council of Abu Dhabi (new Article 
47);  
(iv) The Board Members of the Bureau are appointed by the Chairman of the 
Executive Council of the ADWEA for a – renewable - term of five years (Article 
45); and 
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(v) The Bureau must submit annual reports to the Chairman of the Executive Council 
of Abu Dhabi (amended Article 58) instead of the previous reporting mechanism 
to the Chairman of ADWEA. 
 
5.3.1 Unbundling and the New Market Structure 
 
Prior to 1998, the Abu Dhabi electricity market comprised a vertically integrated ministry 
under state control.   Figure 14 illustrates the past and present electricity market structures.     
 
The new market structure is characterised by functional separation of generation, 
transmission and distribution, with distribution and supply undertaken by companies in 
authorised areas stipulated in their licenses.  The new market structure is fully corporatized 
with extensive government ownership and private sector participation restricted to 
generation.  The government retains a 60% share in IPPs while two generators (IMPC and 
BPC) are wholly-owned by the government.  TRANSCO, the two DISCOS of Al Ain 
(AADC) and Abu Dhabi (ADDC), the procurement company (ADWEC), and the vertically 
integrated Abu Dhabi Company for Servicing Remote Areas (RASCO) are companies 
wholly-owned by the government.  All companies operating in the new market structure are 
regulated by the Bureau.   
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Figure 14 Unbundling of the Abu Dhabi Electricity Market  
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A feature of the Abu Dhabi electricity sector is that the state continues to own 60% of each 
power generating company (through ADWEA or TAQA) and 100% of two small plants in 
remote areas.  
 
It is noticeable from  Figure 15 that no plant has more than a 25% share of the total market, 
although the government’s shareholdings in I(W)PP means that the market is heavily 
concentrated in terms of ownership. Nevertheless, the Abu Dhabi Law does not include any 
maximum threshold on market share or ownership.   As in the case study for Oman, we may 
recall the findings of Andersson and Bergman (1995) who concluded while investigating the 
electricity market in Sweden that it would be desirable to have at least five firms of similar 
size competing in the Swedish market as a safeguard against market concentration.  
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The IPP of Emirates SembCorp Water & Power Company (ESWPC) is a special case 
company located in the Emirate of Fujairah. Although all desalinated water is committed to 
Abu Dhabi, the company could play an active role in the promotion of electricity trade within 
the Emirates National Grid (ENG).  
 
Power & Water Procurement  
Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company (ADWEC), is a private joint stock company 
licensed by the Bureau as the single-buyer and seller of water and electricity in Abu Dhabi. 
This monopoly buyer operates through various Power and Water Purchase Agreements 
(PWPAs) and this monopsonist sells to the two distribution companies via the bulk supply 
tariff (BST). According to the Law (Abu Dhabi Law No. 2, 1998), ADWEC is responsible 
for planning additional water and electricity capacity requirements (Article 32). ADWEC is 
also entrusted with the tendering process, after consulting with the ADWEA, for any 
additional capacities of water and electricity (Article 35).  The law stipulates that bidders 
(subject to pre-qualification) are given an equal and fair chance by the single buyer.  
In the case of Abu Dhabi, almost all private investors in generation are international firms. 
Hill and Raza argue strongly that for the time being it would be risky for international firms 
to accept any arrangements other than the currently used long-term purchase contracts. 
Investors ‘might simply walk away’ if asked to compete on more advanced arrangements like 
a day-ahead–price mechanism (Appendix 1). 




Abu Dhabi Transmission and Dispatch Company (TRANSCO), is a private joint stock 
company that owns and manages the 400, 220 and 132 kV transmission lines in Abu Dhabi as 
well as the 1600 mm to 400 mm water pipeline network. TRANSCO is therefore a natural 
monopoly, owned by ADWEA, in charge of electricity transmission and water storage and 
transmission across the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. Based on Article 40 of the Law, transmission 
tariffs are regulated by the Bureau and either TRANSCO or any other transmission operator 
‘shall not create a preference in favour of, or unduly discriminate against’ any generators or 
distributors.  
 
Distribution & Supply 
There are two distribution and supply companies.  
Abu Dhabi Distribution Company (ADDC), is registered as a public joint stock company for 
electricity and water distribution in the Municipality area of the city of Abu Dhabi selling 
directly to over 200 thousand customers.  The company owns and operates the 33 and 11 kV 
power lines as well as the 800 to 50 mm water distribution pipelines. 
Al Ain Distribution Company (AADC), is based in the city of Al Ain and registered as a 
public joint stock company responsible for the city’s 33 and 11 kV electricity distribution 
network - serving more than 86 thousand customers - as well as the water distribution 
network. 
The law requires the two DISCOS to keep separate accounts for their distribution and supply 
businesses.   
 
Remote Area Services 
Abu Dhabi Company for Servicing Remote Areas (RASCO) is a vertically integrated 
company servicing remote areas.  RASCO is the only vertically integrated company in the 
new Abu Dhabi market structure and is licensed to generate, transmit, distribute and supply 
electricity and desalinated water for remote areas (RSB Annual Report, 2005).    As with the 
Rural Areas Electricity Company in Oman, RASCO’s remote systems will eventually be 
absorbed into the main electricity system as that expands.    
 Chapter 5  Case Study I – Electricity Sector Reform in Abu Dhabi 
 136 
 
Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority  
In accordance with the provisions of Law No (2) of 1998 ADEWA has significant 
responsibilities in the Abu Dhabi electricity sector.  
 
Article 4 of the Law No. 2 gave ADWEA legal, financial and administrative independence in 
order to carry its responsibilities (Abu Dhabi Law No. 2, 1998). Since it was established in 
1998, ADWEA continued to enjoy the powers over the various sector entities through its 
ownership. It is worth noting that according to the four approaches of Ocaña (2001) already 
presented in  Chapter 2 the Abu Dhabi reforms are incomplete with respect to horizontal 
unbundling due to a deficiency in ownership separation.  
 
ADWEA is itself wholly-owned by the Abu Dhabi government and wholly-owns seven 
companies responsible for a variety of activities including power generation, water 
production, transmission and distribution in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (ADWEA Statistical 
Leaflet, 2006, ADWEA Annual Report, 2006 and ADWEC, 2009): 
At early stages of restructuring, ADWEA used to own Union Water & Electricity Company 
(UWEC) located in the Emirate of Fujairah and selling power mainly to the Northern 
Emirates through the Federal Electricity and Water Authority of the UAE (FEWA).  Later, in 
June 2006, 40% of ADWEA’s shares in the 535 MW plant (and 100 MIGD of desalinated 
water) was sold to private firms. The company then became Emirates SembCorp Water & 
Power Company (ESWPC).  
 
ADWEA and/or its sister company Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA) control a 
majority shareholding in each of the following six independent power and water producers 
(IWPPs). All joint venture projects are established on the basis of build, own and operate 
(BOO) arrangements while they sell their produced electricity and water to the single buyer 
ADWEC through long-term Power and Water Purchase agreements (PWPAs). All the entities 
are currently registered as private joint stock companies with a majority state ownership;   
1. Emirates CMS Power Company (ECPC), which is based on a BOO scheme of the A 
Taweelah ‘A-2’ combined cycle power ‘electricity and water desalination’ plant. 
ADWA (through its subsidiary Emirates Power Plant) owns 6%, TAQA (still a state-
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dominated company to be discussed in detail later) owns 54% while CMC Generation 
Taweelah Limited (a subsidiary of CMC Generation) owns the 40% remaining shares; 
2. Gulf Total Tractebel Power Company (GTTPC), which resulted from  a consortium 
chosen selected in 1999 to implement the Taweelah ‘A1’ electricity and water 
production project. The company is owned by ADWEA (6%), TAQA (54%), and the 
remaining 40% is split evenly between Total Fina Elf (20%) and Tractebel (20%). 
The company has a licensed capacity of 1350 MW and 84 MIGD of desalinated 
water; 
3. Shuweihat CMS International Power Company (SCIPCO), a company that was based 
on a BOO scheme to produce 1,500 MW of power and 100 MIGD of desalinated 
water. The project also included 220kV and 400kV grid stations to be then transferred 
to the TRANSCO. This joint venture company the owned by ADWEA and TAQA 
(40%), CMS Generation (20%) and International Power (20%). The operations and 
maintenance of the plant are undertaken on the basis of a 20 year contract by 
Shuweihat O&M Limited Partnership (SOMLP) - a company especially formed for 
this purpose with CMS Energy and International Power owning 50% of the shares; 
4. Arabian Power Company (APC), with 60% owned by ADWEA and  TAQA, 20% by 
International Power,  14% by Tokyo Electric Power Company and 6% by Mitsui & 
Co., Ltd. %).  The company owns and manages a variety of new and old units ranging 
from a 7 MW Diesel plant to a 360 MW steam-turbine plant (Arabian Power 
Company, 2007);  
5. Taweelah Asia Power Company (TAPCO), an other BOO project with 60% state 
majority share holding  out of which ADWEA directly controls 10% and TAQA owns 
the remainder 90%. The 40 % of private equity is split through a holding company 
between Marubeni Corporation (35%), the BTU Group
39
 (25%), Powertek Berhad
40
 
(25%) and 15 % for JBC (Taweelah Asia Power Company, 2007);  
6. Emirates SembCorp Water & Power Company (ESWPC) is a special case company 
located in the Emirate of Fujairah. The state (through TAQA) owns 60% while Gulf 
Holding Company (a subsidiary of SembUtilities) owns 40% of the company. Similar 
                                                 
39
 BTU Group is an investment group focused in energy related industries. With $600 million invested 
in power generation and water desalination, the BTU Group also includes in it shareholding publicly 
traded companies, institutional investors and investment banks from the GCC.  
40
 Powertek Berhad is an infrastructure company listed in the Malaysian stock exchange.  
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to other producers, the company signed a 22-year Purchase Agreement with ADWEC 
for its existing capacity of 535 MW, a 100 million imperial gallons per day (MIGD) 
and an additional 225 MW to be commissioned by 2009 (SembCorp Industries, 2007 
and TAQA, 2007). While all desalinated water is already committed to Abu Dhabi, 
the company could play an active role in the promotion of electricity trade within the 
Emirates National Grid (ENG), through its existing connection;  
7. Fujairah Asia Power Company (FAPCO) owns the Fujairah F2 Plant a power 
generation and seawater desalination plant with 2,000 MW of net power capacity and 
130 MIGD of net water capacity commissioned in 2010. Located in the Emirate of 
Fujairah approximately 280 kilometres north east of the city of Abu Dhabi.  The Abu 
Dhabi Water & Electricity Authority holds a 60% equity interest with Marubeni and 
International Power each holding 20%. The project is funded by a mix of debt and 
equity; and  
8. Ruwais Power Company (RPC) is an IWPP comprising desalination capacity of 100 
MIGD, and generation capacity of 1,511 MW. 
 
Interconnections  
The Abu Dhabi electricity grid is connected to the Emirates National Grid, allowing 
electricity to be transmitted from Abu Dhabi (ADWEA) to Dubai (DEWA) amounting to 400 
MW in 2006 and expected to increase thereafter. Abu Dhabi is expected to be a net exporter 
of electricity and is not expected to enter into any long-term trading agreements. 
 
The Abu Dhabi transmission network is also connected to that of Oman by the Al Waseet 
(Oman) and Al Ouhah (Abu Dhabi) a 220 kV 400MW 52 Kilometre power line. This line is 
in existence and is said to be the main connection for Phase II of the GCC Grid. According to 
Gleissner and Miller, the two systems are ready for electricity trading while Abu Dhabi has 
already proposed an agreement with Oman (Gleissner and Miller, 2007).  
 
In 2011 the Oman and Abu Dhabi procurement companies signed contracts to facilitate the 
sharing of reserve and minimal exchanges to electricity in emergency situations across the 
Oman – Abu Dhabi interconnection.  
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5.3.2 Regulation and Competition in Generation  
 
The Abu Dhabi electricity market comprises a number of statutory monopolists (ADWEC, 
TRANSCO, AADC, AADC and RASCO) and a statutory monopsonist (ADWEC).  These 
companies are heavily regulated by the Bureau which monitors compliance with the 
conditions in the respective licenses, and administers RPI-X type price controls that 
incentivise companies to perform their functions efficiently.     
 
Regulation of generation focuses on ensuring ADWEC competitions to procure new capacity 
are as competitive as possible.  Bidders compete to enter the market and once in the market 
face no direct competition from other generators but are strongly incentivised to satisfy the 
performance requirements of their contracts with ADWEC.  The main incentive is to 
maximise availability (particularly in summer months) as availability payments recover a 
facility’s fixed costs, including capital investment costs and returns to providers of capital.   
Energy charges are typically closely aligned to avoidable costs and in contrast to a situation 
of wholesale competition, production facilities can be indifferent to despatch as they are not 
exposed to output (market) risk.  
 
In a highly regulated environment with significant state ownership and controls some might 
argue that concerns about the exercise of potential market power may be misplaced.    
However, there are at least three supporting arguments why this research is concerned with 
exploring market power potentiality.  First, the state obtaining shares in each generator - 
which seems to be the policy so far – may not continue in the future once more TAQA shares 
are offered to the public, and hence, allowing shares to be passed to the ‘private hands of the 
few’. Accordingly, in the absence of legal thresholds on market share, major private investors 
could easily become key market players. Secondly, such – justifiable - concerns may deter 
government plans for further market opening and divesture. Preferably, reforms must be 
viewed as the best option for expediting development - using proper market design - rather 
than a ‘threat’ to policy makers due to some underperformances and market failure 
potentiality. Thirdly, a level playing field is needed in order to ensure effective competition. 
Factors like plant size and age could influence the biding process, and hence, depriving or 
facilitating new entrants to the market in the absence of market share restrictions. 
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For the time being, just like in the case of Oman, the single-buyer market structure in Abu 
Dhabi is subject to countervailing forces that may restrict the exercise of market power, the 
Bureau being one example.  However, the absence of market share and economic interest 
restrictions such as are in place in Oman may harm competitions for new capacity in Abu 
Dhabi if potential new entrants were to be concerned about potential market dominance.   
Moreover, the Abu Dhabi Law does not address the issue of mergers which are usually 
addressed – in more developed markets - by specifically established competition authorities.   
 
5.3.3 Post Reform Developments  
 
 
The Abu Dhabi National Energy Company PJSC (TAQA) was established as an energy 
investment company in 2005. Based on the Amiri Decree No. 16/2005, TAQA was founded 
with a paid up capital of UAE Dhs 4.15 billion (US$ 1.12).
41
 The primary objective of the 
newly established holding company was to finance and acquire shares of different companies 
operating in the field of energy including electricity and water generation, transmission and 
distribution (although it has only concentrated on the generation side so far). On 23
rd
 July 
2005, TAQA was floated to the public while ADWEA kept 51% of the shares (ADWEA 
Annual Report, 2006). Based on the latest Amiri Decree, the Authority was required to 
transfer 90% of its investments in the public and private joint stock companies (holding 
companies) in favour of the newly established TAQA while the remaining balance equity was 
paid in cash. Upon the expiry of the 20-year tenure of the PWPAs, the Abu Dhabi National 
Energy Company would have to look for new means of business in order to sell its plants’ 
output of water and electricity. Out of its original 51% share in TAQA, the state owned 
ADWEA has already transferred 24.1% to the Fund for the support of Farm Owners ‘The 
Farm Owners Fund’. The Fund is managed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the 
Executive Council of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (TAQA, 2007).     
 
When established in June 2005, TAQA was totally owned by ADWEA.  By August 2005, 
24.9% of TAQA shares were placed for public offering, while 24.1% of the shares were 
offered through a private offering while ADWEA retained 51% of the shares (TAQA Annual 
Report, 2007). Although TAQA is dominantly a state owned company, the establishment of 
                                                 
41
 1 UAE Dirham equals US$0.273 
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the company may be considered as a step towards further ownership separation and market 
restructuring. This public joint stock company clearly allows for future divesture of 
government interest in the water generation and the production of desalinated water, away 
from the wholly state-owned ADWEA. Further unbundling and increased transparency 
between generation, transmission and distribution would be expected if more TAQA shares 
are placed for public offering.      
 
We also note that Article 9 (on Subsidiaries) gives ADWEA power to ‘merge the Abu Dhabi 
Water and Electricity Company with the Abu Dhabi Transmission and Despatch Company’ 
(Abu Dhabi Law No. 2, p. 18, 1998).  A decision to do so would represent a step back in 
terms of greater functional re-integration.    
 
5.4 Key Observations  
 
Our review of the electricity market reforms in Abu Dhabi confirms significant functional 
separation, full corporatisation, and extensive government ownership with private sector 
participation limited to generation.  The electricity market is regulated by a separate 
regulatory body whose independence was strengthened by amendments to Law No (2) of 
1998 implemented in 2007.  Our key observations are as follows:  
1. While the 2007 amendments to Law No (2) of 1998 have strengthened the 
independence of the Bureau, this would be further strengthened by requiring the 
Bureau to report directly to the Council of Ministers;     
2. It would be advisable for the state to divest its shareholdings in TAQA and for TAQA 
to be prohibited from acquiring any interests in ADWEC, TRANSCO, the DISCOS or 
RASCO.    Considering the size of the Abu Dhabi market, TAQA investments should 
be limited to generation while ADWEA should not be permitted to hold shares in 
generation companies as it is the sole owner of ADWEC (the contract counterparty to 
I(W)PP companies) and TRANSCO;  
3. Abu Dhabi might consider the introduction of market share and economic interest 
restriction – that would also apply to TAQA; and  
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4. Removing the possibility of merging ADWEC and TRANSCO would reduce a 
possible source of uncertainty going forward and clarify the government’s 
commitment to functional separation.  
 
5.5 Conclusions  
 
This case study confirms the fundamental nature of the reforms implemented in Abu Dhabi. 
In many respects the Abu Dhabi reforms are a good example for other Emirates to follow.    
 
There are, however, further measures the government might consider to bring the Abu Dhabi 
model closer to the ‘textbook model’ and prepare the way for further reform, for example 
restricting TAQA’s role in the market to clarify the roles of public and private sector 
participation and distinguish its responsibilities from those of ADWEA; improving cost and 
subsidy transparency by requiring publication of cost subsidy and accounting information; 
further separation of distribution and supply functions to assist the development of retail 
tariffs.  
 
The amendments to the Abu Dhabi law in 2007 were required to improve the independence 
of the regulator, particularly from ADWEA influence, and clarify the relationship between 




Chapter 6 Case Study II: Electricity Sector Reform in Oman 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The Sultanate of Oman initiated its electricity market reforms in July 2004 with the 
promulgation of Royal Decree 2004 issuing the Law for the Regulation and Privatisation of 
the Electricity and Related Water Sector, also referred to as the Sector Law (Oman Electricity 
Law, 2004).   This chapter presents a case study of Oman’s electricity market reforms 
highlighting some of the major provisions of the Sector Law, and its subsequent amendments, 
the new electricity market structure and key market participants.   
 
6.2 Background and Electricity Market Characteristics 
 
The Oman electricity market presently comprises three market segments:  (i) the Main 
Interconnected System (MIS) in the north of Oman (87.5% of total supply in 2010), (ii) 
remote rural systems (2.6% of 2010 supply), and (iii) the vertically integrated Salalah Power 
System (9.9% of 2010 supply).      
 
As noted in Section  4.3, residential customers account for around 50% of total GCC 
electricity demand.  Figure 16 shows that in 2010, residential customers in Oman accounted 
for 52% of total supply (55.2% in 2005), commercial customers 21% (16.6% in 2005), 
industrial customers 10% (6.3% in 2005) and government 14% (20.1% in 2005) (AER 
Annual Reports, 2010).   The increased shares of commercial and industrial customers and 
the lower share of government consumption reflect the macroeconomic policy of the 
government that aims to increase the private sector’s share of economic activity.    
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Source: AER Annual Reports (2010) 
 
Electricity demand and generation is significantly higher in the summer months when 
ambient temperatures are high.   Figure 17 shows monthly net MIS generation (excluding 
rural systems and the Salalah Power System) in 2009 and 2010 and monthly maximum 
ambient temperatures in 2010. 
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Demand is highest in April, May, June, July, August and September when recorded 




C. CIGRE-GCC (2005), estimated that 
52% of electricity demand in the GCC is consumed by households whose air-conditioning 
requirements are positively correlated with temperature. 2010 MIS system peak demand was 
3613 MW in June of that year and was 2495 MW on 25
th
 of June 2005, giving a 45% 
increase over five years (AER Annual Report, 2010).   
 
The profile of aggregate electricity demand is such that in cooler months of the year there is a 
significant amount of surplus capacity, a characteristic shared by all GCC member states and 
one that could give rise to possibilities for electricity trade if there are sufficient variations in 
the marginal cost of generation in member states and interconnector use of system charges 
are not prohibitive.    
 
Oman Electricity Market Pre reform 
The decision to implement major electricity sector reform was approved by the Council of 
Ministers in 1999.  The structure of Oman’s electricity sector at that time centred around a 
vertically integrated self-regulated ministry (MHEW) which was not subject to published 
operational planning or performance standards.  Tariffs to final customers were approved by 
the Council of Ministers and, as in other GCC countries, were not cost reflective and were 
heavily subsidised.  
 
Out of the 50 power-stations then owned by MHEW, 4 used gas-turbines or a combination of 
gas and steam-turbines with an installed capacity of 1838 Megawatts, out of which the 
privately-owned Manah Power plant’s capacity accounted for 267 Megawatts. The remaining 
46 stations ran on diesel engines with a total installed capacity of 427 Megawatts (The 
Statistics Book, 2002).  Three entities owned their own sources of generation: Petroleum 
Development of Oman (PDO), Oman Mining Company (OMCO), and Oman Cement 
Company (OCC). These facilities were connected to the national grid and provided periodic 
support to MHEW.   
 
 
 Chapter 6  Case Study II: Electricity Sector Reform in Oman 
 
 146 
In 2003, Dhofar Power Company SAOG - in the Southern part of Oman - was privatized as a 
vertically integrated system of generation, transmission, distribution, supply and collection 
under a twenty-year BOOT Concession Agreement.  The system had an island network 
primary serving the city of Salalah and nearby cities.  This transaction was led by the 
Ministry of National Economy (MNE) not MHEW as part of the early stages of reform.   
 
In 2003, MNE led the procurement of two new private sector I(W)PP under BOO contracts of 
15 year durations.   Both companies were established with 100% foreign equity with 
commitments to offer initial public offerings of 35% within four years.   The Al-Kamil IPP 
was commissioned with capacity of 285 MW, the Barka 1 IWPP had installed capacity of 437 
MW and 20 million gallons to be expanded to 40 million gallons.  By the end of 2003, MNE 
led the procurement of a further BOO project and I(W)PP in Sohar in the Al-Batina Region 
with a planned installed capacity 590 MW and 33 million gallons (AER Annual Reports, 
2009). 
 
These MNE-led private sector power projects signalled the first step of separating electricity 
production from transmission and distribution, and a move towards unbundling Oman’s 
electricity sector.  These projects were significant in several important respects.  First, they 
tested local and foreign private sector interest in the electricity sector and solicited a strong 
response from foreign direct investors indicated by the large number of participants in all 
three tenders. Second, although backed by government guarantees, the process of competitive 
tendering provided a focus of competition to enter the market. This acted to constrain costs 
and provide for genuine risk transfer. Third, they provided estimates of the likely cost of 
producing one extra MWh based on the tendered out capacity for each location, costs that are 
lower than the estimated cost of generation by MHEW plant and that may be further reduced 
by competition.  
 
With the exception of the southern system serviced by Dhofar Power Company SAOG (a 
vertically integrated private company), MHEW’s facilities were managed by private 
companies through tendered contracts. All new connections and maintenance of the national 
grid were carried out by private contractors acting – then - on behalf of MHEW. The supply 
functions of meter reading, billing, and collection were also tendered out to two private 
collection companies operating on behalf of MHEW.   




MHEW was subject to financial constraints and had to negotiate with the Ministry of Finance 
for funds on a project by project basis.   This arrangement and the heavily centralised market 
structure acted to constrain electricity supply.  An important motivation for reform was to 
ensure plans to diversify Oman’s macro economy away from hydrocarbon based activities, 
by promoting new industrial, commercial, and tourism related activities, would not be 
constrained by electricity shortages.  In 1999 MHEW estimated the electricity related 
investment required to support macroeconomic growth projections could exceed RO750 
million (nearly US$2 billion) by end 2010 (Electricity and Related Water Sector Privatisation 
Report, 1999).   
 
The government was advised it could either (i) use its own resources to fund electricity 
infrastructure investment, or (ii) reform the electricity sector so as to attract and utilise 
international private sector capital to fund future expansion.  The SCBA presented in  Chapter 
7 presents estimates of the welfare benefit of relaxing constraints on electricity supply.    
 
6.3 Oman Electricity Sector Law (Royal Decree 78/2004) 
 
The Sector Law was issued on 20 July 2004 by Royal Decree 78/2004 and implemented the 
policies for restructuring, privatisation and regulation of Oman’s electricity and related water 
sector approved in 1999.    
First, the principal purposes of the Sector Law are as follows: 
(i) To implement restructuring of the electricity and related water sector. Operational 
responsibility for the sector passed from MHEW to a number of newly created 
successor entities that were initially wholly owned by the government. Restructuring 
involved the vertical and horizontal unbundling of MHEW whose operational 
responsibilities passed to: three distribution and supply companies, a transmission 
company, a power and water procurement company, a company to service the needs 
of customers in rural areas, two generation companies, and a generation and 
desalination company.  Moreover, a holding company was established to hold the 
Government’s shareholding in the new successor companies (Article 66);     
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(ii) To facilitate the further privatisation of the electricity and related water sector.  In 
accordance with a timetable of the Government’s choosing, state shareholding in 
certain successor companies would be offered to local and international investors to 
facilitate the further privatisation of the sector (Cunneen, 2004);  
(iii) The sector law established a new regulatory authority (Authority for Electricity 
Regulation, Oman (AER)) responsible for licensing and regulating all activities 
stipulated in Article (3) of the law as regulated activities, including: the power and 
water procurement functions and the generation, transmission, distribution and supply 
of electricity and the functions of system operation and dispatch.  According to the 
law, the Council of Ministers is responsible for appointing and removing AER 
members, although AER is otherwise a financially and administratively independent 
entity (Article 20).      
Second, some important Sector Law policies are as follows: 
(i) The Sector Law ensures the government remains responsible for important matters of 
policy, including (a) all matters relating to customer tariffs (Article 9 and Article 11), 
(b) the timing and extent of the electricity privatisation program (Article 65), (c) the 
approval of electricity interconnections with neighbouring countries, and (d) the 
timing and extent of further changes to the structure of the electricity market (Article 
31 and Article 32).  The provisions of the law on these matters accord with the 
Cabinet decision concerning the future role of the government in the electricity and 
related water sector; 
(ii) The Sector Law makes provision to protect the rights and interests of electricity 
customers and requires the regulator to consider the needs of sick and elderly 
customers, and companies to comply with codes of practice relating to customers with 
special needs and the disconnection of customers who have difficulty paying their 
electricity bills; 
(iii) The Sector Law protected the rights of Omani employees of companies to be 
privatized, in accordance with a decision of the Cabinet;  
(iv) The Sector Law requires all companies operating in the electricity sector to comply 
with the Government’s policy of Omanisation42 and with other laws and decisions of 
the Government insofar as they relate to the electricity sector; 
                                                 
42
 The government has declared a policy of Omanisation employing a minimum percentage of Omani 
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(v) The Sector Law implemented a transfer scheme under which MHEW’s electricity and 
related water sector interests, such as employees, contracts, liabilities, and rights to 
land, transferred to the new successor companies;   
(vi) The Sector Law introduced important measures to safeguard the interests of investors 
such as a right to challenge all regulatory decisions and a right to refer challenges to 
international arbitration; 
(vii) The Sector Law established an independent regulatory authority and set out its 
constitution, functions, and its financial and administrative system (Article 19 to 
Article 62); 
(viii) The Sector Law imposes a number of functions and duties on the regulator, including: 
 A duty to secure that all reasonable demands for electricity and related water in 
the Sultanate of Oman are satisfied; 
 A duty to protect the interests of customers and safeguard the interests of rural 
consumers through the continuation of the government’s policy of rural area 
electrification; 
 A duty to secure the preparation and application of technical and safety standards 
with which industry participants must comply; 
 A duty to help facilitate the privatisation of the electricity sector and to promote 
competition where this is conducive to the public interest; and 
 The sector law authorizes the regulatory authority to put in place incentives for 
companies in the sector to operate efficiently. When implementing such measures 
the regulatory authority has a duty to ensure that companies operating efficiently 
can also attract sufficient finance to sustain their activities. A further duty of the 
Authority is to minimize the cost and burden of regulation on industry 
participants;  
(ix) The Sector Law requires AER to report to the government on an annual basis 
regarding developments in the electricity sector, the past and future subsidy 
requirement, and to present recommendations for further changes to the electricity 
market structure in order to facilitate competition and further liberalisation.  Each 
Annual Report must also present AER’s audited financial statements; and   
                                                                                                                                                        
nationals in each economic sector. The percentages for each sector are monitored by the Ministry of 
Manpower.  
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(x) The Sector Law includes provisions that ensure the future development of the 
electricity sector is in accordance with the provisions of the law.  
 
A further element of the restructuring was the establishment of the Public Authority for 
Electricity and Water (PAEW) by Royal Decree No. 92/2007 on September 9, 2007 to 
assume the electricity and water responsibilities of its predecessor MHEW (Oman Daily 
Observer, 2007c).   PAEW is responsible for the water sector and coordinates with AER and 
other government agencies on policy related matters such as subsidy, tariffs and 
environmental compliance relating to electricity and related water.  
 
Private Sector Participation  
Oman has a long history of private sector involvement in its electricity activities.  Between 
1976 and 2002, the government owned and operated the vertically integrated power sector in 
Oman, with the exception of the Manah generation and transmission facilities. Even so, 
maintenance and operation were contracted out. In the eighties, the government started 
outsourcing money collection to private firms and the two collection companies; Oman 
International Finance Company and Oman National Electric Company are still active in the 
sector. 
 
Three schemes allow for the transfer of operational risk and responsibility from government 
to private sector: operation and maintenance outsourcing, Build Own Operate and Transfer 
(BOOT) contracts and Build Own Operate (BOO) contracts.   The principal difference 
between BOOT and BOO contracts is that under the former assets return to the public sector.  
BOOT schemes are an effective way to transfer operational risk to the private sector but not 
ownership risk as assets are returned.   
 
In 1996, Oman’s first IPP, the Manah IPP projects, was a BOOT scheme and involved the 
listing of shares of the United Power Company (UPC).  The project was based on a 20-year 
Build Own Transfer
43
 concession for an initial capacity of 90 MW and a one-hundred and 
                                                 
43
  The government explored the BOT (Build Operate Transfer) scheme in order to make use of the 
then available low interest rate finance while at the same time keeping control over the operations of 
the transmission line.  
 Chapter 6  Case Study II: Electricity Sector Reform in Oman 
 
 151 
eighty-two kilometres of 132 kV transmission line.  In 2000, the government negotiated 
phase-two increasing the capacity of the IPP to 270 MW.   Dhofar Power Company SAOG 
was Oman’s second privatisation project under a 20-year vertically integrated BOOT scheme.  
The gas fired generation included in the project replaced a significant number of diesel 
generators.  
 
6.3.1 The New Market Structure 
 
The Sector Law stipulated in some detail the new market structure and regulatory framework.  
 Figure 18 presents the past and present structure of the Oman electricity sector.   
 




Ministry of  Housing Electricity & Water
Dhofar Power Company

























The Sector Law facilitated the vertical and horizontal unbundling of the vertically integrated 
MHEW and full corporatisation through the establishment of MHEW successor companies.  
The Sector Law also established a new regulatory authority and licensing framework and 
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stipulated that any entity undertaking a regulated activity such as generation, transmission, 
distribution, supply procurement functions and the operation of central dispatch required a 
licence from the regulator to do so.   
 
Since most MHEW successor companies are de-facto or statutory monopolies, the law 
provides for their regulation to safeguard against exercise and or abuse of market power. 
 
The government’s shareholdings in MHEW successor companies are held by the Electricity 
Holding Company SAOC (EHC) which is wholly-owned by the Ministry of Finance.  EHC 
owns 99.99% of the shares in each of the subsidiaries; the Ministry of Finance owns the 
remaining 0.01% (AER Annual Report, 2010).  EHC is not authorised to undertake any 
regulated activities and, when instructed to do so, will sell or dispose of the shares to 
facilitate privatisation.     
 
With just two exceptions all generation companies are 100% privately owned, six of which 
have successfully completed initial public offerings of shares through the Muscat Securities 
Market.  The Dhofar Power Company SAOG operates a vertically integrated private 20 year 
concession.  As the concession agreement was completed before the implementation of the 
Sector Law, the government ensured the property rights of investors were protected by 
implementing specific provisions in the law to this effect.   
 
Generation 
Potential entrants to Oman’s generation market have to participate in fair and transparent 
competitions for the right to sign long-term contracts of typically 15 year durations.  Once 
market entry is attained, there is no direct competition between market participants. Here, 
competition for initial market entry replaces competition in the market.  The payment terms 
established in PPA and PWPA contracts provide incentives for generators to minimise costs 
so as to maximise profits, principally by maximising capacity availability.  
 Table 9 presents net electricity generation in 2009 and 2010 for each of the three market 
segments. 
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Table 9 Net Electricity Generation (2009 & 2010) 
I. Main Interconnected System
Facility Net MWh 2009 % of Oman Net MWh 2010 % of Oman
ACWA Barka SAOG * 2,305,126         12.9% 2,328,323        12.2%
Al Ghubrah SAOC ** 2,702,257         15.2% 2,387,547        12.5%
Al Kamil SAOG 1,283,926         7.2% 1,310,227        6.8%
Al Rusail SAOG 3,149,107         17.7% 3,394,319        17.7%
UPC Manah SAOG 1,045,115         5.9% 1,320,830        6.9%
Wadi Jizzi SAOC 741,875             4.2% 910,152            4.8%
Sohar Power Co. SAOG 3,119,457         17.5% 2,668,896        13.9%
SMN Barka SAOG 1,183,338         6.6% 2,232,129        11.7%
PWP Purchases 188,587             1.1% 301,290            1.6%
PWP (Rental) -                      0.0% 1,280                 0.0%
MIS sub-total 15,718,788      88.2% 16,854,993     88.0%
Annual increse in generation 7.2%
II. Rural Systems
RAEC SAOC 370,232             2.1% 412,787            2.2%
Annual increse in generation 11.5%
III. Salalah System
RAEC SAOC 45,700               0.26% 72,397              0.4%
DPC SAOG 1,688,361         9.5% 1,819,023        9.5%
Salalah system sub-total 1,734,061       9.7% 1,891,420       9.9%
Annual increse in generation 9.1%
Total Oman 17,823,081      100.0% 19,159,200     100.0%
Annual increse in generation 7.5%
*  An SAOG is a public open company that has shares listed in the stockmarket 
** An SAOC is a public closed company w ith no shares listed in the stock market
 
Source: AER Annual Report (2010) 
 
Transmission 
The main electricity transmission system is owned and operated by the Oman Electricity 
Transmission Company SAOC (OETC) which is also acts as the System Operator.   Article 1 
of the Sector Law defines transmission as 132kV and above with all voltages below this 
being distribution (Sector Law, 2004). 
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By end 2005, OETC’s transmission network comprised of 136 km of 220-300 kV overhead 
lines, 2,495 km of 110-132 kV of overhead lines and 5 km of underground lines, 23 km of 66 
kV overhead lines and 1 km of underground lines, 5,252 km of 33 kV overhead lines and 750 
km of underground lines, 10 km of 132 kV underground cables and 496 km of 33 kV 
underground cables (GCC-GIGRE, 2005).  
 
OETC’s transmission system does not cover all of Oman, its loop covers the main regions of 
Muscat with 27% of the total population, Al-Batina (with 28%), Al-Sharqiyah (with 13.4%), 
Al-Dakhiliya (with 11.4%), and Al-Dhahirah (with 8.8%).  
 
Transmission functions have natural monopoly characteristics and, irrespective of public or 
private ownership, are required to be regulated.  The transmission and dispatch licence 
requires OETC to offer access to the transmission system on non-discriminatory terms. 
Charges for connection and use of the transmission system must be consistent with the terms 
of OETC’s RPI-X price control implemented by AER.   
 
The transmission and dispatch licence provides for the implementation of transmission 
system planning standards and operating standards and requires OETC to issue and manage a 
Grid Code.  No equivalent standards were in place pre reform.   The terms of the transmission 
and dispatch licence and the price control mechanisms implemented by it are intended to 
survive the transition from public to private ownership.   
 
On February 2, 2008 Mohammed Al-Khusaibi, the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
National Economy announced in a statement to the 6
th
 session of the Arab Electricity 
Regulators Forum held in Muscat, Oman’s intention to privatise OETC.  The Secretary 
General added that Oman’s privatisation programme would eventually transfer the country’s 
three distribution and supply companies to the private sector.  The privatisation initiative was 
suspended in late 2008 due to the financial crisis.  
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Distribution & Supply 
Three distribution and supply companies, Muscat Electricity Distribution Co. SAOC, Majan 
Electricity Company SAOC and Mazoon Electricity Company SAOC (collectively the 
Discos) own and operate licensed distribution systems in defined authorised areas.  Discos 
are required to operate their systems in a safe and efficient manner and provide connections 
on non discriminatory terms and otherwise comply with the terms of their licenses.   Each 
Disco has a monopoly to supply in the authorised area designated in its licence. In 2010 the 
Discos supplied 14,121 GWh to 597,070 customer accounts.   
 
Discos are statutory supply monopolists whose distribution systems have natural monopoly 
characteristics – Discos are therefore subject to regulation and operate under RPI-X price 
controls implemented by the Authority.   Distribution and supply licenses provide for the 
implementation of distribution system planning standards and supply standards of 
performance. No equivalent standards were implemented by the self regulating MHEW.  
 
The distribution and supply licence requires each DISCO to offer access to its distribution 
system on non-discriminatory terms. Charges for connection and use of a distribution system 
must be consistent with the terms of each Disco’s RPI-X price control that, as in the UK 
system of regulation, provide incentives that act as a proxy for competition.    
 
A feature of the Omani Law, noted by Al Hinai and Cleary (2007), is that it anticipates the 
future separation of the supply and distribution functions and requires Discos to maintain 
separate accounts for each separate business (Appendix 1). 
 
The Sector Law includes a number of mechanisms for further market liberalisation, including 
the removal of supply monopolies to allow competition in supply in all areas, something 
AER is working to implement (AER Annual Reports, 2010).   
 
Meter reading billing and collection is part of the regulated activity of supply and are the 
responsibility of Discos who contract out these functions to the two private companies 
contracted by MHEW (Cunneen, 2004).  
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Power & Water Procurement   
The Omani market structure centres on the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company 
SAOC (PWP), a single buyer (monopsony) in respect of the procurement of capacity and 
energy, and a single (monopoly) bulk supplier of electricity to the Discos.  Producers are 
prohibited from selling electricity directly to customers, and must sell all of their capacity and 
output to the PWP.   
 
Power procurement functions are designated in the Sector Law as regulated activities, and the 
PWP requires a licence to undertake them.   The government no longer provides a direct 
government guarantee for new IPP as the PWP has secured and retained investment credit 
ratings by two ratings agencies.  In October 2007, Moody’s Global Corporate Finance 
assigned PAP an ‘A2’ rating as it had ‘a stable outlook’ and viewed its ‘business profile as 
very low risk, given the tight regulatory limitations on its business activities, its clearly 
defined mandate and the full pass-through of market risk that it provides under normal 
circumstances’ (Moody’s OPWP Report, 2007, pp. 1-2).   The absence of direct government 
guarantees has not impacted the PWP’s ability to procure new IPPs and three new facilities 
with total capacity of 3,500 MW have been successfully procured without direct government 
guarantees.  
 
PWP is regulated and operates under a licence granted by AER that includes conditions that 
constrain the exercise of market power and promote good performance: 
 PWP is required to satisfy a Generation Security Standard (GSS) of a yearly 
maximum of 24 loss of load hours (LOLH), and is required to publish each year a 
statement showing how it proposes to meet the GSS in each of the succeeding seven 
years; 
 PWP is prohibited from discriminating against any person and must not act in a 
manner inconsistent with the promotion of competition; and 
 PWP is required to ensure that its purchases of capacity and output comply with the 
economic purchase condition of its licence.  In its fourth 7-Year Statement covering 
2010 to 2016 PWP’s central estimate is for MIS demand to grow from 3,424 MW in 
2010 to 6,043 MW by 2016, an average annual growth rate of 8.5%.   PWP estimates 
the Salalah Power System will grow from a 297 MW in 2010 to 615 MW by 2016 at 
an average growth rate of 11% (PWP, 2009).   




The Sector Law prohibits PWP from building power plant or owning assets while Article 79 
of the law requires PWP to tender all new capacity requirements through fair and transparent 
competitions open to international bidders if required capacity exceeds 75 MW (Oman 
Electricity Law, 2004).   Only if competition yields no private interest or it is agreed with 
AER to do otherwise (for example due to excessive costs or fear of market power 
exploitations) must the PWP ensure supply by establishing a new state-owned power 
generation company to develop the new required capacity, selling still exclusively to PWP.   
In such cases, the Ministry of Finance in coordination with the Ministry of National Economy 
would determine if and when the new company is to be privatised.  
 
PWP operates under an RPI-X price control implemented by the Authority to motivate 
efficient performance.   
 
Rural (remote) Area Systems  
The Rural Areas Electricity Company SAOC (RAEC) is licensed by AER to undertake 
generation, transmission distribution and supply to small and dispersed rural systems.  RAEC 
has around 54 rural systems of varying size, all of which are supplied by diesel fired 
generation.   RAEC’s functions are regulated and the company operates under RPI-X type 
price controls implemented by the Authority.   In 2010, RAEC supplied 420 GWh to 21,662 
customer accounts, just 2.6% of the 16,132 GWh of total supply.  
 
The number of RAEC systems is expected to decline over time as its systems are absorbed 
into the expanding MIS.  The government does not propose to privatise the company.   
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Salalah Power System  
Dhofar Power Company SAOG (DPC) operates a 20 year vertically integrated concession in 
the Southern Region of Oman.  DPC is subject to ‘regulation by contract’ and is required to 
abide by negotiated performance standards in its Concession Agreement.  In 2010 DPC 
supplied 1,590 GWh to 58,936 customer accounts, accounting for 9.9% and 8.7% of total 
supply and customer accounts, respectively, in Oman. 
  
Sections of the Salalah Concession Agreement are not available to the public, although 
Article 26 is and stipulates penalties for non-compliance with Customer Service and Supply 
Standards.    DPC is required to present a report to PWP (audited by an independent auditor) 
setting out its performance against the standards, and to pay relevant penalties for each 
instance in which it failed to achieve the standards. The PWP undertakes its own penalty 
assessment and in cases of disagreement between the PWP and DPC, of which there have 




In 2010 the government invited AER and PWP to formulate proposals to unbundle and 
restructure the Salalah Power System to align it to the vertically and horizontally unbundled 
MIS.  To assist this process the government had by end 2010 purchased over 99% of the 
shares of DPC (AER Annual Reports, 2010).    
 
Electricity Subsidy  
The government retains full control over customer tariffs while AER is responsible for intra-
company charges such as charges for use of system and connection.  This is in line with 
policies in other GCC member states where consumer prices are not cost-reflective. 
Customers can be reassured that tariffs will not be determined by private sector entities, 
although the costs (benefits) of sector inefficiency will be reflected in a higher (lower) 
subsidy requirement (Cunneen, 2004).  Just like other GCC countries, the government 
continues to subsidise prices.
 
 According to Al Mahrouqi (Appendix 1) - Chairman of the 
Public Authority for Electricity and Water (PAEW) - if Oman considers the introduction of 
                                                 
44
 Based on personal communications from John Cunneen, Executive Director and Member of AER-
Oman received on February 21, 2009. 
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cost-reflective tariffs, it will be only to large consumers (industrial, commercial and 
government entities). 
 
In 2010 government subsidy amounted to RO167.7 million (US 436 million) of which the 
MIS accounted for 67%, RAEC 18% and DPC 15%.   Figure 19 presents 2010 subsidy by 
company per kWh and highlights that RAEC’s rural systems that run on diesel fuel require 
significantly higher subsidy per kWh than the MIS companies and DPC which benefit from 




Figure 19 Subsidy Comparisons Between Systems (2010) 
 
Source: AER Annual Report (2010) 
 
In 2009 AER initiated consultation on cost-reflective tariffs for large industrial and 
commercial users of electricity.  According to the PAEW Chairman, such tariffs may be 
applied to other customer categories in the future but subsidies will continue for ‘vulnerable’ 
consumers.
46
     
 
                                                 
45
 Subsidy is defined by AER as ‘the difference between the economic cost of supply (including 
finance charges) [which are derived from the sum of Maximum Allowed Revenues (MAR)] and 
Permitted Tariff (and other) revenue’ (AER Annual Reports, 2007, p. 29). 
46
 Based on a personal communication with Mohammed Al Mahrouqi, Chairman of PAEW, received 
on 20 May 2009. 
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6.3.2 Regulation and Competition in Generation  
 
 
AER’s focus for the regulation of generation is ensuring PWP conducts fair and transparent 
competitions for new capacity and output and enforcing market share and economic interest 
restrictions.  Article 112 of the Sector Law requires the implementation of market share 
thresholds to prevent market concentration.  AER enforces market share thresholds of 25% of 
contracted capacity with prior regulatory approval required to exceed the threshold.   The 
purpose of the market share threshold is not to automatically disallow interests in excess of it, 
but to recognise that while an investor with a market share below the threshold is unlikely to 
have market power, this might not be so in the case of a market share above the threshold.  In 
applying these concepts to the Oman electricity sector, AER considers a range of factors 
including the structure of the market, demand growth and expected additions of new capacity, 
and how investor shareholdings (market shares) will change following initial public offerings.   
 
Certain features of the market structure are relevant to such deliberations: 
 Licensed generators are prohibited from selling directly to final consumers, and so are 
not able to directly influence prices to customers. Generators are required to sell all of 
their capacity and output to the PWP.   Monopsony provides the PWP with significant 
countervailing buyer power although AER works to ensure the PWP does not abuse 
its position as this may deter potential new entrants from participating in competitions 
for new capacity;  and 
 The terms on which the PWP purchases capacity and output are, in most cases, 
determined by fair and transparent competition. Once determined, payment terms are 
incorporated in PPA/PWPA contracts that remain unchanged for the duration of the 
agreements - other than pre-agreed indexation of certain costs, and exchange rate or 
other adjustments.  Sellers therefore have little scope to increase prices irrespective of 
their market share.   
 
This is not to suggest that in the context of the new market structure a high market share 
would be without risk. There are several ways in which market power might be exercised. 
For example, a licensed generator/declinator may attempt to use its market power to reduce 
the quality of its contracted outputs (and therefore secure an effective price increase). 
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Moreover, a company with a high market share may seek to influence the timing of scheduled 
outages to its advantage, or it may seek to influence dispatch arrangements in ways that 
would be advantageous to it but have the effect of increasing total system costs.  
 
A further reason not to disregard the market share thresholds is that to do so might not be 
conducive to competition if it delayed the introduction of further market liberalisation.  For 
example, a high market share might not in itself be a cause of concern in the context of the 
‘single buyer’ market structure.  But the same market shares or concentration may be 
considered unacceptable in, for example, a pool arrangement.  The introduction of a pool, or 
other forms of competition, might have to be delayed until market shares declined to 
acceptable levels (this could be achieved by requiring divestment of interests, but such 
measures may increase investor uncertainty and are not without cost).  A general point that 
further supports the application of some constraint on market share in the context of the 
single-buyer market structure is the potential for financial instability. An investor with a high 
market share could, if it encountered financial difficulties, transmit instability throughout the 
market. The potential for such instability will be positively correlated with market share 
(Cunneen, 2004). 
 
The strategy of the government for the privatisation of the Al Rusail Power Company was to 
offer the company to investors with an obligation to build, own and operate a new I(W)PP 
(Barka 2), resulting in a combined capacity (of Rusail and Barka 2) in excess of 1,000 MW  
(over 30% of the total market size). Interest in the Rusail privatisation and Barka 2 IWPP 
included Suez Energy International who already had economic interests in the Manah 
production facility and a new IWPP in Sohar.   The Authority determined that Suez could 
participate in the competition for Rusail and Barka 2 on condition that should they be the 
preferred bidder, they fully divest their interest in the Manah production facility and accept 
economic restrictions stipulated by the Authority to constrain their share of the generation 
market to within the 25% threshold. According to Cunneen (2008), AER demonstrated how it 
proposed to promote competition for new capacity while ensuring the market share and 
economic interest restrictions are properly enforced.  This issue was an important test of the 
new regulatory regime that has been overcome to the satisfaction of all concerned. After 
detailed discussions, Suez accepted these conditions and went on to successfully bid for the 
Rusail and Barka 2 project.  
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On 27 February 2007, AER proposed market share restrictions and economic interest 
restrictions for the Salalah Power System consistent with those applied for the MIS.  ‘The 
restrictions would limit the scope for persons with economic interests in entities undertaking 
regulated activities in the Salalah Concession Area securing economic interests in other 
authorised entities. The restrictions would also limit the scope of persons with economic 
interests in existing licensees securing an economic interest in entities undertaking regulated 
activities in Salalah Concession Area’ (Oman Daily Observer, 2007a, p. 21).   The 
restrictions provide regulatory protection against excessive concentration and possible market 
power exploitation and safeguards from vertical reintegration of the already unbundled 
market.  
 
Independent assessment of benefits of reform 
In 2007 the Ministry of National Economy commissioned London Economics in association 
with Herbert Smith LLP and London Power Associated Ltd. to assess whether Oman had 
benefited from the electricity sector reforms.   
 
The advisors found that reform had resulted in a higher monetary cost base but actually 
yielded lower costs in terms of ‘true’ economic costs of electricity. Indeed, ‘the PWP 
managed to reduce average energy costs from the main generation plants from a planned RO 
7.4 [US$ 19.24] per MWh to an actual RO 7.1 [US$ 18.46] per MWh, and a Disco’s tariff 
revenues were 10% higher than anticipated due to tighter management of the meter reading 
and billing contract’. Further, ‘total electricity system losses fell from 23.9% to 21.1%.  
While the losses are still high by international standards (losses in the range of 10% to 11% is 
typically considered as normal), the 11.7-per-cent reduction in 2006 shows that the sector is 
moving into the right direction and the sector reform is having a definite impact’ (London 
Economics, 2007, p.23).  
 
The report also highlighted the increased level of financial transparency. ‘The various 
government-owned electricity sector companies now pay taxes and duties and, since 2006, 
land usufruct charges’, whereas prior to the restructuring, ‘no such taxes, duties and land 
usufruct charges were paid’ (London Economics, 2007, p.26). 
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The consultants concluded, ‘The electricity sector reform undertaken by Oman is ambitious 
and comprehensive, and should lead over time to considerable benefits for Omanies and the 




The Sector Law and single buyer market structure implemented in Oman has been beneficial, 
as noted in the London Economics Report (2007), and might therefore provide a basis for 
recommendations for GCC wide electricity market reform.  However, to confirm this we 
present in  Chapter 7 a full social cost-benefit analysis of the reforms to provide a robust basis 
for our recommendations.   
 
While some characteristics of the Oman and Abu Dhabi laws are similar, some features of the 
Oman Sector Law and market structure are rather more advanced than in Abu Dhabi – 
especially with regards to safeguards against market concentration whilst promoting private 
sector participation,  regulatory independence and providing international investors a right to 
international arbitration.    
 
A particular feature of the Omani case is the comprehensive and detailed nature of the Sector 
law that sets out in detail the new market structure and the regulatory regime under which it 
operates.  This is in line with Newbery who, as noted in  Chapter 2, stated that the rules 
governing market behaviour must be set out correctly before embarking on sector reforms.  
We will argue in  Chapter 8 that the Oman Sector and the regulatory framework it contains 
has proved effective in regulating the behaviour and performance of electricity sector 
companies and may inform recommendations for GCC electricity market reform.  
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Chapter 7  Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of Omani Reforms 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The Omani government identified a number of expected benefits from the electricity reform 
programme, including: improved financial and cost transparency, better security of supply; 
increased electricity sector efficiency; adopting an Independent Power Plant (IPP) model that 
allowed investors a right to own 100% of the project company with an obligation to make 
initial public offerings of shares (of no less than 35% typically within three years of starting 
commercial operations), would assist the development of Oman’s capital market and 
contribute to wider share ownership; a positive impact on the State’s finances as investment 
in new generation would be funded by the private sector; better services to electricity users; 
improved employment and training opportunities for Omani nationals, and  improved 
environmental compliance as electricity companies would be required to comply with 
environmental laws and regulations (London Economics Report, 2007). 
  
Unlike most electricity reform programmes discussed in the literature, electricity reform in 
Oman has to date resulted in just one privatisation transaction: this was the sale of the 
government’s entire shareholding in the Al Rusail Power Company in 2006 for a 
consideration of RO 50 million (US$ 130 million) according to Times of Oman (2006).  
Generation capacity is provided by privately funded IPPs under long term (typically 15 year) 
power purchase agreements.  The privatisation of three generating stations commissioned 
under MHEW management was planned but only the Rusail plant has been privatised.  A 
second distinction from reform programmes discussed in the literature is that electricity 
tariffs in Oman post-reform remained unchanged at their pre-reform levels and heavily 
subsidised.  It is therefore not possible to evaluate changes in consumer and producer welfare 
resulting from price changes (customer tariffs) as there have been no price changes.  Our 
analysis therefore focuses on assessing the benefits derived from moving from a state owned 
vertically integrated monopoly to a fully unbundled and corporatized (single-buyer) 
electricity market structure supervised by an independent regulatory authority.  




This chapter presents an empirical examination of Oman’s electricity reforms using 
principles of social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) to assess whether Oman has benefited (in 
terms of increased social welfare) from the electricity reforms implemented in 2005.   The 
analysis framework compares the changes in welfare due to reform (the actual scenario) 
compared to a scenario in which assumptions about the electricity sector’s performance pre-
reform are applied to the period 2005 to 2015 assuming the reforms had not been 
implemented (the counterfactual scenario).  
 
This chapter sets out the applied SCBA methodology drawing on relevant literature and 
economic research and highlights assumptions specific to Oman’s electricity sector under 
study.       




Social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) differs from private CBA. According to Stiglitz (2000, p. 
275), SCBA ‘takes into account a wider range of impacts, not just profits’ and that in SCBA 
‘market prices may not exist for many benefits and costs, and market prices may not be used 
because of market failures’ (ibid).  
 
Stiglitz (2000) also suggests that the discount rate used in public sector SCBA analyses may 
be lower than that used for private CBA. For our SCBA of the Oman reforms, we use a real 
discount rate of 5%, reflecting the government’s social rate of time preference (STP)47. To 
check the robustness of our results, we perform sensitivity analysis that applies (a) a lower 
rate of 3% that might be more in line with pure time preference and (b) a higher rate of 7% 
that might be closer to a private ‘opportunity cost’ rate used in commercial project finance 
assessments.    
 
                                                 
47
 Given data limitations, we consider the margin between the average lending rate (6-7%) and the 
Government bond rate (2-3%). 
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Drawing from Section  2.2 of this thesis, we apply SCBA ex-post to determine the social 
gains (losses) that have resulted from the policy decision to reform Oman’s electricity sector.  
For the purpose of our study, we review the work of Jones et al. (1990), Galal et al. (1994) 
and Newbery and Pollitt (1997), Green and McDaniel (1998) and Damsgaard and Green 
(2005).  
 
While most of the above mentioned SCBA studied welfare change as a result of primarily 
public asset divesture (privatisation with treasury gains from public enterprise proceeds), 
Green and McDaniel (1998) analysed a situation in which England and Wales opened the 
market to full competition (with the introduction of retail competition where consumers have 
a choice of supplier) with a counterfactual scenario in which the market was not open to retail 
competition. Here, the study did not focus on the welfare effects of electricity privatisation, 
already introduced in the UK since 1989, but sought to measure changes in the welfare of 
agents due to a change in policy, and summing the welfare changes to see if the policy 
increased or reduced welfare (ibid). Similarly, the Damsgaard and Green (2005) analysis of 
Swedish electricity regulatory reform focused on welfare changes from deregulation - with 
privatisation not an issue of study.  
 
For the Omani case under study (and other GCC countries for that matter), SCBA may also 
be used to evaluate changes in social welfare due to reform and corporatisation, bearing in 
mind the limited (or sometimes non-existent) divestures involved in GCC member states. In 
this case, SCBA could measure the net change to welfare in terms of consumer welfare 
change, industry operations and administrative costs. More specifically, SCBA can facilitate 
analysis of the net effects of electricity market restructuring (including expanding the rate of 
investment in new generation capacity through more transparent competitions and long term 
IPP single-buyer contracts), efficiency (gains or losses) as a result of corporatisation while 
factoring in all possible costs associated with the new market arrangements (such as 
unbundling MHEW and undertaking new regulatory functions). Accordingly, in order to 
carry out our SCBA of the Oman reforms (from 2005), we have established two scenarios: 
A. The actual scenario: based on actual data reflecting the overall post-reform 
performance of the sector between 2005 and 2010 and projections through to 2015. 
Here, we examine whether the policy of restructuring and unbundling Oman’s 
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electricity sector has brought about any significant changes in social welfare, even 
though the divesture of state owned assets is limited to the Al Rusail privatisation as 
previously noted in the Omani case study of   Chapter 6; and     
B. The counterfactual scenario: that assumes that the electricity sector continued to be 
self regulated, state-owned and state-managed by the Ministry of Housing, Electricity 
and Water (MHEW). To construct this scenario we assessed MHEW’s performance 
prior to 2005 and made output projections through to 2015 that reflect pre-reform 
trends.  
 
We denote (∆W) as the net change in social welfare resulting from a policy change, with ∆W 
calculated as the sum of changes in welfare of affected economic agents: 
∆W = ∆ Consumers + ∆ Producers + ∆ Government + ∆ Employees + ∆ Competitors 
Where  ∆W is the net change in social welfare resulting from a policy decision;  
∆S is the change in welfare of Consumers;  
∆P is the change in welfare of Producers; 
∆G is the change in welfare of the Government; 
∆E is the change in welfare of Employees affected by a policy decision or 
reform programme; and  
∆C is the welfare change to competitor industries and suppliers.  
 
Galal et al. (1994, Equation 1-1), present a welfare equation in the following form: 
 
∆W = ∆S + ∆Π + ∆L + ∆C 
 
Where ∆S reflects the welfare effect for consumers (consumer surplus), ∆Π denotes the effect 
on enterprise profits (including buyers, government and other shareholders), ∆L reflects 
effects primarily on labour (employees) and any other providers of inputs (like credit, 
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permits, intermediate goods etc.), and ∆C accounts for welfare change with respect to 
competitors.  
 
Another version of the welfare change equation, relevant when there are privatisation 
proceeds, is presented by Jones et al. (1990, Equation 2-2):   
 
∆W = Vsp – Vsg + (λg – λp)Z 
 
Where ∆W denotes the net change in social welfare, Vsp is the social value of the enterprise 
under private operation (actual), Vsg is the social value of the enterprise under continued 
government operation (counterfactual), with Z indicating the privatization sale proceeds 
while λg and λp are shadow multipliers for government and private revenues respectively.  
This equation suggests welfare would be increased following a divestment if the value of the 
government expenditure multiplier λg is higher than the private sector expenditure multiplier 
λp.  According to Domah and Pollitt (2001), this may not be the case for a developed 
economy like the UK, in which case the shadow value of public funds was assumed 
equivalent to that for private funds, and so λg≈λp≈1.  An increase in welfare from λg > λp 
would also require that (Vsp – Vsg) was not negative and large enough to outweigh the λ 
effect as sale proceeds would also increase welfare. 
 
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe λg > 1,  for example, social welfare losses of 
(i) taxes on goods and services (that raise prices and reduce consumption and profits) and (ii) 
income taxes that distort choices of allocation between work and leisure.  Taxes that improve 
social welfare, such as taxes that bring prices closer to the social cost of consumption, i.e. 
correcting for externalities, do not feature in social cost benefit analysis as it can reasonably 
be assumed that if the government received additional income it would not change welfare 
enhancing taxes (Jones et al, 1990).   
 
Government expenditures will also influence the value of λg, although arguments can be 
made to support values greater or less than 1.  Government expenditure on pure public goods 
such as defence and civil order will generally increase welfare, as would expenditure on 
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goods and services with strong positive externalities such as transport infrastructure, health 
and education. On the other hand, government expenditure may reduce welfare if it displaces 
or ‘crowds out’ private sector provision and if public sector efficiency is less than that of the 
private sector (Jones et al, 1990).  
 
Prudent macroeconomic policies have allowed Oman to maintain a high credit rating by 
international standards (A1 stable
48
 as at November 2011), and avoid significant budget-
constraints.  Moreover, taxes and fee revenue account for a very small proportion of the 
country’s revenue budget: in the 2011 revenue budget taxes and fee revenue accounts for just 
2.3% of total revenue (MOF Budget, 2011).  There is no income tax in Oman and corporation 
tax is set at a uniform rate of 12%.  These factors suggest it would be reasonable to assume 
the shadow value of public funds in Oman may be close to 1.   As already noted, Oman’s 
electricity reforms have included just one privatisation transaction, and given our assumption 
that λg ≈1 we do not adjust Rusail privatisation proceeds to reflect differences in λg and λp.    
 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) used SCBA to determine the change in social welfare due to 
efficiency gains from restructuring and privatisation measured by the difference in costs 
between actual and counterfactual scenarios.     
 
It is important to note, however, that a privatised entity will behave in a certain manner and 
will seek to set prices and output to maximise profits which may not maximise social welfare.  
It would therefore be legitimate for a government not to privatise an entity expected to have 
market power post divestment as this may be to the detriment of consumers (Jones et al, 
1990, p 12). An alternative would be privatisation with adequate regulation which some 
countries might find difficult to achieve.  
 
Our SCBA of Oman’s electricity sector reform utilises an equation that reflects the following 
considerations (i) limited privatisation proceeds; (ii) that customer tariffs remain unchanged 
and heavily subsidised post reform; (iii) increased post-reform infrastructure investment and 
output, and (iv) higher employment post reform.  Our SCBA applies the following equation: 
                                                 
48
 Moody’s Investor Service, November 2011 




∆W = ∆S +∆P+ ∆G+ ∆L - R&C 
 
Where  ∆W is the net change in social welfare resulting from electricity sector reform 
measured as the change in welfare between the actual scenario (the 
implementation of the reforms) and the counterfactual scenario (assuming the 
reforms were not implemented);  
∆S corresponds to welfare benefits (consumer surplus) resulting from 
increased supply to customers;  
∆P corresponds to the welfare change to Omani private investors (share 
ownership dividends minus share purchase costs). Since our SCBA is 
concerned with welfare changes in Oman we exclude benefits associated with 
dividends remitted to foreign investors; 
∆G corresponds to the welfare change to government (the change in 
corporation tax income, dividends to government, changes in subsidy and 
privatisation proceeds (Rusail)); 
∆L corresponds to the welfare change to labour (due to changes in 
employment and income); and  
R&C reflects the costs of restructuring and corporatizing the electricity sector 
prior to 2005 and the subsequent regulation of the sector from 2005 to 2015.  
 
We note that the Omani electricity supply industry has no competitors and so we do not need 
to include a term for the effects on them. 
 
In order to confirm that Oman’s electricity sector reforms increased social welfare, our SCBA 
must verify that the costs of reform are outweighed by its benefits.    Following the discussion 
in  Chapter 2, our equation is based on a welfare standard that considers changes in total 
welfare (consumer and producer surplus).         
 






The Main Interconnected System (MIS) accounts for about 90% of the Omani electricity 
sector. Our analysis, therefore, focuses on the costs and benefits of MIS electricity supply.   
We recall that Oman’s electricity sector reforms introduced new and important statutory 
obligations that require electricity sector companies to meet all reasonable demands for 
electricity and comply with performance and security standards, obligations that had no 
counterpart pre-reform and that underpin improved security of supply. The regulator is 
responsible for ensuring companies comply with security of supply obligations and does so 
by enforcing: (1) the Generation Security Planning Standard (GSPS) that requires the PWP to 
ensure the probability of loss of load hours in any year does not exceed
49
 24 loss of load 
hours, (2) Transmission System Security Standards (TSSS), (3) Distribution System Security 
Standards (DSSS) and (4) quality of supply standards (Cunneen, 2004).  It is difficult to 
quantify the difference in security of supply pre and post reform as MHEW did not collect or 
publish relevant data. 
 
Reform has brought changes to the electricity supply industry: (1) relaxation of a constraint 
on electricity supply, (2) new IPPs with larger unit sets have lower unit costs yielding 
operational efficiencies that combined with lower network losses has helped reduce per unit 
government subsidy, (3) the industry now employs more workers with better salaries, (4) 
some IPP shares have been successfully floated in the Muscat Security Market providing 
dividends to private Omani investors and wider share ownership, and (5) new costs 
associated with market unbundling and the establishment and implementation of new 
regulatory arrangements.        
 
The researcher acknowledges that some of the input data and assumptions used in the SCBA 
were provided by AER in cooperation with the researcher in an agreed format that allowed 
what would otherwise have been confidential information to be used in the analysis. 
                                                 
49
 It is stipulated by the Omani Law and implemented through the PWP licence (Condition 5 of the 
Licence requires the PWP to publish a 7-year statement presenting its electricity demand forecast and 
the source and amount of capacity required to satisfy demand and comply with the GSPS ). 
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7.3.1 Effects on Consumer Welfare (∆S): 
 
Among others, the Galal et al. (1994) case studies concluded that consumers are usually 
affected by policy change. Our analysis of the Oman reforms will show that even without 
significant divestures and with unchanged and subsidised tariffs, market restructuring and 
introduction of an independent regulatory function has been of direct benefit to consumers 
and to social welfare generally.   
 
There had been significant pent-up demand from consumers and firms which had been unable 
to get a connection to the grid in the pre-reform period.  Following the reforms, demand 
growth accelerated from 6.5% a year (1997-2004) to 11% a year (2005-2010), an increase we 
attribute to the reforms, and helped to raise non-oil GDP. 
 
Between 1997 and 2004 non-oil GDP increased at an annual average rate of 3%, growth then 
accelerated to 16.7% per annum from 2005 to 2010.    The increased growth in non-oil GDP 
would be expected to drive higher demand for electricity, and as a result of the reforms the 
increase in growth of electricity supply helped to facilitate higher GDP growth. 
 
For our SCBA in the actual case we assume growth in supply between 2011 and 2015 of 11% 
per annum and in the counter-factual we assume growth in supply of 7% per annum from 
2005 to 2015. 
 
To estimate the change in consumer welfare resulting from the electricity sector reforms, we 
estimate the difference in benefits in the actual case (in which electricity supply is higher and 
economic costs are lower) and the counterfactual case. There is an extensive economic 
literature examining the relationship between economic growth and electricity supply, but 
very few analyses of GCC countries.  Analysis by Squalli and Wilson (2006) identified a 
significant and positive long run income to electricity relationship for Oman and other GCC 
countries. Our estimate of consumer welfare reflects the increase in consumer surplus 
captured by increasing the growth rate of electricity supply in response to increased growth in 
non-oil GDP.  In the counterfactual case electricity supply growth is lower than post reform 
supply growth and consumer welfare is correspondingly lower.  




 Figure 20 shows the ‘building blocks’ used to calculate the change in consumer welfare in 
year t in the actual and counterfactual scenarios.   Since price schedules did not change, and 
the extra growth was due to the sector’s ability to connect more customers, this needs to be 
analysed by a shift in the demand curve rather than simply a movement along it. 
Figure 20 Example Calculations of Consumer Surplus  
 
SupplyCF SupplyA
















The net present value of consumer welfare benefits presented in our results is the present 
value of consumer welfare from 2005 to 2015, discounted using a real rate of 5%. Each of the 
variables in the calculations is described below: 
 
Telson (1975) proposed a methodology for deriving an upper bound estimate of the value of 
electricity. Following this approach, in our analysis GDPR is the ratio of average non-oil 
GDP (between 1999 and 2010 but excluding 2005 and 2008 due to large changes in non-oil 
GDP in these two years) and MWh supply.  These demand schedules represent the non-oil 
sector’s willingness to pay for electricity for the actual and counterfactual cases.    GDPR 
represents the maximum amount the non-oil sector of the economy would pay for 1 MWh of 
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electricity; and some of the newly connected customers may not be willing to pay anything 
near this amount.   Our calculation of consumer welfare in both the actual and counterfactual 
scenarios uses a weighted average ‘maximum willingness to pay’ of electricity derived as 
follows:  
Pmax = (GDPR * α) + (PT * (1 – α)), where α is a weighting  
 
GDPR is the ratio of non-oil GDP per MWh indicating the non-oil sector’s willingness to pay 
for electricity - following the upper bond following from (Telson, 1975). The variable α is 
weighting factor to restrict consumer welfare to a particular category of demand (in this 
analysis the demand of Industrial and Commercial consumers) and PT is the demand 
weighted Permitted Tariff reflecting the aggregate demand weighted tariffs of each customer 
category. In the base case, we assume a value for α of 20%, but subject this to sensitivity 
analysis. PT is defined for both actual (PT
A
) and counterfactual (PT
CF




 represents the demand weighted average tariff revenue per MWh (for MIS customers) 
in the actual case in year t. Electricity supply projections from 2011 to 2015 reflect higher 
growth in supply to commercial and industrial customers, customers that pay higher tariffs 
(52 US$/MWh and 44 US$/MWh on average, respectively) than residential customers, 70% 
of whom pay 26 US$ /MWh for all of their power. In addition to changes in the composition 
of demand, following reform electricity suppliers are incentivized to improve revenue 
collection rates and revenue collection has improved since 2005. For these reasons the 
average demand weighted revenue per kWh supplied under Permitted Tariffs rises year on 
year in the actual case (due to higher growth in demand of energy intensive customers), even 




 represents the demand weighted average revenue per MWh supplied in year t, in the 
counterfactual case, with the composition of demand unchanged through to 2015; 
The schedule PMax – DCF represents electricity demand in the counterfactual case; 
The schedule PMax – DA represents electricity demand in the actual case; 
Supply 
CF
 means MWh supplied in year t in the counterfactual case; and 
Supply 
A
 means MWh supplied in year t in the actual case. 
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Calculations of ∆S: 
 
Using as example the consumer welfare calculation for 2010 (2005 prices): GDPR is US$ 
1,756/MWh, PT
CF
 is 32.8 US$/MWh and PT
A
 33.0 US$/MWh.  Counterfactual supply in 
2010 is an estimated 11.7 TWh and actual electricity supply in 2010 is 14.1 TWh.    
 
(1) Consumer surplus in the counterfactual case is represented by areas B + D, calculated 
as follows: 
          
 B + D   = [(GDPR * α + PTCF *(1 – α)) - PTCF] * SupplyCF / 2 
= [(1,756 * .2) + (32.8 * .8) – 32.8] * 11. 7 / 2 
= US$ 2,015.8 million   
 
(2) Consumer surplus in the actual case is represented by areas D + E, calculated as 
follows: 
           
 D + E   = [(GDPR * α + PTA *(1 – α)) - PTA] * SupplyA / 2 
= [((1,756 * .2) + (33.0 * .8)) – 33.0] * 14.1 / 2 
= US$ 2,432.3 million   
 
(3) Change in consumer welfare is area E – B, that is equivalent to: [(D+E) – (B + D)] 
 (D + E) – (B + D)  = 2,432.3 - 2,015.8  
= US$ 416.5 million 
 
(4) Repeating these calculations for 2005 to 2015 inclusive, and discounting using a 5% 
real discount rate, returns our central case estimate of the change in consumer welfare: 
 
NPV of the change in consumer welfare (at 2005 prices) = US$ 3,577.4 million 
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7.3.2 Effects on Private Omani Investors (∆P): 
 
A specific objective of Oman’s electricity sector reforms was to facilitate international 
private sector investment and participation.  Article (15) of the Oman electricity sector law 
provides an exception from the Foreign Capital Investment Law allowing non-Omani 
shareholders in companies undertaking regulated activities to own up to 100 per cent of the 
shares of such companies. However, each I(W)PP project company is required to offer a 
minimum of 35% of its shares in an Initial Public Offering through the Muscat Securities 
Market.  This obligation ensures Omani investors have the opportunity to share in the 
benefits of electricity privatisation and contributes directly to the government’s objective of 
wider share ownership.   
 
Calculation of ∆P benefits to private Omani investors 
To calculate benefits to private Omani investors we identified from financial statements 
amounts investors paid for direct equity shareholdings in IPPs and amounts paid for shares 
purchased from initial public offerings. We then extracted dividends distributed to 
international and Omani private sector investors from the audited financial statements of each 
company for 1999 to 2010 inclusive.  In the actual case for 2011 to 2015 we assume annual 
dividend distributions equal average distributions between 2007 and 2010.  For SMN Barka 
Holding Company who hold shares in two IPPs (Al Rusail and SMN Barka) and whose IPO 
was completed in October 2011, expected dividend distributions for 2011 to 2015 are taken 
from the published prospectus (SMN Prospectus, 2011). For all IPP we assume dividends 
continue in perpetuity by dividing dividends in 2016 by the discount rate and discounting the 
result back to 2005.   We have excluded dividends remitted to foreign investors as the focus 
of our analysis is the change in social welfare in Oman. 
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In the counterfactual case, we assume the policy of requiring I(W)PPs to offer 35% of shares 
to the Muscat Securities Market would apply, and that MHEW would have been able to 
procure privately funded I(W)PPs sufficient to meet counterfactual supply growth of 7% per 
annum.  Reflecting these and other considerations (such as the absence of a requirement to 
hold fair and transparent competitions), we assume counterfactual dividend distributions are 
half the value of dividends distributed in the actual case.  Details of our calculation of the 
benefits to private Omani investors between 2005 and 2015 (taking account of dividends and 
share purchases before 2005) are presented in  Table 10.  
        
 NPV of the change in Omani investor benefits (at 2005 prices) = US$ 131.5 million 
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Table 10 Dividends to Omani Private Investors 
Dividends (Omani & Foreign)
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Future 
Current prices mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ Value
United Power Company SAOG 11.427 24.578 16.934 17.241 14.375 10.187 5.723 7.410 6.877 5.712 6.178 8.135 6.73 6.726 6.726 6.726 6.726
Al Kamil Power Company SAOG 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.005 4.506 5.005 4.755 2.002 3.003 3.69 3.691 3.691 3.691 3.691
ACWA Barka Power Company SAOG 38.688 19.968 20.800 7.072 10.400 8.788 2.912 7.29 7.293 7.293 7.293 7.293
Sohar Power Company SAOG 8.679 5.782 5.782 6.75 6.748 6.748 6.748 6.748
Al Rusayl Power Company SAOC
SMN Barka Power Company SAOC
SMN Power Holding SAOG 10.01 22.828 19.708 19.708 19.708
Total Dividends Paid 11.427 24.578 16.934 17.241 14.375 48.875 30.696 32.716 18.954 29.546 22.750 19.833 34.468 47.286 44.166 44.166 44.166
Dividends to Omani shareholders 6.673 14.353 9.889 10.069 8.395 20.387 12.542 19.389 10.143 15.433 10.743 9.942 16.058 20.961 19.767 19.767 19.767 395.344
Dividends to Foreign shareholders 4.754 10.224 7.044 7.172 5.980 28.487 18.153 18.511 10.293 15.895 12.637 9.891 18.410 26.325 24.399 24.399 24.399 487.971
Dividends: 1999-2015 in 2005 prices
Dividends to Omani shareholders 17.071 34.152 21.886 20.726 16.125 10.514 12.542 18.267 8.883 12.199 9.023 8.107 12.713 16.111 14.752 14.322 13.905 269.997
Dividends to Foreign shareholders 18.153 17.440 9.014 12.564 10.614 8.066 14.576 20.235 18.208 17.678 17.163 333.256
Share Purchase costs 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$
Share purchases costs: current prices 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 98.457 0.000 0.000 34.658 0.000 0.000 63.947 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share purchases costs: 2005 prices 98.457 0.000 0.000 27.396 0.000 0.000 50.628 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000










NPV Omani net Dividends (2005 prices) 305.4 262.9 229.9











Omani net Dividends (2005 prices)
where Counterfactual % of Actual is 25% 229.1 197.2 172.4
where Counterfactual % of Actual is 50% 152.7 131.5 114.9
where Counterfactual % of Actual is 75% 76.4 65.7 57.5
Sources & Assumptions: 1:  Tax & Dividend information for 1999 to 2010 from company published audited financial statements, AER assumptions thereafter. 
2:  SMN Power Holding is the holding company for Al Rusail and SMN Barka project companies.  Dividends for 2011 to 2015 from Prospectus.
3: for UPC, Al Kamil, ACWA Barka 2011 dividends based on previous four year average, remaing constant thereafter.  
4: for Sohar Power Company  2011 dividends based on previous three year average, remaing constant thereafter.  
5: UPC, Al Kamil, ACWA Barka and Sohar Power Company dividends from 2011 split 50:50 between Omani and international investors (the 2010 split). 
6: SMN Power Holding dividends from 2011 between Omani and international investors based on shareholdings stated in Prospectus. 
Pre Electricity M arket Reform Post Electricity M arket Reform Forecast Values
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7.3.3 Effects on Government Welfare (∆G): 
 
For the Oman SCBA, the government is included as it contributes to consumer welfare 
through the provision of electricity subsidy and to producer welfare through the ownership of 
electricity sector companies. The effects of reform on government welfare are assessed by 
considering (i) corporate tax payments by private and government owned electricity sector 
companies between 2005 and 2015; (ii) dividends received by government through its 
shareholdings in government owned MHEW successor companies; (iii) privatisation 
proceeds from the sale of Al Rusail, and (iv) differences in actual and counterfactual 
electricity subsidy.    Our assessment of each of these variables is discussed in turn.  
 
We find that the industry’s actual measured costs declined relative to the pre-reform trend, 
even though these post-reform costs include taxes and dividends that were not paid before the 
reform.  Post-reform subsidy payments reflect the cost estimates which include tax and 
dividend payments – if they were excluded, the true trend in underlying costs would show 
even more reductions.  The counter-factual subsidy estimates are based on cost trends which 
did not allow for any tax or dividend payments and we assume there would have continued to 
be no such payments, had reform not taken place.   
 
(i)     Corporate Tax Receipts 
The reforms transformed a vertically integrated ministry (MHEW) into a fully corporatized 
sector comprising a mix of privately owned companies I(W)PPs, and companies wholly 
owned by government.  All companies are liable to corporation tax that in Oman is presently 
at a rate of 12%.  In the actual case we calculate the present value of tax payments from all 
electricity companies irrespective of whether they are owned by the government or 
international private investors.  In the counterfactual case, the government receives tax 
payments from I(W)PP companies, but as the sector is assumed to remain under MHEW’s 
management, there would be no government owned companies and no corresponding tax 
receipts from them and fewer I(W)PPs.  We calculate the tax benefit as the difference in 
actual and counterfactual tax payments.   
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Calculation of ∆Tax receipts to Government 
Scrutiny of each company’s audited financial statements confirms that while all (private and 
government owned) electricity sector companies are profitable (in terms of pre tax profit) the 
application of accelerated depreciation allowances significantly reduces tax receipts in the 
period under study
50
.  We note, therefore, that future tax receipts can be expected to rise 
significantly once accelerated depreciation allowances are exhausted (we assume 
conservatively this will happen after 2015 and is not therefore reflected in our analysis) and 
particularly so for government owned transmission and distribution companies which are 
implementing significant capital expenditure programmes. The tax calculations for 
government owned and private companies are presented in  Table 11.
                                                 
50
 Actual tax payments of US$ 4.4 m derived from audited financial statements correspond to a gross 
tax liability of US$ 78 m (2005 to 2010). 
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Table 11 Change in Tax paid by Government Owned and Private Sector Companies  
Taxes paid by Government Owned Companies1
Tax Paid
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Current prices mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$
Muscat (MEDC) SAOC 0.000 0.528 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Majan (MJEC) SAOC 0.000 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mazoon (MZEC) SAOC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OETC SAOC 0.000 1.776 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PWP SAOC 0.000 0.296 0.146 0.447 0.369 0.569
Tax Payments to government 0.000 2.600 0.406 0.447 0.369 0.569 0.448 0.448 0.448 0.448 0.448
Total taxes paid (2005 prices) 0.000 2.450 0.355 0.353 0.310 0.464 0.355 0.344 0.334 0.324 0.315
Taxes paid by government owned 
companies :                                                  










Actual 4.9 4.5 4.1
Counterfactual 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sources & Assumptions: 1:  Tax payments for 2005 to 2010 from company published audited financial statements, AER assumptions thereafter. 
Post Electricity M arket Reform Forecast ValuesPre Electricity M arket Reform
 
Taxes paid by Privately Owned I(W)PP Project Companies
Tax Paid
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Current prices mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$ mill US$
Tax Paid as per Cash Flow statements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.435 1.898 1.851 2.907 2.070 2.181 2.181 2.181 2.181 2.181
Tax payments (2005 prices) 0 1.352 1.662 1.463 2.442 1.688 1.727 1.677 1.628 1.580 1.534










Actual NPV tax receipts (2005 prices) 13.9 12.3 11.0
PV tax receipt benefit (2005 prices)
where Counterfactual % of Actual is 25% 10.4 9.2 8.2
where Counterfactual % of Actual is 50% 6.9 6.2 5.5
where Counterfactual % of Actual is 75% 3.5 3.1 2.7
1:  Tax & Dividend information for 1999 to 2010 from company published audited finalcial statements, AER assumptions thereafter. 
Pre Electricity M arket Reform Post Electricity M arket Reform Forecast Values
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(ii)     Dividends to EHC from government owned successor companies  
The Ministry of Finance holds (directly and indirectly) 100% of the shares of MHEW 
successor companies – these are the companies that emerged from the unbundling of MHEW 
to undertake activities previously undertaken by the ministry.  The government is therefore 
the ultimate beneficiary of dividends distributed by government owned successor companies 
(dividends are paid directly to the Electricity Holding Company SAOC that is 100% owned 
by the Ministry of Finance).   There are no dividends in the counterfactual case due to our 
assumption that MHEW remains intact and responsible for electricity sector operations and is 
based on cost trends which did not allow for any such payments. 
 
Calculation of ∆Dividends to EHC from government successor owned companies  
For 2006 to 2010 actual dividends to EHC are as presented in each company’s audited 
financial statements. For 2011 to 2015 we assume dividends reflect average dividends 
distributed in previous years. EHC dividends calculations are presented in  Table 12. 
 
NPV of ∆ in Dividends paid by government owned companies (at 2005 prices)                          
= US$ 444.4 million




Table 12 Change in Dividends to Government from Government Owned Companies 
 
Dividends to EHC SAOC 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Current prices mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$ mill  US$
Muscat (MEDC) SAOC 0.000 12.709 16.991 9.945 9.862 30.282 12.38 12.377 12.377 12.377 12.377
Majan (MJEC) SAOC 0.000 7.496 12.584 9.594 6.258 16.523 8.98 8.983 8.983 8.983 8.983
Mazoon (MZEC) SAOC 0.000 9.103 16.726 16.653 11.687 42.281 13.54 13.542 13.542 13.542 13.542
OETC SAOC 0.000 35.708 28.220 25.662 19.175 74.911 27.19 27.191 27.191 27.191 27.191
PWP SAOC 0.000 2.020 1.056 2.639 2.785 0.000 2.12 2.125 2.125 2.125 2.125
Total Dividends Paid 0.000 67.036 75.577 64.493 49.767 ####### 64.218 64.218 64.218 64.218 64.218
Total Dividends paid (2005 prices) 0.000 63.158 66.188 50.979 41.801 133.735 50.842 49.362 47.924 46.528 45.173
Dividends to EHC SAOC from 
government owned companies :          










Actual 497.7 444.4 398.6
Counterfactual 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sources & Assumptions: 1:  Dividend payments for 2005 to 2010 from company published audited financial statements, AER assumptions thereafter. 




(iii)     Privatisation proceeds 
An already mentioned the government sold its entire shareholding in the 668MW Al Rusail power 
station for a consideration of RO 50 million in 2006. To derive the net benefit to government it 
would appropriate to subtract the present value of dividends Al Rusail would have been expected 
to distribute had it not been privatised.  Al Rusail did not distribute any dividend prior to its 
privatisation and, as before, we assume that this would have continued to be the case in the 
counterfactual. Our estimate of net privatisation proceeds is therefore the gross figure:  
         
NPV of Al Rusail privatisation proceeds (at 2005 prices) = US$ 123.8 million  
 
(iv) Electricity subsidy (MIS) 
Article (18) of the Oman electricity sector law requires the Ministry of Finance to pay electricity 
subsidy calculated by AER to licensed electricity suppliers.   AER calculates the annual electricity 
subsidy required by the three main electricity market segments (the MIS, RAEC rural systems, 
and the Salalah system).  The MIS is by far the largest segment and accounted for around 88% of 
total electricity supply and 72% of total subsidy in 2010 (AER Annual Reports, 2010).  
Accordingly, we focus on the change in actual and counterfactual MIS subsidy between 2005 and 
2015.   
 
Calculation of ∆MIS Electricity subsidy  
 
AER calculates electricity subsidy in each year as: economic costs minus customer tariff revenue.  
To calculate the change in subsidy from the government’s perspective we first multiply the 
economic cost of actual supply (US$/MWh) by actual MWh supply and subtract actual customer 
tariff revenue to derive the actual subsidy in each year.  For the counterfactual scenario we 
multiply counter-factual supply by counterfactual economic costs (US$/MWh) and subtract 
counterfactual customer tariff revenue to derive counterfactual subsidy.  
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The difference in actual and counterfactual government subsidy is sensitive to changes in 
production cost efficiency.  Two sources of efficiency are important to our estimate of actual 
subsidy and so merit further explanation (i) procurement cost efficiencies and (ii) reductions in 
technical and non-technical losses.  The following section describes the calculation 
methodologies for both of these variables.  
 
(i) Procurement cost efficiencies: post reform the electricity sector is subject to a 
generation security planning standard (of 24 LOLH
51
) and rules that require all 
new I(W)PP to be procured through fair and transparent competitions open to 
international investors and supervised by the regulator.  More efficient 
procurement of new privately funded generation capacity has helped the sector 
attain a higher rate of growth in electricity supply compared to the pre-reform 
period.  Growth in system size has allowed the connection of facilities with 
larger unit set sizes (gaining economies of scale in capital costs) and lower 
heat rates (with improved gas use efficiency).  In addition to supporting 
demand growth, new more efficient generating capacity has displaced older 
less efficient plant in the merit order and reduced the average gas use per MWh 
supplied.  Post reform the functions of the system operator, including 
economic dispatch, are subject to periodic audit and scrutiny to ensure 
production facilities are operated efficiently and in a manner consistent with 
minimising short run system costs.  The combination of these factors has 
helped the PWP attain lower procurement costs (in US$/MWh) than would 
have been possible without reform.   
 
Calculation of ∆ MIS Procurement cost efficiencies: 
To estimate the benefit of improved procurement cost efficiencies we first 
adjust all our data to use an opportunity cost of gas, US$ 5 per mmBtu in 2005, 
escalating at 2% per annum, rather than the price paid by the industry, which 
was only US$ 1.5 per mmBtu.  We then compile the actual cost of PWP 
                                                 
51
 Loss of Load Hours 
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purchases (in US$/MWh) between 2006
52
 and 2010 and make projections of 
costs through to 2015 - noting that between 2012 and 2015 some 3,500MW of 
new CCGT IPP capacity will connect to the MIS (AER Note, 2011). In the 
counterfactual scenario, we assume MHEW procurement costs in 2006 are the 
same as the actual scenario but thereafter reduce at a rate of 0.5% per annum. 
This approach acknowledges that while MHEW would have been expected to 
benefit from scale economies and improved efficiencies as the system grew in 
size, this would be at a lesser rate than the actual case.  
 
Figure 21 MIS Procurement Costs: counterfactual and actual  
New Capacity Milestones & notes
2005
2006 Early Power Sohar 1: 360 MW
2007 Full Power Sohar 1: 585
2008 Early Power Barka 2: 363 MW (dispatch audit)
2009 Full Barka 2: 678 MW
2010 Inc cost of temp diesel gen
2011 Inc cost of temp diesel gen
2012 New Early Power 500MW B3/S2
2013 Full Power 1,500MW B3/S2
2014 Early Power Sur IPP 500 MW















As illustrated in  Figure 21, actual PWP procurement costs decline between 
2005 and 2009, increase sharply in 2010, and decline thereafter through to 
2015 due to the addition of new highly efficient CCGT capacity.  2010 and 
2011 were years in which no new MIS capacity was commissioned due to 
weaknesses in the PWP’s performance of its procurement functions (AER 
Note, 2011).  To safeguard security of supply the PWP was required by AER 
to contract for around 300MW of temporary diesel generation in both years. 
Diesel generation is considerably more expensive than gas generation and 
procurement costs per MWh in 2010 and 2011 were significantly higher than 
would have been the case had the procurement of new capacity not been 
delayed. 
                                                 
52
 The new market structure was implemented on 1 May 2005 and PWP information is available from that 
date.  MIS purchase costs in both scenarios start from 2006 (the first full year post reform).  
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Following regulatory intervention and changes to the Board and management 
of the PWP the procurement of new capacity is now back on track with 
3,500MW of contracted capacity scheduled to be commissioned between 2012 
and 2015.  This new and more efficient capacity will help meet demand 
growth and allow older less efficient plant to be withdrawn from service.  
 
The procurement cost calculations presented in  Table 13 show actual and 
counterfactual purchase costs between 2005 and 2015 and the estimated 
benefit (gain) from improved procurement and operational efficiencies 
(including economies of scale and improved dispatch).  We note that by 2015 
procurement efficiency improvements return cost savings of 7.6%, 
representing real savings of US$ 112 million in that year.  
Our estimate of the present value of improved procurement efficiency benefits, 
in 2005 prices discounted using a 5% discount rate, is; 
 
NPV of procurement efficiency benefits (at 2005 prices) = US$ 221.6 million 
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Table 13 MIS Procurement Cost Efficiency Benefits  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Units Purchased (Actual) GWh 9,770.8 11,764.8 12,480.0 14,017.0 15,721.0 16,855.0 18,550.2 20,469.7 22,588.4 24,927.4 27,509.5
Sm3 per MWh 377.5 379.1 369.0 355.8 328.9 325.4 323.9 304.1 279.1 275.4 255.0
million Sm3 of natural gas 3,688.7 4,459.7 4,605.4 4,987.0 5,170.2 5,484.5 6,008.3 6,224.4 6,305.1 6,864.4 7,014.9
Gas costs @ $1.5 mmBtu 187.2 226.4 233.8 253.1 262.4 278.4 305.0 316.0 320.0 348.4 356.1
Gas costs @ $5 mmBtu + 2% pa escalation 636.6 769.7 810.7 895.4 946.9 1,024.6 1,144.9 1,209.8 1,250.0 1,388.0 1,446.9
Total Purchase Costs ($1.5 mmBtu) US$ m 280.8 355.7 370.7 413.1 452.8 508.8 545.0 585.4 640.2 700.0 765.3
Total Purchase Cost per Unit $/MWh 28.7 30.2 29.7 29.5 28.8 30.2 29.4 28.6 28.3 28.1 27.8
Unit cost Index 2005 = 100 100 105 103 103 100 105 102 100 99 98 97
Assumptions:  gas cost$/annual escalation% 5/0.02
Gas cost assumptions $US mmBtu 5
Annual escalation 2.0%
Gas Costs ($ mmBtu + 2% pa esc) $US mmBtu 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.1
Total Cost ($ mmBtu + 2% pa esc) US$ m 730.2 899.0 947.6 1,055.4 1,137.3 1,255.0 1,384.9 1,479.2 1,570.1 1,739.6 1,856.1
Total Purchase Cost per Unit $/MWh 74.7 76.4 75.9 75.3 72.3 74.5 74.7 72.3 69.5 69.8 67.5
Unit cost Index 2005 = 100 100 99 99 95 97 98 95 91 91 88
Source: OPWP Annual Reports & Regulatory Accounts, AER assumptions
Economic cost of gas ($5 mmBtu & 2% annual escalation)
Change in Procurement Costs 0.50% per annum C'factual reduction 
Counterfactual unit Purchase Cost $/MWh 76.413 76.031 75.650 75.272 74.896 74.5 74.1 73.8 73.4 73.0
Counterfactual costs US$ m 899.0 948.9 1060.4 1183.4 1262.4 1,382.4 1,517.8 1,666.5 1,829.9 2,009.3
Cost saving (current prices) US$ m 0.00 1.2 4.9 46.1 7.4 -2.5 38.6 96.5 90.3 153.3
Cost reduction % 0.0% -0.1% -0.5% -3.9% -0.6% 0.2% -2.5% -5.8% -4.9% -7.6%
Cost saving (2005 prices) US$ m 0.00 1.1 4.3 36.4 6.2 -2.0 30.5 74.2 67.4 111.0
NPV of savings (5%) US$ m 221.6 US$ mill 2005 prices  
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(ii)  Losses reductions: Technical and non-technical losses are an important 
element of our study and we compare and then value the difference in total 
losses under the actual and counterfactual scenarios. Drawing from 
Chapter 5 the Omani electricity sector law requires greater transparency of 
losses reporting by market participants. 
 
Scrutiny of MHEW Annual Reports (1997-2004) indicates that total (MIS 
equivalent) system losses under MHEW management increased from 
17.4% in 1997 to 24.6% in 2004.  In the counterfactual case we assume 
total losses remain constant at the 2004 rate of 24.6% between 2005 
through to 2015.  Post reform total losses have declined in response to 
losses reduction incentives in company price controls: by 2010 MIS losses 
had reduced to 16.2% (AER Annual Report, 2010). In the actual case we 
apply AER’s predicted losses benchmarks that are expected to see MIS 
losses reduce from 15.5% in 2011 to 13.5% in 2015. 
 
Calculation of ∆ MIS Losses reductions benefits: 
To calculate the benefit of total losses reductions we derive, for the actual 
and counterfactual cases, the number of lost units in each year.  We 
multiply actual and counterfactual losses by the estimated avoidable cost 
of electricity in that year (reflecting a gas cost of US$ 5 mmBtu in 2005 
increasing by 2% per annum thereafter.  Our estimate of losses reduction 
benefits does not include any allowance for the cost of additional capacity 
required to support higher levels of total generation (due to higher losses) 
in the counterfactual case.  Our calculation of the benefit of losses 
reductions is presented in ‎Table 14.  
 
NPV of losses reduction benefits (at 2005 prices) = US$ 627.2 million 




Table 14 Estimates of Savings in Technical & Non-technical Losses (MIS) 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1: Actual & Forecast Supply TWh 5.024 5.586 5.831 6.083 6.527 6.900 7.174 7.797 8.402 9.220 9.755 11.317 12.714 14.122 15.675 17.399 19.313 21.438 23.796
2: Actual MIS losses TWh 1.055 1.081 1.619 1.800 1.846 1.979 2.194 2.537 2.495 2.562 2.702 2.717 3.005 2.733 2.875 3.070 3.275 3.490 3.714
3: Actual MIS Purchases TWh 6.080 6.667 7.450 7.884 8.372 8.879 9.367 10.334 10.897 11.782 12.457 14.034 15.719 16.855 18.550 20.470 22.588 24.927 27.509
4: Actual MIS losses as % Purchases % 17.4% 16.2% 21.7% 22.8% 22.0% 22.3% 23.4% 24.6% 22.9% 21.7% 21.7% 19.4% 19.1% 16.2% 15.5% 15.0% 14.5% 14.0% 13.5%
5: Cost of 1 MWh lost $/MWh 65.155 65.422 64.962 63.883 60.232 60.786 61.717 59.100 55.336 55.684 52.595
6: Cost of Actual MIS losses US$ m 162.5 167.6 175.5 173.5 181.0 166.2 177.5 181.5 181.2 194.3 195.3
7: Counterfactual (2004) Losses % 17.4% 16.2% 21.7% 22.8% 22.0% 22.3% 23.4% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6% 24.6%0.0%
8: Counterfactual MIS Losses TWh 1.055 1.081 1.619 1.800 1.846 1.979 2.194 2.537 2.734 3.000 3.175 3.683 4.137 4.596 5.101 5.662 6.285 6.977 7.744
9: Counterfactual MIS purchases TWh 6.080 6.667 7.450 7.884 8.372 8.879 9.367 10.334 11.137 12.220 12.929 15.000 16.851 18.717 20.776 23.061 25.598 28.414 31.540
10: Cost of 1 MWh lost $/MWh 65.155 65.422 64.962 63.883 60.232 60.786 61.717 59.100 55.336 55.684 52.595
11: Cost of Counterfactual MIS losses US$ m 178.2 196.3 206.2 235.3 249.2 279.4 314.8 334.6 347.8 388.5 407.3
12: MIS losses savings (current prices) US$ m 15.6 28.7 30.7 61.7 68.2 113.2 137.4 153.2 166.6 194.2 212.0
11: Savings (2005 prices) US$ m 15.6 27.0 26.9 48.8 57.3 92.3 108.8 117.7 124.3 140.7 149.1
12: PV of Savings (@ 5%, 2005 prices) 627.2 m US$
13: PV of Savings (@ 3%, 2005 prices) 724.3 m US$
14: PV of Savings (@ 7%, 2005 prices) 545.9 m US$
Sources: 1: Actual & Forecast Supply: 1997 to 2014 AER from MHEW annual reports; 2005 to 2010 AER Annual Reports, 2011 to 2015 assumed annual grow th in Supply of 10.9% 
2: Actual MIS losses: 1997 to 2014 AER from MHEW annual reports; 2005 to 2010 AER Annual Reports, 2011 to 2015 AER projections 
3: Actual MIS Purchases: 1997 to 2014 AER from MHEW annual reports; 2005 to 2010 AER Annual Reports, 2011 to 2015 AER projections 
4: Actual MIS losses as % Purchases: 1997 to 2014 AER from MHEW annual reports; 2005 to 2010 AER Annual Reports, 2011 to 2015 AER projections 
5: Cost of 1 MWh lost :  is the avoidable cost of 1 MWh (Gas prices @ 5$ mmBtu and 2% escalation) reflecting the average system heat rate in each year. 
6: Cost of Actual MIS losses :  costed using the avoidable cost per MWh in 5; 
7: Counterfactual (2004) Losses: derived from MHEW annual reports; 1997 to 2004 
8: Counterfactual MIS Losses: Losses derived by dividing Actual supply by (1 - 0.246) and multiplying the result by 24.6%  
9: Counterfactual MIS purchases: 1997 to 2004 AER from MHEW annual reports, Actual MWh Supply (1) + Counterfactual losses (8) 
10: Cost of 1 MWh lost : same as (5) 
11: Cost of Counterfactual MIS losses: (10) multiplied by (8) 
12: MIS losses savings (current prices): (11) minus (6)  
11: Savings (2005 prices): line 10 adjusted to the CPI deflator w ith 2005 = 100
Actual Data - Pre Electricity Market Reform Actual & Counterfactual - Post Reform Forecast Values
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 Figure 22 presents the difference in actual and counterfactual subsidy from 2005 to 2015 
(2005 prices) calculated as actual minus counterfactual subsidy. 
 











































































The calculations highlight increasing and significant differences in subsidy:  for our central 
case subsidy in the actual scenario is increasingly higher than counterfactual subsidy 
indicating an increasing cost to the government as a result of increased supply.  However, in 
both cases subsidy per kWh in 2015 (2005 prices) is lower than in 2005, but actual subsidy of 
4.7 USc/kWh is around 26% lower than counterfactual subsidy of 6.3 USc/kWh in that year.  
 
 
NPV difference in subsidy (at 2005 prices) = - US$ 233.9 million  
 




Table 15 Calculation of Difference in MIS Subsidy 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Conterfactual subsidy US$ m current prices 730.9 771.9 818.7 856.4 953.4 1,006.5 1,065.5 1,154.7 1,252.7 1,360.1 1,478.1
US$ m 2005 prices 730.9 727.3 717.0 677.0 800.8 820.7 843.6 887.5 934.8 985.4 1,039.7
US c/kWh 2005 prices 8.8 8.1 7.5 6.6 7.3 7.0 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3
Counterfactual Supply GWh 8,342.8 8,926.8 9,551.7 10,220.3 10,935.7 11,701.2 12,520.3 13,396.7 14,334.5 15,337.9 16,411.5
Actual subsidy US$ m current prices 718.1 763.1 797.4 867.4 972.9 1,061.8 1,146.1 1,230.6 1,313.8 1,479.4 1,596.7
US$ m 2005 prices 718.1 719.0 698.4 685.6 817.2 865.9 907.4 945.9 980.4 1,071.9 1,123.1
US c/kWh 2005 prices 8.5 7.8 7.2 6.1 6.4 6.1 5.8 5.4 5.1 5.0 4.7
Actual Supply GWh 8,402.2 9,219.8 9,754.7 11,317.4 12,713.6 14,121.6 15,675.0 17,399.2 19,313.1 21,437.6 23,795.7
Difference in Subsidy
Counterfactual - Actual RO m 2005 prices 12.7 8.3 18.7 -8.6 -16.4 -45.2 -63.8 -58.4 -45.6 -86.5 -83.4
NPV change in subsidy RO m, 2005 prices @ 5% -233.9
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7.3.4 Effects on Labour (∆L): 
 
The Omani government took deliberate and specific steps to safeguard the employment of 
Omani nationals who may be affected by the restructuring. Omani national MHEW 
employees engaged in electricity related activities were able to choose between moving to a 
successor company or remaining with the MHEW in a water or housing related position. 
Moreover, the Oman electricity sector law includes specific provisions that safeguard the 
employment rights and pension entitlements of Omani national MHEW employees 
transferring to successor companies (AER Note, 2011).  
 
Nearly all contractors who supplied goods and services to MHEW pre reform had their 
contracts transferred to MHEW successor companies thereby ensuring continuity of business 
and employment. This was important as MHEW contracted out a large element of its 
operational responsibilities and a significant number of Omani nationals were employed by 
contractors retained by MHEW. 
 
As a result of these measures the restructuring did not result in any forced redundancies and 
other than Omani national MHEW employees who opted for early retirement, electricity 
related employment did not reduce as a consequence of reform. 
 
In fact, acceleration in the growth of electricity supply and new requirements to comply with 
statutory obligations relating to security of supply, planning and operating standards and 
stricter enforcement of health and safety obligations led to an increase in the demand for 
labour (for both direct employees and contractors). Higher employment is therefore a direct 
benefit of reform. Another benefit is that Omani nationals of MHEW successor companies 
are now paid significantly more than MHEW employees. Our calculation of labour benefits 
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Calculation of ∆Labour Welfare 
 
In order to estimate the difference in employee income in the actual case and counterfactual 
case, we require estimates of: (i) the number of employees in the actual case and 
counterfactual case, and (ii) average salary per employee in the actual and counterfactual 
cases. 
 
For the actual case we focus on direct employees of three distribution and supply companies, 
a transmission and dispatch company and the PWP who collectively provide electricity 
services to MIS connected customers (we exclude production facilities from our analysis due 
to difficulties in estimating the number of full time equivalent employees during the 
construction and commissioning phases). To provide a projection of employees for 2011 to 
2015 we derived a relationship between employees and supply between 2006 and 2010 and 
applied this relationship to the actual supply projection in 2011 to 2015.  The weighted 
average salary of all MIS companies in 2010 was increased by 5% per annum in line with 
prevailing wage settlements for commercial companies and remuneration in 2011 to 2015 
was derived by multiplying annual salary by annual employment. 
 
For the counterfactual case, we derived the ratio of MWh supplied per employee in 2005 and 
applied this to counterfactual supply from 2006 to 2015 to estimate counterfactual 
employment.    The average salary in 2005 was ‘deflated’ by 17% to reverse the uplift in 
salaries granted to MHEW employees joining successor companies.  The adjusted salary was 
then increased by 4% per annum in line with prevailing public sector wage settlements and 
then multiplied by counterfactual employment in each year to derive estimates of 
counterfactual remuneration from 2006 to 2015. 
 
A further component of the calculation deducts an estimate of the income of the additional 
142 staff in the actual case compared to the counterfactual might be expected to earn from 
alternative employment as it would not be reasonable to assume these workers would not be 
able to find employment.  Our estimate of alternative income is based on twice the minimum 





 increased by 5% per annum from 2005 in line with private sector wage escalation (our 
reasoning is that these workers would have found productive employment that would justify 
more than minimum wage remuneration (that typically applies to unskilled workers)). 
 
Further details of the change in labour welfare calculations are presented in  Table 16. 
 
Our estimate of the present value of the change in labour welfare between 2005 and 2015, 
discounted using a real 5% discount rate is: 
 
 
NPV of labour benefits (at 2005 prices) = US$ 62.7 million 
                                                 
53
 Minimum wage in Oman is approximately US$ 520 per month.  
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Table 16 Change in Labour Welfare Calculations 
A Actual & Counterfactual Employment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Direct Staff No. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Distribution and Supply # 573 674 799 904 934 1,012
PWP (MIS) # 31 29 29 33 36 37
OETC # 86 104 119 140 165 177
Total # 690 807 947 1,077 1,135 1,226
Actual Supply GWh 8,402 9,220 9,755 11,317 12,714 14,122 15,675.0 17,399.2 19,313.1 21,437.6 23,795.7
Employee per GWh #/GWh 0.088 0.097 0.095 0.089 0.087 0.083 0.079 0.076 0.072 0.068
Actual MIS Employees # 690 807 947 1,077 1,135 1,226 1,299.7 1,378.8 1,459.7 1,541.6 1,623.9
Counterfactual Supply GWh 8,343 8,927 9,552 10,220 10,936 11,701 12,520.3 13,396.7 14,334.5 15,337.9 16,411.5
GWh per Employee 2006 GWh/employee 11.1
Counterfactual MIS Employees # 807 863 924 989 1,058 1,131.9 1,211.1 1,295.9 1,386.6 1,483.6
B Actual & Counterfactual Labour Remuneration
Staff Cost (Nominal US$ million) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Distribution and Supply US$ m current prices 48.5 18.7 21.5 28.4 33.0 40.0
PWP (MIS) US$ m current prices 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 3.1 3.8
OETC US$ m current prices 2.9 2.9 4.2 5.8 7.4 9.5
Total US$ m current prices 23.3 27.5 36.2 43.5 53.4
Average annual salaries 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Distribution and Supply US$ current prices 27,690 26,954 31,425 35,318 39,551
PWP (MIS) US$ current prices 57,738 60,117 60,197 84,915 103,560
OETC US$ current prices 28,200 35,439 41,526 45,098 53,807
Weighted average for all companies US$ current prices 28,835.3 29,035.5 33,619.8 38,313.3 43,540.9 45,718 48,004 50,404 52,924 55,570
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Actual Salary per GWh Supply US$ current prices 3.13 2.98 2.97 3.01 3.08 3.034 3.034 3.034 3.034 3.034
Actual Employee remuneration US$ m  current prices 23.3 27.5 36.2 43.5 53.4 59.42 66.19 73.57 81.59 90.24
Actual Employee remuneration US$ m 2005 prices 23.3 25.9 31.7 34.4 44.8 48.45 52.40 56.55 60.89 65.38
Counterfactual Salary scalar 1.17 2.68 2.55 2.55 2.59 2.65 2.605 2.605 2.605 2.605 2.605
Counterfactual Employee remuneration US$ m  current prices 24.2 26.9 30.0 33.3 37.1 41.30 45.96 51.14 56.91 63.33
Counterfactual Employee remuneration US$ m 2005 prices 24.2 25.4 26.2 26.4 31.2 33.68 36.38 39.31 42.47 45.88
Opportunity cost of additional Labour US$ m 2005 prices 0.00 1.15 2.21 2.22 2.68 2.81 2.95 3.02 3.00 2.85
Actual - Counterfactual - OP Cost US$ m 2005 prices -0.9 -0.6 3.3 5.8 11.0 11.97 13.07 14.22 15.42 16.65
NPV change Employee welfare US$ m, 2005 prices @ 5% 62.7
Sources:  AER Reports (2005 - 2010), :  Annual reports of MEDC, MJEC, MZEC, OETC & PWP (2006 – 2010)
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7.3.5 Costs Associated with Regulation and Corporatisation (∆R&C): 
 
Implementing electricity market reform gives rise to certain costs that need to be accounted 
for in our SCBA.  We analyse two categories of cost:  first is the cost of retaining consultants 
and advisors to implement the new market structure and establish a new regulatory function.  
Second, is the cost of regulating the new market structure, through the introduction of the 
independent regulator, whose functions have no obvious counterpart pre-reform. Our 
calculations of these costs are presented in  Table 17. 
 
First, estimates of corporatisation costs incurred between 1999 and 2004 include the cost of 
preparing the phase I & II Report policy document, Phase II implementation, and the cost of 
Ministry of National Economy special advisors and others consultancy services. Details of 
these costs are confidential, but total corporatisation costs are estimated in present value 
terms (2005 prices) at US$ 13.4 million (AER Note, 2011). 
 
NPV of corporatisation costs (in 2005 prices) = US$ 13.4 million 
 
AER Annual Reports (2005-2010), provide regulatory costs for the years 2005 to 2011 while 
AER also provided estimates of its expected costs from 2012 to 2015 (AER Note, 2011). 
Accordingly, we can calculate the present value of regulatory costs between 2005 and 2011 
in 2005 prices; 
    
NPV of regulatory costs (in 2005 prices) = US$ 31.7 million 
 
The combined total cost of corporatisation and regulation (R&C) used in our SCBA (in 2005 
prices) is therefore; 
 
NPV of R&C costs (at 2005 prices) = US$ 45.1 million 
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Table 17 Regulation and Corporatisation Costs 
 
A Costs of Regulation
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AER Licence Fees US$ m current prices 2.2 2.0 2.9 3.6 6.4 3.6 4.0
USc/kWh current prices 26.3 22.1 29.6 31.7 50.1 25.3 25.8 33.0 33.3 33.5 33.8
US$ m 2005 prices 2.2 1.9 2.5 2.8 5.4 2.9 4.2 4.7 5.2 5.9 6.6
USc/kWh 2005 prices 26.3 20.8 25.9 25.1 42.1 20.6 26.5 26.9 27.1 27.4 27.6
PV Regulatory Costs (@ 5%) 31.7
Source: AER Annual Report for 2005 to 2011, AER estimates thereafter.
B Corporatization Costs
% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
US$ mill current prices 0.390 0.338 2.172 4.643 1.716 1.976
US$ mill 2005 prices 0.457 0.386 2.425 5.063 1.833 2.040
PV of Savings (5%) 13.4 US$ mill
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0.000 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Disount Factors: 5% 1.2763 1.2155 1.1576 1.1025 1.0500 1.0000 0.9524 0.9070 0.8638 0.8227 0.7835 0.7462 0.7107 0.6768 0.6446 0.6139 0.5847
Discounted R&C Costs (US$ mill 2005 prices) 0.5826 0.4697 2.8076 5.5817 1.9249 2.0396 2.1048 1.7398 2.1847 2.3354 4.1922 2.1749 2.9524 3.1710 3.3786 3.5996 3.8348
PV R & C Costs (@ 5%) US$ mill 2005 prices 45.1 US$ mill
Source: AER.  Costs include Consortium advisory fees, MNE Unbundling Advisor and Regulatory Specialist, and other sundry consultancy costs. 
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 Table 18 presents the results of the welfare calculations.  
 
Table 18 SCBA Results  










1 Change in consumer welfare (∆S) 4,203.9 3,577.4 3,059.3
2 Change private Omani investor welfare (∆P) 152.7 131.5 114.9
3 Change in government welfare (∆G)
(i) Government tax receipts
from government owned companies 4.9 4.5 4.1
from private I(W)PP companies 6.9 6.2 5.5
(ii) Dividends to government
from government owned companies 497.7 444.4 398.6
(iii) Privatisation proceeds (Rusail) 126.2 123.8 121.5
(iv) Change in subsidy benefit -279.8 -233.9 -196.1
Total ∆G 355.9 344.9 333.7
4 Change in Labour welfare (∆L) 72.2 62.7 54.7
5 Regulation & Corporatisation Costs (C&R)
Regulatory costs -36.0 -31.7 -28.0
Corporatisation (unbundling costs) -12.9 -13.4 -13.9
6 Net change in Benefits minus Costs 4,735.8 4,071.4 3,520.7
 
 
Source: author’s research 
 
Our analysis indicates Oman’s electricity sector reforms delivered a net increase in social 
welfare of US$ 4,071.4 million with consumer welfare contributing US$ 3,577.4 million, or 
87% of the welfare change.  
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7.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We tested the sensitivity of the SCBA results presented above to changes in key input 
assumptions, the results are presented in  Table 19.  
 
Table 19 SCBA Sensitivity Analysis  










∆S 4,203.9 3,577.4 3,059.3 1. Value of α = 20%
∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9 2. Counterfactual Supply (2005 to 2015) 7% p.a.
∆G 355.9 344.9 333.7 3. Actual Supply (2011 to 2015) 11% p.a.
∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7 4. Procurement cost efficiency 0.5% p.a. reduction 
∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9 5. Counterfactual losses 24.6% 2005 - 2015
∆W 4,735.8 4,071.4 3,520.7
6. Gas costs US $5 per mMBTu & 2% annual escalation
C'factual Supply 9% ∆S 1,819.6 1,530.6 1,292.7 C'factual Supply 5% ∆S 6,298.3 5,379.8 4,618.8
∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9 ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9
∆G 1,282.3 1,142.5 1,024.2 ∆G -460.1 -359.6 -277.9
∆L 61.6 53.6 46.7 ∆L 81.8 71.1 62.0
∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9 ∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9
∆W 3,267.3 2,813.0 2,436.6 ∆W 6,023.8 5,177.7 4,476.0
Actual Supply 13% ∆S 4,950.4 4,195.9 3,573.8 Actual Supply 9% ∆S 3,493.9 2,988.9 2,569.4
∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9 ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9
∆G 148.7 173.0 190.5 ∆G 556.0 510.9 472.0
∆L 78.7 68.3 59.4 ∆L 66.0 57.5 50.3
∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9 ∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9
∆W 5,281.6 4,523.6 3,896.8 ∆W 4,219.7 3,643.6 3,164.7
α = 30% ∆S 6,305.9 5,366.1 4,588.9 α = 10% ∆S 2,102.0 1,788.7 1,529.6
∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9 ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9
∆G 355.9 344.9 333.7 ∆G 355.9 344.9 333.7
∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7 ∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7
∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9 ∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9
∆W 6,837.8 5,860.2 5,050.3 ∆W 2,633.9 2,282.7 1,991.1
Counterfactual Procurement ∆S 4,203.9 3,577.4 3,059.3 Counterfactual Procurement ∆S 4,203.9 3,577.4 3,059.3
Cost efficiency  1% p.a. ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9 Cost efficiency  0% p.a. ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9
∆G 178.2 193.4 203.9 ∆G 538.5 500.4 466.8
∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7 ∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7
∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9 ∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9
∆W 4,558.1 3,920.0 3,391.0 ∆W 4,918.4 4,227.0 3,653.8
Counterfactual MIS ∆S 4,203.9 3,577.4 3,059.3 Counterfactual MIS ∆S 4,203.9 3,577.4 3,059.3
Losses reductions 1% p.a. ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9 Losses reductions 0.5% p.a. ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9
∆G -275.1 -200.9 -141.0 ∆G 191.5 59.2 -80.7
∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7 ∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7
∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9 ∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9
∆W 4,104.8 3,525.7 3,046.1 ∆W 4,571.4 3,785.7 3,106.3
Actual & Counterfactual ∆S 4,203.9 3,577.4 3,059.3 Actual & Counterfactual ∆S 4,203.9 3,577.4 3,059.3
Gas costs: US $7 per mMBTu ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9 Gas costs: US $3 per mMBTu ∆P 152.7 131.5 114.9
and 2% p.a. escalation ∆G 253.7 258.9 261.1 and 2% p.a. escalation ∆G 474.6 430.9 406.2
∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7 ∆L 72.2 62.7 54.7
∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9 ∆C&R -49.0 -45.1 -41.9
∆W 4,633.6 3,985.4 3,448.1 ∆W 4,854.5 4,157.5 3,593.3
Note:  ∆P and ∆C&R are assumed to remain constant in all scenarios for simplicity
Central Case results Central case assumptions:
 
 




The principal results are as follows:  
 
(i) The change in total welfare (∆W) is most sensitive to changes in consumer welfare 
Vis-à-vis the value of α, that determines the weights of Pmax and Permitted Tariffs in 
the consumer welfare calculation.  In the central case α = 20%, when α = 30% the 
change in total welfare increases by US$ 1,789 million (44%) whereas when α = 10% 
the change in total welfare is reduced by US$ 1,789 million (-44%); 
(ii) The second key sensitivity is the assumed annual growth in counterfactual supply.  In 
the central case we assume counterfactual growth of 7% per annum (based on pre 
reform data).  Assuming counterfactual growth of 9% per annum reduces the change 
in total welfare by US$ 1,258 million (-31%) while counterfactual growth of 5% 
increases the change in total welfare by US$ 1,106 million (27%);  
(iii) Total welfare is less sensitive to changes in the assumed rate of growth in actual 
supply between 2011 and 2015.  In the central case we assume actual supply grows at 
11% per annum over this period (the actual annual rate of growth between 2005 and 
2010).  Assuming actual supply growth of 13% increases the change in total welfare 
by US$ 452 million (11.1 %) whereas actual growth of 9% reduces the change in total 
welfare by US$428 million (-10.5%);  
(iv) In the central case we assume counterfactual losses of 24.6% in each year (the 
observed rate of losses in 2004).  Assuming counterfactual losses reduce by 1 
percentage point per annum reduces the change in total welfare by US$ 546 million           
(-13%),  assuming a reduction of 0.5 percentage point per annum reduces the change 
in total welfare by US$ 286 million (-7%); and  
(v) Total welfare is less sensitive to changes in the assumed rate of improved 
counterfactual procurement efficiency and changes in gas costs, changes in the central 
case assumptions for these items returns adjustments to the change in total welfare of 












Our SCBA objective was to test whether Oman benefited, in terms of increased total welfare, 
from the major electricity market reforms introduced in 2004 that are based around a single 
buyer market structure supervised by an independent regulatory authority.  Our conclusions 
are: 
1. The reforms have significantly increased total welfare, in the central case total welfare 
increases by US$ 4,071 million, principally due to an increase in consumer welfare of 
US$ 3,577 million.  The increase in consumer welfare is in response to higher growth 
in electricity supply that increased from a pre reform growth rate of 7% to around 
11% per annum post reform;   
2. The reforms have delivered both consumer and producer welfare gains with most 
producer welfare gains reflected in changes in government welfare as improved 
efficiency contributes to reductions in electricity subsidy. For example: the natural gas 
required to generate 1 MWh declines from 377 standard cubic meters in 2005 to 255 
standard cubic meters in 2015, a 32% reduction; MIS losses decline from 24.6% in 
2004 to 13.5% in 2015; in the central case the per-unit subsidy (based on the 
opportunity cost of gas) declines from 8.6 USc/kWh in 2005 to 4.7 USc/kWh in 2015; 
3. Although there has been only one privatisation transaction and electricity tariffs have 
remained unchanged and heavily subsidised, excluding consumer welfare we estimate 
reform benefits of US$ 494 million comprising benefits to Omani investors of US$ 
131 million, government benefits of US$ 345 million (including privatisation 
proceeds US$ 124 million) and labour benefits of US$ 63 million; and 
4. The SCBA identifies significant net benefits of reform between 2005 and 2015.  
However, as the electricity sector grows beyond our analysis horizon we expect Oman 
to secure further welfare benefits provided the efficiency improvements introduced by 





Chapter 8 Findings and Implications 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter reviews the current status of GCC electricity markets, in terms of functional 
separation, corporatisation, public and private sector ownership, interconnections with GCC 
member states, and regulation. We also provide indications gathered from survey work of 
expected trends in policy and electricity market reform.  The research findings are presented 
in tables to facilitate cross-country comparisons of the present status of electricity market 
reform in each member state.   
 
The results of the review are supplemented by MCDA and applied to the Textbook Model 
criteria, both discussed in  Chapter 2, to provide a robust basis for our recommendations for 
GCC electricity market reform. The results of the SCBA presented in  Chapter 7 provide 
further support and justification for our recommendations. 
8.2 Survey Review of GCC Electricity Markets 
 
Information on the structure and status of GCC electricity markets was derived using a survey 
questionnaire designed for this purpose with follow up discussions and meetings with 
officials in each member state and further supplemented by document reviews (including 
country specific laws, regulations, and policy proposals).  The GCC survey questionnaire is 
included as Appendix 5 to the thesis and summary notes of meetings are presented in 
Appendix 1.  We now present the results derived from the survey, document review and 
meetings to establish the present status of GCC electricity markets.  
 




(i) Functional Separation  
 
According to the Textbook Model (Littlechild, 2006), vertical separation is a fundamental 
part of the reform process.   Table 20 shows there are significant differences in the extent of 
vertical separation across GCC electricity markets.  
 
Table 20 GCC Electricity Market Structures – Functional Separation 












































Source: author’s research 
 
 
Oman and Abu Dhabi are the only two cases in the GCC where the functions of generation, 
transmission and distribution are fully separated.  However, the functions of distribution and 
supply while separate from generation and transmission are still not fully separate. A feature 
of the Omani electricity law is that separate licences are required for each activity. This legal 
requirement will assist further unbundling and the introduction of retail competition. 
 
Other than the deployment of IPPs the electricity markets in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar have 
not undergone any functional separation, although, from previous parts of the research it is 
understood that Qatar and Bahrain are moving in that direction. For Saudi Arabia, the market 
remains bundled for most activities with the exception of some IPP generation.    
 
Transmission and system operations are separate from the functions of generation, 
distribution and supply in Oman and Abu Dhabi although system operator functions are 
undertaken by the transmission company and are separate from all other electricity functions.  




The distribution and supply functions remain integrated even in the reformed electricity 
markets of Oman and Abu Dhabi.   Our Oman case study noted that state-owned entities 
carrying out the still ‘bundled’ activities of distribution and supply are required by law to 
keep separate accounts for each activity. Moreover, the Omani regulator has implemented 
separate distribution and supply price controls to further separate the distribution and supply 
functions and prepare for retail competition.  
 
Remote areas in both Oman and Abu Dhabi are serviced by small vertically integrated 
companies using diesel-fired-generators to supply small networks serving limited 
populations.  These relatively small systems are serviced by state-owned companies. Saudi 
Arabia may also face a similar situation in remote areas to that faced in Oman and Abu 
Dhabi, and may introduce a similar vertically integrated rural areas entity.  This is less likely 
to be required in the geographically smaller countries of Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. 
 
(ii) Corporatisation  
For the GCC, this research found that corporatisation of generation functions is more 
prevalent than other segments of GCC electricity markets.  In    Table 21, the symbol  refers 
to the corporatised segments in each GCC member state.  
 
Table 21 GCC Electricity Market Structures – Corporatisation 





Generation by corporate 
including state owned 
 
Pending 
    
Transmission by corporate 





Distribution and supply by 












Power procurement by 















Source: author’s research 
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Most segments of the electricity market are corporatised in Oman, Abu Dhabi and Saudi 
Arabia.  Similar initiatives have been taken for generation in Bahrain and Qatar. On the other 
hand, Kuwait lags behind other GCC member states as with one pending IPP its electricity 
utility remains vertically integrated and state-owned.   Further, Oman and Abu Dhabi have 
designated independent corporate procurement companies while Saudi’s TRANSCO 
company acts as the single-buyer.  
 
Corporatisation may be the way of transforming a ‘state-run’ working situation into an 
‘enterprise culture’ working environment with the much needed transparency and 
performance auditing.  The reforms in Oman and Abu Dhabi provide evidence of increased 
transparency through the requirement for companies to provide annual audited financial 
statements. 
 
(iii) Public & Private Sector Ownership 
 Table 22 identifies the scope of public and private sector ownership by function in GCC 
electricity markets.   
Table 22 GCC Electricity Market Structures – Public & Private Ownership 





Generation  G&P 
G & one 
IPP 
pending 
P* G&P G&P G&P 
Transmission  N/A G**  G&P G 
Distribution and supply   N/A G  G&P G 
Generation planning and 
power procurement 
 N/A G  G G 
* Almost all generation is privatised while new requirements are floated through IPPs. 
** Oman declared plans to privatise its main TRANSCO.                                                  G : government        P : private 
Source: author’s research 
 
Our research found that private sector ownership is progressing faster in Oman and 
particularly in generation where most generation companies are privately-owned and publicly 
listed. For Abu Dhabi, divesture in generation have taken a norm of 60% (state-ownership) 
and 40% (private-ownership). Similarly, Qatar has a combination of private and state 
ownership in generation. Qatar has privatised some parts of generation by introducing 
independent power producers (IPPs). Bahrain seems to follow by successfully introducing its 
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first IPP and announcing further steps with this regard.   Recent developments indicate that 
there is a tendency to reduce shares of state-ownership in power generation.   
 
Kuwait is in the process of contracting as its first IPP, a significant development as now all 
GCC member states have implemented (both BOO and/or BOOT) vehicles for privatising 
electricity generation.   
 
We were surprised that the research identified some degree of transmission privatisation in 
GCC member states. For example in Saudi Arabia, some shares of the mainly state-owned 
transmission and distribution company are held by private sector parties.  In Oman the 
vertically integrated Salalah concession agreement was initially owned by private sector 
investors but has been acquired by government to assist the future restructuring of the 
vertically integrated concession (AER Annual Reports, 2010).    
While we find only limited examples of privatisation in GCC electricity markets, other than 
generation, the extent of corporatisation may pave the way for future privatisations.  
Privatisation may be expected to grow as GCC economies expand.    In addition, member 
states’ WTO accession agreements – with Saudi Arabia being the last to sign – require 
service utilities such as electricity to be open to international private investment.  
 
(iv) Regulation  
Regulation and regulatory bodies are both very important elements in any restructuring 
programme. According to Mustafa (2002), regulatory bodies need to be autonomous for them 
to function effectively and in order for regulators to be credible, they must be kept away from 
political pressures. 
 
Drawn from the case studies,  Table 23 indicates that only Oman, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi 
and Saudi Arabia have already established independent regulators. In all three cases, 
regulatory bodies are managed by appointed board members. However, as discussed earlier, 
regulator independence in the case of Saudi Arabia is still questionable. 
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In Oman, members of the regulator are appointed by the Council of Ministers and for 3 year 
terms and must not be government employees and are prohibited (with their immediate 
family) from having economic interests in electricity sector.  
 
The Board of Abu Dhabi regulatory non-government officers were initially appointed by the 
chairman of Abu Dhabi Water & Electricity Authority for a term of service. More 
appropriately, the subsequent amendments to the original law have given the powers of 
appointment and removal of the chairman and board members to the Executive Council of the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi, a decision taken to secure regulatory independence. Both regulators 
are financially and administratively independent and are expected - to a great extent – to 
operate free from political and commercial pressures. 
 
Table 23 GCC Electricity Market Structures – Regulation 





Separate entity responsible 






regulator’s responsibilities in 
detail 
      




















Government officials are 
involved in the management 




   












Has an enforcement power       
Regulator is separated from 
political & business interests 
from (1), and (5) is highest 
  4  1 4 
Source: author’s research 
 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the regulatory authority is chaired by the Minister of Electricity 
and Water with members representing some other government organisations and agencies. It 
is therefore questionable whether such regulator can demonstrate any independence from 
political pressures. Regulator independence is required in order to minimise state 
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interferences and allow more credibility and accountability within both state-owned and 
private-owned market participants.  
 
Oman is the only case where - by law – the regulator’s decisions may be referred to the 
commercial courts.  An added feature is that the law provides for international arbitration 
which is an added value for the country’s much needed foreign investment. 
 
According to electricity sector laws prevailing in Oman and Abu Dhabi, all market 
participants are guaranteed access to transmission and distribution networks on a non-
discriminatory basis. The charges for connection and use of distribution system are subject to 
regulatory approval and must be consistent with the terms of RPI-X price controls imposed 
by their respective licenses.     
 
(v) GCC Interconnections 
One of the objectives of this research was to identify drivers for GCC electricity market 
reforms including possibilities for cross-border trading between member states. The GCC 
Interconnection Grid will provide opportunities for cross-border electricity trading, shown in 
 Table 24. 
Table 24 GCC Electricity Market Structures – Member State Interconnections 





Interconnections exist with 
neighbouring countries 
600 MW* 1200 MW* 
  
with UAE (one 
220kv & three 
33kv for imports) 
400 MW* 





 900 MW* 
Trading electricity with 
neighbouring countries 
 
      
Restrictions exist on the 





   
Source: author’s research              * refers to the GCC-Grid capacities under construction 
 
Once completed, the GCC Grid will facilitate sharing of reserve and other ancillary services.  
The interconnector may facilitate electricity trading between member states. The Omani 
electricity law stipulates that only persons licensed by the regulator can operate international 
interconnections and participate in cross-border trading.  
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(vi) Future Policy & Trends 
Most GCC member states are expected to undergo further economic liberalisation and market 
opening due to many factors including their membership obligations to the WTO. With some 
degree of differences, membership terms and conditions clearly specify market opening 
actions to be taken by members in a variety of services. Another reason for market opening 
and liberalisation relates to the increasing need for international private sector investment. 
Private sector participation is increasingly evident in electricity and related water. Delays in 
market opening may result in increased costs of private capital since doubts about the market 
rules usually yield legal and administrative uncertainties which are usually matched by 
increased costs resulting in higher prices. Hence, governments will be only adding to their 
burden by having to accept new demands for sovereign guarantees instead of seizing the 
opportunity of reducing them. It is for this reason and others already reiterated in earlier 




Table 25 Future Policy and Trends 





Further electricity reforms 
are expected 
      
Regulator freed from 
government interference 







Actions already taken may 

































Direction of long-term trade     
(exporting  importing ) 
      
Source: author’s research 
 
Drawn from our analysis of the GCC electricity markets already presented in  Chapter 4 and 
the various meetings conducted with GCC officials and company representatives,  Table 25 
provides a summary of expected future policy and trends of the electricity service utility in 
the GCC region. 
 
The case studies of Oman and Abu Dhabi concluded that the two markets are already reaping 
the economic benefits of their progressive reforms. Hence, it can be assumed that most GCC 
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countries are expected to take further steps in the direction of electricity sector restructuring 
resulting in a trans-GCC wave of reforms.  
 
While Saudi Arabia is currently working towards further reforms - but has not announced any 
specific plans with regards to its regulatory policy - it is suggested that any future market 
opening must also entail that the regulator becomes more independent as in Oman and Abu 
Dhabi. For Bahrain and Qatar, we have seen nothing that suggests independent regulators are 
being considered, while Kuwait is falling behind in electricity sector reforms.  
 
8.3 Textbook Model - Restated 
 
In chapter 2 we noted the 10 components for reforming electricity markets proposed by 
Littlechild (2006).  We now bring together the results of our survey review to see how GCC 
electricity markets in their present form compare to the textbook model components.  Each of 
the 10 components is discussed in turn: 
 
1. Vertical separation to separate the competitive segments of the market (like 
generation) from the regulated activities (like transmission and distribution), and  
2. Horizontal restructuring so that there adequate numbers of competing suppliers 
service providers,  
 
 Table 20 highlighted significant differences in the extent of vertical separation across 
GCC electricity markets.  Oman and Abu Dhabi are the only two markets in the GCC 
where the functions of generation, transmission and distribution are fully separated, 
although distribution and supply while separate from generation and transmission are 
still not fully separate. 
 
The electricity markets in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar have not undergone any 
functional separation. For Saudi Arabia, the market remains bundled for most 
activities with the exception of some generation that is separate from transmission.   
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3. Designation of an independent system operator (ISO) in order to guarantee network 
stability and encourage competition,  
 
For Oman and Abu Dhabi, the transmission companies (TRANSCOs) play the role of 
the system operator (SO). The TRANSCOs in both markets are not permitted - by law 
- to engage in any generation, distribution, supply or power purchasing activities. 
Therefore, since the role of each company is restricted to transmission, it is reasonable 
to assume that each company – in each market – acts as an independent system 
operator.  
 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the vertically integrated Saudi Electricity Company acts 
as the system operator for the Kingdom, and therefore, does not act as an independent 
system operator. For Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait there are no independent system 
operators. Such activities and part of the many unbundled functions of state agencies 
responsible for electricity (see  Table 20).    
 
4. Specification of customer supply arrangements in the absence of retail competition,   
 
With the exception of the limited references within the Omani and Abu Dhabi 
electricity laws, GCC laws do not yet address customer supply arrangements. Since 
the Omani government has already made a reference to privatising distribution (with 
the exception of some limited systems), we believe it would be desirable for the 
regulator to insist on specific customer supply arrangements being place before 
privatisation. With further amendments to its current legislation, Abu Dhabi should be 
in a good position to privatise its DISCOs and, similarly, needs to specify customer 
supply arrangements. On the other hand, the laws in other GCC states are less likely 
to ‘spell out’ such arrangements for their state-owned entities (or corporations). 
 
5. Privatisation in order to increase performance levels and reduce state intervention, 
 
In the short term, privatisation may lead to higher prices – especially at the stage of 
introduction - and/or may include some consumer price increases and layoffs. In a 
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usual case of privatisation, some market participants (primarily consumers and 
workers) may be negatively affected and might hope to be compensated for their 
losses. However, the trend already reveals that GCC governments are reluctant to 
subject electricity markets to pure competition; therefore no requirement for 
compensation (to market participants) is envisaged as a result of reform at this stage.  
Also, in such fast growing markets, layoffs may be minimised as staff can be 
reassigned to new projects.  Yet governments must still be prepared to give back some 
of the savings and/or earnings through privatisation in the form of workforce 
termination remuneration as well as other forms of settlement to workers presumably 
affected by privatisation. It is worth noting that, regardless of the intention, in practice 
it would be most difficult to compensate all of those affected by privatisation. 
Governments must properly explain the intentions for reform and the overall long 
term gains expected from privatisation well in advance. 
 
Notably, from the two case studies in particular, private ownership in generation tends 
to be dominated by foreign equity and international debt.  Further, local investors as 
in the case of Oman’s IPP initial public offerings seem to show greater interest to 
acquire the publicly traded shares of power plants whose major shareholdings are 
controlled by experienced international firms. Earlier chapters demonstrate that 
privatisation is a process by which ownership and associated risks are transferred 
from the state to the private sector.  
 
In privatising GCC generation, other factors contributing to genuine risk transfer need 
to be addressed. A total risk transfer requires much more developed markets with 
clearer indicators of expected growth rates. Otherwise, private owners and debt 
providers would have to factor in more uncertainties, hence, yielding extra charges. 
Some uncertainties related to the socio-political environment in the GCC are 
associated with regional demand calculations and government spending. For this and 
many other reasons – demonstrated in other parts of this chapter – a GCC member 
state may choose a single buyer model.  
 
6. Creation of markets and trading arrangements in order to facilitate trade transactions 
and to provide for system real-time balancing arrangements, 




From Arizu et al (2006) the single buyer is often used in the case of many developing 
countries and usually refers to ‘centralised purchasing arrangements’. For Oman and 
Abu Dhabi, the two PWPs are already acting as a single buyer and seller in each 
market. Even for a larger market like Saudi Arabia, the study does not envisage a 
wholesale market place for electricity since with double digit growth in electricity 
demand the government will need to afford careful consideration to any new market 
structure as market mechanisms alone may not ensure (a) that electricity supply keeps 
pace with demand, and (b) at reasonably competitive costs.  
 
Once prices rise in a trading environment, the market sends signals to investors that 
new capacities are profitable. Meanwhile, increments in capital-intensive industries 
(where electricity is potentially one) come in cycles. The lack of coordination among 
competitors may result in extra capacities causing some adverse affects on the 
investment side (Green, 2006). For small electricity markets - like the ones in the 
GCC - coupled with potential asymmetry of information, investors may choose to be 
extra careful (causing markets to fall short of capacity) or take a more ambitious path 
by adding capacity (resulting in unfavourable investment conditions). This research 
has already established how in the case of Abu Dhabi state-dominated investments 
(less profit oriented) resulted in extra capacities, while Section  3.6 illustrated how 
uncertainties lead to shortages in Brazil as private investors (in gas-fired generators) 
did not keep up with demand due to concerns about being undercut by hydropower 
producers which resulted in supply falling short of demand calling for state 
intervention including the introduction of a rationing scheme. Another investment-
related concern here with a market-based policy is that without any government 
guarantees, international investors would be expected to increase risk premiums in 
response to increased uncertainty. 
 
Moreover, a pool option works well when other market conditions are in favour. 
Market derivatives (like hedges and futures) would need to be introduced to GCC 
financial markets in order to complement pool mechanisms. Even by allowing long-
term contracts to act as hedges, only state-backed long-term contracts (usually 
through single-buyer models) could yield less volatile prices. Meanwhile – due to 
social and political considerations – GCC governments would not be expected to 
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tolerate volatile retail markets. A California or Argentina-like situation of power 
supply shortage or lost investor interest (presented in  Chapter 3) would certainly not 
be taken easily by the hydrocarbon-rich economies of the GCC. In response to volatile 
prices, GCC governments would have two choices; one, to increase subsidies and 
two, to re-regulate. Subsidisation is already a burden while we have already 
established from worldwide experiences how government intervention leads to an 
undesirable chain reaction. Therefore, the single-buyer model may act as a safeguard 
from any market power exploitation and spare such growing economies any potential 
market failure situations.   
 
This is, perhaps, why Oman, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia have already made their 
choices of a state-owned single-buyer mechanism over the pool model. Accordingly, 
it is expected that Oman Power & Water Procurement Company SAOC would 
continue to act as the sole buyer and seller of electricity and water in Oman subject to 
an RPI-X price control while Abu Dhabi Water & Electricity Company would act as 
the sole PWP for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.  
 
Similarly, the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) – still an integrated system – will 
continue to act as a single buyer although procurement, trading and system operation 
would not be independent. More appropriate trading arrangements are needed to 
advance Saudi market reforms given the fact that the single-buyer is involved in 
procurement, wholesale and retail functions.   
 
Meanwhile, the current drive in Bahrain and Qatar to introduce IPPs suggest that both 
countries are well placed to introduce a single-buyer model.  
 
For the GCC limited-size markets, competition may be envisaged mainly in the 
wholesale segment of the market. The IPP dominated sector must act as a level 
playing field for local and international firms. Although limited, initial findings from 
the case studies on Oman and Abu Dhabi reported above suggest that both markets 
are benefiting from IPP-based reforms.    
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7. Creation of an independent regulatory authority, with enabling powers and adequate 
human and financial resources in order to be able to administer its primary roles of 
incentive regulation and the promotion of competition. 
 
Regulation and regulatory bodies are both very important elements in any 
restructuring programme. According to Mustafa (2002), regulatory bodies need to be 
autonomous for them to function effectively and that in order for regulators to be 
credible, they must be kept away from political pressures. Given the evidence by 
Pollitt (2008) on the Argentinean experience presented in Section  3.6, no other 
authority should be allowed to play the role of the designated regulator once reforms 
are adopted. 
 
Drawn from the case studies,  Table 23 indicates that only Oman, the Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi and Saudi Arabia have already established independent regulators. In all three 
markets, regulatory bodies are managed appointed by board members. However, as 
discussed earlier, regulator independence in the case of Saudi Arabia is still 
questionable.  
 
8. Application of regulatory rules for transmission network access on a non-
discriminatory basis so that all generators are allowed to compete on equal grounds.  
 
According to electricity sector laws prevailing in Omani and Abu Dhabi, all market 
participants are guaranteed access to transmission and distribution networks on a non-
discriminatory basis. The charges for connection and use of distribution system must 
be consistent with the terms of the RPI-X price control imposed by licence.     
 
Access rules in other member states are less clear and possibly non-existent.  The 
introduction of non-discriminatory rules for network access would be a necessary and 
significant development  
 
9. Unbundling of retail tariff to promote competition at retail level by enabling access to 
distribution networks.  




In all GCC countries, governments retain control over customer tariffs. This research 
clearly establishes (mainly from reforms in Oman, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia) that 
tariffs will not be allowed to be determined by the market while governments will 
continue to subsidise electricity especially for household consumers. However, 
accounts separation paves the way for retail tariff unbundling and overall sector 
transparency. From our two case studies – but more so in the case of Oman – it can be 
established that electricity laws in the region are already moving towards separate 
book keeping for the retail functions of distribution and supply. 
 
Unbundling of retail tariffs is also important from a GCC perspective. The research 
review in  Chapter 4 suggests that in order for the GCC region to advance as a 
common market or an economic union, many conditions - including the removal of 
subsidies that distort costs of production in each country - are needed. Improving cost 
transparency for electricity and other services would help to resolve some of the 
disputes over cross-border trading of goods and services that are of GCC origin. This 
may, subsequently, lead to more economic coherence in the region.   
 
The research also suggests - as illustrated in  Table 25 - that actions already taken by 
Oman, Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia and Qatar may lead to more uniform (common) 
GCC-wide electricity market reforms. For Oman, reform has already introduced price 
transparency. This is a good example for GCC member states to follow. Such 
transparency should lead to a better understanding of cost structures (especially for 
GCC exportable goods) and, hence, may reduce disputes over members’ subsidy 
programmes. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi is already exporting to other UAE Emirates 
which could prompt other Emirates to follow suit. Already, the State of Qatar has put 
a request to import electricity even though the GCC Grid is not yet completed. Such 
initiatives (import or export) should strengthen the case for more GCC-wide 
electricity market reforms in order to facilitate cross-country trade. Meanwhile, 
available information suggests that Saudi Arabia is already working towards more 
reforms, which could narrow the differences between its electricity market and those 
of Oman and Abu Dhabi.  
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10. Provision of transition mechanisms that facilitate a smooth reform process while 
responding to any obstructions that might be encountered (after Littlechild, 2006, p. 
xvii). 
 
Electricity sector reforms in Oman and Abu Dhabi have provided for relatively good 
transition mechanisms. One important step was the corporatisation of all market 
participants including generators (both privatised and state owned), transmission 
companies, distributions and supply firms, and the single Power and Water Purchaser 
for each market. Much of the transparency required for market opening may be 
obtained by vertical unbundling and corporatisation. Such measures allow for an 
easier transition from totally state-owned utilities to mostly private-owned utilities.    
 
Another aspect of providing for transition was the establishment of independent 
regulators in each of the two cases. It can be argued that independence of the regulator 
is less questioned from the start of reform in the case of Oman (appointed by the 
Cabinet) whereas in Abu Dhabi the original law was amended to allow the 
appointment of the Chairman of the regulatory authority by the Executive Council 
rather than previously by the ADWEA Chairman.  However, both laws in Oman and 
Abu Dhabi allow regulator independence so that further reforms can be driven by the 
regulator (as an independent agency) separate from the concerned ministry or 
authority responsible for overall sector planning and oversight. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, there is less regulatory independence as the regulator is chaired by the 
Minister for Electricity and Water. 
 
Trading arrangements for Abu Dhabi, Oman and Saudi Arabia also provide for a 
smooth transition from a state-dominated to a mixed-ownership electricity sector. The 
single-buyer model, also used in many other developing countries, contributed to the 
easy adaptation of the reform packages in the three countries. Without such 
arrangements of a single-buyer, decision makers in these countries would have to deal 
with the ambiguities that are usually associated with other wholesale market 
arrangements especially in cases of smaller markets like Abu Dhabi and Oman. 
Lessons learned from California and Chile (although for a different set of reasons) 
bear witness to the extent of damage that may be caused by market misbehaviour.  
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8.4 Choices for Reform (GCC Related Implications) 
 
 
When advising on GCC electricity market restructuring, this research considers a variety of 
criteria that influence our choices. For the purpose of this study, the method of Multiple 
Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is used to assess the four models or ‘choices’ available 
as summarised by Hunt (2002) in Section  2.4.1. Based on this method of investigation this 
research subjects the different alternatives for market design namely;  
Alternative 1: State-owned monopolist: a market structure comprising a single vertically 
integrated monopolist (in terms of generation, transmission, distribution and 
supply), that is a self regulated provider of electricity, typically a ministry or 
government owned company;  
Alternative 2: Single-buyer model: a market structure in which there is horizontal separation 
of generation and vertical separation of generation from transmission, 
distribution and supply, with a ‘single buyer’ procurement entity responsible 
for procuring capacity and output from I(W)PP and providing bulk supplies of 
electricity to electricity suppliers;  
Alternative 3: Wholesale market: a market structure in which there is horizontal separation 
of generation and vertical separation of generation, transmission and 
distribution and supply, and with direct competition between generators to sell 
capacity and output to electricity suppliers, and to a limited extent directly to 
large consumers; and 
Alternative 4:  Retail competition, a market structure in which there is direct competition to 
supply electricity to consumers at fully cost reflective prices.  
 
The researcher has assigned weights to each criterion from 1 to 4 based on the information 
gathered on the GCC (as presented in  Chapter 4) while incorporating the outcomes of the 
case studies (on Oman and Abu Dhabi) and the various meetings (presented in the 
Appendices). A value for each criterion was then attributed to each model or ‘choice’ for 
reform. The main categories to be analysed are listed below in, roughly, a descending order 
according to their importance with respect to the GCC policy considerations; 
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1. Ensuring security of supply. This is a critical policy consideration to the 
reform of GCC electricity markets. A full discussion of security of supply 
would consider generation, transmission and distribution security.  However, 
we focus on generation security and the need to ensure sufficient generation 
capacity is available to meet demand and satisfy system reserve requirements.  
Due to the ‘public good’ nature of security of supply and the technical 
characteristics of electricity, we consider it appropriate to afford special 
attention to ensuring adequate capacity is available.  We assign this criterion a 
weighting of 4 (maximum); 
2. Attracting private investment. This has been an important objective of 
electricity market reform in developing countries. As shown from  Chapter 4, 
the hydrocarbon-dependant economies of the GCC can have budget deficits 
when oil prices fall.  Funding electricity infrastructure through private sector 
participation can help mitigate uncertainty arising from oil price volatility. We 
assign this criterion a weighting of 3; 
3. Improved efficiency.  This is a major driver of privatisation and reform based 
on the belief that private sector efficiency and performance is generally better 
than that of public sector entities.  We assign this criterion a weighting of 3; 
and 
4. Subsidy policy compatibility. In  Chapter 4 on the GCC,  Chapter 5 on the Abu 
Dhabi case study, and  Chapter 6 on the Omani case study we noted that 
currently governments are either not ‘willing’ or not ‘able’ to allow full retail 
competition as this has implications for maintaining the present policy of 
subsidising electricity tariffs for final consumers. However, while there is a 
clear commitment to provide subsidy to residential customers, it is not 
altogether clear that the commitment extends to other customer categories. 
GCC member states will therefore seek market structures that can promote 
efficiency whilst allowing subsidy to continue. We assign this criterion a 
lower weighting of 1 due to the implications of this policy for economic 
efficiency, the fact that subsidy could be provided by means other than 
through tariffs, and as the commitment to provide subsidy may not continue to 
apply to all customer categories. 
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We assign scores to each of the four criteria outlined above with scores ranging from 1 to 10, 
these are summarised in  Table 26 below.    The scores reflect the researcher’s assessment of 
worldwide experiences of each of the four models discussed in  Chapter 3 and policies 
specific to the GCC.  
A. State-owned monopolist:  
(1) Ensuring security of supply: one might argue a state-
owned monopoly would score highly in this category as 
the state has a public interest obligation to provide an 
essential utility. However, one might also expect a 
state-owned monopoly to exhibit the same deficiencies 
as a standard monopolist, including a tendency to 
undersupply which clearly has implications for security 
of supply.  Kuwait, as illustrated in  Chapter 4, is an 
example of a vertically integrated state-owned 
monopoly facing electricity shortages due to planning 
inefficiencies. On balance we assign a score of 5 due to 
our concerns about monopoly performance; 
(2) Attracting private investment: private investors 
sometimes seek government guarantees that are implicit 
when contracting with a state-owned monopolist.  
However, we expect investors to be concerned about 
contracting with a counter-party that has unrestricted 
monopoly power, a concern that has supported the 
introduction of an independent regulatory function. 
Accordingly, we assign a score of 5;  
(3) Improved efficiency: we assign a score of 2 to a state-
owned monopolist given the limited prospect for 
improved efficiency due to the absence of competition; 
and 
(4) Subsidy policy compatibility: state-owned monopolists 
in the GCC can easily and directly implement a policy 
of subsidising electricity tariffs, and we assign a high 
score of 8.   
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B. Single-buyer model: 
(1) Ensuring security of supply: in this model the single-
buyer procurer usually has a statutory obligation to plan 
and contract for sufficient generating capacity to ensure 
security of supply.  Accordingly, we assign a high  
score of 8; 
(2) Attracting private investment: the single-buyer model as 
implemented in Oman and Abu Dhabi has a proven 
track record of attracting significant international and 
local private investment in I(W)PPs, and we therefore 
assign the maximum score of 10; 
(3) Improved efficiency: being a statutory monopolist the 
efficiency of the single-buyer will be sensitive to the 
effectiveness of the regulatory regime under which it 
operates, as the model itself does not ensure efficient 
performance.  In light of these considerations we assign 
a score of 6;  and 
(4) Subsidy policy compatibility: the single-buyer model is 
compatible with a policy of subsidised electricity tariffs 
as the procurement functions do not extend to final 
consumers. We assign the single-buyer model score of 
8. 
C. Wholesale competition: 
(1) Ensuring security of supply: there may be a risk with 
wholesale competition that if a single entity is not 
responsible for ensuring compliance with a generation 
security planning standard, risk-averse investors may be 
less willing to enter the market.  This would make it 
more difficult to ensure security of supply. We assign 
this model 6, a slightly higher score than the state-
owned monopolist yet a much lower score than the 
single-buyer model; 
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(2) Attracting private investment: while investment in GCC 
electricity markets without a government counterparty 
or a fixed term power purchase agreement involves 
market risk, there are market entry opportunities to sell 
power to licensed suppliers and to a limited degree final 
consumers.  This is reflected in a score of 7; 
(3) Improved efficiency: the scope for competition in this 
model will promote efficiency amongst generators 
competing to sell electricity on a daily or hourly basis.  
Accordingly, we assign a score of 8; and 
(4) Subsidy policy compatibility; as with the single-buyer 
model, there is an intermediary between the wholesale 
market and final consumers – except where large 
customers are supplied directly by generators. We 
assign a score of 8. 
D. Retail competition:  
(1) Ensuring security of supply: noting that there is no 
national or GCC wide competition policy, this model 
exposes investors to a higher degree of market risk and 
transactions costs. Generators would need to find and 
enter supply agreements with retailers or final 
consumers and retain those consumers. This may deter 
the level of generation capacity investment needed to 
ensure security of supply.   These concerns are reflected 
in a score of 4;  
(2) Attracting private investment: similar to the comments 
made in relation to security of supply above, private 
investors may view investment in GCC electricity 
markets as high risk and may be unwilling to enter. 
Accordingly, we assign a score of just 4; 
(3) Improved efficiency: full competition offers the best 
prospect of improved efficiency and we therefore assign 
the maximum score of 10; and 
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(4) Subsidy policy compatibility: retail competition would 
make it extremely difficult for GGC governments to 
implement a policy of subsidised electricity tariffs as 
competition would require the introduction of fully 
cost-reflective tariffs.   For this reason we assign the 
lowest score of 2.    
 











Ensuring security of 
supply 
4 5 8 6 4 
Attracting private  
investment 
3 5 10 7 4 
Improved efficiency  3 2 6 8 10 
Subsidy policy 
compatibility 
1 8 8 8 2 
Score (high is good)  3.3 5.9 5.1 4.0 
Rank  4 1 2 3 
Source: author’s research 
             
The results of the MCDA scores summarised in  Table 26 suggest the single-buyer model is 
the preferred market structure for GCC electricity markets.  We know from economic theory 
that fully competitive markets (retail competition) are generally best at achieving economic 
efficiency and maximising social welfare.  However, in the context of the GCC and as 
reflected in the MCDA criteria, ensuring security of supply, attracting private sector 
investment and compatibility with subsidy policy, are very important considerations for GCC 
member states that we believe would be best addressed by adopting a single–buyer model, of 
the form presently in place in Oman and Abu Dhabi.         
 
 
 Chapter 8  Findings and Implications 
 
 225 
The results of the SCBA presented in  Chapter 7 support the proposed implementation of a 
single buyer electricity market structure.  Conducting such a detailed SCBA confirmed that 
Oman’s electricity market restructuring (actual scenario) delivered positive net benefits 
compared to the continued performance of the state owned vertically integrated monopoly 
(counterfactual scenario).  It is worth noting that net benefits were achieved with only 
minimal privatisation proceeds and no change to subsidised electricity tariffs. Under the 
single-buyer model implemented in Oman we believe benefits would have been even higher 
had there been more privatisation transactions and some move to more cost reflective tariffs.  
 
As already noted the single-buyer model we recommend in  Chapter 9 differs from that 
discussed by Hunt (2002).  In our proposed model, as in Oman and Abu Dhabi, transmission 
and system operation will be entirely separate from generation and procurement, which is not 
the case in Saudi Arabia.  Separating transmission and system operation from the single 
buyer procurement function ensures that system operation decisions (such as the despatch of 
individual plant) are taken by the system operator and not by the IPP’s contract counterparty. 
This contrasts with the view of Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996) who see no difference between 
a separate transmission function and combining the transmission and procurement functions. 
 
8.5 Implications at the GCC-level 
 
Our study finds that neither the GCC Charter nor the Agreement provide for a sector-specific 
GCC-wide electricity reform. This implies that any GCC-wide reform policy for electricity 
would have to be agreed by all member states. Otherwise, restructuring at this stage may only 
be introduced in the form of guidelines to be implemented on a voluntary basis. 
 
One other reality is that it is not conceivable for the GCC governments – at least presently – 
to allow consumer prices to reflect actual costs. While the Omani Regulator clearly includes 
the level of subsidies in its annual report, prevailing post-reform legislation in Abu Dhabi and 
Saudi Arabia also stipulate that consumer prices are not subjected to pure market 
mechanisms. Similarly, all the meetings and personal communications carried out for the 
purpose of this research do not suggest any intention to allow a cost-reflective pricing in any 
of the six member states. The proposed model for reform, would accordingly, be based on 
some amendments to the original Textbook Model presented in Section  2.3.3 of this research. 




Further, one of the objectives of this research was to review the drivers for GCC electricity 
reforms including the possibilities for cross-border trading between member states. In the 
absence of the GCC Interconnection Grid under construction – and as presented in  Chapter 4 
- there are limited opportunities for cross-border electricity trading. However, once 
completed, the GCC Grid would provide for electricity trade between member states. This 
implies that some amendments to legislation in each country would be required before actual 
cross-border trade takes place. We note that even with the limitation of the wires between 
Oman and UAE, the two markets could have traded - but did not - due to delays in agreeing 
the bilateral utility-specific agreements which presumably may have been delayed due to the 




In conclusion, the Sultanate of Oman and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (of the UAE) have 
already established a considerable degree of electricity structural-reform based around single-
buyer type market structures and independent regulation.  The two cases may nevertheless be 
used as catalysts for a GCC-wide electricity restructuring and regulatory reform. Current 
GCC Directives do not support electricity sector reforms. Any further market opening for the 
GCC would need to be based on collectively agreed sector-specific regulations which – 
thanks to potential macroeconomic gains - could be smoothly rallied by the GCC secretariat.   
 
The Textbook Model for electricity reform may not yet be applicable to the GCC situation 
due to the limited market size and, most importantly, the lack of political will to apply prices 
that reflect actual costs. In order for the study to propose an applicable reform policy, the 
Textbook Model under consideration would have to be amended mainly to incorporate the 




Chapter 9 Conclusions and Recommendations  
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the analysis conclusions and our recommendations for common 
regulatory reform of GCC electricity markets.   
 
The recommendations reflect conclusions drawn from the analysis of previous chapters, 
including the welfare benefits of competition and the welfare implications of market failure 
discussed in  Chapter 2, the review of electricity reform experience worldwide in  Chapter 3 
including EU experience of collaborative policy formation and the role of institutions, the 
assessment of GCC institutional arrangements in  Chapter 4, reform case studies for Abu 
Dhabi in  Chapter 5 and Oman in  Chapter 6, SCBA of the Oman reforms in  Chapter 7 that 
identified significant welfare benefits, and our review of the status and structure of GCC 
electricity markets and the MCDA in  Chapter 8.   
 
Developing a region-wide policy for electricity reform is a complex task that requires 
consideration of the extent of, and appetite for, regional integration, political and economic 
differences, and the effectiveness and objectives of interest groups in each GCC member 
state. Our recommendations reflect a transitional approach to reform based around a single-
buyer market structure that, in the first instance, aims to harmonise the extent of functional 
separation, corporatisation, private sector participation and regulatory arrangements across 
member states.  Subsequent stages of reform would involve increased intra-regional 
electricity trade leading to wholesale competition and eventually full retail competition.   
 
A combination of effective regulation (of network monopolies) and competition in wholesale 
and retail functions is, we believe, necessary to maximising total welfare.  
 






The first conclusion of the research is that no GCC member state is presently in a position to 
adopt the Textbook model for electricity reform (presented in Section  2.3.3).  Instead, the 
research suggests that an amended version of the textbook model is required for GCC reform 
given the significant differences in GCC electricity market structure.    Table 27 presents a 
comparison of GCC electricity market characteristics against each criteria of the textbook 
model.  
 
Table 27 Application of the Textbook Model to the GCC 







G government-owned  










































Rules for transmission   
non-
discretionary   
non-
discretionary 













specification   
limited 
specification 





Transition mechanisms   limited   limited 
* Privatisation mainly refers to generation while Oman declared plans to privatise its main TRANSCO. 
** Almost all generation in Oman is privatised. 
Source: author’s research 
 
In terms of functional separation, corporatisation, privatisation and regulation, a research 
conclusion is that electricity reform in Oman and Abu Dhabi is more advanced than in other 
GCC member states, although neither country’s electricity market conforms fully to the 
Textbook Model.   While Saudi Arabia has taken some initial steps towards electricity market 
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reform such as limited unbundling and the establishment of a regulator, other essential 
elements of reform are limited, such as the extent of horizontal and vertical separation and 
regulatory independence. There is very limited functional separation in Bahrain, Qatar and 
Kuwait, with no corporatisation (other than for individual I(W)PP) and no separate regulatory 
function.  
 
This research concludes that due to political and social considerations, electricity tariffs in 
GCC member states are and will continue to be heavily subsidised.  Consequently, in the 
absence of cost reflective prices along with market opening precautions resulting from 
network size limitations and security of supply concerns, the Textbook Model will be 




In order to arrive at an applicable policy for reform, the proposed model consists of a set of 
measures that are based on the findings in  Chapter 8. The research recommendations and 
supporting justification are presented below.  
 
 
9.3.1 Recommendation 1: Single Buyer Market Structure 
 
     
Our first recommendation is that for electricity markets in each member to be aligned to the 
market structure shown in  Figure 23, a recommendation consistent with the results of the 
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis presented in  Table 26.  
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Our recommendation requires Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait to unbundle their state-owned 
vertically integrated electricity ministries (authorities) and implement horizontal separation of 
generation and vertical separation of generation, transmission, distribution and supply with 
responsibility for system operations assigned to the transmission company.  Saudi Arabia has 
less restructuring to do, but we recommend it unbundle the vertically integrated Saudi 
Electricity Company to provide for full functional separation. 
An important element of the functional separation to be applied in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia is the establishment of single buyer procurement entities responsible for (i) 
the procurement of new capacity and output from I(W)PP and (ii) the bulk supply of 
electricity sufficient to allow Discos to meet their customer requirements.  These 
procurement entities will be assigned important security of supply responsibilities that are 
highlighted below.  
Abu Dhabi and Oman have already implemented the functional separation required by our 
recommendation.  
         




In the recommended market structure all entities undertaking electricity generation, 
transmission, distribution, supply, system operator and procurement functions are commercial 
companies (we discuss the issue of ownership below).   
As with functional separation, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait have most to do and are required to 
establish new corporate entities from the unbundled state-owned vertically integrated 
electricity ministries.  Saudi Arabia, through the Saudi Electricity Company already has a 
corporate presence in generation, transmission, distribution and supply but our 
recommendation requires it to establish new companies by unbundling Saudi Electricity 
Company’s functions. Abu Dhabi and Oman have already implemented full corporatisation 
of electricity functions. 
 
Ownership 
To accord with the Textbook Model all companies in our recommended market structure 
would be privately owned.  However, it is clear from the MCDA analysis that implementing 
the degree of private sector ownership required by the Textbook Model will take time and 
therefore remains a longer-term objective. For practical purposes and to allow GCC 
governments to retain the control they believe is a necessary component of electricity market 
reform, our recommendation is for full private sector ownership of generation with 
companies performing other functions either wholly-owned or majority-owned by 
government.   In the longer term, when the new market structures are established and 
operating satisfactorily we recommend governments divest their interests in companies to 
reduce state interference in the electricity sector and promote private sector driven efficiency 
improvements.  We return to this recommendation below when discussing the regulation 
recommendations.    The choice over privatisation or corporatisation is a basic element in this 
model:  
1. Corporatisation and privatisation would introduce required accounting transparency 
and assist the unbundling of component elements of electricity supply tariffs and 
provide for greater transparency of subsidy (both with regard to levels and 
distribution).  The recommended market structure facilitates the continued provision 
of electricity subsidy and we expect improved transparency to inform government 
considerations of subsidy objectives and thereby prompt consideration of tariff 
reform; 
 Chapter 9 Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
 232 
2. Corporatisation and privatisation would produce improved transparency of all costs as 
companies would be required to disclose all costs incurred in undertaking electricity 
activities including government taxes and duties, land usufruct costs, the cost of 
funding investment and working capital; and 
3. We strongly recommend that before implementing further privatisation and 
corporatisation, issues concerning employee salaries and termination benefits are 
agreed and clarified prior to reform.      
 
Comments on recommendation 1 
While a fully independent system operator is consistent with the Textbook Model we are 
recommending, based on our research, that in each member state system operator functions 
are undertaken by the transmission company, for the following reasons: 
a. Since most GCC systems are isolated linear (not meshed) networks, there is less 
justification for independent system operators. Some of the systems are small and the 
associated costs and administrative requirements of an ISO might only be justified in 
the case of larger more complex networks; and 
b. Although member states are linked through the GCC Interconnection Grid, import and 
export volumes are expected to be relatively small due to the limited size of the 
interconnections. Regional system operations may be easily coordinated among the 
different transmission companies and the GCC Interconnection Authority. 
The full functional separation required by the recommended market structure would provide 
for cost transparency for each element of the electricity supply chain and assist the 
unbundling of tariffs irrespective of ownership.   The Oman and Abu Dhabi case studies 
demonstrate the benefits of improved cost transparency even where final tariffs are not cost 
reflective. 
We recognise that a single-buyer monopolist and monopsonist is not an optimal structure in 
terms of its efficiency properties.  However, this need not be a permanent arrangement as a 
further recommendation is that in the long-term the single buyer procurement functions are 
replaced by wholesale competition when markets satisfy minimum efficient scale 
requirements and there are sufficient players to avoid market concentration.  
Security of supply was identified in our MCDA as a high priority for GCC member states, 
and provides justification for the single-buyer market structure we recommend.    
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GCC member states have registered a commitment to continue to subsidise electricity tariffs 
and we note that the recommended market structure can accommodate this important policy 
objective. 
 
Finally, our recommendations do not extend to the separate and integrated electricity systems 
serving the oil and gas-industry and non-civilian (security and military) power systems, 
although arrangements should be established to allow these systems to connect to licensed 
systems to secure short-term imports and exports of electricity in cases of emergency. 
  
9.3.2 Recommendation 2: Regulation  
 
 
As our recommended market structure incorporates both statutory and natural monopolies, an 
important and critical recommendation is the establishment of independent regulatory 
authorities in each member state. We recommend independent regulators to minimise the 
scope for political interference and to safeguard against government conflicts of interest 
arising from government ownership of electricity sector companies.  Independent regulation 
may enhance the credibility of reform, increase the likelihood of GCC electricity trade and 
help attract private sector investment.  
We also recommend, however, that legislation in each member state specify the powers and 
obligations of the regulator and drawing from the Omani and Abu Dhabi case studies we 
include the following provisions: 
1. Regulators in each member state should be administratively and financially 
independent entities financed by licence fees; 
2. the powers and obligations of the regulator must allow for full oversight over the 
electricity sector and such powers must not be shared with any local electricity 
authorities;  
3. The board of directors of each regulator must be appointed by the Council of 
Ministers for terms of 3 to 6 years (depending on the contractual norms in each 
country) with renewals not exceeding 10 years; 
4. No government officials must be involved in the board and management of the 
regulator while all board members must refrain from any business related to the 
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sector. Annually, board members must declare to the Cabinet any related business of 
their immediate family members; 
5. Regulatory decisions should be subject to appeal to both local commercial courts and 
international arbitration where in order to stimulate foreign capital participation; and 
6. Full disclosure of the licensing regime to be implemented by regulators to ensure 
transparency of licensing requirements are fully disclosed to market participants, and 
to reduce the scope for regulatory discretion in terms of the licensing framework.   In 
this regard, legislation should instruct regulators to comply with requirements not to 
discriminate, to disclose reasons for its decisions, to consult with relevant persons on 
important regulatory decisions and to minimise the burden and cost of regulation. 
 
We make recommendations for the regulation of the different electricity activities as follows: 
1. The different functions of electricity generation, transmission, distribution, supply 
system operator and procurement functions should be licensed separately with license 
holders required to maintain separate accounts for separate businesses (this is to 
ensure financial transparency should a licensed company undertake unregulated 
activities, and to provide for accounting separation of distribution and supply);   
2. The naturally monopolistic activities of distribution and transmission should be 
subject to incentive based regulation with the precise form of control left to regulators 
to determine.  That said, the form of regulation in all member states should seek to 
proxy the welfare maximising properties of fully competitive markets identified in 
Section  2.2.1 and motivate monopoly companies to provide welfare maximising 
levels of output charged at cost reflective prices (noting however it will be difficult to 
ensure prices reflect marginal costs due to natural monopoly activity cost structures);  
3. Member states may continue to allow vertically integrated companies to service 
remote areas but these companies should be licensed, their activities regulated and 
subject to full accounting separation;  and  
4. Market power concerns in generation are by some degree offset by the countervailing 
power of the single-buyer procurement companies.  However, we consider it 
important to implemented safeguards against potential exploitation of market power 
for a number of reasons.  Firstly, in the absence of well-established competition 
authorities, like in the case of England and Wales (see Section  3.2), market power 
exploitation may be a concern when tendering long-term contracts as an incumbent 
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with a large market share may deter new entrants.  We also recommend investor-
interest thresholds to limit unfavourable mergers that in the absence of general 
competition law may increase market concentration.   Thirdly, capacity market-share 
thresholds would safeguard against horizontal reintegration of generation through 
ownership that might delay the introduction of wholesale competition. We therefore 
recommend 25% thresholds on market share and investor interest – in line with the 
thresholds in place in Oman. In the longer term these thresholds may be supplemented 
or even replaced by general competition law.  It will be important that regulators have 
discretion to relax the thresholds for limited periods, up to 5 to 7 years.  Such ‘grace’ 
periods should be adequate to minimise market concentration, considering the 
prevailing annual growth rates of electricity demand of around 8% - 10% and an 
average four-year lead time for IPP implementation (like in the case of Abu Dhabi 
presented in  Chapter 5).  
 
9.3.3 Recommendation 3: Transitional Measures  
 
It may be concluded from this research that in order for the region to arrive at a more 
harmonised electricity sector policy (by means of a GCC legislation), each member state 
must be allowed the required time to undergo the transformation from a fully integrated 
system (like in the case of Kuwait) to a restructured power sector (like in the case of Saudi 
Arabia) or more unbundled electricity service utilities (like in the case of Oman and the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi).  
 
Drawing from worldwide experiences (see  Chapter 3), different countries have opted for 
different options of reform at their various stages of development. It is therefore 
understandable that our suggested model for GCC electricity sector reforms allows for some 
transitional measures: 
1. Although the optimal goal for our proposed model is to arrive at an agreed region-
wide policy, member states may still use our model for electricity reform as a 
guideline for restructuring their respective industries during their various stages of 
development. During this observatory period, member states not fulfilling the 
requirements of this model may still use the GCC Interconnection Grid for balancing 
requirements or for some short to medium-term exchange contracts.  
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2. While certain parts of the electricity supply chain - other than wholesale - may 
continue to be integrated, member states must be encouraged to keep separate tariff 
structures (though proper accounts separation of retail functions).   
3. GCC members must be encouraged, but not mandated, to dispose of state-
shareholding in generation as long as generation is separated from transmission and 
retail. 
4. In cases of vertically integrated systems at early stages of reform, separate accounts 
must be kept for all activities of generation, transmission, distribution and supply. 
This should encourage further functional and legal separation of the three segments 
while introducing reasonable level of transparency among market participants.  
5. In the absence of an independent regulator, an electricity ministry (or authority) may 
represent the regulator in GCC coordination meetings until such independent agency 
is put in place.     
 
9.3.4 Recommendation 4: Institutional & Administrative Arrangements 
 
It is recommended that a set of administrative arrangements be established in order to 
accelerate electricity reform at the GCC level. Both the GCC Secretariat and Interconnection 
Authority may influence a speedy adaptation of reforms at a ‘national’ and ‘regional’ level. 
  
The Role of the GCC Secretariat 
 
The GCC Secretariat is in a strong position to play a vital role in bringing together the 
members’ views over the necessity for a sector specific GCC Directive on electricity.  
1. The Secretariat should cordially call for meetings and group discussions to review 
experiences of reforms in members like Oman, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia in order 
to arrive at a common level of understanding of the benefits of reform.  According to 
the current institutional arrangements (see Section  4.2.1) such meetings may be 
conducted as part of the workings of the ministers of electricity.  
2. The Secretariat may enforce such workings by formally establishing (through the 
Ministerial Council) a GCC Regulators’ Forum to be elaborated on later in this 
Chapter. 
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3. The Secretariat should also establish (through the Ministers of Commerce & Industry) 
common rules governing the relationship between regulators, stock market authorities 
and consumer protection authorities (when available) especially in cases of power 
sector mergers and acquisition. 
 
The Role of the GCCIA 
 
The GCC Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) would own and manage the regional 
transmission system (the GCC Grid). It is anticipated that the Authority would face many 
challenges if it decides to take on the complex coordinating roles of; the GCC Secretariat, 
System Operators, GCC regulators or even the role of the electricity ministries (authorities).  
Such tendency to expand its role (already sensed through this research) is perhaps justifiable 
by the absence of sector specific directives in either the Charter of the GCC or the Economic 
Agreement between the GCC States. Another reason may be the absence of a GCC 
regulators’ forum.  This model, however, clearly and distinctly designates the role of the 
GCCIA in accordance to the following:     
1. The GCCIA will be a non-profit GCC organization (owned by the member states) 
with a board of directors appointed by the GCC Ministerial Council for a term of five 
years and one renewal.  The term of five years should be sufficient to attract the 
required expertise while any term of more than ten years may cause a concern with 
regards to the Authority’s independence from any political pressures.     
2. The GCCIA will act as the transmission company (TRANSCO) and a system operator 
(SO) of the GCC Grid, and, 
3. The GCCIA will act as a coordinator – among the different TRANSCOs - for all 
cross-border system operations   
4.  The GCCIA must refrain from any trading activities with the exception of those 
related to system requirements ‘network balancing’ purchases and sales. 
5. GCCIA Charges will be subjected to a CPI-X price control (using a GCC weighted 
average) to be agreed periodically by a panel of member state representatives and 
approved by the Ministerial Council. 
6. For emergency relief at early stages of project development, the GCCIA may 
facilitate cross-border transmission through the Power Exchange and Trading 
Agreement (PETA), and subsequently;  
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7. The GCCIA will facilitate the establishment of a GCC power exchange to be both 
administrated and financed independently. 
8. The GCCIA will propose and monitor the implementation of all regional transmission 
access related designs and codes of conduct, meanwhile, different regulators remain 
responsible for the same in each country in liaison with their respective system 
operators.  
9. The GCCIA will be granted separate licences in each country allowing it to export (or 
import) electricity to (or from) any member state through the PWP in each country.  
10. A sector specific dispute settlement mechanism must be devised so that any disputes 
not settled at the GCCIA (or with it) may be clearly referred to the proper GCC 




The already in place meetings between the GCC regulatory authorities (including ministries) 
– although not formal – must be encouraged. It is highly advisable that the GCC Secretariat 
establishes and recognises the proceedings of a Regulators’ Form (in line with the experience 
of the EU already described in Section  3.4) to act as a catalyst for reform in coordination with 
the Interconnection Authority. The outcome of such meetings, discussions and consultations 
need not be officially binding to any participating member. Moreover, such non-binding 
dialogue may be open for public and academic research in order to raise overall awareness 
and expedite the process of electricity reforms within the region. Gradually, the GCC 
Regulators’ Forum should expand its proceedings into more technical and commercial issues 
involving systems reliability, Grid expandability, transmission charges, congestion and 
security of supply concerns. Over time, the Forum could be recognised as the most essential 
contributor to electricity policy within the GCC (and naturally taking the coordinating roles 






 Chapter 9 Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
 239 
9.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
With some basic amendments, the single-buyer market structure - already in place in Oman 
and Abu Dhabi – may be used for a regional reform at the GCC level. Although not the 
ultimate goal of reform, the single-buyer market structure is expected to yield significant 
welfare benefits as already seen from the SCBA of reforms in Oman and lead to further 
market restructuring  
 
Our worldwide review shows that reform needs to be tailored to local conditions, which can 
evolve over time. This thesis concludes that the single-buyer arrangement is best adapted to 
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, Director of Planning and Development, 11 February 2004 
  
Organisation Location 
KAHRAMAA, Qatar Head office, Doha, Qatar 
 
 
 The SNC-Lavalin is the first study for the GCC Interconnection Grid project 
which was revised at some point of time to take into account the first phase 
participants (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain) while Oman and UAE 
would join at the second phase. Finance is based on 35%of share capital and 
65% loan GCC Interconnection project is progressing well. 
 KAHARAMAA acts as a single-buyer which is also in charge of transmission 
and supply. 
 We can envisage some ‘barriers’ to trade across the GCC as electricity 
subsidies vary from one country to another. 
 Generally speaking, governments in the GCC are the monopolist owner of 
power generation, transmission and distribution systems with no real 
competition from the private sector. 
 A challenge to reform is that, if electricity is opened for privatization, people 
would be afraid that prices will rise to reflect real costs. 
 The GCC market is rather small for establishing real competition. 
Governments would have to continue taking the electricity-sector investment 
risks. 
 GCC electricity demand is very seasonal (about one-third in winter and two-
thirds in summer). The total consumption for large projects is about 25% and 
we do not expect it to go more than 40%. With such relatively low-base loads, 
summer-winter load variations will continue. 
 Since there is no different time zone between neighbours like Oman and UAE 
or Saudi and Kuwait, there might be less favourable conditions for cross-
border trade.  
 Only a TRANS-ARAB Grid - if established - would make it possible to benefit 
from the different time zone and weather conditions that exist among the Arab 
countries. However, uplift cost is rather high and such a project would be 
burdened by many financial issues.  
 
- End of findings - 
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Meeting with Hassan Al-Asaad 
 
Participant Date 
Hassan K. Al-Asaad, Corporate Services 3 July 2007 
  
Organisation Location 
GCC Interconnection Authority, Dammam, Saudi Arabia Manama, Bahrain 
 
 
 For the GCC region, the seasons and the timings are similar which makes it 
less endurable for actual power trade than other regions.  Unlike power trading 
between Poland and Sweden which is based on weather conditions or like in 
other countries where trade is based on the differences in time zones.  
Nevertheless, there are opportunities to engage in significant electricity trade 
with other neighbouring and distant regions like North Africa and Europe.  
 GCC reforms vary. Oman is most advanced in GCC reforms while Abu Dhabi 
has also gone a long way with respect to electricity reform. With respect to 
Saudi Arabia, a study was concluded on unbundling the other segments of the 
power sector (i.e. transmission and distribution currently under the jurisdiction 
of the Saudi Electricity Company), but was not applied. Saudi Arabia is 
expected to improve on its new law. The current load demand for the 
Kingdom (approximately 28, 000 MW) is expected to double by 2020. Qatar 
and Bahrain have begun promoting private ownership. Kuwait has shown no 
intention for initiating reforms but it is expected to - eventually – restructure 
its power sector in the near future. 
 It is rather difficult to see at the near future a uniform GCC electricity 
regulation. We might expect improvements to existing regulations (like in the 
case of Saudi Arabia which has taken some internal decision with this regard) 
Also, Bahrain seems to be moving in the direction of a new regulation. Until 
all countries have established new regulatory rules there will be no unified 
regulation between them.   
 The GCCIA will act as a catalyst for reform by influencing the member states 
to establishing a unified regulation or eventually evolve into a regional 
regulator instead.  
 The GCC Grid will primary allow for the sharing of generation reserves and 
emergency assistance (as initially perceived). Power cross-border trading is 
promising with the availability of the interconnection backbone.  . It is 
envisaged that the Authority will play a major role in cross-border trade but it 
is not decided who would be managing the trading table. Also, GCCIA can 
lease out a fibre optic line to telecommunication operators 
 The Grid was initially intended to provide generation reserve sharing and 
emergency assistance but after realizing the potential of what this US$1 billion 
asset can provide, the Authority has ever since been keen on engaging in 
power trading within and beyond the GCC region.  
 It is not agreed how the Grid would be regulated, but perhaps the member 
states along with the GCCIA can form a committee strictly for regulatory 
issues. 
- End of findings - 




Meeting with Adnan Al-Mohaisen 
 
Participant Date 
Adnan I. Al-Mohaisen, Chief Executive Officer 4 July 2007 
  
Organisation Location 
GCC Interconnection Authority, Dammam, Saudi Arabia Manama, Bahrain 
 
 
 The GCC Interconnection project is progressing well and member states have 
been undergoing detailed discussions over the required agreements and will 
soon agree final draft.  
 GCC cross-border electricity trading is expected to be small due to connector 
limitation. In order to engage in ‘meaningful’ power trade, the interconnection 
would have to be enhanced to accommodate more capacity transfers. For 
example; the GCC-Grid is initially designed to provide for 1200 MW while 
the Saudi Arabia existing load in the Eastern Province of KSA is over 9000 
MW. 
 The project has already worked by removing the ‘mental barrier’ to cross-
border power trading. This could lead to more cooperative projects between 
the member states. 
 In order to increase electricity trading between members, country-to-country 
connections (i.e.) inter and outer the GCC region must be expanded. 
 A country can be a major net-importer due to the limited hydrocarbon (gas) 
reserves; environmental constraints due the relatively smaller are size and the 
high capital investment required for power projects in general. 
 The diversity that now exists among members does not allow for a unified 
GCC regulatory framework. A good step would be to establish a forum for 
GCC electricity regulators. 
 Saudi Arabia is moving ahead with reform. A decision has already been taken 
at a management level to restructure the vertically bundled state-owned Saudi 
Electricity Company. 
 Oman is moving and has a very good Law as well as a knowledgeable 
regulator. 
 The Emirate of Abu Dhabi is leading reform within the UAE. 
 Qatar is also moving forward by allowing private participation in the 
generation sector. Qatar has also introduced very qualified young staff to lead 
power sector reforms and we should expect good contribution from them. 
 Bahrain is expected to announce a new legislation for reform. 
 Kuwait has not presented any regulatory reform plans yet.  
 
- End of findings - 
 





Meeting with Al Hinai & Cleary 
 
Participants Date 
Kevin Cleary, Director of Technical Regulation 10 July 2007 
Abdulwahab Al Hinai, Legal Advisor – Licensing Section  
Organisation Location 




 The Omani Market In the case of the Omani Law, the purchase agreements are 
set for many years under the obligation of the PWP while the market share 
constraint of 25% for capacity as well as the economic interest restrictions 
(between generators and between generates and the TRANSCO) which should 
minimise any possible market exploitation. 
 An important feature of the Omani reform is that there are restrictions for 
market share which act as safeguards against market exploitation.  
 Regulator decisions are independent from the government. Regulator 
independency is enhanced by the three-year-tenure while the members of the 
board are not government employees. 
 The Omni Law facilitates for the separation between supply and distribution. 
For the three companies, licenses for each activity are granted separately, each 
activity must have separate accounts while no cross subsidy is allowed. 
 The regulator is funded through License Fees. The licence fee for each 
company depends on the work involved in regulating that company. Thus fees 
paid by generators are relatively low since there is probably only technical 
regulation (including Health & Safety etc) involved. 
 There is difficulty in establishing a GCC market for electricity, unless there is 
transparency in cost structures. 
 It is not clear at this stage who will regulate the GCC Grid. 
 It is possible for Oman and Abu Dhabi to start trading since they have similar 
regulator setups while electricity costs are relatively transparent. In Oman and 
the UAE, electricity purchasing is done on the basis of (capacity + actual 
generation). Therefore, we can anticipate some savings from the economic use 
of the system by better production scheduling in both sides. 
 There are immediate benefits envisaged for cross-border electricity exchanges 
between Oman and Abu Dhabi: (a) reducing the burden of spinning reserve 
(for Oman the spinning reserve stands at 200 MW), (b) the possible reduction 
of load shedding (as most cases occurred in Oman during the summer of 2007 
were due to breakdowns) taking advantage of Abu Dhabi’s access capacity 
during that time, and (c) the system can be run more economically by planning 
production so that it maximizes the use of least costly units to in each country 
 A license has been issued for three smaller connections of 33kv at Khasab in 
the north for the Regional Electricity Company (Oman) to be connected to the 
northern Federal Electricity and Water Authority (UAE). However, no trading 
took place between Oman and UAE because other licensing requirements are 
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not completed yet. The Regulator would issue the license for Oman 
Transmission Company (OTC) only after receiving and reviewing the related 
power system studies and the operational procedures agreed with the Abu 
Dhabi TRANSCO. Also, the OTC is required to obtain an import export 
license which is granted only after studying the commercial agreement 
between Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (PWP) and Abu 
Dhabi Water and Electricity Company (ADWEC). If these licenses are sorted, 
Oman and UAE can start trading immediately. 
 It is unlikely that the GCCIA will be willing to rent transmission capacity. 
Oman has to go through UAE Grids for any use of the GCC Grid, therefore; 
transmission rates have to be agreed with the UAE. 
 Leaving political risks aside, GCC there may be possibilities to agree capacity 
contracts between member starts – with at least 4 years lead time for 
construction. 
 There may be no clear incentives for a country like Oman - that has 
corporations with private ownership – in funding the GCC Interconnection 
 Even in the absence of transparency, GCC electricity trading can be 
established on the basis of bilateral contracts. 
 The GCCIA is expected to act as a facilitator for cross-border trading using a 
bulletin board where demand and supply is announced for each member state. 
Trade would then be based on bilateral contracts facilitated by the GCCIA. 
 The Saudi 60Hz voltage situation may have some implications from a load 
shedding dimension (technically a 50 Hz network goes first). However, such 
technicalities may be dealt with. 
 GCC electricity trading should start on pure trading or ‘market oriented’ with 
no long term commitments in order to minimise political risks. On the other 
hand, a capacity agreement with Abu Dhabi is possible while accepting 
possible risks.  
 A more ‘realistic’ approach would be to: first, to get GCC connected, second, 
to share reserve and third, to establish further trading. Only once bilateral trade 
starts between member states, an exchange can be setup for the six members. 
 There is concern weather the GCCIA - as a company yet being owned by the 
six states – will be able to balance commercial and political interests. 
 Private discussions suggest that no major reforms are anticipated for Bahrain 
in the near future. 
 
- End of findings - 
Appendix 1 Key findings of meetings & Communications 
 
290 





, General Manager  12 July 2007 
  
Organisation Location 
Oman Electricity Transmission Company SAOC Head office, Muscat, Oman 
 
 
 The GCC Electricity Interconnection project is divided into two distinct 
phases. While the GCCIA is responsible for Phase-I which has already started 
(namely the North Grid which interconnects Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia), the development of Phase II is left for Oman and UAE. It is only in 
Phase III that the North Grid will be connected to the South Grid. 
 The significance of the GCC Grid draws from the basic feasibility study 
carried out in 1990 which had an objective that GCC countries would be able 
to assist each other in cases of emergency. The Grid was not meant for trade. 
 Electricity trade may still be viable. From an economic point of view, there are 
some gains expected from differences between peak months and time zones. 
For example, Oman’s summer peak months are May and June, for UAE it is 
after July. Therefore, reserves could be better utilized. The one-hour difference 
between some GCC countries is also a plus point. Although, some studies with 
this regard were not encouraging, spinning reserves will be reduced.  
 Once electricity reforms take place in all member states then they can look at 
cross-border trading to reduce costs.  
 Reforms, however, may also yield a negative impact. In countries which went 
into reform, ‘companies would load their assets to the maximum [no new 
installations] in order to maximize their profits. Almost all blackouts are 
related to restructuring and unbundling’. This means that reforms could 
increase the risks of outages as well as reduce reliability due to a profit-
maximization effort that leads to insufficient supplies.  
 Northern countries with limited space - and Bahrain in particular – are 
expected to try to benefit from the link. Kuwait may benefit from the Grid due 
to the already witnessed shortage of capacity. Kuwait has started a 
consumption saving programme and may take five to ten years to get actual 
generation to match the country’s electricity requirements. Qatar is expected to 
have surplus in the near future. 
 It will take some time until GCC countries agree similar electricity regulatory 
frameworks. At present, there are differences in policies. For example, the 
IPP’s in Oman are owned by the private sector while in Abu Dhabi 60% it 
owned by the government. The Saudi regulator has few challenges to deal with 
due to the vertically integrated situation of the Saudi Electricity Company. 
 Countries should trade through mutual (bilateral) agreements. The GCCIA is 
very close to finalizing sets of trade and legal agreements as well as a 
technical agreement which includes transmission codes and metering codes. 
The Shareholders Agreement (a legal and trade related) would be signed – 
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once finalised - between each member and the GCCIA and between each 
member state and another. 
 GCC reforms are at variant stages while Oman seems to be leading GCC 
reforms with more transparency. 
 There is potential for GCC cross-border trading. Qatar has already applied for 
600MW of import from the Grid as they expect shortage by 2009. They sent 
an official notification, as there are no forms or application procedures 
established yet. Bahrain has already shown interest as well. The UAE could 
also demand imports due to large real-estate expansion. 
 The current mechanisms for power exchange now being discussed in the 
trading agreement include emergency assistance for 30 minutes free of cost 
but trading arrangements – via the Power Exchange Trading Agreement 
(PETA) - are not yet concluded. In the future, it could be part of the GCCIA to 
manage trade on the basis of monthly or yearly declarations. Countries will be 
obligated to declare capacity while penalties or compensations would need to 
be in place for any shortfalls.   
 There are benefits expected from Oman-UAE electricity trading agreement. 
Once the system is synchronized, the two systems would have an increased 
reliability if maintained properly. Disturbances would be minimized. 
Considering Oman’s peak of 3000 MW - and once the two systems are in-sink 
- we can expect economies of scale due to better scheduling. In winter 
(October to February) demand reduces all over the GCC which allows for 
maintenance and replacement at very comfortable time. This is very crucial as 
many plants have completed their life span. With the interconnection, costs of 
replacement could be brought down due to flexibility and better planning. 
Another benefit is that Oman can stop the less economical plants [diesel units]. 
 The Oman PWP agreements are based on capacity charge (agreed load) then 
capacities are called on merit order set by PWP based on capacity from each 
unit. 
 The expected role of the GCCIA would be to stimulate cross-border trading by 
managing the grid and the exchange. It could act as a system operator until all 
regulators are at sink.  
 The Omani electricity sector, when compared to Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia 
laws is more liberalized, more transparent and the regulator is more 
independent from government influences. 
 Although private companies are the actual beneficiaries of the GCC 
Interconnection project, the Omani government took a decision to fund it in 
order to minimize the costs and increase the efficiency of the sector until 
reaching a situation of a self-finance-sector.  
 In Oman subsidy is minimal and all sectors are billed clearly and separately. 
There is a chance that Oman will reach a stage were there will be no need to 
subsidize electricity, which may not be the case in other GCC countries.  
  
- End of findings - 





Meeting with Gleissner & Miller 
 
Participants Date 
Gerhardt Gleissner, Managing Director 15 July 2007 
Keith Miller, Director of planning and Studies  
Organisation Location 




 The GCC Interconnection Grid was not designed for trading when it started. It 
was established to deal with emergency cases. A much larger capacity would 
be required if the project was to boost cross-border trade of electricity. 
 In practice, DEWA-SEWA interconnection has already brought a lot of 
stability to the whole system. At a point of time, 800 MW was suddenly lost, 
but the integrated system was stable as it was able to absorb the drop. 
 Shortages of capacity that are now experienced by some GCC members would 
induce trade among the member countries. 
 Countries must plan for extending their capacity. Member states must not rely 
on cross-border trading to fulfil their normal requirements. 
 With respect to trading with Oman, ‘The towers are all in place, tests are being 
carried out for the interlocking of the two systems’. Further, the Omani 
Procurer (PWP) has already been sent a proposed agreement. 
 Two of the four countries already in the GCC-Grid have expressed interest to 
get into a trade agreement by 2009. 
 Projects now need more lead time than before. EPC contractors are busy and 
might cause delays to some of the electricity IPPs. Also, gas turbines and 
related EPC works now have a lead time of almost four years from a previous 
lead time of two-years. 
 Kuwait would want to import power soon due to its current shortage problems, 
Bahrain should be able to use the eastern grid with Saudi Arabia while Qatar 
in 2009 might have spare capacity to export.  
 The GCCIA seems to present itself as the regulator of the Interconnection 
Grid. Also, the Authority may end up playing a commercial role by selling 
rights, auctioning, placing penalties and developing as a fully commercialized 
entity. 
 There is a concern of potential capacity shortages caused by reform itself. In 
an enlarged and more liberalised GCC market, short-term electricity surpluses 
may result in miscalculated long-term capacity deficits. ‘GCCIA electricity 
trade agreements should reflect such concerns and must penalise countries if 
they do not plan for their own capacity requirements’.   
 The Abu Dhabi Law is a good step in the right direction. There is enough 
transparency as it is clear which parts are subsidised by government.  
 From the Abu Dhabi reforms, evidence show that availability is now more 
reliable. ‘System trips are down’, ‘outages are lower’. This should mean 
increased system availability and enhanced overall reliability. 
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 ‘When new IPPs are designed, they look at all these issues. They [the 
investors] want more effective use of the new capacities. Maintenance 
shutdowns were reduced by about 50% since generators are now paid on the 
basis of capacity-availability according to the conditions set by the PWP 
Agreements’.  
 ‘IPPs are becoming more productive as they use less people. A 100-MW plant 
now employs only 150 persons compared to a previous total of almost 600 
persons’.  
 New projects are now associated with new costs. IPPs are not cheaper to 
construct since private sector investments demand profits. While government 
projects are built on a 30-year basis, privately owned IPPs are financed on the 
basis of 20 years. 
 Further separation between supply and distribution may be expected as the 
regulator (although not stated by Law) has asked that accounts are to be 
separated. 
 It is not yet clear who would regulate the Emirates National Grid however 
there is a body that collects information. 
 UAE-GCC Interconnection Grid is expected to result in more reliability and 
stability to the system. Two main benefits envisaged; for the short term, the 
grid brings about savings on spinning reserve while with respect to long term 
planning the Grid allows for reducing capacity requirements. 
 For the short-term there is exportable power in the Abu Dhabi system, but it is 
not planned for long term exports. The ENG allowed for transmission of 
electricity from Abu Dhabi (ADWEA) to Dubai (DEWA) amounting to 400 
MW in 2006. This is expected to grow for 2008. By 2009, however; Abu 
Dhabi’s peak demand is expected to match available capacity, and hence, 
affecting exports from Abu Dhabi.  
 
- End of findings - 




Meeting with Hill & Raza 
 
Participants Date 
Lindsay Hill, Director of Power of Production 15 July 2007 
Aftab Raza, Senior Economist  
Organisation Location 




 Abu Dhabi reform was intended to stimulate investment in order to facilitate 
growth. For the GCC, another reason for choosing reform would be to improve 
economic efficiency as subsidies could be brought down. Abu Dhabi 
experience may lead other Emirates to follow as demand grows (i.e. Dubai is 
already showing interest in the IPP concept). 
 Emirates National Grid (ENG) has made a significant impact allowing other 
Emirates (other than Abu Dhabi) to reconsider their views over the project 
which means a bigger role for the ENG to act as a legal entity in its right and 
as a TRANSCO for the Emirates.  
 Abu Dhabi is exporting 900 MW on the ENG to other Emirates. The ENG is 
believed to have started to change people’s and governments’ attitude towards 
reform in a more positive way. The GCC Interconnection may also be looked 
at as a similar instrument of commencing change in the GCC as a whole. 
 Bahrain and Qatar ‘have warned us in a verbal and public context that they do 
not want to be locked into their existing electricity structures’ which signals a 
move towards change. 
 GCC electricity trade would be induced by desperate search for capacity as 
well as spinning reserve. Currently, only Abu Dhabi has access capacity, most 
GCC members are falling short of demand while Oman is ‘at the line’. 
 Fuel costs may become an issue when considering exports (as feed gas 
capacity may be a constraint in some cases and would be restricted to local 
consumption). 
 The GCC must put a framework for penalising countries that are not meeting 
their demands. Countries would be expected to plan for their own demands. 
 The progress of electricity sector reform is not very rapid, but it is not always 
good to progress so fast. Reform must be introduced in consideration with 
market ‘maturity’.  
 The initial arrangement for the GCC Grid was targeted to increase system 
stability, but recent discussions include trade.  
 The GCCIA seems to view its role as a System Operator. This needs special 
treatment (licence) according to the Law of Abu Dhabi. 
 For the ENG, volume of traded electricity is quarterly disclosed but prices 
remain non-disclosed.  
 The regulator requires accounts separation in the case of distribution and 
supply. Different from Oman, the Abu Dhabi Regulator is responsible for both 
water and electricity. 
Appendix 1 Key findings of meetings & Communications 
 
295 
  The GCC members are expected to continue funding the GCCIA since 
governments continue to own all the TRANSCOs. Once there would be a 
private TRANSCO, a question may be asked if governments may still continue 
to own and fund the GCC Grid.  
 The Emirates National Grid (ENG) is an arrangement rather than a regulated 
activity. The ENG Supervision Committee monitors the activities while each 
entity in the system is responsible for arranging flow between them. Different 
from the GCCIA funding arrangements, in the case of the ENG each Emirate 
funds the lines up to its border. ADWEA and DEWA have a bilateral trading 
contract but the Committee does not have to know the price of traded 
electricity. Each company has a transmission control room which does the 
arrangements. The role of the committee may change from monitoring to 
coordination to control. Existing laws state that this is the responsibility of the 
individual systems in each Emirate.  
 RASCO was an island system and not connected to the Abu Dhabi grid. When 
the system grew, it was slowly diluted. The Government decided that  the 
transmission part would be transferred to the TRANSCO and relevant DISCO, 
while the generation side was to remain as part of the RASCO but operations 
are outsourced to a the DISCO through a management contract. These are very 
small generators. So RASCO is now ‘a company on paper’. RASCO is 
regulated by the Bureau through a price control. RASCO sells electricity to the 
DISCOs like a small PWP with a quantity of about 250 MW (made up of small 
generators of mostly 1 MW each). 
 The Union Water and Electricity Company (UWEC) – located in the Emirate 
of Fujaira (now called ESWEC is not regulated). It is partially licensed by the 
Bureau for the water production since 90% of its capacity is coming to Abu 
Dhabi. The regulation applies for the price and quality of water supplied into 
Abu Dhabi. No regulation applies to the electricity side of the company as it is 
intended for the Emirate of Fujairah (with no electricity is exported to Abu 
Dhabi). 
 The economic environment has to create the mind set for further reforms. 
Companies are not yet ready for real time market (like the day-ahead market 
place). Risks would be too high while international companies seem to be 
reluctant to take greater risks. The prevailing economic situation still requires 
the remainder of long term contracts. If generators are subjected to pure 
market competition, investors ‘might simply walk away’. 
 The GCC Interconnection Grid should yield increased security of supply, 
availability of spinning, reserves and more stable networks. These were the 
previous reasons for establishing the Grid but recently trading discussions 
came into the picture. 
 While demand is growing at a steady load, investment is coming in big jumps 
(increments of usually 1500 MW). The GCC market would allow for 
immediate returns based on the some trading arrangements.  A sizable facility 
of 1500 MW could be better absorbed if cross-border trading was available to 
take one third of such capacity in the first year. Trading will take a lot of the 
risks as it would result in a smoother supply curve. 
 For the long run, there is good scope for cross-border trading of electricity. For 
the short run, availability of fuel may become a bottleneck (in the form a 
temporary gas restriction caused by some circumstances). 
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 For the short term, Abu Dhabi has a surplus of 900 MW which is being 
exported to the other Emirates (for a period of two years). If gas restrictions 
continue, the costs will then be higher if such exports were to continue. 
 The regulator decisions may be appealed to a group of three arbitrators. One 
arbitrator is appointed by the regulator, one buy the appealing company and 
the third is chosen by the previous two arbitrators. 
 The chairman of ADWEA appointed the members of the board of the regulator 
[this was changed according to a subsequent legislative]. They members are 
non-government officials and they are not allowed to have any related 
business.  
 











































Communications from Date 
Mohammad  Al Mahrouqi, Chairman                                                                18 November 2011
  
Organisation Method 




 Oman Has already corporatised all generation, transmission, distribution and 
supply businesses since 2005. 
 Oman is considering different forms of private sector participation i.e. 
Management Contract or IPO for some companies. 
  Oman, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi have already developed regulatory 
frameworks and functions. The Emirate of Dubai (of UAE) is also considering 
the development of a separate regulatory body for the Emirate. However, the 
degree of independency may vary from a country to another.  
 The GCC Interconnector could drive reform in the long term. For the short 
and mid terms, all GCC countries will continue to face similar challenges as 
high growth and similarity on the load profile and characteristics.  
 Currently Oman depends on gas availability to generate power. I would not 
envisage that Oman will have access gas to be used for electricity export. 
Oman has potential renewable resources and as these become more 
economically viable then Oman could be an exporter for the electricity.  
  GCC will be more sensitive to import electricity for reliability reasons. All 
domestic markets in GCC countries have similar challenges which could affect 
the reliability of imported electricity.  
 If Oman considers the introduction of cost reflective tariff it will be only to 
large customers (Industrial, commercial and government) 
  Also considering policies to improve energy efficiency. 
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Communications from Date 
Ahmad Al Jassar, Undersecretary 23 November 2011 
  
Organisation Method 
Ministry of Electricity and Water, Kuwait Personal Communications 
  
 
 As yet there are no firm plans for further separation but ultimately this law is 
capable of separating transmission, distribution but intent is that the system 
operator/ regulator will remain a public entity, which in this case, is the 
Ministry of Electricity and Water. 
 In Kuwait there are no intensions for intermediate state corporatization.  
 Framework, organization and methods for privatization have been introduced 
under the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Law No 7/2008 and Law 39/2010.   
 The process involves competition and award of contracts to private investors 
under Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) arrangements.  
 The certain implication of this process is that all new generation will be by 
PPP's. This process is just beginning and the implementation of the first, IPP 
tender for Az Zour North Phase 1 is now in progress and subsequent phases of 
Az Zour N and some Renewable Energy projects are being planned.  
 Privatization of all infrastructure other than new plant is still under 
consideration. There are no formal plans yet.  
 With regards to the GCC Interconnector, in its present role of system security 
and very limited power exchange (up to 1.2 MVA); the GCC Interconnector 
has little effect on the domestic market structure. Supply tightness and similar 
demand patterns in all GCC countries limits expansion of the role but in 
principle, in the long term the interconnector could widen a merchant power 
market. 
 Kuwait's economy is oil resource dependent therefore we wish to minimize 
domestic consumption and are becoming increasingly dependent on LNG 
imports. We cannot therefore be a power exporter.  
 Tariff increase is obviously the most powerful demand control measure. It is 
our constant objective and ultimately inevitable. The timescale depends on 
matters beyond our control.  
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Communications from Date 
Abdullah Ahmad Abdullah, PhD., Legal Advisor 23 November 2011 
  
Organisation Method 
Electricity and Water Authority, Bahrain Phone Call (in Arabic) 
 
 
 All new electricity generation in Bahrain will be contracted out through IPPs. 
 Other than the IPPs, no plans are finalised yet for the further separation of the 
different segments.  
 The GCC Interconnector might assist in minimising the reserve requirements. 
Perhaps in the future, it could be a catalyst for further market reforms. Also, 
the Interconnector might provide for exporting electricity from the GCC to 
other regions (like Europe) utilising some spare capacities during cooler 
months in the GCC.  
 Current social and political environment may not support the further 
restructuring of the electricity sector.  
 Due to the nature of the GCC, electricity prices will continue to be subsidised 
in Bahrain. The government is under pressure to continue with such non-cost 
reflective policy. However, there might be another away in the future - other 
than subsidising electricity prices- to assist the [less fortunate people] so that 
prices will be more cost reflective.  
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Communications from Date 
Tariq Khan, Electricity Advisor 27 November 2011 
  
Organisation Method 
Electricity Cogeneration Regulatory Authority, 
Saudi Arabia  
Personal Communications 
 
 Plans are already under way to unbundle the main vertically integrated 
electricity company currently operating in Saudi Arabia (the Saudi Electricity 
Company).   A separate Transmission Company has already been formed 
which will be the system operator effective January 2012. In addition, a 
principal buyer unit is going to be established in the beginning of year 2012.  
In 2013 a separate Distribution Company will be formed, along with four 
generation companies which will adopt the current SEC owned power stations 
in the Kingdom (around 50 plants).  In addition, there are currently nine other 
companies, other than SEC, that are licensed to generate power, ranging from 
small industry-based plants to large IWPP stations. 
 Interconnection of Saudi Arabia’s electricity networks with other countries 
will not be the main driver for reform; however, it will play a complementary 
role to the strategy of moving towards a more competitive market.  This 
introduces the possibility of a greater variety of electricity trading 
arrangements between industry players, both within the country as well as 
internationally. 
 As further developments take place in international electricity connections, 
such as the GCC grid, there will clearly be more opportunities for new 
electricity trading arrangements between countries.  In the case of the GCC 
interconnection the initial benefit and justification of the project was based on 
sharing of capacity reserves and mutual support of the countries’ networks in 
the case of unplanned outages.   However, there is likely to be further 
economic benefits in exchange of power at times of peak demand, since these 
peaks would not occur simultaneously.  For KSA there would be expected to 
be import and export at different times of the day or year, but it is difficult to 
determine at this stage if the net for the year would be import or export. 
 It can be expected that any country would be sensitive to any permanent 
reliance on imported electricity, particularly since the impact of a loss or 
reduction of power can be dramatic, especially in the summer months.  The 
currently established interconnections between countries are based on benefits 
resulting from sharing of capacity reserves during unplanned outages, but not 
on any permanent power transfers or reliance on capacity.  It is conceivable 
that in the future there could be permanent power transfer arrangements based 
on special cases such as emerging technologies (e.g.  solar power and other 
renewable).  
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 A number of issues are being considered related to the escalating demand 
growth in the electricity sector.  Changes to tariff structures are already being 
considered and the influence of low tariffs on energy conservation efforts is an 
on-going concern.  Time-of-day tariffs have been recently introduced for the 
commercial and industrial sectors (with a cost reflective rate for the peak 
hours).  The options for wide scale deployment of smart meters are also under 
investigation, as this would allow variable tariff structures to be offered for all 
customers, plus other benefits such as demand control. Other issues are related 
to the need to comply with  environmental standards which will both effect the 
cost of electricity production and promotion of renewable energy resources 
 







Appendix 2 Key Provisions of the Omani Law 
Royal Decree No. 78/2004 promulgating The Law for the Regulation and 
Privatisation of the Electricity and Related Water Sector in the Sultanate of Oman 
issued on 20 July 2004 (Oman Electricity Law, 2004). 
 
Article (3) each of the following activities shall be subject to regulation and the 
provisions of this Law shall apply to them; 
(a) Generation, Transmission, Distribution, Export, Import or 
Supply of electricity; 
(b) Generation of electricity related with Desalination of Water;  
(c) Generation of electricity co-located with Desalination of Water 
in the same site; 
(d) Operation of central Dispatch system; 
(e) The development and/or operation of International 
Interconnections; and 
(f) The functions assigned to the Oman Power and Water 
Procurement Company provided for in this Law. 
 
Article (9) The Minister of Housing, Electricity and Water shall issue Permitted 
Tariff regulations which are to be implemented in the Sultanate of 
Oman including tariffs for Supply and Connection of electricity, and 
the use of the system of the Salalah Project Company, and such tariffs 
shall be published in the Official Gazette.   
 
 Article (10) The Minister of Housing, Electricity and Water before issuing the 
regulations mentioned in the preceding article shall:  
(1) Take the opinion of the Authority, which is bound to coordinate 
with Licensed Suppliers, and Licensed Distribution System 
Operators, and the Rural Areas Electricity Company, and the 
Oman Power and Water Procurement Company;   
(2) Submit such proposed regulations to the Council of Ministers 
for approval.  
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The amendment or modification of tariffs shall be in the same way. 
 
Article (11) Permitted Tariff regulations may include the following:  
(a) The provision for the payment of Permitted Tariffs by 
commercial, industrial, and residential and other categories of 
Customers or specific groups of Customers in the manner 
provided for in the regulations;  
(b) A provision for the non-application of Permitted Tariffs to 
specific categories of Customers; 
(c) To distinguish between different categories of Customers on 
the basis of the level of consumption or the time or geographic 
location;  
(d) The determination of different structures, levels and times 
relating to the Permitted Tariffs to be applied as between 
different categories or groups of Customers or at different times 
or according to other bases specified by the regulations 
including the negotiation of Permitted Tariffs in each case with 
specific categories of Customers; 
(e) All that is related to the cost of providing Connection; 
(f) Exemption of specific categories or groups of Customers from 
the total or partial payment of Permitted Tariffs;  
(g) Other provisions in respect of Supply and Connection 
Permitted Tariffs as the Ministry of Housing, Electricity and 
Water deem to be appropriate. 
 
Article (18) The Ministry of Finance shall pay the value of the annual financial 
subsidy to Licensed Suppliers after the calculation of such subsidy in 
accordance with the following: 
(a) The Authority shall assess the level of allowed revenue in the 
relevant year the earning of which was available to each 
Licensed Supplier where he has effectively discharged his 
obligations specified in this Law and his Licence; 
(b) The Authority shall determine the value of revenue represented 
by the amounts, which have to be collected by the Licensed 
Supplier in the relevant year where he has effectively 
discharged his obligations specified in this Law and his 
Licence; 
(c) The Authority shall calculate the difference between the 
assessments specified pursuant to paragraph (a) and (b) and 
approve such difference in its Annual Report, and if the 
assessed value pursuant to paragraph (b) (representing the 
revenue collected from customers and others) is less than the 
assessed value pursuant to paragraph (a) (representing the 
allowed revenue) the Ministry of Finance shall be obliged to 
pay such difference to the Licensed Supplier and this Ministry 
shall specify the time and the manner of such payment which 
shall be, at least, every three months during the relevant year;   
(d) The Authority shall calculate any differences between the 
assessments being prepared for the preceding year and what has 
been actually available for collection by the licensee in such 
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year in the light of relevant circumstances, and the Authority 
shall notify the Ministry Of Finance about the methodology of 
calculating the differences pursuant to the provisions of this 
Article and shall include such methodology in the Annual 
Report mentioned in Article (29) of this Law. 
 
Article (19) there shall be established pursuant to this Law an Authority to regulate 
the electricity and Related Water sector. The headquarters of the 
Authority shall be located in the Governorate of Muscat. 
 
Article (20) The Authority shall have legal personality and financial and 
administrative autonomy and shall have the right to own the necessary 
moveable and immovable properties required to achieve its objectives 
and its property shall be considered as public property.  
 
Article (22) The Authority shall: 
(1) Secure the provision of electricity and Related Water services 
in all parts of the Sultanate of Oman and protect the interests of 
Customers particularly Customers who have limited income, 
the sick and elderly; 
(2) Encourage the promotion of competition in the interest of the 
public in the electricity and Related Water sector conducive to 
the achievement of public interest; 
(3) Secure and develop the safe, effective and economic operation 
of the electricity and Related Water sector in the Sultanate of 
Oman and to enhance the safety of the public; 
(4) Secure the Security of Supply in the Sultanate of Oman; 
(5) Secure that Licensees are undertaking to meet all reasonable 
demands relating to Connection to the Total System and 
Supply; 
(6) Secure compliance with the policies of the government in 
relation to Omanisation and training of Omani content leading 
to the creation of technical staff capable of undertaking the 
responsibility; 
(7) Facilitate the privatisation of the electricity and Related Water 
sector in the Sultanate of Oman; 
(8) Secure the protection of Rural Customers and encourage 
Supply of electricity to them through Connection or RAEC 
Connections in accordance with the provisions of Article (85) 
of this Law; 
(9) Take the necessary measures to enable Licensees to undertake 
the regulated activities pursuant to this Law and secure the 
effective operation of their activities in order to attract finance 
for their licensed activities in an economic manner; 
(10) Ensure the financial and technical capability of Licensees; 
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(11) Secure the necessity for taking into consideration the protection 
of the Environment; 
(12) To meet its obligations regarding the procurement and sale of 
Imports and Exports of electricity and International 
Interconnection in accordance with the provisions of Articles 
(114) and (115) of this Law; 
(13) Secure the conduct of fair and transparent competitions for 
New Capacity and Output by the Oman Power and Water 
Procurement Company; 
(14) Undertake not to unduly discriminate without legal justification 
between Persons and to act consistently in like cases; 
(15) Secure the minimization of regulatory burdens on Licence 
Holders or Exemptions Holders; 
(16) Secure the preparation of technical specifications and criteria, 
and Performance Security Standards, for the electricity and 
Related Water sector, to maintain and review them in 
accordance with the relevant exigencies of the public interest; 
(17) Prepare a Public Register containing all that relates to Licenses 
and Exemptions and any modifications made therein, and 
papers and documents relating to any of the above, and the 
certificates in respect of any Member of the Authority, and to 
maintain such Public Register; 
(18) The preparation of objective criteria to ensure that Licenses and 
Exemptions are granted to Appropriate Persons and to review, 
implement, and comply with such criteria and to make them 
available to relevant Persons to obtain them on request; 
(19) Secure the preparation of criteria relating to the welfare of the 
Customer and to amend, maintain, follow up compliance and 
implement such criteria;  
(20) Monitor the development of the electricity and Related Water 
market in the Sultanate of Oman; 
(21) Provide advice to Ministries in relation to the financing of 
RAEC Connection and Electrification Funding and the 
calculation of financial subsidy and tariffs and other functions 
assigned to it in accordance with the provisions of this Law; 
(22) Review the situation of the electricity market in order to assess 
the scope for further Liberalization and submit reports in this 
regard, and to assist in the development of criteria to be applied 
pursuant to the Salalah Project Agreements. The Authority shall 
take into consideration the provisions of the agreements 
concluded before the promulgation of this Law in respect of 
electricity and Related Water sector projects. 
  
Article (29) The Authority shall prepare an Annual Report that shall contain:  
Appendix 2 Key Provisions of the Omani Law 
306 
(a) Detailed information relating to its activities and the 
developments that occurred in the electricity and Related Water 
sector, and the extent to which the electricity market is prepared 
for further Liberalisation, and the volume of Imports and 
Exports of electricity, and the proposals of the Authority in this 
respect; 
(b) The proposals of the Authority in relation to Permitted Tariff 
regulations and government financial subsidy; 
(c) A detailed statement of the achievements in the area of 
providing electricity to Rural Premises through RAEC 
Connection or other Licensed Distribution Companies and the 
possibility of achieving further Connection and the plan of the 
Authority in respect of RAEC Connection and Electrification 
Funding;  
(d) A statement of the audited financial accounts of the Authority 
for each financial year in accordance with international 
accounting standards; 
(e) The method of calculating the value of financial subsidy in 
accordance with the provisions of Article (18) of this Law;  
(f) Any other matters the Authority considers should be included 
in this report. The Authority shall prepare this report within a 
period not exceeding 6 months of the end of the relevant 
Financial year and shall furnish a copy of this report to the 
Ministry of Housing Electricity and Water, and a sufficient 
number of copies shall be furnished to the Ministry of National 
Economy to allow the later to submit the report to the Council 
of Ministers. 
 
Article (31) if the Authority, in coordination with the Ministry of National 
Economy, concludes that the market is not so ready for further 
Liberalisation, the Authority shall include in its Annual Report the 
following: 
(a) A statement of the conditions which the Authority believes 
shall be realized, and the measures to be taken by the Authority 
or by other Persons to realize such conditions, in order that the 
market could be ready for further Liberalisation, and state the 
period the Authority deems required during which such 
measures may be taken, after which the Authority expects the 
market to be ready for further Liberalisation; 
(b) A statement of the kind of Liberalisation that the Authority 
believes eligible for implementation after the completion of the 
above mentioned. 
 
Article (32) if the Authority, in coordination with the Ministry of National 
Economy, concludes that the market is ready for further Liberalisation, 
it shall include in its Annual Report the following: 
(a) The nature and extent of the proposed Liberalisation and the 
amendments which it deems necessary to be made to this Law, 
the licenses issued pursuant to its provisions, and the rules of 
the Grid Code and Distribution Code, and other rules and 
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regulations, and the timing of the proposed Liberalisation, 
before the Liberalisation could be made; 
(b) The outcome of the coordination, which the Authority shall 
make with Industry Participants and other relevant Persons 
relating to such proposals;  
(c) The Ministry of National Economy shall, after consultation 
with the Electricity Holding Company, have the right to submit 
to the Council of Ministers a recommendation to take what it 
deems necessary to implement the Authority's proposals in 
respect of further Liberalisation;  
(d) The Ministry of National Economy, after the approval of the 
Council of Ministers, shall issue a decision to implement the 
abovementioned proposals; 
(e) The nature of the Liberalisation its extent and timing shall be in 
accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article (40) The Authority shall be constituted of 3 or 5 Members appointed by a 
decision of the Council of Ministers, in accordance with 
recommendations of the Ministry of Housing, Electricity and Water in 
coordination with the Ministry of National Economy for a period of 
three years which may be renewed, and the decision of the Council of 
Ministers appointing the Members or renewing the appointment shall 
be published in the first issue of the Official Gazette directly following 
the appointment or renewal, as the case may be.   
 
The Members shall elect from among themselves a Chairman of the 
Authority within a period not exceeding 10 days from the date of the 
publication of the decision of the Council of Ministers in the Official 
Gazette. 
 
Article (41) The Executive Director of the Authority, determined by the Council of 
Ministers from among the Members, shall undertake to implement the 
decisions of the Authority and to represent it before the Judiciary and 
in its relations with others, and his other functions shall be specified in 
regulations issued by the Authority. 
 
Article (42) A Person appointed as a Member of the Authority shall meet the 
following conditions: 
(i) (S)he must be academically and practically qualified and shall 
enjoy high competence in the field of his specialization;  
(ii) (S)he shall not be a shareholder and neither he nor any of his 
relative of the first degree shall have an interest in any Industry 
Participant; 
(iii) (S)he and shall not be a government employee in any capacity 
or an employee of an Industry Participant; 
(iv) To provide an annual declaration of any interest of any relatives 
up to the third degree and to refrain from considering any 
question in which a relative has an interest in;  
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(v) (S)he shall not have been given a punishment restricting 
freedom in crimes involving indecency or dishonesty unless 
rehabilitated. 
The Members shall be responsible for the performance by the 
Authority of its functions. 
  
Article (65) Subject to the provisions of Article (13), the Electricity Holding 
Company shall undertake to implement the policies of the government 
approved by the Council of Ministers in respect of the privatisation of 
the electricity and Related Water sector and shall encourage electricity 
or electricity and Related Water projects in the Sultanate of Oman, to 
be financed from private sources.  The Electricity Holding Company 
shall in particular undertake the following: 
(a) To perform the functions assigned to it pursuant to the 
provisions of this Law; 
(b) To implement the policy of the government in respect of the 
financing of companies Wholly-owned by the Government in 
the electricity and Related Water sector and to safeguard and 
maintain the interest of the government in these companies; 
(c) To hold or dispose of the shares of the government in the 
companies stipulated in Article (66) of this Law and also the 
companies referred to in paragraph (e) of this Article, and to 
take measures and conclude contracts and agreements required 
in respect thereof; 
(d) To take necessary measures to achieve its objectives or 
measures connected to these objectives; 
(e) To establish new companies, or appoint existing companies 
undertaking activities relating to, or complimentary to, its 
activities, particularly for the purposes of securing New 
Capacity pursuant to this Law, and also to establish a new 
company or entrust an existing company whether to undertake 
ownership, operation and maintenance of any of the assets or 
operation of any Electric Plants, Systems, or Production 
Facilities whenever it reverts to the Oman Power and Water 
Procurement Company, or to undertake the ownership, 
operation and maintenance of any of the assets that revert to the 
government in accordance with Article (122) of this Law;  
(f) To provide central accounting services for the companies 
Wholly-owned by the Government operating in the electricity 
and Related Water sector. 
 
It shall be prohibited for the Electricity Holding Company to 
undertake any of the regulated activities or any activity not 
provided for in this Law. 
   
Article (66) The Electricity Holding Company shall undertake to hold the shares of 
the government in the following companies: 
(a) The Oman Power and Water Procurement Company SAOC; 
(b) The Oman Electricity Transmission Company SAOC; 
(c) The Al-Rusail Power Company SAOC; 
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(d) The Wadi Al Jizzi Power Company SAOC; 
(e) The Al Ghubrah Power and Desalination Company SAOC; 
(f) The Mazoon Electricity Company SAOC; 
(g) The Majan Electricity Company SAOC; 
(h) The Muscat Electricity Distribution Company SAOC; and 
(I) The Rural Areas Electricity Company SAOC. 
 
Article (67) The companies stipulated in Article (66) of this Law shall take the 
form of Omani closed joint stock companies, and the Ministry of 
Finance in coordination with the Ministry of National Economy shall 
have the right to modify the legal form of any such companies, and the 
Ministry of Finance shall secure the availability of adequate finance to 
enable such companies to undertake the activity assigned to them 
pursuant to this Law whether such Finance is from the Ministry of 
Finance or from any other source, provided the Ministry of Finance 
approves such finance, all being for as long as the companies are 
Wholly-owned by the Government. 
 
Article (79) The Oman Power and Water Procurement Company shall, where New 
Capacity is needed according to the preceding two Articles, and such 
New Capacity is in excess of: 
(i) 75 MegaWatts in the case of electricity Production Capacity;  
(ii) 27,300 cubic meters per day in the case of Desalinated water 
capacity;  
(iii)  Or a higher threshold specified by the Authority in such cases 
from time to time; 
undertake to contract for the provision of required New Capacity after 
the conduct of a fair and transparent competition in accordance with 
the following procedures:  
Open the competition for all local and foreign investors who have 
suitable expertise and to all owners and/or operators of existing 
Production Facilities; 
(b) Determine its strategy for the procurement for New Capacity, 
such strategy which shall be approved by the Authority shall 
take into consideration:    
 The size and most appropriate location of the New 
Capacity, and the time of its procurement; 
 Imports that may be secured;  
 New Capacity that can be secured from existing Production 
Facilities; 
 A statement of all tender invitation procedures, and the 
manner of evaluation, and the stages of negotiation with the 
bidders; 
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 The necessity for consultation with each Licensed 
Transmission System Operator or Licensed Distribution 
System Operator in relation to the location, Connection, and 
Ancillary Services;  
 Preparation of all documents, papers and data required for 
the conduct of competition. 
(c) If the Ministry of National Economy agrees that there is a need 
for New Capacity for Desalinated water as determined by the 
Ministry of Housing, Electricity and Water, and it appears to 
the Ministry of National Economy that it is not possible for 
such capacity to be procured by the Rural Areas Electricity 
Company, then such company shall coordinate with the 
Ministry of Housing, Electricity and Water on the best manner 
to meet the company’s obligations to provide such New 
Capacity, whether by securing all or part of it in connection 
with electricity capacity, or not.   
 
The company shall, if it has been decided to procure new 
Desalinated water capacity or part of it with electricity 
Generation Capacity, follow the procedures provided for in this 
Article in the aforementioned manner; 
 
(d) The Bulk Supply Tariff prescribed pursuant to Article (135) of 
this Law shall include the reasonable cost relating to the 
procurement of Desalinated water Capacity and Output;   
(e) If it has been decided to procure New Capacity for Desalinated   
water only, the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company 
shall not be bound by that. 
 
Article (112) Without prejudice to the provisions of the two preceding Articles: 
(1) The Oman Power and Water Procurement Company Licence 
shall contain the following conditions: 
(a) A provision for a prohibition on the company not to 
undertake any regulated activity except those specified 
in its Licence; 
(b) A provision for the calculation of the Bulk Supply 
Tariff and its review from time to time; 
(c) A provision to oblige the company to cooperate with the 
Licensed Suppliers who contract on its behalf with 
Autogenerators in relation to Output in regard to the 
conditions of such agency contracts and other contract 
conditions relating to Supply. 
(2) The Generation Licence and Generation/Desalination Licence 
shall contain the following conditions:  
(a) A provision to oblige the Licensee to ensure that his 
Production Facilities meet all reasonable requirements 
for central scheduling and Dispatch; 
(b) A provision to oblige the Licensee to offer terms for 
securing Ancillary Services and to restrict the powers 
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granted pursuant to the Licence to specified Production 
Facilities and/or specific Production Capacity;  
(c) A provision to permit the imposition of restrictions on 
the percentage of total market share for Generation 
and/or Generation/Desalination whether in respect of 





Article (114) The Authority shall when granting a Licence for the Import or Export 
of electricity observe the following:  
(a) The Authority shall not be permitted to grant a Licence to 
Import and/or Export electricity, or modify an existing Licence 
in order to include any such Import and/or Export across an 
International Interconnector with a capacity of 33 kV or more, 
or such other limit decided by the Council of Ministers, unless 
after obtaining the approval of the Council in respect of such 
Import and/or Export based on the recommendation of the 
Ministry of Housing, Electricity and Water; 
(b) The Licence shall exclusively be granted to the Oman Power 
and Water Procurement Company or the Rural Areas 
Electricity Company; 
(c) The Licence shall contain those conditions (if any) which have 
to be included pursuant to a recommendation made by the 
Ministry of Housing, Electricity and Water and approved by the 
Council of Ministers;  
(d) The aforesaid Licence may include other conditions specified 
by the Authority to deal with the manner in which the Licensee 
shall observe the relevant arrangements in respect of the 
performance of his duties pursuant to this Law;  
(e) The Authority shall consider the following: 
(i) The proposed conditions for Import and Export as to the 
price and other matters and the creditworthiness of the 
Person to whom Export of electricity is intended to be 
made; 
(ii) Whether any contracting for Import or Export pursuant 
to a Licence shall be on an interruptible basis;  
(iii) The extent of the effect which the Import or Export may 
have on the ability of the Oman Power and Water 
Procurement Company to fulfil its obligations 
particularly those in respect of ensuring that reasonable 
demand for electricity is met, and the effect on the fuel 
supply market in the Sultanate of Oman; 
(g) The Ministry of Housing, Electricity and Water shall consult 
with each of the Authority and the Electricity Holding 
Company before submitting its recommendations stipulated in 
paragraphs (a) and (c) to the Council of Ministers. 
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Article (115) The Authority shall before granting a Licence to make an International 
Interconnection, consider the following:  
(a) The Authority shall not be permitted to grant a Licence to make 
a new International Interconnection or modify an existing 
Licence where the proposed International Interconnection will 
have a capacity of 33 kV or more, or such other limit decided 
by the Council of Ministers, without the approval of the 
Council of Ministers for the Import or Export of electricity 
across means of an International Interconnection pursuant to 
the provisions of the preceding Article; 
(b)  The Licence shall exclusively be granted to a Licensed 
Transmission System Operator, a Licensed Distribution System 
Operator, or the Rural Areas Electricity Company;  
(c) A Licence to develop and/or operate an International 
Interconnection shall contain such conditions that have been 
approved by the Council of Ministers on the basis of the 
recommendation of the Ministry of Housing, Electricity and 
Water which Ministry shall have consulted with the Authority 
and the Electricity Holding Company before making and 
submitting such recommendation to the Council of Ministers; 
(d) The aforesaid Licence may include other conditions specified 
by the Authority to deal with the manner in which the Licensee 
shall observe the relevant arrangements in respect of his 
performance of his duties pursuant to this Law;  
(e) The Authority shall, when granting the aforesaid Licence, 
observe the possible effects on the Total System and on the 
ability of the Licence Holder to fulfil his duties prescribed 





Appendix 3 Key Provisions of the Abu Dhabi Law 
Abu Dhabi Law No (2) of 1998 Concerning the Regulation of the Water & Electricity 
Sector in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi” issued by the State Decree No. 2 on 1 March 
1998 in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi law No. 
2, 1998) and the subsequent amendments by Law No. (19) of 2007 issued on 1 July 
2007 (Abu Dhabi Law No. 19, 2007).  
 
Article (3)       Establishment as Government Authority: There is hereby established as 
a public organisation, wholly owned by the Government, the Abu 
Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority for the purpose of carrying out 
the duties given to it under this Law. 
 
Article (4)       Independence: The Authority shall have a separate legal personality 
and shall have the capacity to act as such in accordance with this Law 
and shall have financial and administrative independence in carrying 
out its affairs. 
 
Article (7)       Holding company ownership: The Authority shall be entitled to retain 
ownership of all of the share capital of the Abu Dhabi Power 
Corporation. 
 
Article (18)     Taxes, duties etc: The Authority, the Abu Dhabi Power Corporation, all 
companies or entities wholly or partly owned by either of them and 
companies established pursuant to Article (134) of this Law shall be 
exempt from all taxes, fees including custom duties in relation to 
goods, machinery, equipment and spare parts imported for the purposes 
of achieving its objectives. Such exemption shall not apply to fees to 
be collected by the Regulation and Supervision Bureau pursuant to this 
Law or any licence issued under this Law. 
 
Article (27)     Power to establish and dispose of sector entities: The Abu Dhabi 
Power Corporation shall, in such manner as the Authority may from 
time to time direct in each case, for the purposes of the restructuring 
and privatisation of the water and electricity sector in the Emirate or 
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promoting the introduction of privately funded water and electricity 
projects and shall have the power to— 
(1)       dispose of its interest, in whole or in part, in those entities 
established pursuant to Article (21) of this Law; 
(2)       require the disposal by any of the entities referred to in Article 
(21) of this Law of all or any of its assets; and 
(3)       enter into contracts, including contracts for the management of 
production, transmission, distribution and services companies 
wholly owned by Government and the operation of the relevant 
facilities wholly owned by those companies and contracts for 
the lending or borrowing of money. 
 
 
Article (28)     Notice of disposal to the Regulation and Supervision Bureau: The Abu 
Dhabi Power Corporation may sell all or any of its shares in the Abu 
Dhabi Transmission and Despatch Company or the Abu Dhabi 
Company for Servicing Remote Areas only after six months from the 
date of notifying the Regulation and Supervision Bureau of its 
intention and grant the Regulation and Supervision Bureau’s approval 
of such sale. The Regulation and Supervision Bureau may shorten the 
period in consultation with the relevant bodies operating in the water 
and electricity sector (introduced by Law No. 17 replacing the previous 
Article 28 of Law No. 2). 
 
Article (32)     Capacity planning duty: The Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity 
Company shall, for the purpose of ensuring the long term security of 
the supply of water and electricity in the Emirate, determine annually 
in respect of each year and the next five years, the requirement for the 
provision of— 
(1)       new or additional capacity for water desalination; and 
(2)       new or additional electricity generation capacity; and 
(3)       new or additional water storage capacity, in order to perform its 
obligations in Article (30) of this Law and in any case where 
such requirement exists, the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity 
Company shall contract for the provision of such new or 
additional production capacity with those persons operating 
existing production facilities or persons wishing to provide new 
such facilities. 
 
Article (35)     Competition for new production capacity:  
(1)       Invitation to tender: Unless the Authority otherwise directs, 
each person who is to be— the provider of new or additional 
production capacity; or is to be awarded a contract for the 
provision of existing production capacity, shall be selected by 
the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company from among 
those entities (or their subsidiaries) that submit tenders in 
response to an invitation to tender for the right to provide 
production capacity. 
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 (2)      Competence of tenderers: In coordination with the Authority 
and the Regulation and Supervision Bureau and after the 
Executive Council [the Executive Council of the Emirate of 
Abu Dhabi] has granted its approval to the Authority, the Abu 
Dhabi Water and Electricity Company shall prepare any such 
invitation to such persons who have the financial capacity and 
technical and managerial competence to provide such 
production capacity (introduced by Law No. 17 replacing the 
previous Paragraph in Law No. 2).  
 (3)      Tender criteria: The Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity 
Company shall prepare, develop and apply evaluation criteria 
for the purposes of identifying persons who will be—the 
providers of new or additional production capacity; and 
awarded contracts for the provision of existing production 
capacity, and such criteria will include a methodology for 
determining the economic advantages of tenders in response to 
an invitation issued under this Article, but shall otherwise be 
entitled to accept or reject any such tender as it thinks fit. 
 
Article (38)     Regulated bulk supply tariff: The Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity 
Company shall charge each licensed distribution operator a bulk supply 
tariff in respect of supplies of water and electricity made to it. Such 
tariff shall be calculated in respect of each calendar year on a basis 
prescribed by the Regulation and Supervision Bureau in the licence 
granted to the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company. 
 
Article (39)     Transmission duties: It shall be the duty of the Abu Dhabi 
Transmission and Despatch Company and any other licensed 
transmission operator to—  
(1)                   Safety systems: develop, maintain and operate safe, efficient and 
economical water and electricity transmission systems; 
(2)                   Connection duty: comply with any reasonable request to connect to 
such transmission systems— facilities for water desalination storage 
and electricity generation; and systems for water and electricity 
distribution and supply; 
(3)                  Transmission codes, despatch and settlement: develop, maintain, review 
and modify— 
(a)       separate transmission codes for the transmission of water and 
electricity; 
(b)       procedures for the economic and technical despatch of 
production facilities; and 
(c)       a system for the settlement of payments due to and from the 
providers of— production capacity; delivered water and 
electricity output; and ancillary services; and  
(4)                   Regulated transmission tariffs: charge licensed distribution operators in 
respect of connection to and use of its national transmission systems, a 
cost-reflective tariff. Such tariff shall be calculated in the manner 
prescribed by the Regulation and Supervision Bureau in the licence 
granted to the Abu Dhabi Transmission and Despatch Company or 
other licensed transmission operator. 
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Article (40)     Non-discrimination: The Abu Dhabi Transmission and Despatch 
Company or any other licensed transmission operator shall not unduly 
create a preference in favour of, or unduly discriminate against, any 
person or class of persons in the connection of any— water 
desalination and electricity generation facilities; or systems for water 
and electricity distribution and supply; or terms on which it undertakes 
the transmission of water and electricity in such systems. 
 
Article (41)    General function: The Abu Dhabi Company for Servicing Remote 
Areas shall be responsible for the provision of water desalination and 
electricity generation capacity, the transmission, distribution and 
supply of water and electricity to those persons and premises not 
connected to the water and electricity transmission and distribution 
systems. 
 
Article (44)     Establishment of the Regulation and Supervision Bureau: There is 
hereby established a bureau called the Regulation and Supervision 
Bureau for the Water and Electricity Sector in the Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi and it shall have separate legal personality and full legal 
capacity to act as such in accordance with this Law (amended by Law 
No. 17 replacing the previous Article 44 of Law No. 2). 
 
Article (45)     Regulatory Board Members (amended by Law No. 17 replacing the 
previous Article 45 of Law No. 2): 
(1)      Appointment: The Regulation and Supervision Bureau shall be 
managed by no less than three and not more than seven 
members, including the Chairman. The Board shall be headed 
by the Chairman of the Regulation & Supervision Bureau. The 
Board members shall set out and determine its procedures, 
voting process, meetings and management system,  
(2)       The Chairman of the Board and the Board members shall be 
appointed by the Chairman of the Executive Council
56
 
[previously the Chairman of the Board appointed the members 
of the Bureau], and such members shall be persons of 
appropriate competency and experience.  
(3)       Term and re-appointment: The period of appointment of a 
member of the Board shall be for a period of five years and 
may be renewed. 
 
Article (46)    Tenure of Regulatory Board Members: [Law No. 19 replaced the words 
of ‘Chairman of Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority’ 
previously stated in Law No. 2 by ‘Chairman of Executive Council’]:  
(1)       Resignation: A Regulation and Supervision Bureau Member 
may at any time resign his office by giving not less than 30 
days reasonable notice to the Chairman of Executive Council.  
(2)      Deemed resignation: A Regulation and Supervision Bureau 
Member shall be deemed to have given the required notice 
                                                 
56
 Chairman of the Executive Council of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi 
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referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article if he fails to attend 
the meetings of the Regulation and Supervision Bureau for 
three consecutive months without giving a reason or an 
acceptable explanation for his absence. 
 
Article (47)     Removal from office: Only the Chairman of the Executive Council 
[Law No. 17 replaced the words of ‘Chairman of Abu Dhabi Water and 
Electricity Authority’ previously stated in Law No. 2 by ‘Chairman of 
Executive Council] may, and may only, remove any person from 
acting as a Regulation and Supervision Bureau Member on the grounds 
of— 
(1)       physical or mental incapacity which prevents that member from 
carrying out his duties; 
(2)       conviction of a criminal offence; 
(3)       proved maladministration of that member; or 
(4)       proved serious misconduct of that member. 
 
Article (52)     Funding: The Regulation and Supervision Bureau shall have an 
independent budget to be approved by its members [Law No. 19 
deleted –here- ‘after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of 
Management of the Authority’] and shall be funded by the payment of 
fees by those persons awarded licences pursuant to this Law. 
 
Article (53)     Primary duties: It shall be the first duty of the Regulation and 
Supervision Bureau, in exercising its functions under this Law, to 
ensure, so far as it is practicable for it to do so, the continued 
availability of potable water for human consumption and electricity for 
use in hospitals and centres for the disabled, aged and sick. 
 
Article (54)     General duties: The Regulation and Supervision Bureau when 
performing its functions under this law shall have a duty to exercise its 
functions in manner which is best calculated to [this was amended by 
Law No. 17 replacing the previous Article 54 of Law No. 2 mainly to 
provide for wastewater services]: 
(1)       ensure the security of the supply of water and electricity and 
provide sewerage services in the Emirate; 
(2)       ensure the connection and supply of water and electricity and 
the connection to sewerage network for all customers; 
(3)       ensure the provision of special health and safety regulations 
related to supply of water, wastewater services and electricity 
to the general public; 
(4)       publish information relating to the standards of performance by 
licensed operators; 
(5)       take into account national and international environmental 
standards as they affect the water, wastewater and electricity 
sector and consult with relevant bodies in the Emirate and the 
state when necessary and expedient to do so in interest of the 
consumer and sector; 
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(6)       have special regard to the interests of those persons whose lives 
may be endangered by the lack of potable water, sewerage 
services or electricity and others with special needs in 
connection with the cost and method of supply of water and/or 
electricity, or through the use of appliances and fittings; 
(7)       promote competition in the water, wastewater and electricity 
sector; 
(8)       ensure the operation and development of a safe, efficient and 
economic water, wastewater and electricity sector in the 
Emirate; 
(9)       protect the interest of consumers of water and electricity as to 
terms and conditions and price of supply (whether consumption 
is are domestic, commercial or industrial); 
(10)     protect the interests of users of sewerage services in the 
Emirate. 
 
Article (55)     Functions of the Regulation and Supervision Bureau for the Water and 
Electricity Sector: General functions: [Paragraphs 1,4,6,7 and 8 were 
amended by Law No. 19 mainly to provide for wastewater services]. 
The powers of the Regulation and Supervision Bureau shall include — 
(1)       reviewing the provision of water and electricity supplies and 
sewerage services in the Emirate; 
(2)       the issue, monitoring, and enforcement of compliance with 
licences pursuant to this Law; 
(3)       the establishment, maintenance, review and amendment as 
appropriate of technical and performance standards for the 
water and electricity sector and the monitoring and enforcement 
of compliance with such technical standards; 
(4)       the establishment, maintenance, review and monitoring of 
safety standards for the water, electricity and sewerage services 
sector and monitoring and enforcing compliance with such 
safety standards; 
(5)       the establishment, maintenance, review, monitoring, and 
amendment, as appropriate, of customer care standards; 
(6)       the regulation of prices charged to consumers of water and 
electricity and users of sewerage services and the method by 
which they are charged;  
(7)       approving, modifying, monitoring and the enforcement of terms 
and conditions for the supply of water and electricity, and the 
provision of sewerage services to domestic consumers; 
(8)       approving and proposing modifications to transmission and 
distribution codes and operating codes in respect of sewerage 
services, and 




Article (58)     Reporting: 
(1)                   Annual report: The Regulation and Supervision Bureau shall as soon as 
possible after the end of each calendar year make to the Chairman of 
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the Executive Council [previously the Chairman of the Authority under 
the previous Article 58 of Law No. 19] a report— 
(a)       of its activities during that year;  
(b)       of developments during that year in respect of matters which 
fall within the scope of the Regulation and Supervision 
Bureau’s functions; 
(c)       of matters investigated under Article (61) of this Law; and 
(d)       as to the matters referred to in sub-paragraph (3) of Article (76) 
of this Law.  
(2)                   Copies of the report: The Regulation and Supervision Bureau shall 
make a copy of each such report available to any person who may 
request such, upon payment of such fees as the Regulation and 
Supervision Bureau shall determine. 
 
Article (59)     Licensing criteria: The Regulation and Supervision Bureau shall 
establish (and keep under review) specified objective criteria for the 
purposes of ensuring that all prospective licensed operators are fit and 
proper persons to be issued with a licence or exemption and shall make 
a copy of the criteria, applying from time to time, available to any 
interested person who may request such. 
 
Article (62)     Powers to make regulation: The Regulation and Supervision Bureau 
may, in consultation with whom it sees fit [previously ‘in consultation 
with the Authority’ before the amendments of Law No. 19], make such 
regulations as it sees fit for the purposes set out in Articles (63) and 
(68) of this Law. 
 
Article (63)     Supply regulations: Regulations made pursuant to Article (62) of this 
Law may be made for the following purposes [Paragraphs 1,2 were 
amended by Law No. 19 to account for wastewater services], namely 
to— 
(1)       secure regular and efficient supplies of water, electricity and 
provide sewerage services; 
(2)       protect the general public from danger related to water, 
electricity and sewerage works and installation; 
(3)       eliminate or reduce the risk of personal injury; 
(4)       require licensees to take all prescribed steps to secure 
compliance with quality standards; 
(5)       ensure that water in mains pipelines is not contaminated and is 
of potable quality; 
(6)       ensure that any water in trunk mains pipelines connected to 
mains pipelines is not contaminated; 
(7)       prevent the waste and over-consumption of any water after it 
has left the pipelines of a licensed operator to be supplied to 
premises; 
(8)       ensure that the water and electricity fittings installed and used 
by persons to whom water and electricity are to be supplied are 
safe; and  
(9)       promote the conservation of water and the efficient use of water 
and electricity. 
Appendix 3 Key Provisions of the Abu Dhabi Law 
320 
(10)     ensure sewerage network fittings comply with the standards 
determined by the Regulation and Supervision Bureau. 
 
Article (67)     Regulations disputes: The court with the appropriate jurisdiction shall 
hear disputes relating to regulations made under Article (62) of this 
Law. 
 
Article (68)     Streetworks and access regulations: 
(1)                   Purpose of regulations: Regulations made pursuant to Article (62) of 
this Law may be made for the following further purposes, namely to 
enable a licensed transmission operator, a licensed distribution operator 
or any other licensed operator to the extent that its licence so provides 
to— 
(a)       carry out streetworks; and 
(b)       enter into or onto premises belonging to, or occupied by, any 
person for the purposes of carrying out streetworks; 
 (2)                  Application of streetworks and access regulations: for the purposes of 
this Article such regulations shall be binding on such persons, to such 
an extent and in such manner as may be set out in such regulations. 
 
Article (93)     Conditions of transmission/despatch licences: Without prejudice to the 
generality of Article (89) of this Law, licences issued to any person 
authorising the conduct of a transmission and despatch business shall 
include conditions— 
(1)       requiring the licensed transmission operator to engage in the 
economic purchase of goods and services; 
(2)       prohibiting the licensed transmission operator from engaging in 
designated activities other than the business of a transmission 
and/or despatch operator; 
(3)       prescribing how the licensed transmission operator shall 
perform the functions assigned to it in this Law; 
(4)       requiring the maintenance of separate accounts in respect of 
distinct parts of the licensed transmission operator undertaking 
and prohibiting cross subsidy between those parts; 
(5)       providing for the calculation from time to time of the tariff 
referred to in Article (39) of this Law; 
(6)       requiring the licensed transmission operator to implement and 
maintain a settlements system; and 
(7)       requiring the licensed transmission operator to offer terms for 
connection to, and use of, the licensee's transmission system. 
 
Article (94)     Conditions of distribution and supply licences: Without prejudice to the 
provisions of Article (89) of this Law, a licence authorising the 
conduct of a distribution and supply business shall include 
conditions— 
(1)       requiring the licensed distribution operator to engage in the 
economic purchase of water, electricity and other goods and 
services; 
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(2)       prohibiting the licensed distribution operator from engaging in 
designated activities other than the distribution and supply of 
water and electricity; 
(3)       relating to the establishment of tariffs which the licensed 
distribution operator may charge consumers of water and 
electricity and their calculation from time to time; 
(4)       requiring the licensed distribution operator to maintain separate 
accounts in respect of distinct parts of its business and 
prohibiting cross subsidy between those parts; 
(5)       requiring the licensed distribution operator to offer terms to 
persons requiring a supply of water or electricity; 
(6)       requiring the licensed distribution operator to publish codes of 
practice in relation to the payment of bills by consumers, the 
disconnection of consumers, the provision of services to the 
elderly and disabled, the efficient use of water and electricity 
by consumers and the handling of complaints; and 
(7)       requiring the preparation and maintenance of a distribution 
code. 
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Appendix 4 Oman SCBA Sensitivity Tables  
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis: ∆ PV Consumer Welfare  following:
(i) ∆ Anchor level price US$/MWh +/- 10%, +/- 20%
(ii) ∆ Ratio between anchor & price 
(iii) ∆ Discount rate: 3%, 5% and 7%
PV US$m, 3% d/rate & 2005 prices -20% -10% 10% 20%
4,203.9 540 608 675 743 891
Ratio between anchor 1.0% 167.2 188.7 210.2 231.7 278.9
& price 5.0% 836.2 943.6 1,051.0 1,158.4 1,394.6
10.0% 1,672.4 1,887.2 2,102.0 2,316.7 2,789.2
12.5% 2,090.5 2,359.0 2,627.5 2,895.9 3,486.5
15.0% 2,508.6 2,830.8 3,152.9 3,475.1 4,183.8
17.5% 2,926.7 3,302.6 3,678.4 4,054.3 4,881.2
20.0% 3,344.8 3,774.4 4,203.9 4,633.5 5,578.5
22.5% 3,762.9 4,246.2 4,729.4 5,212.7 6,275.8
25.0% 4,181.1 4,718.0 5,254.9 5,791.8 6,973.1
30.0% 5,017.3 5,661.6 6,305.9 6,950.2 8,367.7
PV US$m, 5% d/rate & 2005 prices -20% -10% 10% 20%
3,577.4 540 608 675 743 891
Ratio between anchor 1.0% 142.3 160.6 178.9 197.1 237.4
& price 5.0% 711.6 803.0 894.4 985.7 1,186.8
10.0% 1,423.2 1,606.0 1,788.7 1,971.5 2,373.5
12.5% 1,779.0 2,007.4 2,235.9 2,464.3 2,966.9
15.0% 2,134.8 2,408.9 2,683.1 2,957.2 3,560.3
17.5% 2,490.6 2,810.4 3,130.2 3,450.1 4,153.7
20.0% 2,846.4 3,211.9 3,577.4 3,942.9 4,747.1
22.5% 3,202.2 3,613.4 4,024.6 4,435.8 5,340.5
25.0% 3,558.0 4,014.9 4,471.8 4,928.7 5,933.9
30.0% 4,269.6 4,817.9 5,366.1 5,914.4 7,120.6
PV US$m, 7% d/rate & 2005 prices -20% -10% 10% 20%
3,059.3 540 608 675 743 891
Ratio between anchor 1.0% 121.7 137.3 153.0 168.6 203.0
& price 5.0% 608.5 686.7 764.8 843.0 1,014.9
10.0% 1,217.1 1,373.3 1,529.6 1,685.9 2,029.7
12.5% 1,521.3 1,716.7 1,912.0 2,107.4 2,537.2
15.0% 1,825.6 2,060.0 2,294.4 2,528.9 3,044.6
17.5% 2,129.8 2,403.3 2,676.9 2,950.4 3,552.1
20.0% 2,434.1 2,746.7 3,059.3 3,371.8 4,059.5
22.5% 2,738.4 3,090.0 3,441.7 3,793.3 4,566.9
25.0% 3,042.6 3,433.4 3,824.1 4,214.8 5,074.4
30.0% 3,651.2 4,120.0 4,588.9 5,057.7 6,089.2
Anchor level of non-GDP/MWh (2005 prices)
Anchor level of non-GDP/MWh (2005 prices)
Anchor level of non-GDP/MWh (2005 prices)
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Table 2: Sensitivity analysis: ∆ PV consumer welfare  following:
(i) ∆ counterfactual supply growth (2005 - 2015) 
(ii) ∆ actual supply growth (2011 - 2015)
(ii) ∆ discount rate 
PV US$ m, 3% d/rate & 2005 prices 4,203.9 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9% 5,588.3 3,493.9 1,109.6
From 2011 to 2015 11% 6,298.3 4,203.9 1,819.6
13% 7,044.8 4,950.4 2,566.1
PV US$ m, 5% d/rate & 2005 prices 3,577.4 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9% 4,791.3 2,988.9 942.0
From 2011 to 2015 11% 5,379.8 3,577.4 1,530.6
13% 5,998.3 4,195.9 2,149.1
PV US$ m, 7% d/rate & 2005 prices 3,059.3 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9% 4,128.9 2,569.4 802.8
From 2011 to 2015 11% 4,618.8 3,059.3 1,292.7
13% 5,133.3 3,573.8 1,807.2
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis: ∆ PV electricity subsidy  following:
(i) ∆ counterfactual supply growth (2005 - 2015) 
(ii) ∆ counterfactual losses percentage point reduction per annum 
(ii) ∆ discount rate 
PV US$ m, 3% d/rate & 2005 prices -279.8 5% 7% 9%
Counterfactual MIS losses: 0.00% -1,095.9 -279.8 646.5
0.25% -1,242.6 -449.2 451.0
% point reduction p.a. from 2004 0.50% -1,382.4 -610.5 265.0
0.75% -1,515.7 -764.2 87.9
1.00% -1,643.2 -910.9 -81.1
PV US$ m, 5% d/rate & 2005 prices -233.9 5% 7% 9%
Counterfactual MIS losses: 0.00% -938.4 -233.9 563.7
0.25% -1,065.5 -380.3 395.2
% point reduction p.a. from 2004 0.50% -1,186.7 -519.6 234.8
0.75% -1,302.4 -652.6 82.0
1.00% -1,413.1 -779.7 -64.0
PV US$ m, 7% d/rate & 2005 prices -19605.8% 5% 7% 9%
Counterfactual MIS losses: 0.00% -807.6 -196.1 494.4
0.25% -918.2 -323.1 348.5
% point reduction p.a. from 2004 0.50% -1,023.8 -444.3 209.5
0.75% -1,124.8 -560.0 76.8
1.00% -1,221.4 -670.7 -49.9
Counterfactual annual growth in 
Supply: 2005 to 2015 
Counterfactual annual growth in 
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis: ∆ PV electricity subsidy  following:
(i) ∆ counterfactual supply growth (2005 - 2015) 
(ii) ∆ Actual growth in Supply (2011 - 2015)
(ii) ∆ discount rate 
PV US$ m, 3% d/rate & 2005 prices -279.8 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9.00% -899.4 -79.8 850.7
From 2011 to 2015 11.00% -1,095.9 -279.8 646.5
13.00% -1,299.7 -487.1 435.3
PV US$ m, 5% d/rate & 2005 prices -233.9 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9.00% -775.4 -67.9 733.1
From 2011 to 2015 11.00% -938.4 -233.9 563.7
13.00% -1,107.5 -405.8 388.4
PV US$ m, 7% d/rate & 2005 prices -19605.8% 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9.00% -671.7 -57.7 635.7
From 2011 to 2015 11.00% -807.6 -196.1 494.4
13.00% -948.3 -339.2 348.5
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: ∆ PV Labour benefit following:
(i) ∆ counterfactual supply growth (2005 - 2015) 
(ii) ∆ Actual growth in Supply (2011 - 2015)
(ii) ∆ discount rate 
PV US$ m, 3% d/rate & 2005 prices 72.2 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9.00% 75.5 66.0 55.4
From 2011 to 2015 11.00% 81.8 72.2 61.6
13.00% 88.3 78.7 68.2
PV US$ m, 5% d/rate & 2005 prices 62.7 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9.00% 65.8 57.5 48.3
From 2011 to 2015 11.00% 71.1 62.7 53.6
13.00% 76.6 68.3 59.1
PV US$ m, 7% d/rate & 2005 prices 5474.5% 5% 7% 9%
Assumed growth in Actual Supply: 9.00% 57.5 50.3 42.3
From 2011 to 2015 11.00% 62.0 54.7 46.7
13.00% 66.7 59.4 51.4
Counterfactual annual growth in 
Supply: 2005 to 2015 
Counterfactual annual growth in 










Table 6:Senestivity analysis: ∆ PV procurement costs  following:
(i) ∆ in gas costs
(ii) ∆ counterfactual procurement efficiency
PV US$ m, 3% d/rate & 2005 prices 258.7 1.5/0.00 3/0.02 5/0.02 7/0.02
Counterfactual annual % 0.0% 155.5 191.8 485.4 778.9
reduction in MIS purchase costs 0.5% 65.8 42.8 258.7 474.7
1.0% -21.4 -102.2 38.3 178.7
PV US$ m, 5% d/rate & 2005 prices 221.6 1.5/0.00 3/0.02 5/0.02 7/0.02
Counterfactual annual % 0.0% 134.8 164.9 417.9 671.0
reduction in MIS purchase costs 0.5% 57.2 35.8 221.6 407.4
1.0% -18.4 -89.8 30.6 151.0
PV US$ m, 7% d/rate & 2005 prices 190.7 1.5/0.00 3/0.02 5/0.02 7/0.02
Counterfactual annual % 0.0% 117.5 142.4 361.5 580.5
reduction in MIS purchase costs 0.5% 49.9 30.1 190.7 351.3
1.0% -15.9 -79.2 24.4 128.1
Table 7:Senestivity analysis: ∆ PV electricity subsidy  following:
(i) ∆ in gas costs
(ii) ∆ counterfactual procurement efficiency
PV US$ m, 3% d/rate & 2005 prices -279.8 1.5/0.0 3/0.02 5/0.02 7/0.02
Counterfactual annual % 0.0% 150.4 -57.6 -97.3 -137.0
reduction in MIS purchase costs 0.5% 78.2 -177.6 -279.8 -382.1
1.0% 7.9 -294.5 -457.6 -620.7
PV US$ m, 5% d/rate & 2005 prices -233.9 1.5/0.0 3/0.02 5/0.02 7/0.02
Counterfactual annual % 0.0% 130.8 -45.7 -78.4 -111.2
reduction in MIS purchase costs 0.5% 69.2 -147.9 -233.9 -320.0
1.0% 9.3 -247.5 -385.4 -523.3
PV US$ m, 7% d/rate & 2005 prices -196.1 1.5/0.0 3/0.02 5/0.02 7/0.02
Counterfactual annual % 0.0% 114.4 -35.9 -62.9 -89.9
reduction in MIS purchase costs 0.5% 61.7 -123.5 -196.1 -268.6
1.0% 10.4 -208.8 -325.8 -442.8
Gas cost US$ mmBtu/annual escalation from 2005 
Gas cost US$ mmBtu/annual escalation from 2005 
  

























                                                                                                             




                       Subject: Doctoral Research in Electricity Regulation. 
 
We are carrying out research in the University of Hull, United Kingdom concerning 
‘electricity sector regulation’ in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The 
research will examine the possible introduction of a common set of regulatory 
principles to govern the regulation of member State electricity markets and their 
interconnections.  
 
We are seeking information on the electricity sector arrangements in your country to 
assist this research.  The first section of this questionnaire is a synopsis of the research 
objectives.  The second section is the questionnaire, and is divided into four sub-
sections, namely: 
 Market structure and ownership, 
 Regulation, 
 Future policy, and 
 Other comments. 
 
We value your contribution and assistance in this research and would highly 
appreciate if you could have the completed questionnaire returned to us by 15
th
 March 
2006. The completed questionnaire should be forwarded to the corresponding 
researcher (details given below). 
 
We thank you in advance for your kind cooperation and assistance in providing 




Ali Masoud Al-Sunaidy 
Researcher, Department of Economics, University of Hull, UK  





Topic: Reforming the Electricity Service Utility in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council Countries (GCC):  
Prospects for regulatory reform  
 
The current research will propose a GCC-wide institutional and regulatory 
reform for the regulation of electricity markets.   
 
Experience suggests that effective regulation requires the regulatory framework to 
clearly define the role and status of the regulatory body.  Of particular importance 
is the extent to which the regulator can operate autonomously and free from 
external intervention. Enabling legislation that establishes a regulator should 
clarify to investors, customers and the Government the scope of the regulator’s 
powers, the mechanism of appeal against regulatory decisions, and the basis on 
which the regulator’s board of management is appointed.   
 
Some GCC member States have established, or are in the process of establishing 
independent regulatory bodies (with no Government representation) to regulate 
their electricity markets.  Other members States are considering the introduction 
of a regulatory function where none presently exits.  
 
Our research will consider the prospect of implementing a common set of 
regulatory principles that, if adopted by member State regulators, would provide a 
basis for further (economic and electricity market) integration and enhance the 
credibility of electricity regulation in the GCC.  
 
The objective of the research is to promote further academic research in this area 




The research will address the following questions: 
1. Are all GCC member States prepared to introduce the reforms necessary to 
implement common principles for the regulation of electricity markets and 
their interconnections? 
2. What degree of organizational and legal reform would be required of member 
States to implement common principles for the regulation of electricity 
markets? 
3. What are the prospects for effective GCC cooperation for the implementation 
of a unified approach to electricity regulation? 
Appendix 5 GCC Questionnaire 
 
Definitions for activities referred in questionnaire: 
Generation: power production Distribution: Low voltage grid (lower than 
132KV) Transmission: High voltage grid (132KV or 
higher) including co-ordination, system 
operation, grid control & dispatch 





You are kindly requested to provide the following information: 
 
A. Market Structure & Ownership 
 
Please provide details of the current structure of the electricity market in your country, 
identifying the extent of horizontal/vertical integration or separation of generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply by completing the questions below. 
 
Please feel free to provide in section D (Other comments), a summary of the present 
market structure, ownership arrangements and degree of private sector participation, 
and any additional information relevant to the research. 
 
A Functional separation    
A-1 Is Generation separate from 
Transmission? 
Yes No In some cases 
A-2 Is Transmission separate from 
Distribution? 
Yes No In some cases 
A-3 Is Distribution separate from Supply? Yes No In some cases 
A-5 Is Generation separate from 
Distribution? 
Yes No In some cases 
A-6 Is Generation separate from Supply Yes No In some cases 
A-7 Is Transmission separate from Supply? Yes No In some cases 
A-8 Is the function of generation capacity 
and output procurement separate from 
System operation? 
Yes No In some cases 
      
 Corporatisation   
A-9 Is electricity Generation undertaken 
by? 
 Ministry  Corporate entity (including 
state owned) 
A-10 Is electricity Transmission undertaken 
by?  
 Ministry  Corporate entity (including 
state owned) 
A-11 Is electricity Distribution undertaken 
by?  
 Ministry  Corporate entity (including 
state owned) 
A-12 Is electricity Supply undertaken by?   Ministry  Corporate entity (including 
state owned) 
A-13 Is generation capacity and output 
procurement undertaken by? 
 Ministry  Corporate entity (including 
state owned) 
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 Ownership     
A-14 Is Generation wholly owned by 
government?  
Yes No If no, what % of 
capacity is private 
owned? 
     % 
A-15 Is Transmission wholly owned by 
government?  
Yes No If no, what % of line is 
private owned? 
     % 
A-16 Is Distribution wholly owned by 
government?  
Yes No If no, what % of line is 
private owned? 
     % 
A-17 Is Supply wholly owned by government?  Yes No If no, what % of supply 
is private owned? 
     % 
A-18 Is the entity responsible for planning of 
generation capacity and output 
procurement wholly owned by 
government? 
Yes No If no, what % of this 
entity is private owned? 
     % 
      
 International Interconnections     
A-19 Are there Interconnections between your 
country and neighbouring countries? 
Yes No 
If yes, how many 
interconnections? 
      
A-20 How many MWh were exported from 
your country across an international 
interconnection in 2004 
      MWh   
A-21 How many MWh were imported  to your 
country across an international 
interconnection in 2004 
       
MWh 
  




A-23 Are there any restrictions on the use of 
international interconnections (e.g. limits 
to the amount of energy exchanges, 
restrictions on who can participate in 
cross border transactions etc?) 
Yes No 
  
      
 If you answered yes to A-23 please clarify:  
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B.  Regulation 
 
Please provide details of the current arrangements governing the regulation of the electricity 
market in your country, by completing the questionnaire below. 
 
Please provide copies of legislation and statutory instruments establishing the regulatory 
framework. 
 
Please feel free to provide any additional information you think would be relevant to the 
research in section D (Other comments). 
 
 1:  Basis of Regulation    
B-1 Who is responsible for electricity regulation:   Ministry  Independent 
Regulator 
 Other 
 If other, please explain:  
 
      
      
 2:  Regulatory Authority     
B-2 Was the Regulator established by 
legislation? 
Yes No If yes, law 
number: 
      
B-3 Does legislation specify regulator's 
responsibilities in detail? 
Yes No   
B-4 Scope of regulator's responsibilities:  Electricity only  Electricity & other 
responsibilities 
B-5 What kind of governing body does 
the regulator have? 





 If other, please explain:  
       
      
B-6 
Are Ministers or government officials directly 
involved in the management of the regulator? 
 Yes  No   
B-7 Can regulatory decisions be appealed?  Yes  No 
If yes, to 
whom 
      
B-8 
Does the regulator have enforcement powers 
(for example cancellation of license, levying 
fines, etc)? 
 Yes  No   
B-9 Who appoints regulator/ Board of Members?       
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Is the regulator/ Board Members appointed for 
a fixed tenure? 
 Yes  No 
If yes, for 
how long: 
      
B-11 
Do clear rules exist on the circumstances in 
which regulator/Members can be dismissed? 
 Yes  No   
      






 If other, please specify:  








C.  Future Policy 
 
Please provide details of the direction of future policy by completing the questionnaire below. 
 
Please provide, in section D (Other comments), any additional information you think would 
be relevant to the research. 
 
We are particularly interested in knowing if your country would implement an independent 
regulator in the future and if so, would the new regulatory framework be established by law?  
 
C-1 
Are you expecting changes to the structure and 
regulation of your electricity sector? 
 Yes  No  
 If Yes, please explain:  
       
     
C-2 
Do you think your Government would allow an 
independent regulator to regulate the electricity 
sector free from government intervention?   
 Yes  No  
     
C-3 
Do you think your Government would allow 
some elements of electricity sector policy to be 
determined at a regional level by a body such as 
the GCC? 
 Yes  No  
 If No, please explain:       
 If Yes, which elements and why:       
     
C-4 
To what extent do you think your Government 
would use imported electricity to meet local 
demand requirements:  
 0% 
 Between 0% and 25% 
 Between 25% and 50% 
 Between 50% and 75% 
 More than 75% 
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D.  Other comments: 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments on market structure and ownership, 
regulation and future policy, or any areas related to these: 
 
      
 
You may use addition sheets or attach additional material that you believe is relevant to the 
research. 
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